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An overview of Reykjavik from Hallgrimskirkja church earlier this month, ahead of a referendum on whether Iceland should resume accession negotiations with the European Union.
An overview of Reykjavik from Hallgrimskirkja church earlier this month, ahead of a referendum on whether Iceland should resume accession negotiations with the European Union.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on one issue: Iceland’s EU referendum.

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The Briefing: Iceland's Referendum -- Will It Restart EU Accession Talks?

On August 29, Iceland will hold a referendum on restarting European Union accession talks with Brussels.

Iceland has been here before. It applied to join the EU in 2009 and began accession negotiations the following year, but a new government put the talks on hold in 2013. Two years later, Reykjavik told Brussels that Iceland should no longer be considered a candidate for membership, although it stopped short of formally withdrawing its application.

What happens this time could resonate well beyond Iceland. While a referendum on an island of just under 400,000 inhabitants in the North Atlantic normally wouldn’t grab too many headlines, this vote could have far-reaching consequences for the EU, its current candidate countries, and other European countries that are pondering closer relations with the bloc.

A Test Of The EU's Appeal

For Hallgrimur Oddsson, director of the think tank Evrópustraumar (European Currents), which charts EU-Icelandic relations, the vote is very much a challenge for the EU’s expansion policy.

“The enlargement over the past decade and more has been pointing eastwards,” he told RFE/RL. “In my mind, from the EU perspective, this is a sort of a test. To see if the EU is attractive enough for the wealthier northern countries that are now currently outside of the union to join.”

Among European diplomats speaking to RFE/RL, there is a sense that this poll matters as much in Brussels as in Reykjavik -- largely because of the instant feel-good factor it would give the EU, which has endured a turbulent decade marked by Brexit, sluggish economic growth in parts of the union, disputes over migration, and security concerns fueled by Russian hybrid attacks.

It would also provide a symbolic boost to a bloc whose recent enlargement debate has largely centered on less wealthy candidate countries in Eastern and Southeastern Europe.

If Iceland were to join, it would be the third richest member state on a per capita basis and a net contributor to the European Union’s budget -- something that none of the current EU candidate countries in the Western Balkans or Eastern Europe is expected to be.

It would also be easily “absorbable,” as it would not only be the smallest member state population-wise, but is already part of the passport-free Schengen zone and large parts of the EU’s internal market and rulebook by virtue of being a member of the European Economic Area (EEA), together with non-EU Liechtenstein and Norway.

The Impact On Norway And Current EU Hopefuls

The most obvious and immediate impact if Iceland votes “Yes” on August 29 could be felt in Norway, another affluent, non-EU Nordic country that is already watching the vote closely.

EU diplomats have told RFE/RL off the record that Oslo is in regular contact with Brussels about what the potential Icelandic resumption of accession talks would look like and what would be left of the EEA if Iceland were to join.

Norway has rejected membership of the EU (or its predecessors) twice, once in 1972 and again in 1994. A majority of Norwegians is still against joining according to recent polls, but an Icelandic “Yes” could fuel calls for Norway to hold a vote on at least opening accession talks.

EU officials also believe that Iceland moving closer to the union could trigger renewed discussion in both Greenland and Scotland about their relations with Brussels.

Greenland, which is a Danish territory, was part of the EU forerunner, the European Economic Community, until it unilaterally withdrew in 1985, but leading politicians there have recently been keen to explore deeper ties with the EU.

And Scotland was, of course, part of the EU when the United Kingdom was a member and voted overwhelmingly in favor of remaining in the bloc in the 2016 Brexit referendum.

Any potential future talks with these two countries, however, would have to involve Copenhagen and London, respectively -- something that is likely to be politically sensitive as it could involve questions of greater autonomy or independence. But don’t rule either out if Iceland edges closer to EU membership.

There is also great hope in Brussels that renewed Icelandic accession talks will give fresh impetus to the current EU candidate countries -- notably front-runners like Albania and Montenegro in the Western Balkans, but also Moldova and Ukraine.

One reason is simply that it would demonstrate that enlargement remains possible, given that no country has joined since Croatia back in 2013. But more importantly, because some of these countries could be “paired” with Iceland in an eventual EU accession -- potentially not only speeding up the process but also making it more attractive to current EU member states, which must approve any new additions and are very keen to get Iceland in.

The most obvious candidate for “pairing” is Montenegro, which has advanced the furthest out of the current crop of candidates, with 18 out of 33 policy chapters closed.

Iceland had closed 11 chapters before it suspended talks with the bloc, so it is not inconceivable to see Reykjavik and Podgorica go hand in hand toward EU membership near the end of this decade, if all goes smoothly.

But Will Icelanders Vote Yes?

In politics, however, things rarely go as planned and Iceland could serve up a potential embarrassment for Brussels if it nixes the opportunity to relaunch the accession process in the upcoming referendum.

As Steven Blockmans, the deputy director of the International Center for Defense and Security (ICDS) put it to RFE/RL: “It will impact the international stature of the European Union. Take some more of its shine away for other candidate countries. So, the enlargement processes as a whole and its image will suffer. It will be a blow.”

And that blow could come later this week.

In most polls, the “Yes” side is ahead, but only by single digits and there are still a substantial number of respondents who have stated that they are unsure how they will cast their ballots.

Most are expecting a Saturday night nail-biter, including Vilborg Asa Gudjonsdottir, a researcher at the University of Iceland.

“It's impossible to predict, because this is super close,” she said. “And even those that were undecided a month ago and have decided what they're going to vote for today, these votes are splitting almost equally for the “Yes” and for the “No” side. So, I won't be making any predictions here.”

That split is also apparent in the Icelandic political landscape where the coalition government has two parties that are in favor of restarting the talks -- the center-left Social Democratic Alliance and the centrist Liberal Reform Party. On the other hand, the junior coalition partner -- the People’s Party -- and the entire opposition is against this.

If there is a “Yes” vote on August 29, Icelanders would still have to approve any final negotiated accession treaty with the EU in a second referendum.

EU membership is also expected to require constitutional changes to allow for the transfer of sovereign powers. Under Iceland's current rules, a constitutional amendment must be approved by parliament, followed by a general election, and then approved unchanged by the newly elected parliament. The next regular election is due no later than 2028, although passage of a constitutional amendment would itself trigger an election.

Euro Dreams And Transatlantic Tensions

When Reykjavik initially sought to join the bloc back in 2009, the island’s banking sector had been severely hit by the global financial crisis and membership not only of the EU, but especially the eurozone, was seen as a potential lifesaver.

That was just before the eurozone itself was engulfed in the same financial meltdown and quickly became less attractive to Iceland.

In many ways the economic argument is also very much front and center this time, too.

As Oddsson points out, Iceland has “high inflation and price stability has always been an issue.”

“We have a small free-floating currency,” he said, referring to the Icelandic krona. “And the question is, can we get that price stability and lower rates with the euro?”

Geopolitical issues, however, are also at the back of some voters and politicians’ minds, notably with transatlantic trade tensions and political spats as well as increased Russian submarine activity in the far north.

“Arctic security has become a hot button issue,” Blockmans said. “Of course, the saber rattling over Greenland and the fact that [US President Donald] Trump confused Iceland for Greenland a couple of times, has not helped. That has put nerves on edge, and it's been seized upon by this pro-European coalition”

The United States has not made any explicit claims regarding Iceland, however, with Washington honoring a 1951 defense agreement with Reykjavik that protects the island, which is the only NATO member without a standing army.

The Problem With Fish

Despite the will to get closer to the EU, there are notably two areas in which the North Atlantic nation is far from integrated with the union: the Brussels Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and its Common Agriculture Policy (CAP).

Gudjonsdottir points out that farmers, a small but politically very influential interest group, are very much in favor of a “No” vote.

“Farmers are worried that joining the EU would mean a loss for them,” she says. “For example, we have protective tariffs on agricultural products and those would have to go if we joined the EU. What would that mean for their livelihoods and for their ability to continue to farm?”

But fishing will be the big sticking point in any future EU-Iceland negotiations.

The country has a long and proud history as a fishing nation and that has a big impact on politics today.

While its economy has diversified in recent years, fishing still accounts for around 10 percent of the country’s GDP, and the industry is still considered a proper power broker in the country.

Both people and politicians on the island are well aware of the 1975-1976 “Cod War,” when Iceland expanded its exclusive fishery zone from 50 nautical miles (80 kilometers) off its coast to 200 miles (322 kilometers).

This happened much to the chagrin of Britain, but London eventually backed down after Icelandic coast guards started cutting the nets of British fishing boats and 200 miles eventually became the UN-codified norm for exclusive fishing zones.

The EU also follows this zonal arrangement but with the caveat that fishing boats from one EU member state can fish in the waters of another EU member state, such as Irish boats operating in French waters and vice versa.

Reykjavik, however, isn’t keen to allow other European fleets have greater access to Iceland’s rich and well-managed fishing waters.

So, how do you square this circle?

Iceland ideally wants an opt out from the CFP, but other EU fishing nations, such as France, Portugal, and Spain, likely won’t accept such an exemption.

Another idea would be to allow non-Icelandic fishermen to fish for some species in Icelandic waters, such as mackerel, but not the more lucrative cod or haddock.

The EU may also toy with the idea of simply giving Iceland a transition period for a defined time, meaning that the country will be gradually integrated into the CFP over many years.

This thinking is similar to what might be in store for Ukraine and its massive agriculture sector should it become an EU member.

Either way, the negotiations will be tough and could potentially drag on.

And if Iceland feels it hasn’t got the best deal on fish and agriculture, the people will likely reject any deal -- that is if this process even starts after the August 29 vote.

That's all for this week!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or via e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

Some 90 people died in the chaotic conditions following the influx of migrants into Ceuta.
Some 90 people died in the chaotic conditions following the influx of migrants into Ceuta.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on the Ceuta crisis and whether or not Russia had a role.

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The Briefing: What Was Russia’s Role In The Ceuta Migrant Crisis?

The images of thousands of migrants reaching the Spanish exclave of Ceuta in North Africa in late July jolted the European Union, already dozing on its month-long summer break, into action.

The bloc’s EU ambassadors were called back from their vacations for an online meeting on August 3 to prepare for another online meeting of the club’s 27 interior ministers the following day. By then, the crisis had already been largely averted, as Spain, initially heavily criticized by other member states, had called in reinforcements and said it had already turned back nearly 70,000 out of the 72,000 people that made it into Ceuta. Nearly 90 people died in the chaotic conditions that overwhelmed the Spanish coastguard.

None of the migrants are thought to have made it into mainland Europe. While Ceuta, together with its sister exclave Melilla, are officially part of the EU’s passport free Schengen zone, the pair are under special rules that stipulates that identity checks must be carried out when departing there to destinations in continental Europe, making it nearly impossible to make it onto the ferries crossing the Strait of Gibraltar.

The Smuggling Network

So what or who was behind the huge influx of migrants? In their joint statement issued after their early August meeting, the bloc's interior ministers laid the blame on “migrant smuggling networks” and also hinted that the EU needs to improve “shared situational awareness, which could be achieved by further developing early-warning systems such as pre-frontier intelligence and social media monitoring.” Before the migrants began arriving in Ceuta, rumors spread online that Spain would welcome people with open arms.

Looking for a cause, some European politicians highlighted both a decision by Madrid to regularize migrants and a recent Spanish Supreme Court ruling. The former, the legal status scheme, however, largely catered to Spain's Latin American labor migrants and applied to people who could show proof of residency for five consecutive months before the start of this year.

And the second suggested cause of the influx was a highly technical court ruling from early July that stipulated that Madrid’s immediate-return procedure of migrants did not apply to people intercepted while attempting to swim from the territory of Morocco to Ceuta and Melilla. According to the ruling, it only applied if the migrants breached a physical barrier, meaning that those attempting to swim would go through a much a slower legal process instead of being sent back immediately. The court ruling, however, barely made news in Spain when it was issued on July 8.

The Moroccan Hand?

So what then was the pull factor? While smuggling networks so far seems to be the preferred official answer in Brussels, some European officials have wondered, at least privately, about Morocco’s role in the process. (They are also quick to point out that Spain openly and repeatedly says both in public and behind closed doors that Rabat has nothing to do with it and that the country has been very helpful when it comes to returning the migrants.)

The relationship between Morocco and Spain is a delicate one. In 2021, Morocco allowed 8,000 migrants to reach the two Spanish exclaves after Madrid allowed the leader of a Western Sahara independence movement to receive medical treatment in the country. Western Sahara belonged to Spain up until 1975, but Morocco claims the territory and de facto controls most of it. While Madrid previously held the position that a UN-sponsored referendum should settle the status, the country U-turned after the 2021 migrant crisis by stating that Western Sahara should be an autonomous territory under Rabat’s control.

Some observers have said that Morocco took exception to Spain’s move earlier in July to improve political relations with Algeria -- one of Rabat’s big regional rivals that is pushing for West Saharan independence.

With Spain -- and by extension, the EU -- reluctant to point fingers at Morocco, the interior ministers' joint statement ended on an intriguing note: “communication during moments of crisis could further be reinforced through timely coordination and should be more coherent, especially to counter malicious external actors engaged in foreign information manipulation and interference.”

The Belarus Scenario

But who might those "malicious external actors" be? One obvious choice in Brussels is Russia, which has a history of encouraging migrants onto the EU’s border. The Ceuta crisis did have some similarities with the attempt by Belarus and Russia, mainly in 2021-2022, to push thousands of people, mostly from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, to Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. (This attempted influx continues to this day, with Latvia recently forced to temporarily close its border to Belarus after a spike in attempted border crossings.)

Back then, Brussels was quick to point the finger at Aleksandr Lukashenka’s regime and the Kremlin’s backing for it both logistically and via foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI). Sanctions frameworks were extended to include acts of “instrumentalization of migrants” and visa bans and asset freezes were imposed on officials that facilitated migrants' routes to EU borders, tour operators and hotels that had been used on the journey, and even Belavia, Belarus’s national air carrier, for transporting the people to Belarus in the first place.

This Ceuta situation appears different, however. EU officials familiar with both the Ceuta and Belarus incidents have told RFE/RL that the latter was a complex hybrid operation instigated by Moscow and Minsk, which was long-term and clearly political.

What happened in Ceuta, according to EU officials, appears more sudden and spontaneous. And while EU officials say that they see no evidence that Russia instigated the influx, Moscow has been exploiting it online, targeting separate audiences in Europe, Africa, and Latin America.

EU diplomats that track Russian FIMI have told RFE/RL that Moscow's “digital fingerprint” was clearly all over the Ceuta incident. They described a so-called “portal combat” operation in which various Russian Pravda websites in different languages and with linked Telegram accounts amplified alarmist stories about the migrant influx.

The Russian media narrative hit on familiar, well-worn themes: notably that the West was failing, partly due to hapless European elites; migrants were invaders and occupiers; and the United States and Israel were behind the incident in order to punish Spain’s left-wing government for its support for Palestine. These narratives are also routinely pushed by various European far-right populists, some of which have direct political links to the Kremlin.

Limited Success...Except For Division In The EU

While the EU diplomats RFE/RL spoke to said Russia's attempt at manipulation was considerable, they also questioned how much impact it had actually had. In fact, the main consequence might have been causing more EU division, as many member states appeared to gang up on Spain.

Italy, whose right-wing government has made fighting non-European immigration a central priority, quickly and temporarily suspended sea and air links with Spain and was an instigator of a letter -- signed by 21 other EU member states (though crucially not Spain’s immediate neighbors France and Portugal) -- that took a rather tough stance on Spain.

By the time the interior ministers met and Madrid had the situation under control, the bloc closed ranks, praising Spain, and officials from previously critical countries privately admitting that their initial responses had been too hysterical and focused on domestic audiences.

And despite Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha publicly calling out the Kremlin, it seems that EU diplomats don't want to give Russia too much credit. “The Kremlin is keen to get publicity for their various stunts, which can inflate the significance of Russian FIMI,” one EU diplomat told RFE/RL.

That's all for this week! I am off next week so the next edition of the newsletter comes on August 25

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

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