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Ukrainians protest against a draft law that would limit the independence of the country's anti-graft agency in Kyiv on July 24.
Ukrainians protest against a draft law that would limit the independence of the country's anti-graft agency in Kyiv on July 24.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two major issues: Ukraine’s wobbly week and Iceland’s flirting with EU membership.

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Briefing #1: Questions Persist Despite Zelenskyy U-Turn

What You Need To Know: The European Union has breathed a collective sigh of relief after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s swift U-turn this week over legislation that would have limited the independence of two key anti-corruption agencies. But questions and speculation remain about what triggered it, what it says about Kyiv’s ruling class and how it will affect the war-torn country’s chances of joining the bloc. On July 22, Zelenskyy signed a bill approved by parliament that placed the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) under the auspices of the Prosecutor General, a position appointed by the president. Within hours Ukrainians, despite Russian air strikes earlier in the day, took to the streets to protest the move, which critics said undermined the independence of the institutions in a country long known for deep-seated corruption.

The response from Brussels was also immediate. Both European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and the president of the European Council, Antonio Costa, called Zelenskyy, demanding an explanation and expressing “strong concerns.” European enlargement commissioner Marta Kos said in a post on X that “independent bodies like NABU and SAPO are essential for Ukraine’s EU path.” Within two days Zelenskyy had done an about-face, putting forward new legislation that would reverse course and ensure independence for NABU and SAPO.

Deep Background: But the damage was already done. Speaking on condition of anonymity, one diplomat said Zelenskyy had “managed to shoot himself in the foot for no apparent reason,” as it gave ample ammunition to the many in the 27-nation bloc who claim that Kyiv is hopelessly corrupt. Another noted that it seemed that Ukraine had suddenly been transported back to the era of former President Viktor Yanukovych, who constantly battled to control the judiciary. Yanukovych was ousted from power in 2014 during the Maidan protests, sparked by his decision not to sign a political association and free trade deal with the EU, instead choosing closer ties with Moscow. Grumblings over this week's legislative rollercoaster were also directed against Zelenskyy’s head of office, Andriy Yermak, a powerful but deeply polarizing figure in European circles. Sources said questions persist about whether this was the “real face” of Zelenskyy and his entourage, given that many officials have long held fears about what they call his “tendencies to want to centralize power.” Zelenskyy admitted that demonstrations in the country, the first such show of defiance against the government since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, made him change his mind. EU officials saw the change as positive -- signaling a healthy and empowered civil society that also highlighted Zelenskyy’s democratic credentials -- in contrast to the considerable backsliding, for example, that has been seen recently in Georgia.

Drilling Down

  • It appears as though pressure from Brussels may have also helped Zelenskyy's decision. Everything was on the table, admits one official, and the bloc made that known.
  • That would mean freezing some of the billions of euros in funds that the EU provides to Ukraine on a regular basis. A lot of this cash is conditioned on reform efforts, notably when it comes to the judiciary.
  • One of the benchmarks for Ukraine to get visa liberalization to the bloc, back in 2017, was the setting up of NABU. While no one was openly suggesting the suspension of visa liberalization, as is currently being mooted with Tbilisi, the threat of looking into it was enough to rattle Kyiv.
  • Then there was the delicate issue of de-coupling Ukraine from Moldova, allowing the latter to proceed alone in the EU accession process. That would be a heavy blow to Ukraine, given the pair have so far moved closer to membership hand in hand.
  • The discussion about this started in Brussels in the spring, with Hungary reluctant to give Kyiv the green light to start accession talks.
  • The idea was very much alive before the latest developments in Ukraine, and EU officials have indicated to RFE/RL that it may come up again in early September with a view to giving Moldova’s ruling pro-EU government a boost before its crucial parliamentary election later that same month.
  • The fact that Hungary appears to be unlikely to change its position on the issue ahead of its own national elections in April next year has made the issue even more pressing. Many EU member states believe that this decoupling would be unfair as it essentially would give in to Budapest’s “blackmail.”
  • Yet some diplomats admitted that the latest events had weakened their argument, regardless of the subsequent Ukrainian backtracking.
  • Highlighting the diverging paths, the same day Ukraine's parliament approved the controversial law, Greek police arrested the Moldovan oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc, arguably the country’s most wanted man.
  • A former politician and one of Moldova's richest people, Plahotniuc is allegedly the mastermind behind the theft of $1 billion from Chisinau a decade ago -- a charge he denies. At this moment, Moldova’s and Ukraine’s efforts to fight corruption couldn’t have contrasted more in the eyes of some in Brussels.
  • Interestingly, there is a feeling in Brussels that the Ukrainian frustration with the Hungarian veto and the bloc’s inability to deal with it could have driven Zelenskyy to care less about EU “hobby horses” such as corruption.
  • Rumors are swirling that several of the bloc’s leaders told him at a recent conference in Rome that he should be ready to accept that Moldova might move ahead of Ukraine.
  • That, coupled with less focus on the issue from the new American administration, gave him an opportunity to deal with long-standing nuisances such as pesky anti-corruption officials, diplomatic sources said. He may have overplayed or revealed his hand. Either way, the EU has taken note.


Briefing #2: Is Iceland The Next Country To Join The EU?

What You Need To Know: When predicting which country would be the next to join the European Union, the smart money seems to be on Montenegro given that it has been negotiating for years and has advanced the furthest of all candidates. Others point to Albania, which is currently making great strides toward Brussels as the next member. There are also some who think that Moldova -- a reform-oriented and ambitious country in the bloc’s eastern neighborhood -- stands a decent chance of becoming the EU's 28th member state in the coming year. But the right answer may actually be Iceland.

The Trump administration's overtures to annex the Danish territory of Greenland and the prospect of a trade war between its security provider, the United States, and its biggest trading partner, the European Union, have created unease on the North Atlantic island. The current Icelandic government, which came to power last year, has announced that a referendum on resuming accession talks with Brussels will be held before 2027. Polls suggest a majority would support restarting talks.

Deep Background: The country has been here before. It was badly hit by the 2008 global financial crisis, when three of its major banks collapsed. EU membership -- and especially joining the eurozone -- was seen as a way out of the crisis, and negotiations with the bloc began in 2010. Talks were suspended three years later by a newly elected right-wing government. By then, the eurozone was itself engulfed in the same financial crisis, so joining the club and adopting its ailing common currency was no longer seen as a panacea. In those three years of accession talks, Reykjavik opened most of the 33 accession chapters and closed 11. By comparison, the current EU accession frontrunner, Montenegro, has managed to close a mere seven chapters in more than a decade of talks.

It’s not for nothing that EU officials believe that Iceland could wrap up the entire process in a couple of years if it was to resume its application -- which, according to the European Commission, remains valid. It helps, of course, that the country is part of the European Economic Area (EEA), which means that it -- together with other EEA members Norway and Liechtenstein -- is already applying the EU’s internal market rules. When European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen visited the island last week, she was quick to point out that the issue of future EU membership is “a sovereign decision that the people take here. So, it’s not a topic for me to comment on.” But, she added, “Iceland is familiar and integrated into the single market, we share values, we know each other very well, we are like-minded -- all this is an asset.” Speaking on condition of anonymity, a European diplomat familiar with the topic was even more forthright. “It would be good if a Western European country would join the EU, especially after Brexit,” they said. “It would show that the club truly is attractive.” Integration would prove seamless, given that Iceland is richer than the EU average and -- with a population of 300,000 -- would be the smallest member state if it joined.

Drilling Down

  • While Brussels officially is trying to stay out of the Icelandic debate on membership, it is quietly doing everything to edge it closer.
  • During her visit, von der Leyen promised a trade review to potentially upgrade the EEA agreement. She also struck a deal to protect critical infrastructure that is essential for Iceland, such as subsea cables, and started negotiations on a new security and defense partnership agreement, which would allow closer cooperation on cyber and hybrid threats.
  • The partnership, expected to be ready by year’s end, is especially important for Iceland, which is acutely aware of the need for security cooperation, particularly as both Russia and China are becoming more active in the Arctic region.
  • The United States has also rattled the country recently with talk of taking over Greenland, sparking debate there about rejoining the European Union after leaving the European Communities -- a precursor of today’s EU -- back in 1985.
  • While Washington hasn’t made similar claims on Iceland, there is a certain nervousness, as the US provides for the country’s defense on behalf of NATO via a bilateral agreement signed in 1951.
  • To this day, Iceland is the only NATO member without its own army and there are no imminent plans to create one. In 2006, the United States announced it would continue to provide for the island’s defense but without forces being permanently stationed there. That policy still stands, and the former US air base in Keflavik remains a hub for NATO exercises.
  • But it is the transatlantic trade tension that is really making Iceland twitchy. Reykjavik wants Brussels to consult them on the EU-US trade talks, but that is not something that EU officials can promise without full membership.
  • And it is trade in general that could spark conflict during eventual membership negotiations, especially on agriculture and fisheries, which are key industries on the island.
  • Those two items are excluded from the EEA for good reason. There is a fear that the EU’s common agriculture policy would kill farming on the island by flooding it with cheap food products from other EU member states.
  • Fishing is even more delicate. Reykjavik claims proudly that its management of fishing stocks is superior to Brussels. And it would be very reluctant to give up its exclusive rights to fishing within its 200-mile economic zone to Danish, Dutch, Irish, Spanish, or French fleets.
  • Then there is commercial whaling, which is still permitted in Icelandic waters despite the EU’s push for a global moratorium.
  • The fact remains that most political parties in the Icelandic parliament are against EU membership.
  • And while polls show that the population is keen to restart talks with Brussels, they are less sure that they actually want to become members. In Brussels, officials remain hopeful but see obstacles for a small yet fiercely independent nation to voluntarily give up its sovereignty. “It’s a long shot on their side, not ours,” one said.


Looking Ahead

The Helsinki Final Act celebrates 50 years, and the anniversary is marked by a whole day of high-level speeches and panels in the Finnish capital on July 31. The agreement, signed by 35 nations including the Soviet Union and the United States back in 1975, was a high watermark of Cold War détente and paved the way for today’s Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

That's all for this week!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen (left) and European Council President Antonio Costa will be heading to Asia this week. (file photo)
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen (left) and European Council President Antonio Costa will be heading to Asia this week. (file photo)

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two major issues: the chances of the EU suspending visa liberalization for Georgia and the next EU budget.

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Briefing #1: Will The EU Really Suspend Visa Liberalization For Georgia?

What You Need To Know: European Union foreign ministers failed to take any meaningful decision on Georgia at their July 15 meeting in Brussels.

However, the European Commission did send a letter to Tbilisi warning that Georgians' visa-free travel privileges could be suspended if a number of conditions aren’t met by the end of August.

The question now is how serious this deadline really is, whether the Georgian government will budge, and ultimately whether Brussels can actually muster the will to act if Tbilisi doesn’t change course.

One thing was clear from the start.

Sanctions, even the latest proposal of slapping asset freezes and visa bans on two Georgian judges, were off the table.

Both Hungary and Slovakia had made it clear in preparatory meetings that they would not approve.

According to EU diplomats familiar with the discussions, the issue was briefly touched upon, but since unanimity is needed and clearly wasn’t attainable, it was agreed that sanctions work will continue at lower levels in Brussels.

This is a clear indication that restrictive measures of this sort won’t happen anytime soon.

And with the same ministers at the same meeting failing to adopt sanctions on Israeli West Bank settlers and Russian officials, it is increasingly obvious that the EU consensus rule is once again preventing the bloc from taking concrete foreign policy decisions.

Deep Background: Surprisingly, there was also no push to start a review of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement, which could lead to the suspension of certain provisions -- particularly those related to trade.

The question is how much of an effect this would have, as EU imports from Georgia under the agreement's free trade component are only worth around 200 million euros ($233 million).

Some EU member states did bring it up, and there is a real possibility that the ministers will return to it when they formally meet again in October.

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas concluded that the option of triggering a review is very much on the table, especially since this move doesn’t require unanimity.

That leaves the suspension of visa liberalization as the remaining option to put pressure on Tbilisi -- a move that would require a qualified majority to trigger.

While RFE/RL understands that such a majority is emerging, it’s not universally popular among member states and it was made clear that it should be used as a very last resort.

Around eight member states, led by Italy, argued against it, saying it would hit the Georgian population at large and therefore would be disproportionate.

Kallas urged countries to be ready to react in case Tbilisi hasn’t complied with eight visa-free regime benchmarks that the European Commission put forward in a report back in December 2024.

These benchmarks include repealing the controversial "transparency of foreign influence" law and the equally contested legislative package on "family values and protection of minors."

Brussels also wants Georgia to align its visa policy with the EU list of visa-required third countries.

Drilling Down

  • Now the question is whether the EU will really do something and what the deadline really is. The European Commission did send a letter to Georgia on July 15 noting that “in case of persisting non-compliance the Commission could take appropriate measures on the basis of Article 8 of the revised Visa Regulation, specifically activating the visa suspension mechanism.”
  • Various Georgian media outlets circulated an early version of the letter, which didn’t include a specific deadline. It simply asked Georgian authorities "to update the Commission on the implementation of these recommendations and, if not already done, to take appropriate measures to address the issues raised in all Commission recommendations (in annex).”
  • Interestingly, this was not the final version of the letter, which was identical to the draft apart from a revision of the above-mentioned paragraph. The final version, seen by RFE/RL, stated that “we would like to ask you to update the Commission on the implementation of these recommendations by the end of August and, if not already done, to take appropriate measures to address the issues raised in all Commission recommendations (in annex).”
  • So, the end of August it is -- a date Kaja Kallas also mentioned in the press conference after the foreign affairs meeting.
  • The question is how firm that deadline really is. The Georgian parliament is in recess for all of August. While the president can recall the chamber for emergency sessions to pass crucial legislation, few in Brussels believe this will happen.
  • But the bloc is also “on holiday” for most of August. EU foreign ministers will come together for an informal meeting in Denmark on August 29-30 and again on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York in September, but their first formal meeting at which any concrete decision can be made will take place on October 20.
  • It seems member states would be more comfortable waiting for the European Commission’s next visa suspension mechanism report due later in the autumn or even the annual enlargement reports, which the Commission plans to publish later this year, assessing the progress of all EU candidate countries. As the ministerial meeting showed, Brussels tends to kick the can whenever consensus is lacking.


Briefing #2: Proposed EU Budget: What's In It For New Members?

What You Need To Know: The European Commission has put forward its vision for the next long-term (2028-2034) European Union budget -- a record-high 2-trillion-euro ($2.3 trillion) framework, with a doubling of funds for both Ukraine and EU foreign policy in general, and a fivefold increase in defense-related investment.

It is worth remembering that the July 16 proposal is just the opening shot in a battle that will consume Brussels for the next two years.

All 27 EU member states, which provide the vast majority of the cash through national contributions linked to their gross national income (GNI), must approve the proposal.

But this is not likely to happen until what is expected to be marathon, last-minute negotiations in the latter half of 2027.

So don’t count on the budget remaining at 2 trillion euros by then -- or on Ukraine, foreign policy, and enlargement policy getting as much financial support as the European Commission presented on July 16.

Most of the net contributors -- in other words, those who pay more into the common budget than they receive back -- are mainly richer northern member states such as Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden, and they aren’t keen to increase the budget at all.

Deep Background: The commission proposal is already a 600-billion-euro ($700 billion) jump compared to the 2021-2027 budget.

And with several countries grappling with low growth, ballooning deficits, and budget cuts, the idea of the EU expanding its coffers right now could be useful ammunition for Euroskeptic parties railing against Brussels across the continent.

To appease member states on this, the European Commission is proposing two things.

First, new “own resources” so that the budget isn’t so dependent on member state contributions. Some of the new ideas include a tobacco tax and levies on large corporations.

Few think this will succeed or have much impact.

So instead, the second thing that the commission proposes is to send most of the cash back to member states in the shape of support for farmers, fishermen, and poorer regions of the bloc.

This is already the biggest section of the budget at the moment -- worth a total of 865 billion euro ($1 trillion) of the 2-trillion-euro proposal.

It probably won’t shrink.

Drilling Down

  • Interestingly, there is now a proposal to allocate 131 billion euro ($152 billion) for defense, which would be a fivefold increase compared to the current level.
  • Several member states, notably Denmark and France, have indicated that the EU must become more of a military player, especially as the United States might dedicate fewer military resources to the continent in the coming years.
  • If the proposal is not watered down, this would signal real intent on the issue.
  • So, what about the foreign policy aspects of the commission’s plan?
  • It’s all grouped under the heading “A Stronger Europe In The World” and totals €200 billion ($233 billion).
  • This is a doubling of the previous budget and contains everything from humanitarian aid, various foreign missions the bloc has -- such as a monitoring mission in Armenia -- to pre-accession funds for EU candidate countries in the Western Balkans and the bloc’s eastern neighborhood.
  • The money proposed for pre-accession is around 40 billion euros ($46 billion), an increase from before, but there is still no breakdown of how much cash each country will get.
  • What is interesting, however, is that there is a revision clause in the proposal which means that the budget will be reworked if a country joins the club during the 2028-2034 period.
  • After all, members tend to get more money than candidate countries. And given that nations like Albania, Montenegro, and possibly even Moldova could join within this time frame, they stand to gain even more.
  • It is worth remembering here that Ukraine has been given a separate heading altogether.
  • While Kyiv, of course, can benefit from the 200 billion euro of accession and humanitarian cash, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has promised a dedicated 100-billion-euro ($116 billion) pot for the reconstruction of the war-torn country.
  • Between 2024 and 2027, this so-called “Ukraine facility” amounts to €50 billion ($58 billion) in loans and grants, financed through common EU borrowing, which all member states guarantee to repay.
  • The question is whether a country like Hungary, which has been skeptical about all things Ukraine in recent years, will agree to this -- especially as von der Leyen announced that rule of law conditionality applies to all the funds in the new budget. This conditionality existed to a certain degree in the previous budget and allowed Brussels to freeze billions heading to Budapest.
  • Watering down conditionality in order to get more money for Ukraine already seems like one of the many compromises that will now have to be struck for this budget to eventually go through.


Looking Ahead

The European Union is not quite on holiday yet. This week the presidents of the European Commission and European Council Ursula von der Leyen and Antonio Costa, respectively, are heading to Asia.

On July 23, they will be in Tokyo for what is expected to be a cordial EU-Japan summit.

The next day, the atmosphere might be tenser as they jet to Beijing for an EU-China summit in which they will meet with both President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Qiang.

Don’t expect big announcements for either summit.

That's all for this week!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

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About The Newsletter

The Wider Europe newsletter briefs you every Tuesday morning on key issues concerning the EU, NATO, and other institutions’ relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe’s Eastern neighborhoods.

For more than a decade as a correspondent in Brussels, Rikard Jozwiak covered all the major events and crises related to the EU’s neighborhood and how various Western institutions reacted to them -- the war in Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, Russia’s support for separatists in eastern Ukraine, the downing of MH17, dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, the EU and NATO enlargement processes in the Western Balkans, as well as visa liberalizations, free-trade deals, and countless summits.

Now out of the “Brussels bubble,” but still looking in -- this time from the heart of Europe, in Prague -- he continues to focus on the countries where Brussels holds huge sway, but also faces serious competition from other players, such as Russia and, increasingly, China.

To subscribe, click here.

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