Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am previewing two big meetings: Mark Rutte's first NATO ministerial and an EU summit that will be dominated by migration.

NOTE TO READERS: As we are celebrating the second anniversary of the Wider Europe newsletter this week, we have added a new feature: You can now listen to my briefings by clicking on the button below! We're actually using an AI version of my voice and would love to know what you think -- and, of course, what we can improve.

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(Listen) The Wider Europe Briefing: EU Leaders Grapple With Migration

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Briefing #1: Migration Issues To Dominate This Week's EU Summit

What You Need To Know: EU leaders gather in Brussels on October 17-18 for their regular fall summit -- a dress rehearsal ahead of the often more dramatic pre-Christmas summit in December when real decisions are taken on enlargement, funding, or sanctions before the holiday season kicks in.

This week's meeting is also the last one before the U.S. presidential election in November, as well as a presidential election and referendum on EU membership in Moldova on October 20 and then the Georgian parliamentary vote six days after that.

In Brussels, discussions about Ukraine will be central although few decisions are expected. The hot-button issue is expected to be the migration debate, which may have consequences for several countries hoping to one day join the bloc.

Deep Background: The draft summit conclusions, seen by RFE/RL, offer little that's new on Ukraine. Amid vague talk of some kind of "peace summit" to be held by the end of the year, potentially including participation on some level by Russia, the conclusions text simply states that "the European Council also stresses that no initiative about Ukraine can be taken without Ukraine."

The draft document indicates that no new sanctions on Russia appear to be forthcoming and instead leaders, at the end of the summit, will emphasize the need for "full and effective enforcement of sanctions and for further measures to counter their circumvention, including through third countries."

On economic aid, EU ambassadors last week agreed on another 35 billion euros ($38.2 million) in financial assistance for Kyiv for 2025, leveraged from frozen Russian central bank assets in the EU.

The EU has, however, not agreed on prolonging the sanctions on these central bank assets from the current six months rollover to the proposed 36 months extension. That extension would allow other G7 nations to provide funds as well, as they want guarantees that the Russian money, which is mainly in the EU, remains frozen for a longer period of time. Hungary is currently blocking the extension, and a decision on this issue from Brussels likely wouldn't come until after the U.S. presidential election.

On the upcoming Moldovan votes, the summit draft conclusions call out the Kremlin's attempts to influence the process, noting that "persistent attempts to use foreign information manipulation and interference to undermine democratic elections and the choice of the Moldovan people for a prosperous, stable, and peaceful European future."

While not openly taking sides, it is clear Brussels is hoping for Moldovans to vote for the EU in both the referendum and the presidential vote. Just last week, the EU slapped asset freezes and visa bans on five people, including Evghenia Gutul, the pro-Moscow governor of the Moldovan autonomous Gagauzia region. It also sanctioned Evrazia, a Russian-based NGO founded to promote Russian interests in Moldova.

In addition, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen traveled to Chisinau, the Moldovan capital, and presented a financial package for the country worth 1.8 billion euros for the next three years.

Drilling Down

• For Georgia, the mood is decidedly more somber. The text notes "serious concern regarding the course of action in Georgia, which runs contrary to the values and principles upon which the European Union is founded" and adds that recent developments in Georgia jeopardize the country's EU path and "de facto halts the accession process."
• The recent adoption of the so-called foreign agent law and anti-LGBT law have prompted the EU to cancel high-level political visits to Tbilisi and withhold some EU money going to the South Caucasus country. Brussels hasn't ruled out that more measures could be adopted in the future if Georgia further backslides on democracy.
• Perhaps the most intense discussion at this week's two-day summit is likely to center around migration. The most controversial line in the draft conclusions is about the "new ways to prevent and counter irregular migration...in line with international law." This is something of a continuation of a letter written by 15 EU member states to the European Commission back in June, which mainly focuses on the need for various migration partnerships with non-EU countries. That could mean paying countries like Tunisia and Turkey to prevent migrants from reaching the bloc in the first place or looking into schemes, such as one under way between Italy and Albania, where Rome will build reception camps in Albania to house up to 40,000 migrants a year picked up at sea.
• The idea of creating these types of "external hot spots" outside the EU in which people get their asylum claims tested before they may enter the EU is gaining ground. There is also the broader issue of returning people that have no legal right to stay in the bloc.
• Hardened attitudes on migration come weeks after Germany decided to impose checks on all its borders in the wake of an attack where a failed asylum seeker killed three people in the west of the country during the summer.
• It also comes as anti-immigration parties have finished top in Austria's parliamentary elections on September 29 and done well in recent polls in the Czech Republic and Germany. It's also worth noting that the recently formed French government is dependent on Marine Le Pen's far-right National Rally for survival and that similar political forces are heading or influencing governments in other key EU member states such as Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Essentially, there is just a diminishing number of countries, most notably Spain, that are reluctant to adopt a more restrictive EU migration policy.
• While the EU summit won't go into any detail about other countries that could play a similar role in hosting migrants as that of Albania, it's possible other EU candidate countries, for example in the Western Balkans, could be asked.
• The new European Commission, which should be up and running by the end of the year, will be tasked with looking into such solutions to the migrants issue in the future. In a letter from Ursula von der Leyen to the commissioner designate for home affairs, the Austrian conservative Magnus Brunner, the European Commission president, writes that "you will steer innovative operational solutions to counter irregular migration."

Briefing #2: Mark Rutte's First Big NATO Meeting

What You Need To Know: NATO's defense ministers (and possibly a few leaders) will meet on October 17-18 in what will be new Secretary-General Mark Rutte's first proper meeting as the head of the organization. It's also the first time the defense ministers of the military alliance's four "Indo-Pacific partners" -- Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea -- join for a session with their 32 NATO counterparts.

It does signal the push, largely from the United States, to focus more on the growing influence and threats posed by China. While Beijing isn't officially branded as an "adversary" by NATO, the military alliance is open about how Beijing is challenging Euro-Atlantic interests, security, and values -- hence the apparent need to step up operations, including joint arms production and training, with the four states.

In the same spirit, NATO allies will want the Indo-Pacific quartet to intensify their support for Ukraine. This is especially true of South Korea, which is a big producer of ammunition needed on the battlefield. Korean arms manufacturers are providing some of this ammunition to NATO allies, who then often pass it on to Kyiv. Seoul is treading carefully here, though, wary about drawing too much attention from neighbouring North Korea and China.

Deep Background: In the second of three ministerial sessions, Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov will join to brief the participants about the war effort. He will also most likely plead for more military aid, notably air defense and long-range missiles.

NATO will want to communicate at the meeting that the alliance has come a long way in meeting its goal set at the Washington summit in July of providing Ukraine with 40 billion euros ($43.7 billion) of funds in 2025. Otherwise there likely won't be too much good news on Ukraine.

The situation on the front lines "remains discouraging," as one NATO source told me, and Kyiv isn't experiencing much luck politically either. During his trip to the United States in September, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy didn't get what he wanted in terms of allowing Kyiv to use Western weapons to strike targets deep inside Russia -- or even hints that an invitation for Ukraine to join NATO was forthcoming.

And last week, Zelenskiy's meeting with U.S. President Joe Biden and other leaders at the German military base of Ramstein was canceled due to Hurricane Milton hitting Florida.

The Ramstein meeting, which brings together over 50 nations that support Kyiv militarily, was widely seen by diplomats as the last chance for Ukraine to push for these two key goals before the U.S. election on November 5. The chance of getting a NATO invitation during Biden's remaining time in office is likely very slim, whereas there's probably a greater chance of getting a green light to strike Russian military targets outside Ukraine.

It is possible, however, that a Ramstein meeting could still take place at a ministerial level, possibly even on the sidelines of this week's NATO defense meeting.

Drilling Down

• The third and final session of the ministerial is about NATO's own deterrence and defense. And it could prove to be the trickiest one. There will be talk about how to respond to the increased number of Russian airspace violations in NATO frontline states such as the Baltic states, Poland, and Romania.
• Don't expect any joint agreement on this, and countries will be free to defend their airspace as they see fit -- but there will be a sense of caution in not escalating the situation with Moscow too much.
• Another contentious issue is the pre-positioning of defense equipment in NATO member states close to Russia. This places heavier weapons and ammunition closer to NATO borders to increase readiness in case of an attack. NATO has pushed pre-positioning for over a decade, even though there is a distinct lack of equipment.
• In fact, it is only the United States that has enough heavy weapons and ammunition to place in depots in various frontline states. West European allies have been criticized for underspending on defense in recent decades, claiming they have sent all their spare equipment to Ukraine or have just been reluctant to share more of what they have.
• The plan now is to determine how much burden frontline states should bear in preparing for an eventual attack, as well as how much other NATO nations, which comprise the eight multinational battlegroups stationed in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia, should bring to the host nations' military depots.
• And then you can expect politicking to happen at the sidelines in terms of who should become Rutte's righthand person. The deadline for applications for the deputy secretary-general position closes on the final day of the ministerial meeting (October 18), and, in November, the successful candidate should be revealed. The former defense minister of North Macedonia, Radmila Sekerinska, and the former foreign minister of Bulgaria, Mariya Gabriel, are the early favorites, but don't rule out that there are other candidates under consideration as well.

Looking Ahead

EU energy ministers are gathering in Luxembourg on October 15 and they will be joined by their Ukrainian counterpart, German Galushchenko, who will brief them about how his war-torn country is preparing for the winter ahead. The Russian military has continued to target Ukraine's energy infrastructure throughout the summer and fall.

On the same day and in the same city, there will at least be some joy for Albania as Tirana will officially open its first EU accession chapters. A so-called intergovernmental conference will be held to mark the occasion under the auspices of the ongoing Hungarian presidency of the Council of the European Union.

That's all for this week! Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two big issues: A new EU sanctions mechanism targeting malign Russian actions and Albania's recent progress on joining the EU.

Briefing #1: Expanded Sanctions To Target Russian Hybrid Threats

What You Need To Know: Ambassadors from the 27 European Union member states on October 2 agreed to a new sanctions mechanism targeting Russian hybrid actions. Broadly, "hybrid" here means actions carried out on behalf of a state to undermine the functioning of another country, so, for example, trying to impact elections or targeting critical infrastructure. It is expected that the new measures will be formally agreed by the bloc's finance ministers when they assemble in Luxembourg on October 8.

The new sanctions regime is, according to the EU diplomats I have spoken to, meant to plug some of the gaps in the current restrictive measures on the Kremlin.

Essentially, the EU has two types of sanctions regimes: geographical and horizontal. Brussels has mostly used geographical sanctions -- which focus on a particular location or political entity -- to hit Russia since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In short, it targets the Russian government, its citizens and entities, such as companies, that the bloc deems to have undermined the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

In this area, Brussels has gone quite far -- introducing all sorts of economic sanctions on various Russian industries, such as oil, diamonds, and coal, just to mention a few, as well as imposing visa bans, and asset freezes on around 2,300 people and firms.

Then, on top of that, there are horizontal sanctions that are not limited to one country and that target people and companies around the globe. In this area, the bloc has sanctions pertaining to terrorism, cyberattacks, the use of chemical weapons, and human rights abuses. Russian citizens are blacklisted under these horizontal sanctions as well.

Deep Background: Earlier this year, the EU created something of a mix between a geographical and a horizontal sanctions regime -- creating a blacklist of people committing human rights abuses in Russia. The sanctions largely targeted people responsible for the jailing and mistreatment of Russian opposition figures such as Vladimir Kara-Murza, who was released from a Russian prison last month in a major prisoner swap between Russia and the West, as well as Aleksei Navalny, who died in mysterious circumstances in a Russian prison in February.

The sanctions just agreed by the EU are a similar mix. But, actually, they go a step further. The text, prepared by the legal service of the Council of the EU, one of the bloc's main decision-making bodies, and seen by RFE/RL, notes that the EU is free to impose asset freezes and visa bans on people or entities that are "responsible for, implementing, supporting, or benefiting from actions or policies by the government of the Russian Federation, which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the union or in one or several of its member states, in an international organization, or in a third country."

So, in a sense, it covers not only Russian citizens, but also other nationals working for Russia -- and it involves not only actions taken in the European Union but worldwide. Brussels could, in other words, now go after a wide spectrum of Russian activities, not just confined to a narrow geographical area (such as Ukraine) or very specific actions (such as human rights abuses).

The two big challenges going forward, however, will be defining the hybrid actions, or "destabilizing activities," as the official document puts it, and then proving that Russia is responsible.

It will be up to the member states to present compelling evidence that the bloc's legal service can approve. This is likely to prove tricky, especially given that all 27 member states must sign off. It is also unclear how far back the sanctions can go -- or if potential new listings will only be able to concern recent actions.

Drilling Down

• The legal text lists eight different examples that are sanctionable. The first one is perhaps the most wide-ranging: "the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process," which includes trying to tamper with elections or challenging the constitutional order of a country.
• It will likely be hard to prove that Russia is effectively interfering in an EU member state. However, the new sanctions may open up the possibilities of the bloc punishing Russians attempting to interfere in vulnerable third countries. Two cases in point: both Georgia and Moldova are holding crucial elections this month. Georgia is holding parliamentary elections on October 20.
• The second example listed in the EU's legal document concerns the planning, directing, or engaging in violent demonstrations. Diplomats I spoke to said that this could apply to a situation such as recent riots in the United Kingdom, which began in July after the fatal stabbing of three young girls in the northern English town of Southport. Disinformation helped fuel the riots, which developed strong anti-Muslim and anti-migrant sentiments. If it was proven that Russians were fanning the protests online, they could be targeted if something similar were to occur.
• The third sanctionable offense is activities that "silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation." So, for example, that could apply to something like the hammer and tear-gas attack in Lithuania earlier this year on Leonid Volkov, a former close aide to Navalny.
• Then there is "coordinated information manipulation." A good example of the type of activity this could apply to would be the Prague-based Voice of Europe website that both the Czech Republic and the EU placed sanctions on earlier this year for running a Russian influence operation.
• Another sanctionable offense would be the targeting of critical infrastructure in EU member states. This includes crimes such as damaging undersea cables, but could also include arson attacks on buildings and public transportation.
• What the EU called the "instrumentalization of migrants" could also be targeted, with examples seen at the borders of Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, where the Belarusian authorities, often supported by Russia, have been accused of flying in migrants, mainly from Asia, and then sending them to the borders of nearby EU countries.
• The last two items on the EU's list are activities that Wagner and other Russian-sponsored mercenary groups would most likely carry out. The EU would target actions such as "instigating or facilitating an armed conflict in a third country" and exploiting such armed conflicts through "the illicit exploitation or trade of natural resources and wildlife in a third country." That is a reference to illegal ivory or diamond trading.

Briefing #2: Albania Decouples From North Macedonia And Moves Closer To The EU

What You Need To Know: Albania will finally open its first five European Union accession chapters on October 15. This comes after Tirana and EU member Greece buried the hatchet in September over a spat that had significantly slowed down the country's membership bid.

For four years, Albania's membership bid has been tied to North Macedonia's. No longer, as Albania is making progress while North Macedonia is still struggling due to its ongoing dispute with Bulgaria.

The five chapters Albania will open next week all belong to a cluster that Brussels calls the "fundamentals." These are, essentially, the EU negotiating chapters a country opens first and then closes last, and there are many EU laws that need to be "transposed" -- to use the EU's lingo -- into the national law of the candidate countries. Two of the five "fundamentals" chapters -- No. 23 dealing with judiciary and fundamental rights and No. 24, which concerns justice, freedom, and security -- are seen as the crucial ones. Many of the EU hopefuls are grappling with corruption and weak legal systems, and Brussels wants to address that before they join the club.

Deep Background: The green light for Albania came at a meeting of the bloc's Europe ministers on September 24, when the Greek minister noted that Athens was satisfied with Tirana moving ahead in the enlargement process.

A day later, Cyprus, which normally aligns with Greece, also flagged that, to its mind, Tirana was good to go. The breakthrough actually came earlier in September, when Fredi Beleri, the ethnic Greek mayor of the Albanian seaside town of Himare, was released from an Albanian prison. Beleri was arrested and imprisoned last year over a vote-buying scheme. It was a move that soured relations between Athens and Tirana, with Greek officials demanding his release and accusing the Albanian government of politically motivated persecution.

In June, while still in prison, Beleri was elected to the European Parliament as a candidate for the Greek ruling center-right New Democracy party. He was released from prison for a few days in July to be sworn in at the Strasbourg-based chamber.

It is clear now that North Macedonia, once considered the "star pupil" of the EU hopefuls in the Western Balkans, even changing its official name, is stuck. It has failed to comply with Bulgaria's request to amend its constitution so that the country's ethnic Bulgarian minority is mentioned as one of the founding peoples of North Macedonia.

This change, requested in 2022 as a prerequisite to launch accession talks, needs a two-thirds majority in the Skopje parliament, something that, so far, has remained elusive. And it appears to be even less likely to happen any time soon, as the center-right government that has been in power since this summer is less inclined to make compromises with Sofia.

Bulgaria, on the other hand, is preparing for parliamentary elections at the end of the month, so no big political decisions are really in the works. In fact, most Bulgarian parties are in agreement that the ball is firmly in Skopje's court.

Drilling Down

• The fact that North Macedonia and Albania are now decoupled -- after both received the go-ahead to start accession talks in 2020 and both symbolically started accession talks on the same day in 2022 -- is galling for Skopje. Especially as North Macedonia, back in 2020, was seen as a front-runner and some of its officials, albeit in private, were complaining about Albania "hanging on to Skopje's coattails" to get closer to the EU.
• The decoupling is worth watching as it could shine some light on what might happen with Ukraine and Moldova. The two countries are also formally coupled on their current EU accession paths, both becoming official EU candidate countries in 2022 and both symbolically opening accession talks on the same day in June of this year.
• Back in the day, grumbles could be heard in Kyiv that Moldova was just managing to get ahead thanks to the efforts of Ukraine. The question is whether they'll remain coupled next year when both are expected to officially open negotiations chapters -- the same five "fundamentals" as Albania will open now.
• To open accession chapters, all 27 EU member states must give a green light. And this is certainly not a given yet, at least in the case of Ukraine. Poland will hold the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU in the first half of 2025. It has recently been embroiled in a spat with Ukraine over the 1943 Volhynia massacre of ethnic Poles by Ukrainian nationalists, with Warsaw demanding a proper exhumation and burial of the victims. There is no indication yet that Poland will use Ukraine's enlargement process to get its way, but don't rule it out completely.
• And then, of course, there's Hungary, which has been a vocal critic of Ukraine's future EU integration and has insisted on Kyiv giving more rights to the ethnic Hungarian minority in the country. Budapest has previously indicated that they would like to decouple Moldova and Ukraine.

Looking Ahead

The European Parliament plenary this week could be interesting. On October 8, the Strasbourg chamber will debate the upcoming elections in Moldova and Georgia and vote on resolutions on both the following day. With Georgia's government showing some authoritarian tendencies of late, and with crucial elections coming up, Tbilisi could well be criticized in the resolution.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban will also address the chamber on October 9. He was initially slated to do so in September, but severe floods in Central Europe forced him to cancel.

Later this week, on October 10-13, U.S. President Joe Biden will travel to Germany. He will first go to the capital, Berlin, and then to the U.S. military base of Ramstein in the western part of the country to chair the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, which coordinates weapon deliveries to Kyiv. Look out for any possible news on allowing Ukraine to use Western arms systems to hit deep into Russia.

That's all for this week! Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

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