Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.
I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on one issue: the upcoming EU summit, with a focus on Ukraine, Russia sanctions, and EU enlargement.
The Briefing: The EU’s October Summit -- Sanctions, Enlargement, And Financing Ukraine
As European Union leaders gather in Brussels on October 15-16, the main media focus will most likely be on the almighty EU budget battle as the 27 prime ministers and presidents make their first real stab at finding a consensus for the next long-term EU budget for 2028-2034.
They will fail, as summits are already planned for November and December to potentially seal the deal. But there is no guarantee that they will strike an agreement then either, as the draft proposal of 1.6 trillion euros ($1.78 trillion) is dividing northern “frugals,” who want more cuts, and the rest, who want the budget to increase or at least stay the same.
The fight over cash in Brussels tends to be the fiercest and most drawn-out, and will divert much of the EU’s attention away from the bigger international issues confronting the bloc, such as the war in Ukraine and even its own process of admitting new members.
Yet, the draft EU summit conclusions, seen by RFE/RL, still offer some hints about what the bloc hopes to do on a number of foreign policy issues in the coming months.
Financing Ukraine
There was a sudden political storm brewing in both Brussels and Kyiv when Ukrainian officials began warning in early September of a military funding shortfall of as much as $27 billion.
Much confusion ensued as various other numbers were cited, and Ukrainian and European officials started studying what the issue was and whether the 90 billion euros ($100 billion) that the EU had agreed to lend Kyiv earlier in the year for 2026 and 2027 -- with 45 billion euros earmarked for each year -- would need to be restructured, notably by bringing forward some of the money allocated for 2027.
EU sources familiar with the discussions told RFE/RL that the changing estimates of Ukraine’s needs reflect the rapidly evolving situation. They explained that the cost of the military equipment Ukraine intends to purchase is rising, as are expenditures on military personnel salaries and compensation payments for the families of fallen soldiers.
However, through national budget reallocations and financial support from other international partners, Kyiv has been finding ways to cover its most urgent needs.
This was also confirmed in the draft EU conclusions, which note that the European Council “welcomes the ongoing disbursements to Ukraine from the EUR 90 billion Ukraine Support Loan for 2026 and 2027, including the recent disbursements of EUR 5.34 billion. It welcomes the fact that the means to cover Ukraine’s budget and defense needs for 2026 have been identified.”
But this is not the end of the story.
While 2026 is covered for now, EU diplomats believe that Ukraine will use up the remaining 45 billion euros in the first half of 2027, meaning that the gap avoided this winter will likely reappear a year later. That means the EU will have to find more money, as the bloc’s next long-term budget, which is expected to include more funding for Ukraine, won’t kick in until 2028.
It is therefore very possible that the discussion about using the billions in frozen Russian assets held in the bloc will come into play again at some point. This definitely won’t happen at this week’s summit, but the issue could return to the agenda at the summits scheduled for November and December and is almost certain to resurface early next year.
Symbolic Sanctioning And Estonian Embarrassment
The draft summit conclusions mention that “the European Union remains determined to further increase pressure on Russia so that it stops its brutal war of aggression and engages in meaningful negotiations towards peace. The European Council welcomes the recent adoption of the 21st sanctions package and of a substantial number of further listings of individuals and entities.”
Despite what initially looks like a straightforward call for more sanctions on Moscow, there is a subtle but important difference here.
In previous years, and at earlier summits, EU leaders have consistently pushed for further measures, meaning additional sanctions packages. But after the difficulties that dogged the 21st round of sanctions, which were only approved after a lot of wrangling in July, it is clear that the bloc is inching away from adopting new economic sanctions and is instead now essentially just adding more names to its blacklist.
And while the headline figure of almost 1,600 new listings, officially approved on October 12, sounds impressive -- marking the largest-ever addition to the EU sanctions list -- those targeted are hardly household names. In fact, they all belong to Russia's domestic military-industrial complex, which has hardly any assets in the bloc to begin with.
But not everything has been plain sailing, even with these seemingly straightforward listings.
Embarrassingly, Estonia, a sanctions hawk, asked for one company and one person to be removed from the originally proposed list seen by RFE/RL. The entity was the Solikamsk plant, which exports rare earth materials and the individual was its CEO, Ruslan Dimukhamedov.
With most of the company’s EU exports going to Estonia, the Baltic state confirmed that it had pushed the bloc not to sanction it.
In a statement given to RFE/RL, the Estonian EU representation noted that “the company provides NPM Silmet, which is based in Estonia, with strategically important materials for Europe. European industries who are reliant on NPM Silmet include electric vehicle manufacturers, wind turbine producers, and the electronics, automotive, and aviation sectors across the European Union.”
The statement also noted that “NPM Silmet is actively looking for alternative sources for the materials it imports from Russia. Estonia will revisit listing the Russian company and person next year.”
The whole affair illustrates how even the most ardent supporters of Ukraine in the EU have national economic interests tied to Russia that they simply won’t compromise on, making a mockery of the bloc's push for tougher sanctions on the Kremlin.
Visas For Russians
While traditional sanctions policy appears to be taking a backseat for now, the issue of restricting more Russians from entering the EU is gaining traction in Brussels.
The EU is still working on banning Russians who have fought in Ukraine from entering the bloc on Schengen tourist visas, with the draft summit conclusions calling for “the swift implementation of the measures concerning Russian ex-combatants.”
This is the most obvious sign that even Mediterranean countries like France, Italy, and Spain, which rely heavily on tourism, are moving closer to agreeing to measures that could require Russian applicants to submit military service documents when applying for Schengen tourist visas in the future.
Interestingly, the text also mentions the need for “reviewing and tightening visa requirements and policy regarding Russian nationals.”
According to EU officials, this means work is also underway to restrict the territorial validity of Russian tourist visas, so that visa holders would no longer be allowed to travel freely throughout the Schengen zone but would instead have to remain in the country that issued their visa.
There is also a push to stop recognizing non-biometric Russian travel documents, including diplomatic and service passports.
When it comes to Russian diplomats already in the EU, efforts are also afoot to restrict their movements. Currently, Russian diplomatic and consular personnel in EU countries are generally only required to notify authorities when traveling to another member state, but the proposal would introduce a requirement to obtain prior authorization from the country they intend to visit.
A limit on how long Russian diplomatic personnel can remain in their host countries is also under consideration, as European counterintelligence services are keen to curb long-established spy networks, in which diplomats stationed in one place for extended periods often play a key role.
The Clock Is Ticking For Montenegro
This week will be hailed as yet another momentous one for EU enlargement, with Albania set to close another EU accession chapter on October 13, the same day that Moldova and Ukraine are due to open talks on a whopping 17 chapters, bringing their total to 24 out of 33, after overcoming yet another initial Hungarian red light.
Perhaps the most interesting country to watch now, however, is the absolute frontrunner Montenegro, which is entering a crunch period in its quest to become the EU's 28th member state by 2028.
The draft EU summit conclusions note that “the European Council welcomes the ongoing work on drafting the accession treaty with Montenegro and notes the intention of the Council Presidency to reach an agreement on the provisional closure of all negotiating chapters by the end of this year, based on the implementation of the corresponding reforms by Montenegro.”
This sounds promising, but not everything is going swimmingly.
The drafting of the accession treaty, which the European Commission and Podgorica are hoping to have fully negotiated by spring and signed by the summer, is not progressing quickly enough so far.
The working group dealing with the drafting is still meeting only once a week in Brussels. By now, meetings should be taking place more frequently, suggesting that not all EU member states are equally keen to accelerate Montenegro's accession process.
The goal of closing all chapters by the end of the year also seems to be hanging by a thread.
Yes, the country closed talks on three chapters on October 12, taking its “tally” to 21 out of 33, but those chapters had already been slated to be closed in September.
There had also been hopes of closing another four chapters this month, but that now looks unlikely to happen before November.
Croatia is behind most of these delays, as it still has a lot of bilateral scores to settle with its smaller neighbor.
On transport policy, for example, Zagreb initially raised concerns about “cabotage,” the right of a transport company from one EU country to provide services in another, amid fears that cheaper Montenegrin truckers would undercut Croatian competitors. That issue has since been resolved, but Zagreb is now raising concerns about the way Montenegro’s maritime agency operates.
Most of the disputes, however, concern historical issues, which would normally be addressed under Chapter 31, covering foreign policy. But with Montenegro yet to close that chapter, these disputes threaten to spill over into negotiations on other chapters as well. Worryingly, talks on closing Chapter 31 haven’t even begun.
The Croatian demands include several issues stemming from the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s.
Take, for example, the Zoran Gopcevic swimming pool in the Montenegrin city of Kotor. Zagreb is demanding that the facility be renamed, as Gopcevic was a guard at the Morinj camp during the conflict, where hundreds of Croatian prisoners were held in inhumane conditions and even subjected to torture.
Then there is the issue of the “Jadran,” a three-masted sailing ship built in 1933 that was historically based in the Croatian coastal city of Split and which Zagreb wants returned to Croatian control. When the Yugoslav wars broke out in 1991, the “Jadran” was in Montenegro, where it has remained ever since, with Podgorica claiming that the ship's presence on its territory at the time of Yugoslavia's dissolution gives it legal ownership.
On top of this, there are also land and maritime border disputes between the two countries and discussions over billions of dollars in war reparations, which could slow down the accession talks even further.
That's all for this week!
Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or via e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.
Until next time,
Rikard Jozwiak
If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.
