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Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two issues: Visa liberalization suspension for Georgian diplomats and EU-Kosovo relations after Brussels easing sanctions on Pristina.

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Briefing #1: EU Set To Suspend Visa Liberalization For Georgian Diplomats This Month

What You Need To Know: The European Union is set to follow through this month on a plan to suspend visa liberalization for all Georgian diplomatic and service passport holders after saying Tbilisi has “violated numerous commitments undertaken during the visa liberalization dialogue.”

The European Commission hinted the move was imminent when it issued its annual report on December 19, 2025, on how countries that enjoy visa liberalization with the bloc have fared on a number of issues. The Georgia assessment was scathing, with Brussels slamming Tbilisi’s controversial legislation on “transparency of foreign influence” and “family values and protection of minors," noting that “in most areas, no corrective measures were reported and, in several others, the situation has further deteriorated.”

Deep Background: While Brussels will suspend part of the visa-free regime due to democratic backsliding, other issues were also highlighted in the report, including a lack of alignment with EU visa policy for those from some third countries. The report notably highlights the growth of the Russian diaspora in the South Caucasus country, with the document stating that 160,000 Russian citizens have emigrated there since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine nearly four years ago.

“There is an increasing concern that Russian presence in Georgia may be exploited to carry foreign influence operations. Another area of concern is the potential misuse of Georgian citizenship, especially when obtained via simplified naturalization procedures by Russian nationals,” the text states, adding: “Such cases raise both illegal migration risks and broader security implications for the EU.” Other complaints include Georgian nationals “remaining illegally in the EU to access medical care or to apply for asylum on medical grounds,” as well as the lack of progress on anti-corruption measures such as the need for a dedicated asset recovery office or the recent gutting of the anti-corruption bureau.

Drilling Down:

  • There are, in other words, quite a few reasons for the European Commission to make use of the suspension mechanism. And with new European legislation entering into force at the end of 2025, making it easier to trigger the mechanism, the EU executive is wasting no time.
  • One of the changes is that the commission in theory can decide on its own to suspend the visa-free regime for certain passports. It will, however, still consult with the 27 EU member states and a vote will be held.
  • The process is known as an “implementing decision,” meaning that the European Commission will start by presenting a legal act. This document can be already ready by the week that started on January 12, sources told RFE/RL.
  • Then something known in the EU as “comitology” begins. This means that a specific “comitology committee” will convene at a yet unknown date. All EU member states are represented here, and the European Commission should then ask for a formal opinion on the act in question.
  • This formal opinion usually takes the shape of a vote that isn’t legally binding but tends to be respected. If a qualified majority of the 27 capitals (55 percent of EU countries representing 65 percent of the total EU population) vote in favor of the proposed implementing act, it is adopted.
  • It is widely believed among EU diplomats that RFE/RL has spoken with that such a majority exists. To prevent the act from becoming valid, a qualified majority must vote against whereas the European Commission must come back with a revised act if there isn’t a qualified majority either for or against.
  • The timeline is not yet known but the vote is likely to take place in January. There is, however, a visa working party on January 23 in the council where home affairs experts of all the member states sit. They expect that they will get a briefing from the European Commission on the road ahead on this issue.
  • While suspending visa liberalization is very rare, the European Commission has taken a lighter version by just targeting diplomatic and service passports, not the entire Georgian population. And while Brussels has hinted that this might be the next step if things don’t improve, few EU member states have so far shown any desire to go for a blanket suspension.
  • This also means that the step is largely symbolic as all diplomats and bureaucrats also have regular passports they can travel on.
  • In many ways, the move is a way to tighten an EU decision made in early 2025 when the bloc decided to suspend parts of a visa-facilitation agreement with Georgia, meaning that Georgian diplomats had to apply for visas to travel to the EU member states that decided to implement the decision.
  • Nineteen out of 27 have so far done so. With the impending suspension of visa liberalization for diplomats and other officials, all 27 will have to carry out the decision.

Briefing #2: As The EU Eases Sanctions On Pristina, What's Next For Kosovo?

What You Need To Know: The European Union says it will start lifting sanctions this month first imposed on Kosovo in summer 2023, when Pristina implemented the results of controversial elections in the Serb-dominated north despite warnings from Brussels. The move could potentially resuscitate the Balkan country's EU hopes, allowing this to be the year its EU membership application, submitted in late 2022, can finally be assessed by the European Commission.

It may also allow for a restart of the Brussels-facilitated dialogue with Serbia after a two-year hiatus. The sanctions raised eyebrows when first adopted as they lacked precedent when it came to the bloc's relationship with an EU hopeful. For starters, they were not sanctions in a strict political and procedural sense and have been referred to as "measures" in the "corridor lingo" of Brussels. EU sanctions must be presented to the 27 EU member states in a formal legal act and then unanimously agreed. This was the case, for example, when Brussels imposed asset freezes and visa bans on individuals from EU candidate country Turkey in 2019 due to the unauthorized drilling for gas in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Deep Background: With Kosovo, nothing of the sort happened. Instead, the EU foreign policy chief at the time, Josep Borrell, wrote a letter to EU member states outlining the measures and recommending the capitals implement them even though there was no obligation. The directorate-general for enlargement, the EU's department dealing with countries wanting to join the bloc, then informed Kosovo of what would hit them. These measures were mainly EU-related, meaning funding for Kosovo from the bloc's common budget would be frozen, high-level visits would be on hold, and the Stabilization and Association Council -- the main political conduit for Brussels-Pristina relations -- would not meet until further notice.

Intriguingly, while there was no formal EU unanimity to impose the sanctions, member states later stepped in to demand unanimity to lift them. In one of his last acts before leaving office in 2024, Borrell asked for the measures to be removed, but there was no consensus and the initial decision stood. Some momentum in Kosovo's favor came with the new European Commission team starting at the tail-end of 2024 as diplomats noted that outgoing Hungarian Enlargement Commissioner Oliver Varhelyi had "a soft spot" for Serbia and prevented any real movement in favor of Pristina.

An approach of "gradual lifting" of the measures was announced, though what it entailed wasn't spelled out. Both European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and new EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas visited the country in 2025, dismissing the notion of a ban on high-level visits even though no high-ranking Kosovar politician came to Brussels on a bilateral visit that year. The political breakthrough came at an EU-Western Balkans summit in Brussels on December 17, when Von der Leyen announced that the measures would be lifted. This came after what Brussels called "smooth and peaceful" local elections in north Kosovo in October reversing the move from 2023. But that wasn't the end of the story. In the run-up to the summit France, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, and Spain pushed for a two-step lifting in which roughly half the frozen money -- 216 million euros -- could be released for Pristina imminently.

The remainder, some 205 million euros, would be distributed first after the national parliamentary elections on December 28; they argued that incumbent Prime Minister Albin Kurti could benefit too much electorally if all the cash was released immediately. A new condition had been set by largely the same countries had been instrumental in Serbia avoiding similar EU measures later in 2023 after Serb militants with alleged Belgrade backing attacked Kosovar police in the northern village of Banjska, leaving one law enforcement officer dead.While other EU member states grumbled that pro-Serbian member states yet again were causing anti-Kosovo moves, they eventually agreed as they wanted to avoid another political impasse.In the end, Kurti increased his vote share and the EU promptly put out a statement saying the second part of the frozen funds would be released in early 2026.

Drilling Down:

  • The issue now is that while the political decisions have been taken to lift all the measures, the actual technical work hasn't yet kicked in. In fact, the first batch of money has been "programmed" -- meaning earmarked for various Kosovo recipients -- but has not yet been received. According to EU officials RFE/RL has spoken to, Brussels has not made the formal move to "program" the second batch even though it is expected to be a formality made later in January.
  • As these measures were imposed in an unprecedented way in 2023, there is discussion in Brussels about what is needed to technically lift them. For example, do EU member states need to be consulted again in writing or in some council working group or committee, or can the commission just go ahead regardless?
  • What is clear, however, is the European Commission wants to re-engage with Kosovo. Few in the building believe Serbia and Kosovo will be happy to take part in the dialogue to normalize relations anytime soon, but the Brussels envoy for the talks, Danish diplomat Peter Sorensen, recently had his mandate renewed for another two years.
  • It is believed that Kallas, who has yet to host a single dialogue at the highest political level, is keen to try to achieve something in the Western Balkans after a bruising start as the bloc's top diplomat.
  • With Brussels increasingly sidestepped on issues such as peace talks about Ukraine, the Gaza war, and the situation in Iran, EU officials half-jokingly note that getting Serbia and Kosovo to agree might be the "lowest-hanging fruit" available for the bloc at the moment.
  • There could also be a chance that EU member states finally agree to send over Kosovo's EU membership application to the European Commission for the EU executive to assess whether Pristina can join the club down the line.
  • The last country that truly tried to tackle the issue is the Czech Republic, which received the application during its six-month presidency of the council in the latter half of 2022. The five Kosovo non-recognizers Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain blocked any movement, however, and have made it clear to fellow EU member states holding the rotating council chair that they won't entertain the issue.
  • We can expect that nothing will happen in the first half of 2026 while Cyprus is at the helm, but there might be a change when Ireland takes over in July. Dublin has indicated it is pushing hard to conclude EU accession negotiations with Montenegro by the end of the year and hopes to push Albania, Moldova, and Ukraine closer to the club as well. With EU enlargement being one of Ireland's top priorities, it may even test the waters on Kosovo.
  • Rumors are swirling in Brussels corridors that Spain -- often the most hardened of the non-recognizing quintet -- will finally allow the commission to give an assessment so long as the process doesn't force member states to immediately tackle the issue of Kosovar statehood.


Looking Ahead

Perhaps the most anticipated event this week is the meeting between U.S Secretary of State Marco Rubio and his Danish counterpart, Lars Lokke Rasmussen, which is set to take place on January 14. There is hope, at least in Copenhagen, that the meeting will give more clarity on what the United States wants regarding Greenland, an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark. The White House has recently said that it cannot rule out taking the territory by military force, while Rubio has indicated that a potential purchase is more likely.

That's all for this week!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orban speaks during a press conference at the end of the European Council meeting in Brussels, Belgium on December 19, 2025.
Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orban speaks during a press conference at the end of the European Council meeting in Brussels, Belgium on December 19, 2025.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's new newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on my far-fetched prediction for 2026: The EU will do well!

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2026: The EU Might Actually Do Rather Well This Year

Around this time of year, I always try to make a bold claim for the new year. For 2025, I was speculating that Transnistria and Moldova might reunite -- something that didn't even come close to happening. So, for 2026, I will make an even more outrageous claim. I predict that the European Union will actually do rather well.

It’s fair to say that there is a lot of doom and gloom in Brussels these days. Largely overlooked in talks over a potential future settlement of Russia’s war in Ukraine, facing countless hybrid attacks such as severed undersea cables and drone incursions, and enduring fraying transatlantic relations with a White House openly questioning the bloc have all taken their toll on Brussels. Rarely has the club been tested so much from all angles. “A sheep in a brand-new world of predators,” as one EU diplomat recently put it.

And frankly, it shouldn’t be better this year with the United States potentially pulling more of its troops out of the continent and stepping up support for various Eurosceptic parties, Ukraine either being forced to accept a humiliating deal with Moscow or being pushed back further militarily by a resurgent Russia that even might test an EU or NATO country – something that European officials have been warning about and cautioned that they aren’t really ready to face alone.

But there is an alternative, brighter vision for the EU -- admittedly a highly unlikely one involving some opportunities to grasp and a lot of “ifs”.

Ukraine Gets The Money

Let’s start with one of the major disappointments in the closing stages of last year: the failure to agree to a reparations loan for Ukraine. This was admittedly a major blow for both European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and German chancellor Friedrich Merz, who were pushing hard to leverage frozen Russian state assets in the bloc to generate a 90-billion-euro loan for Ukraine for the next two years. The rationale was, why should EU taxpayers foot the bill for Moscow’s pillaging of Ukraine when Putin’s cash could be used instead?

Yet, the alternative, to raise money backed by the EU budget and supported by 24 EU member states (the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia opted out) isn’t actually as awful as it seems. Sure, some EU leaders lost their prestige over the reparations loan and the bloc appeared indecisive but, in the end, Kyiv will get enough money to sustain its fight against Russia for the next couple of years and the Ukrainians don’t have to pay the money back until Russia pays reparations.

In the meantime, the Russian assets remain frozen for as long as the EU wishes to have them immobilized with the bloc keeping the option of using them later. It’s not ideal, but it’s more than any other country or organization is offering Kyiv at the moment.

Expanding The Club, Cutting Russian Energy

And then there are things that the bloc has already done that could start bearing fruit soon. Take enlargement for example. The bloc will continue to close accession chapters with Montenegro and Albania in the new year with the former now set to become the EU's 28th member state by 2028. Brussels' thinking, albeit wishful at this moment, goes that by adding Montenegro and potentially even Albania rather soon would motivate Kosovo and Serbia to engage in talks to normalize relations between them, which have been dormant for years. But given that Serbia didn’t even show up at the latest EU-Western Balkans summit in Brussels just before Christmas, this might be easier said than done.

With the EU having shed more members than it gained in the last decade with Brexit, adding one or even a few will give Brussels a boost by showing the EU is still an attractive club for outsiders. Iceland potentially holding a referendum this year to resume EU accession talks suspended over a decade ago would further reinforce this image.

Then there is the phase-out of Russian energy that will be more or less completed this year and will cut the bloc off from one of its longest dependencies on the Kremlin. Decided in late 2025, the prohibition of Russian gas imports for short-term contracts will apply from 25 April 2026 for liquefied natural gas (LNG) and from 17 June 2026 for pipeline gas. For long-term contracts, the cutoff is 1 January 2027 for LNG and September that same year for pipeline gas.

No Big Votes!

Another thing that might help the EU is the lack of elections in 2026. If France can escape holding snap parliamentary elections, which actually seems likely at the moment, this year is a bit of an anomaly as none of the big countries actually have to face their voters nationally. That means that French President Emmanuel Macron and his counterparts in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, and Spain can start off 2026 focused on policymaking.

Sure, there are elections that will capture attention. Take the votes in two former East German regions, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Saxony-Anhalt, in September in which the AfD is set to finish first. The far-right party might, for the first time, simply be too big to ignore when coalition-building starts (if it doesn’t get an outright majority). This will induce a lot of soul-searching in Germany, notably as the party is also expected to get around a fifth of the vote in two other regional elections in the Western part of the country earlier in the year.

And in Slovenia’s parliamentary election in March, its long-time populist maverick Janez Jansa might return to power again -- joining likeminded Brussels-bashers already in power in Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia.

The Magyar Moment

But that quartet might be short-lived, as Hungarians go to the polls in early April. And there are strong indications that Viktor Orban, who has been running the country since 2010, will be defeated by Peter Magyar -- a former Fidesz protégé who turned into an opposition leader.

This would be the most consequential result for the EU this year as Orban’s Hungary has been seen as a spoiler on many issues, notably related to Ukraine. While Czechia and Slovakia often side with Hungary, few believe that they will be hardline enough to block things on their own like Hungary has often done.

And while Peter Magyar and his Tisza party are rather lukewarm on Kyiv as well, Brussels would expect several Budapest vetoes simply to be lifted if they came to power. The list is long and includes EU military aid to Ukraine that has been blocked for three years, EU accession negotiations with Ukraine (and Moldova) on ice since 2024, potentially tougher sanctions on Moscow (and Minsk), and a greater readiness to channel other types of funding for the war-torn country.

Money Matters

A defeat for Orban could also make it somewhat easier to agree on a new multi-year EU budget, as the rule-of-law conditionality -- meaning that EU funds can be frozen in cases of rule-of-law transgressions -- can be kept in the framework. Hungary has had millions of euros suspended in recent years due to this conditionality, and Orban would likely try to sabotage any continuation of the mechanism.

The budget, covering the years 2028-34, should ideally be agreed at the end of 2026. The European Commission came up with its proposal earlier in 2025, an ambitious plan worth nearly 2 trillion euros, which included 100 billion euros for Ukraine and splashing around 130 billion euros on defense. The final deal will surely not be that ambitious, as many of the richer EU member states loathe seeing spiraling Brussels budgets while they normally have to be tightening the national budget back home. Expect a final agreement to be struck in 2027. However, the level of ambition will give you an indication of how serious the EU is going forward, notably in defending itself and sticking up for Ukraine beyond 2027.

Mending US Ties?

Finally, there is also the relationship with the United States, which EU officials hope will get better after a rocky 2025 in which the bloc had to accept a 15% tariff on most EU imports and saw it getting viciously attacked when it slapped a 120 million euro fine on Elon Musk’s X for breaching transparency rules under the bloc’s newish Digital Services Act (DSA), which entered into force in 2022.

More DSA cases against other American internet giants are in the making even though settlements might be reached before fines are meted out. Targeting Chinese internet giants might also smooth things over with Washington. Fears will remain all over the bloc, notably when it comes to any decision to pull large numbers of American troops back from the continent and that more broadsides, such as the National Security Strategy’s musings about European “civilizational erasure” might continue from American officials.

But when speaking to European diplomats there is also a hope that American rhetoric will be milder given that midterm elections are coming up in November. While 2025 was a year of foreign diplomatic efforts, the thinking is that American politics will turn to domestic issues as the vote approaches. Foreign policy hardly ranks high among voter priorities when ordinary Americans go to the polling booths, leaving the transatlantic relationship to recover somewhat in 2026.

Feel free to reach out to me on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here.

Thanks for all your questions, comments and encouragement throughout 2025!

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

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About The Newsletter

The Wider Europe newsletter briefs you every Tuesday morning on key issues concerning the EU, NATO, and other institutions’ relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe’s Eastern neighborhoods.

For more than a decade as a correspondent in Brussels, Rikard Jozwiak covered all the major events and crises related to the EU’s neighborhood and how various Western institutions reacted to them -- the war in Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, Russia’s support for separatists in eastern Ukraine, the downing of MH17, dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, the EU and NATO enlargement processes in the Western Balkans, as well as visa liberalizations, free-trade deals, and countless summits.

Now out of the “Brussels bubble,” but still looking in -- this time from the heart of Europe, in Prague -- he continues to focus on the countries where Brussels holds huge sway, but also faces serious competition from other players, such as Russia and, increasingly, China.

To subscribe, click here.

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