Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two major issues: How Brussels will deal with Kosovo's EU application and how lobbying in Brussels will change for EU hopefuls in the wake of Qatar-gate.

Brief #1: Kosovo's EU Membership Application Is A First For Brussels

What You Need To Know: Kosovo officially applied to join the European Union on December 15. Pristina has long sought eventual membership in Western organizations, but the move was sped up by Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February last year and the subsequent renewed impetus of the EU enlargement process with Bosnia-Herzegovina, Moldova, and Ukraine. Those three countries have all become official EU candidates in recent months.

With even Georgia applying for membership last year and getting potential candidate status, Kosovo was suddenly the only country left in Europe that had previously expressed hopes of one day joining the bloc but that still hadn't formally applied to do so.

Deep Background: Kosovo's application is a real head-scratcher in Brussels. Normally, when a country applies for membership, EU member states in the European Council simply send over the request to the European Commission, usually with minimal fuss, so that it can prepare an opinion. That process can sometimes take years. Not so in Kosovo's case.

That is because this is the first time ever that a country that isn't recognized by all EU member states is formally asking to become a part of the club. It is, in other words, a legal sui generis that Brussels must grapple with.

And it is not only the five non-recognizers of Kosovo -- Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain -- that will have potential issues. Because of the naysaying quintet, the European Union, as an international organization, also does not regard Kosovo as a sovereign state. The bloc simply refers to the country as "Kosovo," with an asterisked footnote containing text agreed in the ongoing EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina that reads: "This designation is without prejudice to the position of status and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence."

Drilling Down

• Sweden, which currently chairs the rotating six-month European Council presidency, officially briefed EU ambassadors in Brussels on the issue for the first time on January 11. It was a very short discussion in which only the Swedish ambassador spoke, informing his colleagues that all member states will be consulted in the upcoming two weeks and that they will reconvene toward the end of the month for a more thorough discussion and to potentially decide on a course of action.
• It is already clear that it will be very tricky to move forward. Not only will the five non-recognizers be reluctant to change their minds, Hungary recently signaled that it is against any moves that would indicate future EU membership for Kosovo, as Budapest claims it would jeopardize the chances of Kosovo and Serbia reaching a deal. Belgrade and Pristina have been locked in talks about normalizing mutual relations since 2011.
• There is, however, pressure for Sweden to do something with this issue before the end of its presidency, which concludes on July 1. Firstly, it is Spain, perhaps the most militant non-recognizer, that takes over the EU presidency next. And Madrid, with plenty of its own separatist quandaries, will almost certainly not want to deal with this question. Secondly, there is a serious risk that the issue will be buried next year. In 2024, Brussels will be consumed by a "changing of the guard," with European Parliament elections and the selection of new presidents for the European Council and European Commission.
• To just sit on the issue, though, would damage the EU's credibility. It could be solved in the European Council using Qualified Majority Voting (QVM). Instead of unanimity, in QVM only 55 percent of member states (representing at least 65 percent of the total EU population) need to vote in favor for a motion to pass -- meaning Kosovo would pass the muster. But there is a reluctance to use QVM, with a preference for reaching some kind of consensus among the 27 member states.
• The answer might be found in semantics, in particular the difference between "unanimity" and "consensus." The former means that everyone actively says yes -- in a vote or otherwise. The latter means that no one opposes. This offers the opportunity for countries like Spain to "look the other way" and to agree without being seen as endorsing the view that Kosovo is a sovereign state.
• It would also help if Serbia and Kosovo struck some sort of deal this spring. A draft proposal is on the table, and even if that wouldn't result in Serbian recognition of Kosovo's statehood, it could mean mutual recognition of national symbols such as passports, and that alone could go a long way in allaying the fears of the non-recognizers.

Brief #2: What Qatar-Gate Means For Lobbying

What You Need To Know: Brussels was rocked in December with the arrest of European Parliament Vice President Eva Kaili; her partner; a former Italian member of the European Parliament (MEP); and the boss of an NGO, perhaps ironically named Fight Impunity. They are now facing preliminary charges of corruption, money laundering, and participation in a criminal organization that could be related to an alleged bribery campaign organized by Qatar.

Kaili, who before the scandal was a rising star in both Greek and European politics, was immediately stripped of her immunity and vice president title, with the Belgian prosecutor reportedly finding 150,000 euros ($163,000) in cash at her Brussels apartment -- money she claimed she learned about on the day of her partner's arrest.

For now, the scandal is mostly confined to the European Parliament, with two more MEPs set to have their immunities revoked when the European Parliament plenary reconvenes on January 16.

Deep Background: The European Parliament is now busy coming up with new rules and regulations to prevent another Qatar-gate. On January 12, the house's powerful Conference of Presidents, which consists of the European Parliament president and the leaders of the chamber's political groupings, discussed a number of measures that they will now start to implement.

The measures will likely have an impact on how countries in the Western Balkans and the EU's Eastern Neighborhood lobby the chamber in the future. Brussels has always been something of a lobbyists' paradise, with thousands of politicians, officials, and diplomats in the same place with very lenient rules. But that might be about to change soon.

Drilling Down

• Under proposed new reforms, whistle-blowers will be better protected, even though details still have to be worked out and will take time to implement. One suggestion is a new, independent ethics commission that would oversee all EU institutions and have punitive power to fine or even suspend EU officials. It's ambitious and well-meaning, but also unlikely to get off the ground.
• Other ideas include a "cooling off period" for former MEPs who wish to work as lobbyists; a requirement that those who want to appear at European Parliament events be listed in the EU's transparency register; and a rule making it mandatory for MEPs to make public all scheduled meetings with third parties related to a report or resolution the European Parliament is working on.
• While EU candidate countries such as Ukraine and North Macedonia enjoy widespread support in the chamber, and the European Parliament is the EU institution keenest on rapid membership for these countries (even though they only have a limited say in this and other foreign policy fields), lobbying is still taking place, especially around the various reports and resolutions that concern these aspiring candidates.
• European Parliament resolutions might be nonbinding and have little bearing on EU policy in general, but countries affected tend to get rattled by them, and they garner a fair bit of media attention. The European Parliament's recent call to the Georgian authorities to release former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili from jail and to impose sanctions on oligarch and political kingpin Bidzina Ivanishvili certainly didn't go unnoticed in Tbilisi. The chamber's resolution to classify Russia as a "terrorist state" in November made quite the media splash and apparently triggered a Kremlin-linked cyberattack on the parliament.
• There are other ideas being proposed that directly concern the Western Balkans and the bloc's Eastern partners. One is the banning of any unofficial groupings of MEPs, such as so-called Friendship Groups with third countries. Another idea is that countries' official interactions with the European Parliament would only be allowed through the Committee on Foreign Affairs, official parliamentary delegations to the country or region, or the European Parliament president.
• Another proposal likely to fly is that resolutions tabled with urgency, usually dealing with current human rights issues, must first be approved by the parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs. That's because there have been complaints that previous urgent resolutions were the target of improper influence.

Looking Ahead

There have been quite a few announcements recently about more Western weapons deliveries to Ukraine. Expect more this week as the Ukraine Defense Contact Group will convene on January 20. The group, usually referred to as "the Ramstein Format" after the U.S military base in Germany where its first meeting was held last April, is a U.S.-led group of more than 40 countries. It includes all 30 NATO allies, the two NATO invitees, Finland and Sweden, and also other non-NATO countries such as Australia, Israel, Japan, Morocco, Qatar, and New Zealand.

Before the next meeting in Ramstein, the defense chiefs of all 30 NATO allies will convene in Brussels on January 18-19 for a meeting of the Military Committee, NATO's highest military authority. The war in Ukraine is expected to dominate proceedings there, as well.

The European Parliament will hold its first plenary of the year in Strasbourg this week. Ukraine will, of course, feature prominently throughout the four-day session. Perhaps the most interesting debate is taking place on January 17: "the establishment of a tribunal on the crime of aggression against Ukraine." While no such tribunal is expected under the auspices of the United Nations -- Security Council member Russia could just veto it -- the EU is looking into ways to establish such a body.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your inbox every Monday.

And you can always reach us at newsletters@rferl.org.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's new newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods. To subscribe, please click here.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two major issues: a possible political deal between Serbia and Kosovo, and the many hurdles facing Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine before they can become members of the EU.

Brief #1: Serbia-Kosovo: Is A New Agreement Imminent?

What You Need To Know: The situation in Kosovo threatened to boil over at the end of 2022, with roadblocks set up by ethnic Serbs in the northern part of the country. The protesting Serbs were outraged over the arrest of a former Serbian police officer, Dejan Pantic, in Kosovo.

After pressure from both the United States and the European Union, Pantic was eventually placed under house arrest in order to defuse the tension. Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic then promptly promised, on December 29, that all barriers and roadblocks would be removed.

The flare-up was similar to one in November following the walkout of hundreds of ethnic Serb police officers, judges, and prosecutors protesting the decision by Pristina to ban Belgrade-issued license plates inside Kosovo.

This latest crisis even reached the higher echelons of NATO, with Serbia at one point fielding a request to the military organization's KFOR peacekeeping mission for permission to deploy its troops in Kosovo. The international force, which has been present in Kosovo since 1999, ignored the call and stated publicly that it had sufficient capabilities to enforce its UN mandate. The mission then helped in the removing of the barricades, with the last one dismantled on January 5.

Deep Background: While Brussels is worried about the situation and the near-constant white-knuckle moments in recent months, several diplomats I have spoken to take this as an indication that both Belgrade and Pristina are edging closer to some sort of political deal, possibly in the next few months.

The two countries have been locked in an EU-led dialogue to normalize bilateral relations since 2011, a process that has produced few concrete outcomes in recent years. However, the changing security landscape in Europe since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine appears to be changing the parameters.

Speaking on the condition of anonymity, European diplomats noted that Serbia, which so far has refused to align with any EU sanctions on its traditional ally Russia, is feeling the squeeze as the Kremlin is bogged down and suffering huge losses in Ukraine. That has no doubt contributed to the EU's lack of enthusiasm for letting Serbia into the union.

For Kosovo, meanwhile, baby steps are being made to get closer to Brussels. At the end of the year, EU member states finally agreed to green-light EU visa liberalization for Kosovar citizens by January 2024, and Pristina officially handed in its EU membership application. The European Commission is expected to sit on Kosovo's application for a long while, though, with five EU member states still not recognizing the fledgling country's independence.

Drilling Down

• Both U.S. and EU officials are traveling to the region in early January, and a French-German proposal that the EU's foreign policy chief Josep Borrell has been working on was presented to EU member states in Brussels before the holidays at the end of the year.
• A draft of the French-German proposal, seen by RFE/RL, doesn't include mutual recognition but is rather a potential building block to a much bigger and more comprehensive agreement further down the road. The document states that "while the present basic agreement constitutes an important step of normalization, both parties will continue with new impetus the EU-led dialogue process, which should lead to a legally binding agreement on comprehensive normalization of relations."
• Perhaps the most crucial part of the proposal is that "both parties shall mutually recognize their respective documents and national symbols, including passports, diplomas, license plates, and customs stamps." That is certainly a real carrot for Kosovo.
• Another part of the proposal likely to please Pristina is that Serbia will not object to Kosovo's membership in any international organizations -- a real bone of contention since Kosovo declared independence in 2008. There is also a call to exchange permanent missions, support each other's aspirations to join the EU, and that both parties can "proceed on the assumption that neither of the two can represent the other in the international sphere or act on its behalf."
• There are also sweeteners for Serbia. Pristina should formalize the status of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo and "afford strong protection to the Serbian religious and cultural heritage and religious sites."
• Crucially, the proposal also mentions the need to "ensure [an] appropriate level of self-management for the Serbian community in Kosovo, including the possibility for financial support by Serbia." For a long time, Serbia has bristled at Kosovo's stalling on the creation of a community of Serb municipalities in the north of the country, a central requirement of the 2013 Brussels agreement between the two countries. Still unimplemented, the French-German draft proposal requires both parties to fulfill the requirements laid out around a decade ago.

Brief #2: The Nitty-Gritty Of EU Enlargement

What You Need To Know: In June 2022, after a recommendation by the European Commission that the 27 member states swiftly endorsed, Moldova and Ukraine were granted EU candidate status, and Georgia was placed one rung below as a potential candidate country. This was only three months after the trio applied for membership in the wake of Russia's February invasion of Ukraine.

For a process that normally takes well over a year, this was decided on at breakneck speed, partly due to some creativity by the European Commission. Firstly, the commission reversed the normal order of things, granting Kyiv and Chisinau candidate status immediately and then asking them to fulfill a number of reforms, notably regarding the rule of law, in order to proceed to the actual start of accession negotiations. For Georgia, though, the usual rules still applied: Take note of our recommendations, do your reforms, and only then can you become a candidate.

All three countries are now eagerly anticipating the European Commission's annual enlargement report in October, where a thorough assessment and recommendations will be made. As soon as this spring, the commission will give an update on how the trio is doing. And by the end of the year, EU member states could decide that Ukraine and Moldova can start to negotiate and that Georgia will become a candidate country, if the commission so recommends. But there does need to be unanimity among the 27 member states, which isn't easy when European capitals are often swayed by domestic events and popular opinion.

Deep Background: This past summer, the European Commission was creative in another regard. In assessment reports delivered on June 17 on Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, the commission repeated the political criteria needed to become a member. However, a second installment of the reports, due to be published this month, is much more technical and comprehensive. It looks at how aligned each country is with EU legislation in all policy fields -- from science and research to environmental protection and foreign and security policy.

The drafts for each of the three countries, which I have seen, are more than 50 pages of Brussels outlining what needs to be done across 32 policy fields (called chapters). They use an assessment scale to mark each country's progress: early stage; a certain level of preparation; moderately well-prepared; good level of preparation; and well-advanced.

Drilling Down

• This is very much the nitty-gritty of EU enlargement. Once a country gets past the politically symbolic moves of getting candidate status and opening accession talks, this is where the hard work starts. And also, the part where many candidate countries get stuck. Take Montenegro and Serbia as examples. They have been negotiating with Brussels for the best part of a decade and have each "closed” (i.e. aligned with EU legislation) just a handful of the more than 30 chapters. Lack of administrative capacity or political will to undergo serious reform are often the reasons cited.
• If Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia are hoping to become members of the EU within the next five to 10 years, the commission reports make for sober reading. Horrific war aside, Ukraine has a large administrative capacity and strong political will to join the bloc. Enthusiasm might not be enough, though. The European Commission notes that, for most policy chapters in Ukraine, there is only "a certain level of preparation," the second-lowest grade.
• It notes, among other things, that the "public procurement control environment is complex and weak due to lack of staff," that there is "no independent fiscal institution," and that the country should establish and manage a fleet register and a data collection framework for fisheries.
• Perhaps unsurprisingly, Ukraine scores the highest on foreign relations and security and defense policy, where the country receives "a good level of preparation" in both fields. It is also deemed to be "moderately well-prepared" in key areas such as customs, energy, and digitalization and media.
• For Moldova, the report is even tougher, with the commission deeming Chisinau to be at an "early stage of preparation" in the majority of chapters and at a "certain level of preparation" for pretty much all the rest, making it the worst performer of the three. An EU official with insight into the process who prefers to remain anonymous points to the fact that this is because previous Moldovan governments have failed to reform the country sufficiently.
• Georgia appears to have the strongest report, reflecting years of pro-EU and relatively reform-minded governments. In quite a few chapters, notably those related to economics and finance, it is deemed "moderately well-prepared," even though it is lagging behind in sectors such as justice, intellectual property, and agriculture.

Looking Ahead

After a couple of weeks of vacation, the Brussels machinery will start grinding again this week. European Union ambassadors will be busy rubber-stamping some of the decisions taken by EU leaders before the break. One of those decisions is the prolongation of all the bloc's sanctions on Russia by six months to July. The move will mean that all of the various restrictive measures taken against the Kremlin by Brussels throughout 2022, as well as the sanctions adopted back in 2014 for the annexation of Crimea, will now have the same expiry date.

EU diplomats will also look into the final details of the first proper big meeting of the year: the annual EU-Ukraine summit, slated for February 3. The initial idea was to hold it in Odesa or Lviv, but in the end the meeting looks set to be held in Kyiv, with the presidents of the European Council and the European Commission, Charles Michel and Ursula von der Leyen, respectively, traveling to the Ukrainian capital.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your inbox every Monday.

And you can always reach us at newsletters@rferl.org.