Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL's Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two major issues: the EU mulling restrictive measures on Georgia and hitting Moldova’s pro-Moscow opposition with sanctions.

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Wider Europe Briefing: Sanctions Galore As EU Hits Moldovan Opposition, Mulls Targeting Tbilisi

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Briefing #1: The EU Weighs Up Georgia Sanctions

What You Need To Know: As EU foreign ministers gather in Brussels on July 15 for their last official meeting before the summer break, Georgia is once again high on the agenda due to the deteriorating political situation in the South Caucasus republic with the recent arrests of several opposition politicians.

After briefly being discussed by ministers last month, the situation in the country is now a major discussion point -- and more decisive action may be taken this time.

The bloc has so far enacted some symbolic measures against Tbilisi.

In early 2025, Brussels imposed visa requirements on Georgian diplomatic passport holders. It has also refrained from holding high-level political meetings and diverted EU funding from Georgia’s government to civil society.

Deep Background: The most pressing issue this time is whether the bloc -- with the unanimous approval of all 27 member states -- manages to impose any sanctions.

There have been attempts before, notably in January, when the EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas wanted to slap visa bans and asset freezes on 13 individuals linked to the Georgian Dream party for a crackdown on opposition protesters.

Back then, Hungary and Slovakia vetoed any such moves, and sanctions talks stalled in Brussels for a while.

EU officials have in recent weeks also discussed the possibility of blacklisting a couple of people responsible for what an internal EU document seen by RFE/RL calls the “instrumentalization of the justice system by the Georgian authorities.”

This would occur under the “EU global human rights sanctions regime” -- a sanctions framework similar to the US Magnitsky act that already includes more than 100 human rights abusers from various countries, such as China, Libya, Russia, and Sudan.

According to several EU officials familiar with the discussions, more than 10 EU member states -- including France, the Netherlands, Poland, Austria, Sweden and the Baltic trio of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania -- have been pushing for sanctions to be adopted by EU foreign ministers.

Just like in January, Bratislava and Budapest have been resisting the move, arguing that any type of restrictive measure could worsen the situation and that dialogue with Tbilisi is a better approach.

While not siding with Slovakia and Hungary, Greece has been arguing against taking any hasty decisions.

Despite the obvious opposition, many diplomats RFE/RL has spoken to on condition of anonymity believe that there still is a chance of finding a consensus to blacklist at least a couple of Georgian judges, whom the EU deems responsible for the arrest of Georgian oppositionists. It’s believed that sanctions-skeptic countries may accept this instead of targeting high-profile politicians.

Drilling Down

• So, what other options are being discussed? The most obvious one is to suspend visa liberalization for Georgian citizens -- a move that only requires a qualified majority of 55 percent of member states representing 65 percent of the total EU population.
• Sweden is the latest country to push for this, arguing that it can be done temporarily if the situation continues to worsen after Georgian local elections in early October. This view is apparently also supported by the Baltic states, Denmark, France, and Poland.
• Others have expressed reservations, however -- notably Greece and Slovenia. They argue that such a radical move -- with the bloc never having suspended visa liberalization for an EU candidate country before -- should be taken as an absolute last resort.
• It has also been pointed out that such a step would likely have more of a negative impact on ordinary Georgian citizens rather than the country’s leadership. Another alternative proposal put forward by the European Commission is to impose national entry bans on certain individuals.
• This is regarded as a somewhat “softer measure” compared to imposing a blanket suspension of EU visa liberalization or broader sanctions. However, it would only be effective if several member states chose to adopt and coordinate this approach.
• Whether that will happen remains uncertain, as some countries -- such as Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, and Romania -- have stressed that it still is important to keep communication channels open with Tbilisi.
• The internal EU document also mentions the possibility of suspending Georgia’s candidate status, which the bloc unanimously bestowed on the country back in December 2023. The EU, however, has never before unilaterally reversed candidate status in its history (Iceland asked Brussels to remove its EU candidate status back in 2015). Once again, unanimity would be necessary to take this step.
• Finally, there is an option that could likely be achieved this week: a large group of countries, led by the Baltic trio, plans to ask the European External Action Service and the European Commission to conduct a thorough assessment of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement from 2016.
• The goal would be to explore the possibility of suspending parts of the agreement in the future, such as the free trade provisions it includes. Such a suspension would require only a qualified majority.

Briefing #2: Brussels Tightens Stance On Moldova’s Pro-Russian Opposition

What You Need To Know: EU foreign ministers on July 15 are expected to rubber stamp an agreement to impose sanctions on people and entities the bloc deems guilty of “actions destabilizing" Moldova, where Russia still wields massive influence and maintains more than 1,000 troops in the separatist Transdniester region.

The sanctions regime was first adopted in 2023 in an attempt to protect Chisinau from Moscow-backed attempts to wrestle back political control over the country.

So far, 16 people and two organizations are blacklisted, most notably the fugitive oligarchs Vlad Plahotniuc and Ilan Shor, both of whom fled Moldova.

The proposed new batch of listings, seen by RFE/RL, consists of seven individuals and three entities -- all in one way or another linked to Shor.

Deep Background: The Russia-based Shor, whom the Moldovan police believe was responsible for a vote-buying scheme last year that nearly swung the referendum on future EU membership in the Eastern European republic, was a key figure in bank fraud scandal a decade ago in which close to $1 billion was transferred out of Moldovan banks for loans that remained unpaid.

Shor’s political party SOR was outlawed in 2023, but a year later he launched a new political bloc from Moscow called Victory/Pobeda, which is one of the three entities proposed for sanctioning by the EU.

The official sanction text notes that “the Victory/Pobeda Political Bloc is involved in spreading false information and in vote-buying schemes” during both the referendum last year and the presidential election that returned the pro-EU President Maia Sandu to office.

Shor’s company A7 is also listed.

Described by Brussels as a firm “established by Ilan Shor, together with multiple financial companies in Moscow, partnering with Russian state entities” it stands accused of being the vehicle used by him to buy votes.

A7 has also been accused of helping facilitate cross-border financial transfers for Russian clients in the face of Western sanctions.

The third entity on the list is the “Cultural Educational Centre of Moldova” which according to the EU was distributing free vouchers to voters transported to a Moscow polling station, “while simultaneously promoting the ‘Card of the Citizen of the Republic of Moldova' in the Russian Federation’ propaganda program.”

This was, according to the bloc, another activity that Shor and his associates were behind.

Drilling Down

• Another Individuals on the list also appear to be linked to Shor. Alexandru Beșchieru is the leader of the Forța de Alternativă și de Salvare a Moldovei (Alternative and Salvation Force of Moldova) political party, which is one of the successors of the SOR party and now finds itself under the umbrella of the Victory/Pobeda political bloc.
• Victoria Furtuna, the leader of the Moldova Mare (Greater Moldova) party, is another who allegedly has benefited from Shor’s patronage. Moldovan members of parliament Alexandr Nesterovschi and Irina Lozovan, both of the Renastere (Revival) party which is perceived to be yet another successor of the SOR party, are also proposed for blacklisting.
• The pair were sentenced earlier this year to 12 and six years in prison, respectively, for illegal financing of political parties. Both disappeared after their convictions, with Chisinau authorities believing that they currently are hiding in the breakaway Transdniester region.
• The leader of the Renaissance party, Natalia Parasca, is also included in the EU document with the bloc pointing out that she is a member of the board of the already sanctioned entity Evrazia, which according to the files is “actively involved in the illegal financing schemes” of Shor. Vadim Grozavu, leader of the Victory Party and Alexei Lungu, who heads the Chance Party, are also to be blacklisted.
• The EU sanctions do not, however, include the mayor of Chisinau, Ion Ceban.There was confusion on July 9 when the Romanian Foreign Ministry announced on its website that due to national security considerations, Bucharest had barred him from entering Romania.
• That the measure also included a ban on access to the EU’s Schengen area, which encompasses most EU countries as well as non-EU countries such as Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland.
• Ceban will be included in the Schengen Information System (SIS), which is a Schengen area database used for sharing information on border management and security, unless he appeals the decision.
• But that stops short of a full ban as individual European capitals can undercut the Romanian ban by issuing a visa to their country or simply just allowing him entry.

Looking Ahead

On July 16, the European Commission will present its first draft proposal for the next long-term EU budget (2028-2034).

The proposed budget of over a trillion euros ($1.2 trillion) will kick off a debate in Brussels that will drag on for months, as member states will fight among themselves over how much money should be spent on various items.

Perhaps the most interesting question will be how much money will go to EU foreign policy and enlargement, with the bloc expected to take in new members during the new budget period.

That's all for this week!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two major issues: Why the EU still can’t agree on new Russia sanctions and Denmark's EU presidency.

Briefing #1: Why Can't The EU Get Its Russia Sanctions Over The Line?

What You Need To Know: The European Union is edging closer to finally adopting its latest sanctions package, the 18th since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine over three years ago. But two items remain to be negotiated. First, there's the price cap on Russian oil. It’s included in the draft proposal seen by RFE/RL, but it's unclear whether it will stay. Second, there's a Slovak veto on an issue that is related to the sanctions, though not directly part of the package.

Deep Background: When the European Commission presented the proposed package to EU member states in early June, its main proposal was to lower the price cap from the current level of $60 to $45 per barrel.

Since the policy is coordinated through the Group of Seven (G7) nations, the EU sought approval from other G7 countries -- notably the United States -- for the change at a summit in Canada last month. But it failed to get the Americans on board, especially as oil prices surged after Israeli and American attacks on Iran.

Brussels has, however, considered going ahead regardless -- especially since the Russian oil price cap was originally a workaround to the EU’s ban on providing services for transporting Russian oil. In recent discussions in Brussels, EU officials who are familiar with the file but not authorized to speak on the record noted that Cyprus, Greece, and Malta -- all countries with considerable maritime services sectors -- are against lowering the price cap.

However, Greece and Cyprus could ease their stance, especially as the United Kingdom, another big maritime insurer, is in agreement with Brussels on a lower oil price cap. Diplomats even think that the United State could eventually join as well if Brussels and London are fully on board. The last hold-out appears to be Malta, even though there are some hopes that Valletta could agree to a cap lower than $60 but above the proposed $45 per barrel.

Drilling Down:

• Then there is the matter of the Slovak veto. Bratislava has conditioned its thumbs up for more Russia sanctions on the reworking of a separate proposal by the European Commission to phase out Russian energy imports into the bloc by the end of 2027.
• The proposal, presented in May, is called “RePowerEU” and has caused consternation in Slovakia as well as Hungary, which is understood to be quietly backing its northern neighbor.
• And it is easy to see why. Since 2022, the European Union has limited various Russian energy exports via sanctions, for example by banning most coal and oil imports into the bloc. But sanctions require unanimity among the 27 EU member states, and Hungary and Slovakia have, in recent years, vetoed some of the more ambitious proposals from Brussels targeting Russian energy.
• The European Commission is therefore attempting, via RePowerEU, to regulate the EU’s internal market with a raft of measures, most of which can be adopted via a qualified majority of 55 percent of the member states representing 65 percent of the total EU population voting in favor. In other words, taking a route that circumvents Bratislava and Budapest.
• The key proposal will be a legal requirement to ban all new Russian gas contracts and short-term “spot” contracts for Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) by the end of this year. For longer-term contracts, the regulation will suggest a phase-out period ending no later than 2027.
• EU gas imports from Russia have decreased from 45 percent in 2021 to 19 percent in 2024, and are expected to fall to 13 percent in 2025 with the end of the Ukraine transit route at the start of the year. The EU has, however, been embarrassed by a 12 percent increase in Russian LNG imports in 2024 compared to 2023.
• With regard to oil imports, the situation is less dramatic but highly geographically specific and politically sensitive. Russian oil imports now account for only three percent of total EU oil imports, compared to 27 percent in 2022, largely due to sanctions banning Russian seaborne oil imports and refined petroleum products.
• But landlocked Central European nations got an exemption from these measures. While the Czech Republic has now stopped importing from this source, Hungary and Slovakia still get 80 percent of their oil imports from Russia.
• The European Commission will now demand an end to Russian oil imports by the end of 2027. Hungary and Slovakia need to provide a timeline on how they plan to achieve this, outline their alternative plans, and provide greater transparency regarding their current contracts with Moscow.
• Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico indicated at the EU summit in Brussels on June 26 that he would not green light the sanctions package, indicating that he needs clarifications regarding RePowerEU. According to diplomats familiar with the file, Bratislava is seeking legal certainty regarding potential Gazprom claims over contracts rather than exemptions.
• Last week, European Commission officials visited Bratislava to meet with Slovak officials and representatives of energy companies. While the meetings “went well” according to EU diplomats, it appears that Fico still isn’t fully on board. EU ambassadors, meeting in Brussels on July 4 to discuss the sanctions, were told he is not ready to approve just yet.
• The press release issued by the Slovak Economy Ministry after the European Commission visit also hinted that more talks are needed in the coming days. Economy Minister Denisa Sakova said that “the Bratislava meeting was an important step towards finding solutions that take into account the specific factors of each member state when diversifying sources and thus ensure affordable energy prices also for Slovak industry, which is facing rising costs.”
• She added that “we are ready to continue to take a constructive approach to the proposed measures and to continue the expert discussion with the involvement of all relevant stakeholders."

Briefing #2: Denmark’s Full Intray For Its EU Presidency

What You Need To Know: Denmark has taken over the six-month rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union as questions swirl over Europe's security, trade, and the war still raging on its eastern flank. While there isn’t much Copenhagen can do about some of the issues that will face the 27-nation bloc given the veto power wielded by some capitals, Denmark is expected to push for the EU to compensate for diminishing aid coming from Washington. Russian and Ukrainian officials met in Istanbul on May 16 and June 2, the first direct peace talks since the initial weeks of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which Moscow launched on February 24, 2022. The negotiations yielded agreements on prisoner swaps and the exchange of bodies of soldiers killed in the war, but produced no progress toward a cease-fire, let alone a peace deal. A month later, it seems a peace deal is no closer at hand.

Then there's the transatlantic trade row that risks erupting again as the August 1 deadline set by the Trump administration for a deal on tariffs is approaching swiftly. If no agreement is reached, EU goods going to the US could face 50 percent tariffs. The European Commission is in charge of what have been intense negotiations between Washington and Brussels on a new longer-term deal. Denmark’s role will be in the background, trying to get all member states onboard with whatever the Commission compromises on, which can be tough as some countries are more dependent on trade than others. The same is true for potential trade deals that the Commission can strike later this year with countries such Australia and India. EU countries need to sign off on these deals, but expect a lot of resistance as protectionism grows among some members with major farming sectors.

Deep Background: And then there's the elephant -- in this case the world's biggest island -- in the corner of the room: Greenland. Denmark wants to avoid any transatlantic dealings in coming months over the island, which is under Danish control but coveted by US President Donald Trump. The topic reportedly wasn't broached at a recent NATO summit in The Hague that Trump attended, and Danish officials hope this remains the case during their country's EU presidency. A recent election result in Greenland has also strengthened Copenhagen’s hand and there could even be renewed calls for the territory, which withdrew from the European Union back in 1985, to be part of the bloc again. For now, Denmark at least has the backing of all other member states when it comes to its territorial integrity, but this issue could resurface again at any time, posing numerous awkward questions in Brussels and beyond. The Danish Prime minister, Mette Frederiksen, mentioned the issue in her joint presser with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen when marking the opening of the presidency: “For many people in Greenland and the entire kingdom of Denmark, it feels safe when you really can feel that the rest of Europe stands together with you in this strange and difficult situation.”

Drilling Down:

• Another issue that will dominate Denmark's presidency is the EU’s new long-term budget beginning in 2028.
• The European Commission will fire the opening salvo in mid-July by presenting a basic framework for the five-year period and then come back in September with a more developed concept.
• Don’t expect a deal any time soon.
• The long-term EU budget, which will be a pot of money well north of 1 trillion euros, is the most fought-over issue lingering over Brussels.
• It will consume the city and pit institutions and member states against each other for months, even years, to come. Denmark will simply make sure that talks don’t boil over from the get-go.
• What about EU foreign policy and enlargement? On foreign policy, the bloc's top diplomat will help guide potential sanctions on Georgia, which has been criticized for backsliding on democratic reforms and lurching away from Brussels and toward Moscow.
• But with Hungary and Slovakia expected to veto any tough measures, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas will have a tough time brokering a deal with teeth.
• The same is likely to be true of future sanctions on Russia even though the club’s 18th round is expected to be agreed in the coming days, though likely without the signature move to lower the Russian oil cap from the current $60 per barrel to $45 after the idea failed to gain support from Washington.
• While Denmark is keen to accelerate EU enlargement and has made it a priority during the next six months, various national vetoes are likely to make progress minimal.
• Poland, which held the presidency before Denmark, had big hopes here but ended up with Albania opening some negotiation chapters and Montenegro closing one.
• Expect that these two Western Balkan states will continue their steady march toward membership in the coming half a year, but otherwise Denmark will likely face the same frustrations as Warsaw.
• Hungary continues to block Ukraine from opening accession talks, and there is real fear among EU officials that Budapest will continue to do so until its parliamentary election in April 2026.
• The tricky question for Denmark will be whether it attempts to decouple Moldova from Ukraine, as they so far have progressed hand in hand. If it happens, it is likely to be in September, just ahead of crucial Moldovan parliamentary elections later that month.
• Hungary’s behavior will make calls for the country to be stripped of its voting rights grow, but to do that unanimity is needed, and Slovakia -- and possibly others -- are unlikely to give that a green light.
• Backlash to that could come from other countries in the form of reluctance to give the go-ahead to open and close accession chapters with “Hungarian favorites” such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, while North Macedonia, already blocked by a Bulgarian veto for two years, will wonder why no one is putting pressure on Sofia.
• Kosovo, which applied to join the EU in 2022, will presumably also see its bid to join club continue to languish in the Council.
• Denmark would like to send the application for a European Commission assessment, but there is no consensus among member states, and Copenhagen’s case is not helped by Pristina’s inability to form a government months after a general election.

Looking Ahead

Thursday, July 10, will see two important meetings related to Ukraine happening in Rome.

Firstly, the so-called “coalition of the willing” are meeting chaired by the British Prime minister Keir Starmer. The informal group of largely European countries, brought together by France and Britain, will continue to discuss how to the continent can step up and support Kyiv in case there is a ceasefire.

The Italian capital will also host a “recovery conference” for Ukraine hosted by the Italian Premier Giorgia Meloni. This annual conference is meant to gather financial and practical support for the reconstruction of the war-torn country. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy will attend both meetings.

That's all for this week!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.