Accessibility links

Breaking News

Wider Europe

Georgian anti-government demonstrators protest outside Georgia's parliament in central Tbilisi (file photo)
Georgian anti-government demonstrators protest outside Georgia's parliament in central Tbilisi (file photo)

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two issues: The EU’s new “democracy shield” & who the next EU member states are.

please wait

No media source currently available

0:00 0:13:39 0:00

Briefing #1: What Is The EU’s Democracy Shield?

What You Need To Know: The European Commission is preparing to present its latest plan to protect the bloc and EU candidate countries from foreign interference and political manipulation. The "democracy shield," as it's being called, is a collection of proposals to be rolled out in the coming years. An advanced draft of the document, seen by RFE/RL, emphasizes that Russia is the main direct threat to both the European Union and those nations aiming to join the bloc. The European Commission will present the plan on November 12. "In addition to its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine, Russia is also escalating hybrid attacks, waging a battle of influence against Europe. The tactics used are reaching deep into the fabric of our societies, with potentially long-lasting impacts," the draft says. "By spreading deceitful narratives, sometimes including the manipulation and falsification of historical facts, they try to erode trust in democratic systems."

No other country is mentioned in the 30-page-text, even though the bloc has previously voiced worries about China's attempts to wield political influence throughout the continent. The issue of fighting disinformation and foreign interference is controversial both in Brussels and beyond. The EU is still reeling from the broadside fired by the US Vice President JD Vance at the Munich Security Conference in February, in which he argued that the danger for the EU wasn't coming from China or Russia but rather internally via censorship and suppression of dissent and voices. The criticism came shortly after Romania's Constitutional Court in December 2024 annulled the result of the first round of voting in the presidential election just days before the second round was due to take place. The court ruled that the Kremlin had run an online campaign to promote nationalist candidate Calin Georgescu, who finished first. Many critics accused the court of political interference in the election and of impinging on free speech. The European Commission is therefore treading carefully.

Deep Background: While part of that caution comes because many of these issues are the responsibility of individual member states, it's also because Brussels is wary of being even more antagonistic toward large online platforms, notably US-based ones such as Google, Microsoft and Meta, as transatlantic relations have become unpredictable with trade wars and fears of the United States pulling out more troops from the Continent.

Yet the draft suggests the EU must engage with these tech giants. Most of them, with the glaring exception of Elon Musk's X, have signed up to the EU's Code of Conduct on Disinformation, which means companies such as Facebook and TikTok provide regular updates to the European Commission on how they're addressing the issue.

The paper suggests the European Commission should push such companies to do more to "demonetize disinformation" and improve the detection and labeling of AI-generated and manipulated content. The focus of the "democracy shield" is threefold: improving situational awareness, supporting democratic institutions and free media, and boosting citizen engagement. The main proposal is for the creation of a European Center for Democratic Resilience. This would be a hub that would "link together existing networks and structures working on prevention, detection, analysis, and response to patterns of threats in the information space, and work to develop joint approaches, practices and methodologies and exchanging relevant data and analyses."

Drilling Down:

  • The EU tried this once before, in 2019, but the Rapid Alert System never really took off. This second attempt will involve EU institutions, member states, and even candidate countries such as Moldova and Ukraine as well as those in the Western Balkans.
  • The European Commission, however, wants to make it clear this isn't some sort of Ministry of Truth. The plans would be rolled out gradually, participation will be voluntary, and the center will operate in "respect EU and national competences."
  • Other ideas include the roll-out of an "EU digital identity wallet" next year for EU citizens and residents, the creation of a European network of fact-checkers who will work on a fact-checking repository, and "a voluntary network of influencers to raise awareness about relevant EU rules and promote the exchange of best practice."
  • Recalling September's parliamentary election in Moldova, in which Russia was heavily involved in trying to shape the outcome, the draft also suggests that EU election observation missions outside the bloc should be strengthened "to assist national authorities throughout the electoral cycle" -- something Brussels is likely to do again in next year's hotly contested parliamentary elections in Armenia.
  • In the same fashion, there is also a proposal to extend the mandate of the European Digital Media Observatory, which provides research and analysis on disinformation campaigns. It will now get more funding to do more work around elections, not only in EU member states but also partner countries.
  • The financial backing of independent media and journalism in the EU neighborhood, including Belarus and Russia, is also mentioned in the paper.
  • No concrete sums are mentioned.
  • However, many of the programs suggested under the "democracy shield" are currently included in the European Commission's 2 trillion-euro ($2.3 trillion) proposal for the next seven-year EU budget, starting in 2028.


Briefing #2: The EU Is Ready To Expand, But Who Will Be The Next Member – And When?

What You Need To Know: The European Commission's annual enlargement report appears to show the EU's executive is serious about adding new members by the time its five-year mandate ends in late 2029. And it has identified four candidates for that purpose: Albania, Moldova, Montenegro, and Ukraine. The November 4 report, the first issued since the new commission took office late last year, is designed to assess the progress (or lack thereof) of 10 EU hopefuls, which also include Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Turkey.

But this year the report took on a distinctly geopolitical tone. According to officials in Brussels, EU enlargement has become a thing again. The last country to join was Croatia back in 2013, and since then the bloc actually contracted for the first time ever when Britain left in 2020. The 2025 annual report states that the "this is the first Commission mandate since 2010-2014 where, given the accelerating pace of the process for some candidate countries, enlargement is a realistic possibility" and that the entire process "now moving faster than in the last 15 years." The change of pace has everything to do with Russia's full-scale attack on Ukraine -- launched in 2022 -- with EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas noting that "geopolitical shifts make the case for enlargement clear-cut. Enlargement is not a nice-to-have; it is a necessity if we want to be a stronger player on the world stage."

Deep Background: The smart money is on Montenegro being the next addition. Podgorica aims to wrap up EU accession talks by the end of 2026, and the report notes that the country "is on track to meet this ambitious objective." Ultimately, this isn't the call of the European Commission, nor the candidate countries. The 27 current EU member states decide via unanimity to open and close the 33 accession chapters covering all policy fields that EU hopefuls need to adopt in order to become a fully-fledged member. Podgorica has been negotiating for 13 years already, and while it has opened talks on all 33 chapters, it has managed to close just seven. However, most of those have been in the past 12 months, which shows a momentum toward accession. In December, it plans to close another five, but this might be a bit too optimistic according to EU diplomats contacted by RFE/RL. Worries remain, especially regarding the fight against organized crime and corruption and the independence of the judiciary. Thus, next year may be too soon, but word on the street says Montenegro very well might be "EU member state number 28 in '28."

Albania might be the next best bet for membership. The government in Tirana hopes to conclude talks in 2027, and the commission believes this is doable. Albania's candidate progress in the past 12 months has been nothing short of stunning: It has managed to open 28 of 33 chapters and is set to commence negotiations on the final five later this month. The key, however, is closing the chapters, and that is more difficult. Tirana also faces a PR challenge: While Albania is a growing tourist destination -- and plenty of Europeans are snapping up coastal properties there -- the country still carries the negative reputation of being a hotbed of organized crime. It's no surprise then that the European Commission recommends Tirana put even more effort into "investigations of drug traffickers and an increase in identifying and the dismantling of criminal groups."

Drilling Down:

  • Moldova and Ukraine, meanwhile, solidly remain "coupled" -- as they have since both applied for membership in 2022 -- despite rumors this year that they'll be separated.
  • Forging its own path would have allowed Moldova to start accession talks as Ukraine has been blocked by Hungary for over a year and is likely to remain stalled until the next parliamentary election in the Central European country in April 2026.
  • Moldova hopes to join in 2028, and Ukraine believes it could join at some point this decade despite the ongoing war. Both countries received the best assessments by the commission to date even though Kyiv was cautioned earlier this year about the influence of the special anti-corruption agencies NABU and SAP.
  • While the countries remain blocked, all EU member states bar Hungary have agreed to continue the technical work with Chisinau and Kyiv while waiting to get the final political green light from Budapest that could come with a change of government next year. The idea is then to open as many chapters as possible immediately.
  • The common belief in most EU capitals is that roughly half can be opened. Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos even remarked, somewhat optimistically, that negotiations on all 33 can commence immediately if only Budapest would change its mind.
  • In the meantime, talks will continue on how to make the enlargement process more practical. The president of the European Council, Antonio Costa, floated the idea that only unanimity should be needed to start and finish accession talks -- a suggestion quickly shot down by EU member states that prefer to have several brakes to pull to slow down the process.
  • Hungary isn't the only country having issues with its non-EU neighbors: Bulgaria is currently blocking North Macedonia, and Croatia wants to keep Serbia in check before Belgrade can join.
  • Plenty of other types of political "test balloons" have also been released in recent weeks on how enlargement can work. There's been talk of not letting new members have voting rights on certain issues -- a sort of secondary membership that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy immediately dismissed when asked about it last week.
  • The European Commission will in the meantime work on pre-enlargement policy reviews and reforms in order to assess the impact of new members on various policy areas.
  • Kos already floated the idea of a mechanism to suspend voting rights or deny access to EU funds for new members in case of rule-of-law violations. All this is a clear nod to older, Western EU member states that have been lukewarm on expanding the club out of fear of "another Hungary" in reference to Viktor Orban's many rule-of-law transgressions and battles with Brussels over the years.
  • The most likely way to make enlargement manageable is something used in the past: transition periods. This mechanism was used in the 2004 enlargement of eight Central and Eastern European countries, whose citizens, for example, weren't allowed to immediately seek work in other parts of the EU.
  • Poland, with its large agrarian market, was also not fully integrated into the EU's single market overnight. A similar arrangement for Ukrainian agricultural products, which have caused political problems in parts of the club, would not be surprising.
  • Of the four candidate countries, Ukraine has the most uphill battle ahead, given its size and the challenges of the war.
  • It will be much easier for the EU to "absorb" Albania, Moldova, and Montenegro. Kos alluded to the fact that the population of Montenegro, at roughly 600,000, is the same as the Belgian port city of Antwerp, and that Albania and Moldova, with fewer than 3 million citizens each, are like Rome.
  • Don't be surprised if these countries are EU members 28, 29, and 30.

Looking Ahead

EU ambassadors will on November 12 give green light to a new rules that will make it easier to suspend visa liberalization. The move will then be rubberstamped by minister of the 27 EU member states before it enters into force in December. The new rules might soon be tested on Georgia whose government, according to Brussels, has been backsliding politically in several areas in recent months.

That's all for this week!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is welcomed by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen during a European Council meeting on October 23, 2025.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is welcomed by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen during a European Council meeting on October 23, 2025.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two issues: a potential peace plan for Ukraine and Armenia’s long road to EU visa liberalization.

please wait

No media source currently available

0:00 0:11:50 0:00

Briefing #1: Will Europe’s 12-Point Plan On Ukraine Work?

What You Need To Know: With the proposed summit between US President Donald Trump and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, in Budapest seemingly postponed, European countries are once again scrambling to make themselves relevant in any potential settlement of the Ukraine war.

One of the latest attempts is a leaked 12-point plan, seen by RFE/RL, initiated by Finland that has been circulating in European capitals in recent weeks.The document is not a ready-made peace deal, something that its tentative title, “Elements Towards Peace In Ukraine,” makes clear. It has also not been discussed at a higher EU level nor officially endorsed by any country. Rather it is something that has been worked on by the Coalition of the Willing, a collection of over 20 countries supporting Ukraine, since the spring.

The 12 points are framed around two phases: the first one, “cease-fire,” and the other, “negotiations.” A “cease-fire first”approach is something that most European nations have been pushing for ever since the Trump administration started talking with the Kremlin. The document states that such a cease-fire “will begin 24 hours after the parties have accepted this plan” and that a line of contact “will be frozen at the point where it is at the start of the cease-fire.”

Deep Background: In a nod to the United States being in the driving seat of the talks, it is also suggested that the monitoring of the cease-fire will begin “immediately under US leadership, using satellites, drones, and other technological tools." Also during the cease-fire phase, the plan is that Ukraine and Russia agree on a “nonaggression pact,” meaning that while Moscow will stop attacks on Ukraine, Kyiv also must refrain from trying to take back Russian-controlled territories in Ukrainian regions such as Crimea, Donbas, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhya by military means. Regarding the nuclear power plant in the latter region, the proposed idea is to transfer it from Russian control to an unnamed third party and start negotiations on letting Ukraine take it over again.

Under the plan, there would also be “confidence-building measures," which are spelled out as “selected, symbolic sanctions being lifted once the cease-fire has lasted for an agreed number of days.” Another idea is that Russia would be welcomed back to international organizations. While not explicitly spelled out, it could be assumed that this would mean the Council of Europe, which Russia was excluded from in 2022 and the International Olympic Committee. It is also proposed that during the cease-fire phase, a “Board of Peace” would be established, chaired by President Trump, to oversee the implementation of an eventual peace plan -- an idea seemingly borrowed from a recently unveiled 20-points peace plan for Gaza.

Drilling Down:

  • The second phase -- negotiations --firstly involves an armistice. The text notes that “negotiations on a final line of contact will begin, which will remain in effect until the parties have agreed on permanent governance of the occupied territories.”
  • This will also involve security zones established around the line of contact where no military activities will be allowed and monitoring by a multinational, civilian mission on both sides of the line.
  • Security guarantees, something the Coalition of the Willing has been working on for months, is the 8th point even though no further details are offered.
  • The 9th point is controversial as it concerns a high-level dialogue between Kyiv and Moscow to “increase mutual understanding and respect for diversity of language, culture, and religion.”
  • Officials from eastern EU countries that RFE/RL has been in touch with believe that this point plays up Russian allegations, often regarded as baseless, that Russian-language speakers in Ukraine were discriminated against and needed protection by Moscow.
  • The next point is controversial for many European governments as it mentions “the start of negotiations on the permanent governance of the occupied territories.” This goes against the “maximalist” views that many EU capitals hold that Ukraine shouldn’t relinquish any new territories and that its territorial integrity is crucial.
  • The penultimate point involves reconstruction, in which a fund will be established for Ukraine. It is noted that frozen Russian assets might be used for the fund.
  • Finally, there is a line on Russia sanctions gradually being lifted as the plan is being implemented. Here, it is also mentioned that Ukraine and Russia will start a process on agreeing compensation for war damage with the frozen assets in the West, totaling over 200 billion euros ($233 billion), proposed to be returned once an agreement between Kyiv and Moscow has been reached. A so-called snapback mechanism in which all sanctions and isolation measures automatically are imposed if Ukraine is attacked again is also suggested here.
  • So how much chance does this plan have of succeeding? “Probably not much,” admits one European official I spoke to on background. And while some of them still think that the United States might be interested in at least some aspects of the proposals, few believe that Russia will get onboard anytime soon. As one European diplomat put it: “We can have a 12-point-plan, but there won’t be peace -- that is Putin’s one-point-plan.”


Briefing #2: Will Armenia Be Next To Get EU Visa Liberalization?

What You Need To Know: There are lots of discussions in Brussels right now about suspending visa-free travel into the bloc for certain Georgians, most likely officials and diplomats, after what several European Union countries regard as democratic backsliding in the South Caucasus country. That decision is likely to be taken late this year, after the European Commission’s annual EU enlargement report, which is expected to give a scathing review of the political situation in Tbilisi, and when the new, easier rules for suspending visa liberalization enter into force in December.

In parallel, however, the EU is taking steps to eventually grant visa liberalization for another country from the region -- Armenia. Since 2014, the country has enjoyed so-called visa facilitation with the EU, meaning that it’s cheaper and easier to obtain visas. In 2024, Yerevan started a visa liberalization dialogue with Brussels, the first step on the long road to its citizens being allowed to enter most EU countries for a period of 90 days without the need for a visa.

Deep Background: The next step was taken on October 22, when EU member states agreed on the visa liberalization action plan (VLAP). This document, seen by RFE/RL, outlines what Armenia needs to do in four broad policy fields in the coming years: document security; migration management and asylum; public order and security; and external relations and fundamental rights. It is now expected that the document will be handed over to Armenia in the coming weeks and that work on reforms in the various fields will begin. With the European Union growing increasingly wary of any type of immigration into the bloc, it is clear from the document that it is migration management and asylum that will be the one of the four areas most closely observed. The European Commission, which will be the EU institution that will propose that Armenia is ready for a visa-free regime (though the proposal needs to be backed by a majority in the European Parliament and all 27 EU member states), will need to take into account the visa-refusal rate of Armenian citizens or the number that are being refused entry at the EU’s external border and apprehended for staying too long in the EU. According to the VLAP: "A substantial improvement in these performance indicators over the course of the visa dialogue, will be used as an indicative reference in the Commission’s assessment of the expected migratory and security impacts of the liberalization of the visa regime with Armenia."

So far, those rates are stable, but they need to be reduced to satisfy governments in the EU that are increasingly led or supported by populist parties. An EU diplomat with knowledge of the issue speaking on condition of anonymity said that the main worry is that the number of Armenian citizens apprehended for overstays in the EU has increased in recent years. The VLAP document notes that asylum seekers in the EU from Armenia have risen from 4,655 in 2019 to 5,125 in 2024. "That number must go down in the coming years, otherwise things won’t move here," the diplomat noted.

Drilling Down:

  • Other key issues that need to be sorted out include a clear timeframe for the rollout of biometric passports and a phaseout of old passports; implementation of all international anti-money-laundering legislation; striking a cooperation deal with Europol that would allow exchange of personal data that would enable “establishing fair and transparent conditions for the acquisition of Armenian citizenship.”
  • That last point has become increasingly important for the bloc as it is fighting against various types of “investor citizenship schemes,” in which rich people can get passports from certain countries simply by making a big investment. This has been a common tactic for Russians and Belarusians trying to circumvent the EU’s various sanctions on Moscow and Minsk in recent years.
  • So, what happens next? Expect that the European Commission will issue its first progress report on how Armenia is faring in the first half of 2026. Incidentally, Georgia completed such reforms faster than any other country, accomplishing the process in just over two years.
  • Georgia was given its VLAP in early 2013, and, in late 2015, the European Commission already proposed visa-free status in its fourth and final progress report. The European Parliament and EU member states agreed with the assessment shortly after and, in March 2016, visa liberalization kicked in for Georgians.
  • Will it go that fast for Yerevan, meaning Armenians can get visa-free travel by late 2027? “Maybe not that fast,” said one EU official dealing with the issue, who was speaking on the condition of anonymity. However, the EU is keen to support Armenia right now given that it is the country in the region that is most interested in closer ties with Brussels.
  • The European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU’s diplomatic arm, is already evaluating how the recent Moldovan parliamentary elections went and what lessons can be learnt for elections in Armenia in June 2026.
  • Chisinau obviously enjoys much closer ties with the EU than Yerevan as it is an official candidate country and benefits from large financial and political support, but the EU is keen to draw Armenia closer to the bloc as well. Visa liberalization won’t be granted before Armenia's elections next year but expect a lot of encouragement from Brussels that things are moving in the right direction in the coming months.


Looking Ahead

There isn’t much happening in Brussels this week as the All Saints’ weekend approaches but EU agriculture ministers will meet on October 28. They will be joined by their counterpart from Ukraine who will brief them about the war-torn country's agricultural sector, with Kyiv still aiming to export as much grains and other products as possible, both via the Black Sea and land routes to the EU.

That's all for this week! I am off next week, so the next edition of the newsletter will be with you on November 11.

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

Load more

About The Newsletter

The Wider Europe newsletter briefs you every Tuesday morning on key issues concerning the EU, NATO, and other institutions’ relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe’s Eastern neighborhoods.

For more than a decade as a correspondent in Brussels, Rikard Jozwiak covered all the major events and crises related to the EU’s neighborhood and how various Western institutions reacted to them -- the war in Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, Russia’s support for separatists in eastern Ukraine, the downing of MH17, dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, the EU and NATO enlargement processes in the Western Balkans, as well as visa liberalizations, free-trade deals, and countless summits.

Now out of the “Brussels bubble,” but still looking in -- this time from the heart of Europe, in Prague -- he continues to focus on the countries where Brussels holds huge sway, but also faces serious competition from other players, such as Russia and, increasingly, China.

To subscribe, click here.

RFE/RL has been declared an "undesirable organization" by the Russian government.

If you are in Russia or the Russia-controlled parts of Ukraine and hold a Russian passport or are a stateless person residing permanently in Russia or the Russia-controlled parts of Ukraine, please note that you could face fines or imprisonment for sharing, liking, commenting on, or saving our content, or for contacting us.

To find out more, click here.

XS
SM
MD
LG