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Hungarian opposition leader and president of the Tisza (Respect and Freedom) party Peter Magyar (center) waves a Hungarian flag during a campaign rally organized by Hungary's Tisza party in Budapest on March 15.
Hungarian opposition leader and president of the Tisza (Respect and Freedom) party Peter Magyar (center) waves a Hungarian flag during a campaign rally organized by Hungary's Tisza party in Budapest on March 15.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two issues: A look at Hungarian vetoes and how they can change after the elections, and why Brussels is known as the Leaky City.

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Briefing #1: The Fate Of Hungary's Vetoes

What You Need To Know: This week, the EU has entered something of a lull as the impending Easter holidays means there are few meetings of import being held in Brussels. But this lull isn't just about the holidays; most are waiting for possibly the most consequential elections in Europe this year as Hungary goes to the polls on April 12.

With so much EU policy -- notably related to support for Ukraine -- becoming part of the Hungarian election campaign, there is a sense in the EU capital that things will only start to move once the elections are over, no matter if Fidesz' Viktor Orban manages to prolong his 16-years-reign or if his rival, Peter Magyar, and his Tisza party wins.

This optimism stems from the fact that while Orban has made many harsh statements about Ukraine and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, especially in recent months, he is expected to "mellow somewhat," as one RFE/RL source put it, if he wins and allow some of his vetoes to be lifted.

Nearly all officials RFE/RL has talked to both from EU institutions and EU member states openly admit they would prefer a Tisza victory. But they caution that while EU-Ukrainian relations will likely improve with Magyar in power, they still expect him to be tough on Kyiv and not necessarily reverse everything blocked all at once.

Deep Background: So what things paused by Budapest are contenders for unblocking following the vote, regardless of who assumes the premiership?

For starters, there is an expectation in Brussels that the 90-billion-euro loan to Ukraine, initially green lit by Orban in December though later blocked due to the lack of Russian oil supplies via the Druzhba pipeline, will be approved in April.

A European Commission team of experts is currently in Ukraine, and even though they haven't yet gained access to the damaged pipeline, there is hope in the EU that the infrastructure will soon be fixed, the oil will start flowing to Central Europe, and the loan will subsequently be waved through -- even though politicking both in Budapest and Kyiv prevents any moves before April 12.

The EU's 20th sanctions package on Russia, first meant to be approved around the fourth anniversary of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 22, is also expected to be approved after the election. The initial proposal, which included a maritime services ban related to Russian petroleum products that would prohibit EU-based companies from providing services to any vessel transporting these products from Russian ports, is likely to be watered down or removed altogether due to spiraling energy costs in the wake of the Iran conflict.

Drilling Down:

  • If Tisza wins, however, there will be an urge in Brussels to test some of the previous sanctions proposals that Hungarian up till now has rejected. These include sanctions on Russian nuclear energy, which other EU countries that still cooperate with Russia's Rosatom are likely to veto.
  • A potential Magyar government might be more inclined to approve individual sanctions on Russian Patriarch Kirill or people heading various Russian sports organizations and federations as the current Orban government has maintained a policy to veto any potential blacklistings of religious and sports-related individuals.
  • New attempts to sanction violent Israeli settlers on the West Bank, vetoed by Budapest since 2024, and an attempt from 2025 to blacklist leading figures in the ruling Georgian dream party, also shot down by the Hungarians, might be resuscitated with a Tisza government even though other EU member states such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia might take over the veto button at least when it comes to Tbilisi.
  • With all sanction decisions needing unanimity, including rollovers, Brussels will be keen to see whether a potential new Hungarian government would de-list individuals ahead of every renewal period.
  • The sitting Fidesz government has been known for leveraging its green light for extensions to successfully de-list Russian oligarchs such as, for example, Moshe Kantor. It does appear, however, that Slovakia has become just as well-versed in this game, although it remains to be seen if Bratislava will do so without Budapest's backing.
  • Then there are quite a few issues related to Ukraine that are trickier to solve if Fidesz remains in power. Firstly, Orban has made it clear he doesn't see Ukraine as a future EU member and has vetoed the start of Kyiv's accession talks since 2024. While he might be persuaded, at some point, to at least give thumbs up for some accession chapter negotiations to be opened some time in the future, it is far from certain.
  • At the same time ,Magyar is not a fan of a quick EU accession for Ukraine. He has repeated the mantra of EU countries that don't believe in expedient Ukrainian membership: that the process must be merit-based and hence take time.
  • He would most probably be OK with the opening of talks with Ukraine (and Moldova, which is paired with Kyiv) soon, but don't rule out him dragging his feet on this issue.
  • A Fidesz government has made it a central point not to support Ukraine militarily in any way. This has included vetoes on 6.6 billion euros' worth of lethal aid from the bloc's European Peace Facility (EPF) slated for Kyiv, the possibility of sharing satellite images with Ukraine from the EU's Satellite Center (SatCen), and revising the mandates of the two EU missions to Ukraine, EUAM & EUMAM, to include them in future European security guarantees for Kyiv. There is hope in Brussels, though no concrete promise, that these three vetoes would be reversed if someone new is in charge in Hungary.
  • Finally, and more symbolically, there is also an expectation in Brussels that more foreign policy statements will be signed off by all 27 EU member states going forward.
  • Much to the annoyance and embarrassment to European diplomats, the EU has in recent years had to put out statements just in the name of the EU foreign policy chief after Hungary vetoed common texts that, for example, condemned Belarus's sham presidential election in 2025, welcomed the ICC arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin, and commemorated the anniversary of the death of Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny.


Briefing #2: Why Brussels Earns The Nickname Of The 'Leaky City'

What You Need To Know: Much of the chatter around Brussels in recent days has been about Hungary. First came a piece in The Washington Post that claimed the country's combative foreign minister, Peter Szijjarto, made regular phone calls to his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, during the breaks of the EU's monthly EU Foreign Affairs Council.

Separately, private phone conversations between a Politico journalist and an EU official were leaked online. The discussions centered on Hungarian-Ukrainian relations and the Hungarian investigative journalist Szabolcs Panyi, who has often broken stories about links between the ruling Fidesz party and Moscow. Last week, the Hungarian government charged Panyi with spying on behalf of Ukraine.

While it hasn't been established who's behind the Politico leak, many in Brussels have pointed the finger at Hungary. And while the alleged wiretapping of journalists was widely condemned by Brussels and will likely result in more European officials staying off the phone, the story about Szijjarto's dealings with Lavrov came as no surprise. After first denying it, Hungary's foreign minister then confirmed that he not only speaks to Russian colleagues before and after EU meetings but also to counterparts from Israel, Serbia, Turkey, and the United States.

Deep Background: All of this confirms two things those in Brussels have known for years. First, the EU capital is known as the "leaky city" for a reason. Second, there are -- and always have been -- limits to what diplomats will share among the 27 member states.

Take, for example, the various council meetings that national ministers from the member states attend in Brussels, and sometimes Luxembourg, on a monthly basis -- in Szijjarto's case, it was the Foreign Affairs Council.

All the ministers are usually in the room with a small team of aides from their capitals, along with a few of their country's officials based in Brussels. There are also officials from the EU's councils and European Commission. Then there are several translators. All in all, including the ministers, there could be around 100 people in the room, all with cell phones.

It shouldn't, therefore, come as a surprise that some of these people are in touch with others outside the meeting room, often in their own capitals. It also shouldn't come as a surprise that some of these meeting attendees are in touch with foreign capitals and scoop-hungry journalists.

While the European officials I've spoken to were not at all surprised that Hungary has been passing on information to Moscow, they were a little shocked at the brazenness of doing it directly from a council meeting. But they bemoan that there's little they can do about it.

"What do you want us to do?" asked one official, speaking on condition of anonymity. "Tap his phone or accompany him to the bathroom whenever he goes out?"

With so many people in the room, most ministers are briefed beforehand and told to be selective about what they share. Often, they resort to simply reading pre-agreed lines and only veer off-script if absolutely necessary. In Brussels, the unwritten rule is to exchange sensitive information during bilateral meetings with trusted counterparts on the sidelines, rather than committing anything important to paper. After all, documents in the EU capital have a habit of ending up in the hands of the media -- or worse.

Drilling Down:

  • Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk's post on X confirmed that, for years, he had limited himself from speaking too much at meetings in Brussels.
  • Interestingly, the EU summits between heads of government -- the likes of which Tusk has attended many times in his years as prime minister and president of the European Council -- are far less "leaky" and more secretive than ministerial meetings. There, the leaders tend not to bring their phones into the meeting room, and there are usually a few council officials who relay sanitized information from the room to national delegations. In turn, these leak versions that suit them best in their home countries. This is the Brussels version of the Telephone game.
  • So what about all the documents? Legislative proposals are shared widely as all capitals need to decide on them at some point in the process. Many of these files are publicly available, so there are no secrets to truly pass on.
  • Some documents, though, are far more restricted -- for example, sanctions packages targeting countries such as Belarus, Russia, and Iran. These files shouldn't be liberally passed around, but they often end up in the hands of journalists, lobbyists, and others within hours of the European Commission sharing the documents with EU capitals.
  • "It is the way Brussels operates: The system is leaky and many hands are involved, so blame is always passed around, but no one is rarely found out," one seasoned Brussels diplomat, speaking anonymously, told me.
  • That doesn't mean officials are not annoyed by the constant leaks. There are regular discussions on an ambassadorial level about leaks, but, in the end, there is usually an acceptance that a system in which documents must circulate among many people -- including in the member states themselves -- can never be completely leak-proof.
  • No one in Brussels will openly admit it, but most politicians and officials are well aware of how a tactical, well-timed leak can sometimes benefit them.·
  • Perhaps more of a concern is when internal briefing notes are passed around. These are documents drawn up from closed-door meetings at various levels, usually by diplomats from member states and often containing sensitive political and security information. Diplomats usually write these briefing notes for their colleagues back home, so it's more than possible the leaks are coming from the various capitals rather than Brussels.
  • Not everything is shared with everyone in the EU. On issues involving Turkey, for example, Greece and Cyprus are sometimes not briefed by member states; on military matters, which are mostly handled by NATO, some of the neutral states do not participate.
  • In fact, the truly sensitive stuff in Brussels is just shared in various informal groupings of like-minded states that shift from topic to topic. None of that is going to change with the latest revelations about the leaks.


Looking Ahead

Much of the focus in Brussels this week will be on how to combat energy prices as the Iran conflict rumbles on. EU energy ministers will have an informal meeting online on March 31, and a day later the European Commission will present certain emergency measures member states can take such as subsidizing electricity bills and allowing more flexibility for state aid rules to help energy companies.

That's all for this week. I will off next week, so the next issue of the newsletter will come out on April 14!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here .

Russian President Vladimir Putin (right) welcomes Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian in St. Petersburg in December 2025. The EU has warned of Russia's "destabilizing tactics" in Armenia ahead of parliamentary elections in June.
Russian President Vladimir Putin (right) welcomes Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian in St. Petersburg in December 2025. The EU has warned of Russia's "destabilizing tactics" in Armenia ahead of parliamentary elections in June.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two issues: the EU's game plan for Armenia and Belarus's prospects as the US lift sanctions on potash.

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Briefing #1: The EU Plan To Keep Russia Out Of Armenia's Election

What You Need To Know: European Union foreign ministers last week gave the green light to send a so-called hybrid rapid response team to Armenia to help the South Caucasus republic combat issues such as foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) and cyberthreats ahead of the country's parliamentary elections on June 7.

The mission statement for the rapid response team, seen by RFE/RL, states that Armenia "has been facing intense hybrid activities, with concerns over an intensification of actions taken by adversaries to undermine democratic institutions, processes and societal trust" and that these sorts of threats "are highly likely to escalate further in the run up to the elections."

According to the paper, the team, which will consist of nine to 14 experts, will be sent to Armenia in late March or early April for 10-15 working days with the stated goal of advising the Yerevan government on crisis management plans and intelligence sharing in various electoral scenarios.

One of the expected results for the EU is that "Armenian political authorities have a clearer understanding of their roles and responsibilities in complex crisis management and hybrid threat detection and response, particularly in relation to the upcoming elections."

Other actions will include help on tracking and prosecuting illicit financing and to launch "a public awareness campaign related to the elections on FIMI, with support in targeting key demographics and promoting media literacy and critical thinking."

Deep Background: The EU dispatched a similar team to Moldova ahead of its parliamentary elections last year, in which the pro-EU forces retained their power. There are hopes among EU officials RFE/RL has been in touch with to repeat "a success story" in Armenia.

While it is unclear whether the hybrid response team is returning to Armenia closer to the election date, its presence in the early spring will produce a report to guide Brussels' next steps vis-a-vis Yerevan.

This could include a fully fledged civilian EU mission to Armenia to replace the current EU mission, EUMA, which was created in 2023 to contribute to stability in the border areas of Armenia adjacent to Azerbaijan. Such a mission would, however, need unanimous backing from all 27 EU member states.

In parallel with the hybrid response team, the EU's diplomatic corps, the European External Action Service also distributed to EU member states a longer document titled Political Framework For A Crisis Approach (PFCA) For Armenia.

The 28-page-file, also seen by RFE/RL, argues in favor of a new Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) mission, stating it is "in the EU's vital interest to build on the growing bilateral relationship with Armenia and contribute to domestic and regional stabilization, notably by disentangling Armenia from polarizing foreign interferences. CSDP options should be explored to this end, with a view to complementing existing EU tools and in view of the possible phasing out of the current EU CSDP mission as the (Armenia-Azerbaijan) peace process takes hold."

Drilling Down:

  • The paper makes it clear that Moscow is the main adversary for Brussels in Armenia. It notes that "Russia has intensified its coercive posture toward Armenia amid Yerevan's gradual reorientation toward the EU, exploiting Armenia's deep economic dependency and the fragile regional security environment."
  • The "destabilizing tactics" the document lists are Russian threats of gas price hikes and selective trade slowdowns, disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, and "psychological operations (PSYOPs) to undermine confidence in electoral integrity and regional stability."
  • The paper also points out that the Kremlin "is expected to leverage existing tensions and fears with Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Iran, which further complicates the regional picture and the course of the peace process."
  • While Yerevan has approached the EU in recent years, including by hoping for visa liberalization at some point and toying with the idea of one day applying for membership in the bloc, the document is clear-eyed about how closely intertwined the country still is with Moscow.
  • It notes that "Armenia remains heavily dependent on Russia in security, economic, and energy spheres." The Russian military base in the Armenian city of Gyumri and Russian FSB border guards patrolling Armenian borders with Iran and Turkey as well as providing Armenian border guard service are listed as geopolitical factors to be considered.
  • On the economic side, there are clear indicators that Moscow's influence in Armenia remains considerable. Armenia is a member of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, which makes Moscow the country's main energy supplier and biggest trade partner with close labor-migration ties. Russian firms also control major Armenian gas, rail, and telecom infrastructure.
  • The document is also surprisingly frank about what the EU stands to lose if it doesn't step up in its engagement with Armenia. It warns Brussels risks "diminished EU influence on key processes, including the implementation of peace arrangements, the shaping of Armenia's security reforms and its broader strategic orientation" if it doesn't match political statements of support with concrete actions.
  • Again, the fear is Russia will step in if Brussels doesn't. The paper concludes by saying, "The EU would miss a historic opportunity to enable regional actors to free themselves from Moscow's embrace at a moment of Russian weakness in the region."


Briefing #2: What Now For Belarus's Potash Trade?

What You Need To Know: The United States announced on March 19 that it is easing sanctions on several Belarusian companies, including Agrorozkvit, Belaruskali, and its marketing arm, the Belarusian Potash Company, after a deal was agreed to release 250 prisoners being held in Belarus.

The measures have been in place since 2021, when the regime of authoritarian leader Aleksandr Lukashenko forced a commercial jet en route from Greece to Lithuania to land in Minsk to detain Belarusian journalist Raman Pratasevich and his partner, Sofia Sapega. The easing of sanctions and the prisoner release -- the latest in a series of such moves -- highlights a thaw in relations between Washington and Minsk that began with the start of the second term of President Donald Trump.

The question now is what effects these sanctions, particularly the easing of restrictions on Belarusian fertilizers, can have on both Minsk and globally as the world faces ever-growing price hikes due to the war in Iran.

Potash is crucial for food production. Together with nitrogen and phosphorus, it is used in fertilizers needed to sustain the entire crop-growing cycle in crucial foodstuffs such as wheat, rice and maize -- products that provide over 40 percent of global caloric intake.

In the Northern Hemisphere, spring is the most important time of year when it comes to fertilizers. It is currently the season for wheat, sugar beet, and rapeseed to receive a crucial second or even third round of fertilizer application. A shortage of fertilizers due to spiraling costs can lead to food scarcity in poorer parts of the world and increased food prices in developed countries.

Deep Background: All this is important for Belarus, in particular, as various types of potash-based fertilizers have been the country's top exported commodity, bringing in over $1 billion in 2024, according to estimates.

Belarus accounts for around 15 percent of the global share of fertilizer production. It used to have an even greater share before it was targeted by various Western sanctions imposed after a deadly crackdown on the opposition and civil society that followed a 2020 presidential election in which Lukashenko claimed victory despite widespread claims of fraud.

That year, the sector totaled almost $2.5 billion from fertilizer trade. Locked out from lucrative US and European markets, Belarus instead targeted big fertilizer importers such as Brazil, China, and India. Despite that, trade volumes have dwindled.

But will the EU also lift its Belarus sanctions? It certainly doesn't look like it.

In late February, the EU unanimously extended its economic sanctions on the country by another year. Those measures include an import ban on Belarusian potassium-based fertilizers and targeted sanctions on companies such as Belaruskali. According to several EU officials that RFE/RL spoke to on condition of anonymity, the United States has not put pressure on the bloc to ease its restrictive measures or allow the transit of these Belarusian products through its territory.

While nitrogen-based fertilizers still can be imported, they are slowly being phased out, as well. Last year, the EU added duties of 40-45 euros ($45-50) per ton on top of a 6.5 percent tariff on the product from both Belarus and Russia. That duty is set to rise to 60 euros per ton this summer and to 80 euros next year, before finally going up to 350 euros per ton by 2028.

The increases essentially make it economically unviable for markets abroad to buy Belarusian products. The question is whether European farmers -- one of the strongest lobby groups in the EU -- will want to lower or abolish those tariffs if production costs keep rising this year.

Europe's own fertilizer production is considerably more expensive due to stricter environmental legislation and a lack of cheap gas. A qualified majority of the 27 EU member states is needed to reverse the current sanctions policy and, with markets squeezed, it could be one to watch.

Drilling Down:

  • The Iran crisis could affect this in several ways. With strikes being launched at targets around the Persian Gulf, shipping through the vital Strait of Hormuz has virtually ground to a halt. The waterway carries about one-fifth of the world's energy.
  • It also handles some 20-30 percent of global fertilizer exports, including around 20 percent of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade -- a key component in synthetic fertilizers. Critically, 50 percent of all global sulfur shipments pass through the strait; as a byproduct of oil and gas processing, sulfur is an essential ingredient in phosphate fertilizer production.
  • Since the outbreak of the war, global fertilizer prices have increased by 25 percent and are expected to soar. Asia is particularly vulnerable. It takes a majority of both the LNG and fertilizer exports traveling from the Persian Gulf.
  • India, which is in desperate need of potash before the monsoon season starts in June, is perhaps the country to watch but also sub-Saharan Africa. While the Continent is not a big fertilizer importer in relative terms, many African farmers don't have the financial capacity to absorb global price increases and might instead cut yields creating local food insecurity.
  • Higher global oil and gas prices will also have implications for farmers in the West as post-production costs such as transportation, refrigeration, and milling are expected to soar.
  • So can Belarus expect increased export revenue soon? Potentially, although it is not that straightforward. Brazil, China, and India could increase their potash imports now, as the likelihood of being punished by secondary US sanctions have diminished further. But there are also complications.
  • For starters, EU sanctions remain on potash, meaning that Belarus can't transport the product the fastest and cheapest way: via the ports of the Baltic states, notably Klaipeda in Lithuania. That means that Belarus will still have to ship its potash on Russian railways to St. Petersburg, which takes a longer time.
  • These routes are also overloaded with Russian potash, which takes precedent. Russia is the world's second-largest producer of the product, claiming one-fifth of global exports and is looking to exploit the market opportunity presented by the Strait of Hormuz closure.
  • It is also unclear whether the US, another major fertilizer importer, is particularly interested. Getting the stuff all the way from Belarus may not make too much sense as Canada, by far the global leader in fertilizer exports, is a closer and easier option.


Looking Ahead

On March 26, there is an important EU court ruling as five Russian businessmen, including the influential Dmitry Mazepin, will find out if the judges will remove them from the EU's sanctions list or if they will remain blacklisted.

The quintet has all previously lost in the EU's general court and are now at the appeals stage at the higher EU Court of Justice. According to the bloc, all five are politically close to the Kremlin and have financed Moscow's war effort in Ukraine through their business activities.

That's all for this week!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

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