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People take part in a demonstration against the government of Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Jansa, in Ljubljana in May 2021.
People take part in a demonstration against the government of Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Jansa, in Ljubljana in May 2021.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two issues: The Slovenian election and a difficult EU summit.

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Briefing #1: Slovenians Vote In Crucial, Overlooked Poll

What You Need To Know: There are no national elections in any of the big European countries in 2026, which is something of anomaly -- and a relief for many. Instead, all eyes have turned to the frenetic run-up to the April 12 election in Hungary in which polls indicate that the 16-year reign of Viktor Orban may come be coming to an end.

But before that, there's another election that's little discussed and yet could have consequences for the EU. The parliamentary vote in Slovenia, home to 2 million people, on March 22 could act as something of a bellwether of things to come in Hungary. It represents a battle between the liberal-centrist incumbent and former businessman Robert Golob's Freedom Movement Party (GS) and his conservative rival, Janez Jansa of the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS).

Deep Background: Jansa has been the towering figure of Slovenian politics for decades and was instrumental in securing the independence of the country as Yugoslavia violently disintegrated in the 1990s. He is now seeking a fourth term as prime minister.

While this election is about many things, Jansa's polarizing nature is a topic very much on voters' minds.

Luka Lisjak, a historian and editor at Razpotja & Eurozine, told RFE/RL that the SDS leader "has been many things during this career, almost everything: hardcore communist to left-wing critic of the regime to liberal, neoliberal, neoconservative nationalist."

"In 2026, he is the representative of the let's say, the Trumpist current of the European right wing," Lisjak added.

Jansa is not shy about playing up his alignment with the sitting US president. In fact, he was one of few world leaders who congratulated Trump on his claims of having won the 2020 American presidential race. And like Trump he is prolific on social media; his previous premiership in 2020-2022 was characterized by constant spats with mainstream media and various cultural wars.

If back in power, he is expected to form something of a "sovereignist alliance" within the EU together with Orban, Slovakia's Robert Fico, and the Czech Republic's Andrej Babis in which they will rail against Brussels ideas on green politics, migration, rule of law issues and a more federal union.

While the SDS is still part of the mainstream center-right European People's Party (EPP), it was indicative that its members in the European Parliament voted against current European Commission chief Ursula von der Leyen -- an EPP colleague -- when she was re-elected in 2025.

On foreign policy, the leaders of the Western Balkans will be apprehensive of a repeat of an alleged policy paper from 2021 that Jansa denied authorship of that would create a greater Albania, Croatia, and Serbia. He would also almost certainly reverse the current government's pro-Palestinian stance in favor of closer ties with Israel and bigger support for the current US-Israeli war with Iran.

There is one issue, however, where he markedly differs from Orban and Fico: Russia. He was the first foreign leader (alongside Czech and Polish colleagues) to visit Kyiv shortly after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Here, he would be more closely aligned with another conservative European politician, according to Lisjak.

"He remains much more supportive of Ukraine's defense and is much more critical of Vladimir Putin. And therefore, maybe not so much in internal politics but in foreign politics, I would say the most similar would be Georgia Meloni in Italy."

Drilling Down:

  • Jansa's potential comeback can also be ascribed to Golob's somewhat lackluster performance in government in the past four years with domestic issues of various sorts dominating the debates.
  • Dimitar Keranov of the German Marshall Fund (GMF) points out that while the Slovenian economy is rather stable compared with some other countries in the region, "you have questions like wage growth, housing affordability, even inflation. And of course, the second key issue is health care and public services. So for example, long waiting times, staff shortages are the most visible political issues."
  • The flight of qualified medical personnel to neighboring Austria has been a hot potato as the government supposedly wedded to the bread-and-butter issues of the center left haven't seemed capable of delivering.
  • But Keranov also sees another advantage for the SDS:"Golob and his party haven't been so effective in mobilizing online or having this effective online communication strategy, whereas I think Jansa's party has been more effective in the online communication domain. And I think this is nowadays decisive."
  • It's also the issue of how Golob came to power back in 2022, as a new kid on the block on the back of a wave of voter fatigue of Jansa's Covid-19 handling and the relative implosion of the center left.
  • That he teamed up to form a government with the center-left Social Democrats and the even more left-leaning Levica party also created an issue, according to Lisjak:
  • "I think [it was] probably the most left- wing government Slovenia has had in 25 years or so. So there is a big chunk of the population that voted for him because they were fed up with Jansa's government but did not expect such a clear turn to the left in political and social issues and they're disappointed with. Those are the voters that he will have a hard time winning back."
  • Ultimately, that is what will determine the outcome of the elections: not Jansa's SDS and Golob's GS that will go toe-to-toe for first place with something between 20 and 30 percent of the vote, but a myriad of smaller parties that hope to clear the 4 percent threshold and become the kingmakers.
  • In this mix are not only Golob's current coalition partners but potentially also the Pirate party that tends to swing left, a trio of center-right parties that run as an alliance and could prop up a future Jansa government even if one or two of them go the other way, a pro-Russia anti-establishment party, Resnica, that dislike both camps, and the likely third place finisher, the Democrats.
  • This party, created by Jansa's former foreign minister Anze Logar, could be the party to look at on election night -- even though the coalition-building to get the 46-seat majority in parliament may take much longer and be much messier than that.


Briefing #2: Little Progress On Ukraine, Iran Expected As EU leaders Gather

What You Need To Know: EU leaders are meeting in Brussels on March 19-20 for a summit that initially was supposed to deal with how the bloc can become more economically competitive on the world stage. Instead, the meeting is likely to show that two of its "signature deliveries" on Ukraine -- a 90-billion-euro loan and another sanctions package on Russia -- remain essentially stuck, and there is precious little that the club can deliver on when it comes to the war on Iran.

The blockage on both items related to Ukraine is a direct consequence of a Hungarian veto (with Slovakia while not being as vocal, backing Budapest). The Ukraine financial aid was already agreed at a summit in December when Hungary and Slovakia, alongside the Czech Republic, got an opt-out, but you still need unanimity to change the way the common EU budget is set up to ensure that the loan will go to Kyiv.

Hungary has refused to give its thumbs up ever since the Soviet-era Druzhba pipeline carrying Russian oil to Central Europe was damaged in Ukraine in later January.

Deep Background: Several EU officials who RFE/RL have spoken under the condition of anonymity said they had hoped the issue would be resolved by the summit but are now skeptical, especially given the increasingly hostile rhetoric coming from both Budapest and Kyiv.

With Orban facing a tough re-election battle on April 12, the issue has dominated the domestic political cycle. At the EU Foreign Affairs Council on March 16, Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto suggested Ukraine could restart the pipeline but refuses for purely political reasons.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, meanwhile, accused European allies of blackmailing his country to reopen Druzhba.

The European Commission wants to send a fact-finding mission to the damaged part, located in Ukraine, which Kyiv so far has refused, and a coordinated letter exchange between the Ukrainian leader and von der Leyen to pave the way for such a mission has not happened, much to the frustration of many EU diplomats.

The draft EU summit conclusions, seen by RFE/RL, are still optimistic that a deal will be stuck on the issue. The text notes that "following its December 2025 decision to provide Ukraine with a support loan of EUR 90 billion for 2026 and 2027, the European Council welcomes the adoption of the loan by the co-legislators and looks forward to the first disbursement to Ukraine by the beginning of April."

While it's seen as positive that this text isn't in brackets -- normally an indication that it has yet to be agreed on by all 27 member states -- it is worth pointing out that at other summits Hungary has simply opted out of Ukraine-related parts of the meeting declarations.

  • Drilling Down:
  • Regarding the 20th sanctions package, there is even less hope that anything will be agreed this week. Here, the text is clearly in brackets, and according to EU diplomats it is more likely that the text, rather than the brackets, will disappear during the actual meeting.
  • The aim initially was for the measures to be adopted around the fourth anniversary of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, but now that the deadline's passed there isn't the same urgency.
  • This also has to do with the fact that the headline item of the proposed measures -- a full maritime service ban on vessels carrying Russian oil -- has become increasingly unattractive since US-Israeli strikes on Iran earlier have driven energy prices through the roof.
  • Instead, there have been calls, notably by Orban, to drop the bloc's energy sanctions on Russia, following the United States decision to pause its restrictive measures linked to energy on the Kremlin for a month. The EU, however, is not planning to go that far, with the renewal of its sectoral sanctions on Moscow coming up first in July.
  • The EU response, or lack thereof, will likely be the main discussion point at the summit. In the draft conclusions, the regular EU lines are being repeated.
  • There are "calls for de-escalation and maximum restraint" and "full respect of international law by all parties." It "strongly condemns Iran's indiscriminate military strikes against countries in the region" and adds that Tehran "must never be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon."
  • But there are two crucial issues to be addressed: assisting the United States in keeping the Strait of Hormuz open for navigation and combatting higher electricity prices in the EU as a result of its blockage.
  • This comes as the US President Donald Trump warned NATO allies that they face a "very bad future" if they don't support the American effort to reopen the key maritime corridor.
  • One European diplomat told RFE/RL that most European countries want to "appear helpful" to Washington by balancing this with the desire to not be "sucked into the conflict."
  • A potential "coalition of the willing" of various naval assets could be gathered, and there are suggestions to boost the EU naval mission of the coast of Yemen, called Aspides, even though it only contains four boats at present and hasn't been "too effective" in preventing attacks from Huthi rebels, according to several EU officials.
  • The big fight could instead come about whether to water down the EU's climate goals in order to combat higher electricity bills, a direct consequence of the Iran war.
  • With fears that this is a surefire way for populists of various hues to gain even more electoral votes, the summit conclusions stipulate "a review of the emissions trading system (ETS) at the latest by July."
  • Some countries like Italy and Poland would prefer the ETS to be even more watered down, whereas Spain and Sweden see it is a central plank for the bloc to achieve net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.


Looking Ahead

On March 18, the European Union and Iceland will sign a so-called Security and Defense Pact. Brussels has previously signed this sort of deal to deepen defense cooperation with numerous close allies such as Albania, Canada, Japan, Moldova, and the United Kingdom, but this signature is symbolic as it comes in the middle of a big debate in Iceland about closer ties with the bloc, with the island planning a referendum in late August to resume EU accession talks.

That's all for this week!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org .

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here .

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and his Slovak counterpart, Robert Fico
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and his Slovak counterpart, Robert Fico

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and, this week, I am drilling down on two issues: Hungary and Slovakia threatening the Russia sanctions renewal; plus, various ideas on EU enlargement.

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Briefing #1: Hungary And Slovakia Are Playing With The EU's Russia Sanctions Renewal -- Again

What You Need To Know: Hungary and Slovakia are yet again leveraging their vetoes in order to get a handful of Russian individuals removed from the European Union’s visa-ban and asset-freeze blacklist, which was created after the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The other 25 EU member states are, on the other hand, countering by suggesting that the list should be renewed just once a year and are suggesting that two other individuals -- seen as legally “weak cases” -- should be delisted instead.

The blacklist, which now consists of over 2,700 individuals and companies, is currently extended every six months -- normally in September and March with the next deadline on March 15. The bloc’s ambassadors had an initial discussion about it on March 3 and are expected to come up with a solution when they meet again either on March 11 or later on March 13.

Deep Background: The issue, however, is being further complicated by the lack of progress on the Druzhba pipeline, which carries oil from Russia to Europe. With the flow of oil interrupted since late January to landlocked Hungary and Slovakia -- which still enjoy an exemption from EU sanctions on Russian oil -- both Bratislava and Budapest have blocked the 90 billion euros ($105 billion) loan to Ukraine and the 20th sanctions package on Russia. The Central European nations are blaming Kyiv for not wanting to repair the Soviet-era pipeline that crosses Ukraine on its way to the EU, while Kyiv contends that the structure was damaged by Russian bombardment and that continued assaults by the Kremlin on Ukrainian energy infrastructure make any repairs complicated and dangerous. While not immediately linking the renewal of these sanctions to the pipeline, an EU official told RFE/RL under the condition of anonymity that “everything hangs together” and that the resumption of operations of the Druzhba pipeline in the coming days or even a European-led mission to observe the damage to it could move this sanctions file forward.

Drilling Down:

  • The practice of leveraging the veto to get individuals delisted has been used by Hungary at almost every six-month extension. In March 2025, oligarch Viatcheslav Moshe Kantor, Russian Sports Minister Mikhail Degtyaryov, and Gulbahor Ismailova, the sister of billionaire tycoon Alisher Usmanov, were removed from the blacklist in this way.
  • According to several individuals familiar with the file but who are not permitted to speak on the record, Bratislava has renewed its push to try to get Usmanov and Russian-Israeli oligarch Mikhail Fridman removed, just as was the case when the sanctions were debated and renewed the last time, in September 2025. On top of that, Budapest is angling to get oligarchs Dmitry Mazepin, Pyotr Aven, Musa Bazhaev, and Albert Avdolyan off the list. Back in September, the other 25 EU member states managed to push back by countering that they were asking for a 12-months rollover instead of the usual six and that no so-called “political delistings” should occur.
  • Additionally, those 25 countries were also helped at the time by the United States reportedly pushing Hungary and Slovakia to step back, as well as a ruling in the European Court of Justice stating that sanctions on another Russian oligarch, Roman Abramovich, were legally sound -- thereby strengthening the case for not removing any individual seen as close to Russian President Vladimir Putin. In the end, none of the people suggested by Hungary and Slovakia were delisted but the renewal period remained six months.
  • Now, those 25 nations are trying to repeat the trick of a 12-month rollover threat, along with adding two other names to be removed instead. According to a document seen by RFE/RL, the proposal is to delist Maya Bolotova and Niels Troost. These two names are seen as “weak cases” by the EU’s legal service, which means that they probably would be required to be removed anyway because of insufficient evidence against them.
  • Niels Troost is a Dutch businessman who was sanctioned by the EU in late 2024. His company, Paramount Energy and Commodities, had continued to trade Russian crude oil at prices above a G7-backed price cap. To date, he is the only EU citizen to be blacklisted for undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity. He has maintained, however, that he was deceived into a business deal that fell afoul of EU rules on Russian oil trading.
  • Bolotova was sanctioned in 2022 and is the daughter of Nikolai Tokarev, the head of the Russian energy giant Transneft. The EU official journal states in its reasoning for sanctioning her that “Bolotova and her ex-husband Andrei Bolotov own luxury real estate in Moscow, Latvia, and Croatia worth more than $50 million, which can be linked to Nikolai Tokarev.”
  • The journal further notes that “she also has links with the company Ronin, which manages the pension fund for Transneft. When [Bolotova] applied for Cypriot citizenship, she listed the address of Ronin Europe as her own in the press announcement.”


Briefing #2: Ukraine's EU-By-2027 Bid Hanging By A Thread

What You Need To Know: It is becoming clearer by the day that the EU won’t be able to accept Ukraine as an EU member by next year. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said as much to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy when visiting Kyiv in February when she said that the European Commission doesn't set dates. And earlier in March, ambassadors of several EU member states shot down the European Commission's idea of a so-called “reversed membership” at a dinner with key people in Von der Leyen’s cabinet. The “reversed” option would involve granting EU membership first, followed by a gradual expansion of market access, while, at the same time, requiring steady progress on democratization and the rule of law.

Deep Background: The EU's plan for Ukraine, it seems, is to continue with the status quo and mix it with a second option -- a sort of “gradual integration” that would give Kyiv access to certain EU benefits before getting full membership in the end. This is a plan that has been floating around Brussels corridors for more than a decade and was publicly endorsed by the leaders of Albania and Serbia, Edi Rama and Aleksandar Vucic, respectively, in a recent, jointly penned opinion piece for the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. The idea of Ukrainian membership by 2027 has troubled Brussels for months already. It is part of the US-led 20-point plan to settle the war between Russia and Ukraine, which was negotiated with minimal European input.

Everyone in Brussels would agree that EU membership is the ultimate security guarantee that can be offered to Kyiv. At the same time, the bloc is at pains to point out that accession is -- and always has been -- a long and arduous process in which a country's national laws need to become EU laws. Theoretically, a change in government in Hungary could end Budapest’s long-standing veto on launching Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations -- but, even then, closing the full set of chapters would likely take Kyiv many years. Ukraine just isn’t that advanced in its preparations and reforms for entry to the bloc. Hence, the need for the European Commission to potentially offer Ukraine the “reversed membership” option.

Drilling Down:

  • But at a dinner with member states' ambassadors on March 4, this "reverse" idea was widely criticized. According to a read-out of the meeting seen by RFE/RL, the two big hitters, France and Germany, dismissed the idea and were backed by Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, and Sweden.
  • Instead, there was wider support for the two other options -- the status quo or gradual EU integration of the kind the Albanian and Serbian leaders are supporting.
  • All of this reflects three positions that most EU member states cling to, even if they don't speak about it publicly: First, they want to keep veto rights on enlargement policy; second, they don't want the process to go too fast; and, third, they know how difficult it is to reform the enlargement process without resorting to an EU treaty change -- a Pandora's box that no one wants to open as the bloc would be struck in constitutional wrangles for years to come.
  • On the veto issue, there is widespread annoyance with Budapest’s hard-line “no” for Ukraine and an understanding that there shouldn’t be over 100 veto opportunities as there currently is in the enlargement process. Despite those objections, most EU capitals want to retain the right to veto any candidate countries at some point along the way, if necessary.
  • There are similar sentiments regarding the issue of fast-tracked membership. EU officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity, have told me that they still think that it's a "merit-based" process in which EU hopefuls undergo reforms to make sure they don't democratically backslide while a member of the union. "Avoiding another Hungary is much more important than speed for us," one EU diplomat said.
  • Rama and Vucic highlighted the issue of the reforms the EU itself must undertake by noting that “worries about decision-making, institutional balance, and political cohesion are legitimate. Leading politicians in Paris, Berlin and elsewhere have emphasized that internal EU reforms may be necessary to keep an enlarged union capable of decisive action,” adding that “We are not naive. These arguments matter. We have -- often the hard way -- learned how difficult it is to persuade all member states to speed up our accession processes, and how easily progress can be blocked.”
  • What they are instead asking for is an accelerated integration of prepared candidate countries into the EU’s single market -- but this would come with “no veto rights or additional commissioners, members of the European Parliament, or changes to voting structures.” Essentially, all the benefits EU membership would offer but without institutional representation of any kind.
  • This sort of solution would be music to the ears of France and Germany, as well as for EU hopefuls in the western Balkans, who stand no chance of joining the bloc any time soon. The exemption is the current front-runner Montenegro, which still hopes to get full membership by 2028 and isn’t looking for any Plan Bs. It also doesn’t offer Ukraine anything but dashed hopes.
  • But there are issues with this approach as well. For starters, there isn’t currently any legal possibility to offer “half memberships” in the EU. You are either in or out.
  • What can be done is that the European Commission gets creative and comes up with a pre-accession treaty for those countries interested in the Albanian-Serbian option. For example, this could mean that before they are full EU members, they could become members of the visa-free Schengen zone. That could be tricky, however, as such an option would need to be signed off by all member states.
  • In the end, the EU will likely offer lower-hanging fruit that doesn’t require any big legal changes. Some of the western Balkan states are already in the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) and they will soon be included in the EU’s “roam like home” mobile zone that Ukraine and Moldova became a part of at the start of 2026.
  • With the Balkan nations all having Association Agreements with the EU, those deals can be deepened to include more integration in areas such as foreign policy and energy -- something that many EU ambassadors pointed out at their dinner last week.
  • That may not suit Ukraine, but most EU member states and candidate countries are now edging closer to a “hybrid” of the current rules and additional gradual-integration “goodies” -- just as long as it isn’t fast-tracking anyone toward full membership anytime soon.


Looking Ahead

There is a distinct South Caucasus focus in this week’s European Parliament session in Strasbourg. On March 11, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian will address the chamber. Later that same day, there will be a debate about the situation in Georgia and the country's political prisoners, with the house expected to pass a nonbinding resolution on the topic a day later.

That's all for this week!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

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