Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two major issues: the main takeaways from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy's Brussels visit and the latest in Sweden's and Finland's increasingly frustrating bids to join NATO.

Brief #1: The Main Takeaways From Zelenskiy's Visit To Brussels

What You Need To Know: Just a week after European Council President Charles Michel and a large part of the European Commission visited Kyiv, it was Zelenskiy's turn to visit Brussels on February 9 -- his first stop in the EU capital since the Russian invasion almost one year ago.

The visit came after a brief stopover in London and a meeting in Paris with both French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz.

Zelenskiy's first foreign trip since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, came in late December last year when he made a sudden appearance in Washington, D.C. to try to secure U.S. approval for Patriot missile deliveries to Ukraine.

On his way back from the United States, he also briefly met with Polish President Andrzej Duda in Rzeszow, Poland.

The fact that he visited the United States, Poland, the United Kingdom, and France all before visiting Brussels raised some hackles among a few EU officials. Yet his choice of itinerary reflects one clear reality: Ukraine needs more weapons, especially amid reports of an impending Russian military offensive.

In this respect, Brussels isn't the priority.

In London, Zelenskiy secured long-range missiles and the training of Ukrainian pilots on NATO-standard fighter jets. In Paris, Macron was very much open to the idea of sending Mirage planes. In Brussels, Zelenskiy addressed all 27 EU leaders, first in a plenary session and then in smaller groups, with the aim of securing deliveries of fighter jets as soon as possible. (Since the invasion began, the Ukrainian president has attended nearly every EU summit via video link.)

Deep Background: Zelenskiy's Brussels trip was more notable for the various photo ops than any concrete deliverables. Known as "leak city," his Brussels visit was reported by the press three days in advance, while his journeys to London and Paris were kept tightly under wraps.

Before he even landed, EU institutions were vying for who would host him first. In the end, there was something of a classic "Brussels fudge," in which Michel and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen greeted him at the airport, while his first proper appearance was at the European Parliament.

It was the parliament that first pushed for Ukraine's EU membership and its president, Roberta Metsola, was the first leader of an EU institution to go to Kyiv after the breakout of the war.

Drilling Down:

• On the question of Ukraine's EU membership, Zelenskiy pushed for the opening of EU accession talks in 2023. The EU summit conclusions, hammered out among EU leaders and issued after he left, stated that: "The European Union acknowledges Ukraine's determination to meet the necessary requirements in order to start accession negotiations as soon as possible." That is seen as the clearest sign yet from Brussels that negotiations can indeed be opened this year.
• The Ukrainian president also asked for more EU sanctions, in particular for more measures against Russian drones, missiles, and IT services. He also called for the sanctioning of Rosatom, Russia's state-owned nuclear energy firm.
• Talks with EU ambassadors on the EU's 10th sanctions package on Russia started over the weekend with a view to have them adopted by the first anniversary of Russia's invasion on February 24. It will likely consist of many of the things Zelenskiy was asking for, including a ban on European companies exporting various technologies to Russia, exports that are worth some 10 billion euros ($10.7 billion).
• More energy sanctions, for instance those targeting the Russian nuclear sector, are likely to be off the table as Hungary has made clear that it won't green-light such moves. Much was made of footage from the summit where Zelenskiy was applauded by EU leaders, with the exception of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban. The Hungarian leader later noted that Budapest belongs to the "peace camp" and was pushing for an immediate cease-fire.
• Orban was not the only one giving slightly mixed messages. Bulgarian President Rumen Radev said before the meeting that he was against sending more weapons to Ukraine and that Brussels should look to "all diplomatic efforts" to peacefully end the war.
• Perhaps the most striking revelation of the day was when Zelenskiy told EU leaders that Ukraine had intercepted a Russian plan to destroy Moldova, noting that it contained "who, when, and how" and that he had informed Moldovan President Maia Sandu of the alleged plot. The Moldovan intelligence service later confirmed Moscow was trying to destabilize the country.

Brief #2: Sweden And Finland Hit A Roadblock In Their NATO Bid

What You Need To Know: In the fall of 2022, it looked like Finland and Sweden would join NATO, either by the end of the year or at the start of this one, in what would have been the quickest accession ever to the military alliance.

The Nordic pair applied to join in May 2022 as a direct result of Russia's attack on Ukraine. By June 2022, at a NATO summit in Madrid, the 30 members of the alliance gave their go-ahead. By late October 2022, 28 members had already ratified the Nordic pair's accession protocols.

Nearly four months down the line, not much progress has been made. Worse, it's probably fair to say things have unraveled.

While Hungary has indicated that its parliament might ratify the accession protocol when its plenary spring session commences on February 27, things are looking bleak regarding the ratification of Turkey.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has blocked the Swedish path to NATO for the foreseeable future, with Ankara saying Stockholm hasn't lived up to the obligations of the memorandum agreed in Madrid in June 2022 between Finland, Sweden, and Turkey. (Ankara wants to see progress from Finland, and notably Sweden, in the areas of fighting terrorism, the lifting of arms embargoes on Turkey, and fulfilling Turkish extradition requests.)

What especially annoyed Turkey were two protests held in Sweden in January. One was organized by a pro-Kurdish group and ended with an Erdogan effigy hanging upside down near Stockholm's city hall. At the other, a few days later, a Swedish-Danish far-right politician and provocateur set fire to a copy of the Koran outside the Turkish Embassy in the Swedish capital.

Deep Background: The fallout from those January protests has been brutal. Swedish ministerial visits to Turkey have been canceled; the Swedish Embassy in Ankara had to temporarily close due to demonstrations, with more threats against Swedish consulates across the country.

Swedish and NATO officials I have spoken to on the condition of anonymity now concede that little progress will be made before the Turkish parliamentary and presidential elections slated for May 14.

The NATO summit in Vilnius on July 11-12 is probably the earliest Sweden and Finland can become members -- either because Erdogan is no longer focused on the elections or because the country's long-time leader is no longer in power.

Drilling Down:

• What is clear is that the spat with Sweden has boosted the Turkish president's ratings in opinion polls. For the first time since he came to power in 2002, his Justice and Development Party (AKP) is facing a real electoral challenge with galloping inflation and six opposition parties forming a credible coalition.
• After last week's devastating earthquakes in Turkey, Sweden was quick to offer and mobilize help to Ankara, which could lead to better relations. There is a precedent for that: The last time such a large earthquake hit the country, back in 1999, Greek help paved the way for a thaw in Athens-Ankara relations, with Greece green-lighting Turkey's EU candidate status a few years later.
• Regarding Finland, Turkey has indicated it is ready to decouple the ratification process and just give Helsinki the green light. In January, Finnish Foreign Minister Pekka Haavisto noted that his country would look at other options if the situation remained the same. That stance was later softened, with the Finnish president and prime minister both reiterating that they wanted to join together with Sweden.
• Still, a recent poll showed that the majority of Finns would happily go it alone, if necessary. Last week, one of the biggest Finnish newspapers published a story, based on anonymous sources in the country's security apparatus, that claimed that Finland is ready to fly solo, largely because it feels vulnerable given its 1,300-kilometer border with Russia.
• In the meantime, Sweden is trying to implement as much as possible from the Madrid memorandum. An arms embargo against Turkey has been lifted and a new anti-terror law will enter into force in June. But the new law will not ban the waving of flags, such as that of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which previously has enraged Turkey.
• Sweden will also not ban the burning of the Koran, something that Erdogan has asked for, citing both freedom of speech and the fact that blasphemy isn't a crime in the country. However, a recent request for another demonstration in which the Koran would be burned was turned down, with the authorities citing threats to public security.
• The latest spat is also causing political strains in Stockholm. The new right-wing government, which came to power in October 2022, thought it would have an easier time dealing with Ankara as the previous ruling Social Democrats enjoyed widespread support from Sweden's Kurdish community. But this new government relies on support from the nationalist and populist Sweden Democrats, whose party leader, Jimmie Akesson, recently called Erdogan "an Islamic dictator."
• Stockholm will also have problems extraditing people, with Erdogan now insisting that 130 people -- Kurds and opposition figures -- be handed over. While a handful have been extradited over the past few months, the Swedish government and Supreme Court have blocked the deportation of five people.

Looking Ahead

The European Parliament will meet for four days, starting on February 13, in Strasbourg for its February plenary. It is expected to pass two resolutions calling for the immediate release of former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and Russian opposition leader Aleksei Navalny.

While both resolutions are nonbinding, they will likely cause a stir in both Tbilisi and Moscow. Both are serving prison terms on charges their supporters say are politically motivated.

NATO defense ministers will meet in Brussels on February 14-15. The question of sending more arms to Ukraine will dominate the agenda, but it is also worth looking out for the possible adoption of the military alliance's so-called political guidance, which spells out what priorities, in terms of military capabilities, NATO should have over the next five years.

There will also be a discussion on how to address the alliance's depleting arms stockpiles, including by green-lighting new weapons procurement. NATO will also look at the construction of more storage facilities.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your inbox every Monday.

And you can always reach us at newsletters@rferl.org.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two major issues: the debates over Belarus sanctions and Russian oil caps, and what they really have in common; and why Ukraine is being overly ambitious in its attempts to join the European Union in two years.

Brief #1: Russian Oil Caps, Sanctions On Belarus, And The Battle For The 'Global South'

What You Need To Know: Over the last week, EU ambassadors have grappled with three separate, but intertwined topics directly related to the war in Ukraine: a new sanctions package on Belarus, the possibility of setting two new price caps on Russian oil products, and a review of the already existing price cap on Russian crude oil that was agreed in December 2022.

While there is consensus among the 27 EU member states that all three are needed, views differ on both the content and the timeline.

All three issues also concern the EU's relationship with the so-called Global South, in this case meaning countries, especially in Asia and Africa, that tend to be economically poorer than European nations but are playing an increasingly important role in world politics due to their steady economic growth.

Within the context of the war in Ukraine, Brussels has been keen to secure the support of many of these southern nations when it comes to votes in the United Nations condemning Moscow.

But the EU is also extremely wary of Kremlin propaganda, which portrays the bloc's Russia sanctions as damaging for the world economy and for creating shortages of food and fuel globally.

Deep Background: Perhaps the easiest bit for EU officials and diplomats to agree on is the new price caps.

This is because they are in agreement with the Group of Seven (G7) leading advanced economies that the cap should be $100 for Russian petroleum products, such as diesel, and $45 for other cheaper products made from oil, such as liquid paraffin and industrial lubricants.

There was also a strong desire to agree on this by February 5 when the EU embargo on buying these types of Russian oil products enters into force.

With most shipping and insurance companies based in the EU and G7 countries, the caps are meant to reduce the revenue that Moscow gets from sales to non-EU/G7 countries, while ensuring vital supplies continue to flow to the Global South.

The same idea was behind the EU/G7 cap on Russian crude oil, set at $60 per barrel in early December 2022. While that cap has contributed to the Kremlin losing out on crucial cash to fund its invasion of Ukraine, the Baltic trio of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as Poland, wanted an immediate review undertaken by the European Commission with the view to potentially lowering the cap to $40-50.

And they wanted this to happen before green lighting any agreement on the new caps. For most other EU countries, the United States, and the European Commission, the review can wait until March.

Drilling Down:

• The European Commission analysis is that the price cap works: lower prices without the disruption of deliveries to third countries. The commission has also noted that China uses the cap to further negotiate the price down.
• The Baltic trio, on the other hand, has pointed to the EU regulation, agreed in December 2022, that stipulates that the oil price cap "shall be reviewed, as of mid-January 2023 and every two months thereafter." The trio also notes that Brussels agreed that the cap should be at least 5 percent below the average market price for Russian oil.
• With Russian oil currently selling around $50 per barrel, the Baltic countries are arguing that a $60 cap is an empty gesture, pointing to some estimates that show Russia still gets $600 million per day from the sale of various fossil fuels.
• Other EU member states, however, shoot back that the G7 isn't bound by the EU regulation and that a review first in March will allow a rather volatile market to adjust to the cap introduced just two months ago.
• In the end, EU ambassadors agreed on February 3 on the two new petroleum product price caps at the expected rate of $100 and $45. And to placate the Baltic trio and Poland, a clear legal procedure spelt out how the March review of the oil cap will be carried out.
• The need not to disrupt the flow of oil to the EU's southern partners is the overriding fear here. That apprehension is noticeable in the EU's latest sanctions package on Belarus, the first since the summer of 2022. The proposal mirrors some of the measures already applied to Russia, such as an EU ban on providing IT services, consulting, polling services, and luxury goods to the country and a prohibition on the import of Belarusian steel and gold.
• But just as with the last EU sanctions package on Russia, agreed at the end of 2022, there is also a derogation when it comes to fertilizers and food products. The Belarus proposal, seen by RFE/RL, notes that this is "in order to further address food security concerns in third countries" and that individuals who play "a significant role in international trade in agricultural and food products, including wheat and fertilizers" can have their assets unfrozen by Brussels.
• For Minsk, this could mean Belarusian tycoon Ivan Halavaty and Russian billionaire Mikhail Gutseriyev, who has been supportive of Belarusian leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka, could potentially see EU asset freezes against them dropped.

Brief #2: Ukraine's Overly Ambitious Plan To Join The EU

What You Need To Know: Possibly the biggest talking point from last week's EU-Ukraine get-together in Kyiv was the timeline for Ukraine's EU membership.

Ahead of the meeting, Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal confidently proclaimed that his country had a very ambitious plan to join the club within two years.

He repeated the same thing at the press conference after his government had met with the 16 visiting European commissioners, although he did add the caveat that the approval process in EU member states might well take longer.

On that point he's certainly not wrong: There is a need for all 27 to agree to opening accession talks, and the same unanimity is needed to open and close every one of the 33 negotiation chapters.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who was standing next to Shmyhal, diplomatically dodged the question of timelines, simply adding bureaucratic platitudes such as "the accession process is merit-based."

She did note, however, that Kyiv's "speed and ambition and determination, while being in an atrocious war, is impressive."

Deep Background: Ukraine has every right to be optimistic about its chances. Last year, it received candidate status three months after applying -- something of a record -- and there is still widespread political and popular support across the EU for Ukraine and Ukrainians.

The fact that over half of the college of European commissioners travelled together to Kyiv is significant.

And, while there, they did agree on measures that will help Ukraine get closer to the bloc, including a road map to improve the country's access to the European Union's lucrative single market in areas such as public procurement and industrial products.

Import duties for Ukrainian goods will be waived for another year and the "solidarity lanes" -- transport links between the EU and Ukraine -- will be given a funding boost of 1 billion euros ($1.1 billion).

Drilling Down:

• Yet, there is a hard road ahead. When Ukraine got its candidate status, it also received seven conditions to fulfil in order to open accession talks, including the enactment of new anti-oligarch and media laws, greater protection for national minorities, and reforming the country's Constitutional Court and anti-corruption bureau.
• While Shmyhal says that all seven conditions have been either met or that considerable progress has been made, several EU officials I spoke to on condition of anonymity said that only about 50 percent of the work has been accomplished so far.
• The European Commission will come with its big assessment on Ukraine's progress in October and, while Kyiv hopes for a positive review and the start of accession talks by the end of the year, there is every chance that the EU will come with more conditions before any talks can start. That would push the timeline to 2024 and possibly even beyond.
• It is also worth noting that, while in Kyiv, the European Commission quietly published its assessment on how aligned Ukraine, as well as the other EU hopefuls Georgia and Moldova, are with EU legislation in all policy fields. Out of 33 chapters, Ukraine is deemed to have "a good level of preparation" in only four, including energy and foreign policy. To adopt all the necessary EU legislation within a year will be something of a Herculean task.
• Then there is also the skepticism, notably among western member states, about rushing Ukraine into the EU. While some eastern member states wanted something akin to an official midterm report on Kyiv's accession progress already in the spring, that idea was shot down and will now simply be an "oral update" by the European Commission that won't have much legal bearing.
• For more EU foot-dragging, look no further than the EU-Ukraine summit declaration that EU ambassadors haggled over for days. The main bone of contention was this sentence: "The EU acknowledged the considerable efforts that Ukraine demonstrated in the recent months towards meeting the objectives underpinning its candidate status for EU membership." In early drafts, the word "progress" was used in the sentence, however a good number of western EU member states objected, and it was replaced with "efforts." As a diplomat from one eastern member state noted to me: "Ukraine might be ambitious, but I really sometimes wonder if we are."

Looking Ahead

A week after travelling to East Asia to visit Japan and South Korea, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg will spend most of this week in the United States, meeting with both the U.S. secretaries of state and defense, the National Security Council, and members of Congress. Expect a full range of issues to be discussed, including more arms to Ukraine, preparation for the meeting of NATO defense ministers in Brussels in mid-February, and the NATO summit in Vilnius in July.

EU leaders will gather in Brussels on February 9-10 for their first summit of the year. The focus will be on migration issues, amid a recent spike in asylum requests in the EU. The issue mainly concerns the bloc's southern borders, so the influx of Ukrainian refugees since Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022 is not on the table. It's likely that EU candidate countries in the Western Balkans will be asked to do more to combat migrant smuggling along the so-called "Western Balkan route" leading to the EU.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your inbox every Monday.

And you can always reach us at newsletters@rferl.org.