Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.
I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on Russia sanctions, a Slovak veto, and more EU money to protect Baltic infrastructure.
Briefing #1: New Russia Sanctions And The Slovak Veto
What You Need To Know: The European Union will likely approve new sanctions next week, focusing on people who have abducted Ukrainian children, but larger sanctions in response to the events in Leipzig will have to wait as the bloc is first struggling to overcome a Slovak veto to renew restrictive measures on the over 3,000 people already blacklisted.
The EU's foreign policy corps, the European External Action Service (EEAS), has already provided EU capitals with a list of 1,600 people and entities -- mainly belonging to the Russian defense industry -- whom they want to blacklist. This list was produced ahead of Germany officially announcing that Moscow was behind the drone incidents that led to the closure of Leipzig airport in August.
The German government also then closed the Russian consulate in Bonn and the Russia House in Berlin and is looking into further sanctions. But according to several European officials RFE/RL spoke to, Germany might find it easier to simply "co-opt" the EEAS proposal and add more names to it.
Even though most of the names aren't likely to be vetoed by any member state, they probably won't be approved until the bloc's foreign ministers meet on October 12; such a big batch of individuals still need to be legally cleared before they can be slapped with asset freezes and visa bans.
Deep Background: In the meantime, Brussels is likely to approve on September 9 a smaller raft of sanctions on 10 people and 17 entities that Brussels accuses of "systematic unlawful deportation" of Ukrainian children to Russia or territories in Ukraine currently are occupied by Russian forces.
The EU document, seen by RFE/RL, notes that these sorts of deportations "constitute grave breaches of international law and a violation of the fundamental rights of the child with the aim to erase Ukrainian identity and undermine the preservation of its future generations."
The people proposed for sanctioning are mainly leading officials in occupied territories in Crimea and Donbas, but perhaps the most remarkable entry on the list is the Songdowon International Children's Camp, which is run by North Korean authorities.
The document notes that this camp "participates in organized programs involving the transfer of Ukrainian children from temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine to North Korea." The transfers are coordinated by Russian officials, and while it is supposed to be "a cultural exchange," the paper notes that "Ukrainian children are exposed to curated narratives and activities designed to promote pro-Russian narratives."
The other entities are other so-called summer camps in either Russia or in occupied regions of Ukraine where they, according to the bloc, are exposed to programs that pushes "loyalty to Russia, Russian national identity, adoption of Russian national values, military historical themes, and participation in activities linked to military-patriotic organizations."
Drilling Down:
- Before the EU adopts more sanctions, the member states must also agree on renewing them, that is far from straightforward.
- The club must unanimously roll over the over 3,000 blacklisted firms and individuals, including Russian President Vladmir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, whom it has put under rolling sanctions since the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine by September 15.
- Ideally, the bloc would have preferred to already have this done and dusted, but it looks likely that this might go down to the wire just like it tends to do every six months, in March and September, when the list is up for an extension.
- It used to be Hungary, under the Russian-friendly government of Viktor Orban, that tended to leverage its veto in these matters in order to de-list people. In 2025, for example, Russian oligarch Viatcheslav Moshe Kantor and Russian Sports Minister Mikhail Degtyaryov were removed after pressure from Budapest.
- With the change in government in Hungary in May, it now appears Slovakia has picked up the blocking baton from its southern neighbor. According to several European officials familiar with the file who weren't authorized to speak on the record, Bratislava is asking to get Russian-Uzbek oligarch Alisher Usmanov and Russian-Israeli oligarch Mikhail Fridman taken off the list before it will green light a roll-over.
- This was something Slovakia tried to do with Hungary in March but failed, even though they said at the time that getting the pair delisted was "critical." According to people involved in the talks, No new reasons have been put forward by Bratislava for removing the pair this time.
- Both Fridman and Usmanov were sanctioned by the EU in 2022 for being in Putin's inner circle and contributing to the undermining of Ukraine's territorial integrity.
- While Usmanov failed in EU court in both 2024 and 2025 to be removed from the sanctions list, Fridman won a major case against Brussels in 2024 but remains blacklisted as the ruling concerned the sanctions as formulated back in 2022-23, with the bloc having updated the listing criteria with new evidence since then.
- How will this end? The other 26 are essentially pushing for a roll-over with no so-called political delistings but also for sanctions to be extended for another 12 months instead of the six months that has been the standard up till now.
- The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, the EU's sectoral sanctions on Russia -- targeting its energy, steel, and financial services among others -- were prolonged by a full year in June via consensus that included Slovakia. This broke with the previous setup of extending the measures every summer and winter. The idea is therefore to follow the same logic with the blacklistings.
- Secondly, and more importantly, it is also a sort of tactic. EU diplomats believe they can strike a deal with Slovakia in which they let go of the one-year extension proposal in order to ensure that the two oligarchs, together with everyone else on the list, remain sanctioned for at least another six months.
Briefing #2: More EU Financing To Protect Baltic Infrastructure
What You Need To Know: For years, the so-called Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) was Brussels' symbol for the European dream of an "ever closer union" -- a 33 billion euro kitty within the bloc's current budget to boost trans-European infrastructure networks in the transport, energy and digital sectors.
Think of 5G corridors, intercontinental energy grids, and upgraded rail links between member states. So popular is this budget envelope among EU member states that the European Commission has suggested the cash in it for the next proposed EU budget from 2028 to 2034 will increase to 88 billion euros.
But this facility is no longer just about connecting member states with infrastructure. As of this year, cash is also going to protect what is already in place against sabotage from third-country actors such as China and Russia.
Earlier this year Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, along with Poland, were given 113 million euros from the facility to protect the current infrastructure related with the Baltic states' electricity networks synchronization with the continental European networks rather than expand it: a first on the EU level.
The cash will go to things such as increased monitoring and even walls and fences around substations and energy transformers, increased cybersecurity, emergency reserves, and even the possibility to detect and shoot down drones. Later this week, another political step will be taken to ensure that, legally, the facility can be used to secure critical infrastructure.
Deep Background: The move to dedicate money for security measures that began in February 2025, when the three Baltic states completed the Baltic Synch, leaving the Soviet-era grid they were connected to for decades to the European continental one via Poland through the LitPol overland electricity link.
Even though the synchronization was successful, the trio understand they are unusually exposed to various hybrid attacks to their energy framework. LitPol will remain the only overland energy link at least until Harmony, another electricity connector between Lithuania and Poland, is predicted to be ready in 2030-31.
To understand its importance, and exposure, the LitPol substation in Lithuania across the Polish border is now surrounded with barbed wire, concrete barriers, and military guards ready to prevent drone strikes or armed sabotage.
Drilling Down:
- Then there are the underwater links, notably Estlink 2, whose submarine cables were severed by the Cook Islands-registered oil tanker Eagle S linked to the Russian shadow fleet, in late 2024.
- The cost repairing Estlink 2 was estimated to be up to 60 million euros but the eventual price for consumers due to the sudden spike in energy costs was calculated to be five times higher, creating a big blow to the small economies of the region.
- The vulnerability is then obvious, something numerous attacks on energy infrastructure in Europe have borne witness to in recent months.
- Only last week, saboteurs damaged a high-voltage power line in the eastern German state of Brandenburg and a power grid site in the western state of North-Rhine Westphalia. German federal investigators have in fact registered over 165 suspect acts of infrastructure sabotage in this year alone. Some of the perpetrators are climate activists, but others are carrying out hybrid attacks on behalf of third countries.
- Germany isn't the only country being targeted. Drones over power stations, arson attacks on substations, and massive cyberattacks on energy sites in Poland and Norway last year are part of an increasingly difficult European security environment.
- It's in this context that the EU now is creating a legal framework to use more of the money for the CEF to actually protect infrastructure. This must be done by changing the TEN-E regulation, a major EU legal framework on cross-border energy infrastructure.
- In June, EU member states reached an agreement to create a specific category within TEN-E dedicated to the security, resilience and repair of critical energy infrastructure. But it was not entirely straightforward.
- While countries close to Russia understand and pushed for the need to have this category, not all member states saw the need for this, especially those in the south that haven't faced the same problems.
- Therefore, the security funding would be capped at 5 percent of the total financing planned under CEF. It might seem small considering the threat Europe is facing, but diplomats from frontline states are at least happy that the common EU budget can now be used for it.
- The measure is now in the European Parliament, where the committee on energy will vote on a negotiation position vis-a-vis the council, where member states sit, and the European Commission later this week. The goal is they will come to an agreement later this year.
Looking Ahead
The European Court of Justice is busy with delivering verdicts in numerous cases this fall.
On September 9, it will once again decide on whether Brussels should continue to sanction Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich . The former Chelsea FC owner was blacklisted back in 2022 and has already lost twice court, but he has appealed once more.
That's all for this week!
Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.
Until next time,
Rikard Jozwiak
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