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At the 2026 EU Enlargement Forum on November 16, Finnish President Alexander Stubb mused about whether the United Kingdom might re-join and half-jokingly expressed hope that Canada could become a member of sorts in the future.
At the 2026 EU Enlargement Forum on November 16, Finnish President Alexander Stubb mused about whether the United Kingdom might re-join and half-jokingly expressed hope that Canada could become a member of sorts in the future.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two issues: the upcoming EU-Western Balkans summit and why Brussels is fast-tracking EU enlargement decisions ahead of a difficult 2027.

Briefing #1: Tougher Talk On Serbia As EU, Balkan Leaders Meet

What You Need To Know: On November 25, the European Union will host the leaders of the six Western Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia & Serbia) that are still officially aiming to join the bloc.

While these summits are semiannual affairs that don't normally produce much news, the two previous ones -- in Brussels in December 2025 and in Montenegro this June -- proved politically volatile at least by EU standards as the combative Serbian president at the time, Alexander Vucic, was at the center of numerous rows.

Now that Vucic has been ousted from power following the October 25 parliamentary election in which the yet leaderless and heterogenous Student List movement proved triumphant, this summit will be the first real test of whether the EU is actually capable of pulling the EU hopefuls in the region toward eventual membership.

Deep Background: An early draft declaration seen by RFE/RL indicates Brussels is at least attempting to become pushier in its demands and sending a few messages to the new leadership in Belgrade -- if they even are in place by the time of the summit, that is.

The new Serbian parliament convenes on November 17, so if a new cabinet isn't sworn in quickly there is a good chance that caretaker Duro Macut might still represent the country at the Brussels meeting.

It also depends, though, on whether a declaration is agreed in the first place. At the June summit, it was not approved for the first time since the regular EU-Western Balkans format began in 2018. Belgrade refused to endorse language in the text demanding countries in the region align with EU sanctions on Russia as well as balking at the conditionality of the proposed Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue.  

Drilling Down

  • The current draft has sharpened language on both issues in a clear nod to the incoming Student List leadership, which on the campaign trail as well as since winning the election has expressed major reservations about the need for high-level political dialogue with Kosovo and to change Serbia's cozy relations with the Kremlin.     
  • The reference to the dialogue is much higher in the text than in previous years and with more political urgency., noting that "the absence of a normalization of relations between Pristina and Belgrade continues to hold back both partners on their European path. All agreements reached in the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue must be implemented."
  • It adds that EU financial support under the 6 billion euro Western Balkans Reform and Growth Facility "is conditioned on the partners' constructive engagement with measurable progress and tangible results in the normalization of their relations."
  • No dialogue at the highest political level has taken place since EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas took office in late 2024. The last such meeting occurred in September 2023 under her predecessor, Josep Borrell.
  • While diplomats both in the bloc and in the region believe this dialogue "to be dead," EU officials still harbor hopes of resuscitating it at some point. EU sources tell RFE/RL that the Brussels leadership has been in touch with Kosovar Prime minister Albin Kurti, urging him to give Belgrade's incoming leadership "the benefit of the doubt."    
  • Perhaps the biggest message to Serbia and the students in the prospective declaration is the need to come to terms with the past. The EU was shocked by the images of Serbia's official and public adulation of convicted war criminal Ratko Mladic at his September funeral.
  • The text states: "Any glorification of war criminals, genocide denial, and revisionism contradicts the most fundamental European values. We call on all Western Balkans partners to promote a culture of respect for and solidarity with all victims and of respect for verdicts from international and domestic courts relating to war crimes."
  • The Vucic government's refusal to distance itself from Mladic's glorification convinced even pro-Serbian EU member states not to push for the opening of EU accession Cluster 3 with Belgrade, consisting of eight mainly economy-related negotiation chapters. Serbia has not moved forward toward EU membership since late 2021, and Vucic even boycotted the EU-Western Balkans summit in December last year over what he saw as a lack of progress notably on this cluster.  
  • It is also clear from the text that the EU is increasingly annoyed that both China and the United States are vying for economic and political influence in the region.
  • The declaration, which the Western Balkan countries must decide (or not) to align with on summit day, pointedly notes that "we count on the Western Balkans partners to communicate to their citizens that the EU remains the region's main investor and trading partner, as well as its largest provider of financial assistance and a reliable security partner. Furthermore, the EU contributes to stability and security across Europe."
  • The document points out that the EU has financed things such as 500 public WiFi hotspots in the region and welcomed Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia into the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA). It also makes a reference to the flagship policy of extending the EU's "roam like home" program to the region, which would allow no extra mobile data costs. Negotiations on this scheme started earlier in November and could enter into force in early 2027.


Briefing #2: Why 2027 Will Be Tough For EU Enlargement

What You Need To Know: At the European Commission's annual enlargement forum in Brussels on November 16, leaders from both the bloc and various candidate countries spoke confidently about a bigger and more powerful EU. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen spoke of the "courage and foresight to build a larger union" and announced that, "for the first time in many years, we have a real prospect of enlargement in front of us."

Finnish President Alexander Stubb mused about whether the United Kingdom might re-join and half-jokingly expressed hope that Canada could become a member of sorts in the future.

Deep Background: Enlargement may not exactly be at the top of Europe's agenda as it heads into 2027. This is largely due to some major elections coming up in key European countries, with the main being the French presidential elections in April-May.

Most EU officials seem already resigned to the real possibility that right-wing populist Marine Le Pen will sweep to power. Le Pen and her party, the National Rally, have been critical of any EU enlargement in terms of Ukraine, Moldova, and the Western Balkans in general.

Her party is also set to make further gains in the parliamentary elections that follow the presidential ones, potentially stopping even EU accession frontrunner Montenegro from joining as it hopes in 2028 or 2029. Under the French Constitution, ratifying the treaty for any new member requires either a national referendum or a three-fifths majority in both the lower house, the French national assembly, and in the upper one, the Senate.

While all eyes are on France, there are also other worries. In Italy, Guiseppe Conte, leader of the left-wing populist Five-Star moment and a vocal opponent of Ukraine joining the EU, has a real chance of becoming prime minister. And Poland might elect a government consisting of right-wing parties keen to blame Ukrainian migrants, protect domestic farmers from Ukrainian agri-products, and make historical grievances a central part of relations with Kyiv.

Drilling Down

  • This is why Brussels is trying to get as much done as possible on enlargement in the coming months. For Montenegro, that means potentially closing another four accession chapters this week.
  • That would leave only six chapters, something the current Irish EU Council presidency believes is feasible before the end of the year, when Lithuania takes over the rotating presidency and deals with the final two (chapter 34-35) institutional chapters before the accession treaty could be ready for Montenegro to sign in June.
  • Ukraine and Moldova, however, will soon will be "decoupled" after walking hand-in-hand on their respective EU path since 2022. But first they need to open together the remaining two clusters, consisting of nine negotiating chapters.
  • Moldovan President Maia Sandu and Ukrainian Prime Minister Serhiy Koretskiy told the forum they hope this can happen before Christmas. That, of course, requires unanimity of the 27 EU member states, and so far Hungary has refused to give its OK for Brussels to send so-called screening letters for that pair of clusters, preventing them from being opened.
  • Budapest reportedly has no new political demands for Kyiv but, according to several EU sources RFE/RL has been in touch with under the condition of anonymity, is eyeing more EU funds that so far has remained frozen due to the previous Hungarian government's rule of law backsliding. The Hungarian green light might therefore come as soon as this week, making it possible to indeed have all clusters/chapters for both opened in 2026.
  • When everything does open, Moldova will clearly speed ahead. The European Commission admitted as much when it published its annual enlargement report this month with accompanying roadmaps for 2027. For Moldova, it hopes to close a full 25 of the 33 policy chapters that year whereas for Ukraine the same number is a mere nine.
  • Then there are the so-called interim benchmarks (known in Brussels corridors as "IBAR") on issues related to rule of law and fundamental rights. Moldova handed in its self-assessment earlier this month, and the European Commission is likely to give the thumbs up later in November, sending over the file to EU member states.
  • This could be approved by the start of the new year. A positive IBAR assessment is a necessity to close any negotiation chapters.  For Ukraine, the full assessment might not be ready until the spring, which opens a gap between Kyiv and Chisinau.
  • Sandu was coy about the decoupling, noting diplomatically that Chisinau was "not in a competition with any other candidate country," and adding, "We want Ukraine to advance as it would be great to be surrounded by EU member states."
  • Koretskiy, on the other hand, said he has more pressing concerns than the enlargement process, notably the daily Russian attacks on his country, saying it's hard to do political work when there is "a bomb alarm 20 hours a day."   
  • He also added that Moscow currently was aiming "to destroy everything in Ukraine this winter" and was also looking to exploit the current Ukrainian state budget gap of over 70 billion euros, which the EU hopes to partly cover with a new 45 billion euro loan that will be presented this week.


Looking Ahead

The Ukraine defense contact group (known as Ramstein) and the EU defense ministerial are both meeting in Brussels on November 17. Nominally, they will deal with how various Western countries could do more to help Ukrainian militarily, but most eyes will be on US Undersecretary of Defense Elbridge Colby, who will attend both meetings.

Any comments of his on Ukraine will be closely dissected, but what most Europeans will be after are any hints about the US forces' posture review that is due soon in which Washington might announce troop reduction from the continent.

That's all for this week!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

A Ukrainian delegation meets with representatives from Europe in Abu Dhabi on the sidelines of trilateral peace negotiations between Kyiv, Moscow, and Washington on November 10.
A Ukrainian delegation meets with representatives from Europe in Abu Dhabi on the sidelines of trilateral peace negotiations between Kyiv, Moscow, and Washington on November 10.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two issues: why the EU cannot agree on an envoy for Russia-Ukraine peace talks and what safeguards Montenegro could face when it joins the bloc.

No media source currently available

Briefing #1: Can The EU Agree On An Envoy For Russia-Ukraine Peace Talks?

What You Need To Know: As US-led talks between Russia and Ukraine get underway in Abu Dhabi on November 10-11, the European Union and its member states are once again fretting about who will represent them, having failed to secure a seat at the top table in the Emirati capital.

But they will not be completely absent from Abu Dhabi.

The national-security advisers of the so-called “E3” -- France, Germany and the non-EU United Kingdom -- will be there, as will their Italian counterpart.

Bjorn Seibert, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s head of cabinet, Anna Maria Boura, the main foreign policy adviser to European Council President Antonio Costa; and Geoffrey Van Leeuwen, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte’s chief of staff, are also attending.

But like the representatives of the four major European nations, they will not be in the negotiating room. Instead, according to European diplomats who spoke to RFE/RL, they will spend their time “waiting in the corridors” and being briefed by the United States before and after the talks.

In that sense, not much has changed since Donald Trump took office in early 2025. Despite multiple rounds of peace talks in various locations and formats, Europe remains very much on the sidelines.

Deep Background: What has made the Europeans particularly nervous this time, however, is a comment by Jared Kushner, the US president’s son-in-law and peace envoy, who last week suggested that a broader European security architecture could be part of any peace deal.

The Europeans have responded defiantly, noting that nothing can be decided about them -- or Ukraine for that matter -- above their heads and without their consent.

They have also pointed out that they have real cards to play here, including the wide-ranging sanctions imposed on Moscow and the freeze on Russian assets. Moreover, it is up to them to decide whether and when Ukraine can join the EU.

Yet despite all the tough talk, they will, once again, spend time this week discussing whether to agree on a single envoy -- or perhaps several -- to represent them in future talks.

Having an envoy should at least improve their chances of securing a seat at the table, according to EU officials supporting the initiative.

The issue will be discussed when EU leaders assemble for an informal summit in Dublin on November 13, and potentially even more informally a day earlier, when leaders from across Europe, with the exception of Belarus and Russia, descend on the Irish capital for the semiannual European Political Community (EPC) gathering.

The debate was prompted by a rather angry letter that Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni sent to Costa last week, and which was seen by RFE/RL. In it, she said that she was “convinced that we all realize how, by projecting the image of Europe acting in an uncoordinated manner, we are simply playing into the hands of those who want this war to continue. I think this is unacceptable, considering that human lives and the future of our security are at stake.”

She was referring to the various formats in which European nations had participated in a seemingly uncoordinated manner according to her, including the recent phone call between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Finnish President Alexander Stubb accompanied by Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store.

Meloni added that “Europe needs to speak with a single, authoritative voice,” but she was also quick to point out that “I am not asking for a place for Italy in this or that format.”

In a more diplomatic response, Costa thanked Meloni for setting out her concerns “so clearly” and underlined that “Europe needs to act with coherence, unity and determination.”

Drilling Down

  • Some officials RFE/RL has spoken to wonder whether Costa himself encouraged Meloni to write the letter, especially as the two potentially stand to gain the most from raising the issue.
  • Under the EU treaties, the European Council president has a role in representing the bloc internationally. Yet it has become clear that France and Germany are unlikely to give up their own potential seats at the negotiating table in favor of Costa.
  • Italy, meanwhile, is another major EU power, behind France and Germany. And while Meloni has made it clear that she isn't seeking special treatment for Rome, she has previously suggested that former Italian leaders, such as Mario Draghi, could serve as an envoy.
  • Interestingly, Italy’s national-security adviser is also in Abu Dhabi, even though a more formal decision to include Rome would likely prompt other major EU nations, such as Poland and Spain, to push for a seat at the table, too.
  • What is clear is that few want to see Gahr Store and Stubb continue in a mediating role. Other Nordic and Baltic nations, such as Russia hawks Denmark, Estonia, Lithuania, and Sweden, were furious about the call with Putin and the lack of prior coordination among the northern countries.
  • Diplomats form several other countries also point out that Norway isn’t an EU member, while Stubb doesn’t attend EU summits, as that is the job of the Finnish prime minister.
  • In private, some have also expressed irritation at Stubb's very public efforts to position himself at the center of any negotiations.
  • Ultimately, the EU is likely to emerge from the Dublin summit in much the same position as before: without a single envoy to represent the bloc.
  • One source noted that “we are constantly seeing pushing and pulling in all directions. The E3 have so far established themselves fairly strongly, and they have not done a bad job.” Another diplomat added that “the E3 won’t go away, that’s for sure.” A third predicted that there might be a “landing zone” agreed in Dublin involving the E3 and “stronger institutional backing but no definite decision.”


Briefing #2: The Safeguards Montenegro (And Other EU Newcomers) Will Face

What You Need To Know: In its annual EU enlargement report last week, the European Commission reiterated its hope that Montenegro will conclude accession negotiations by the end of the year.

To date, 23 of the 33 main policy chapters have been provisionally closed, and the EU executive believes that not only the remaining 10 but also two less talked-about additional chapters -- numbers 34 and 35 – can be concluded by then. Most European diplomats consider that an extremely ambitious goal.

Unlike the 33 main chapters, these two are usually dealt with toward the very end of the accession process, as work on drafting the accession treaty gathers pace. The European Commission hopes the treaty can be signed with Podgorica in June 2027.

We are not quite there yet. The working group tasked with drafting the treaty is still meeting just once a week in Brussels, rather than almost daily, as tends to happen when the process really picks up speed.

Chapter 34 should be relatively straightforward to conclude. It deals with institutions, meaning the rules needed to ensure that Montenegro is fairly represented in EU institutions, including having its own commissioner and a number of members in the European Parliament that reflects the size of its population.

Deep Background: Chapter 35, however, might prove to be trickier.

Nominally titled “Other Issues,” it allows EU member states to include a wide range of additional provisions.

Sometimes the chapter contains little of substance, but this time Montenegro may not be so lucky.

The EU is planning to include new safeguard clauses proposed by the European Commission in early October.

These measures essentially create something of a two-tier system between current EU member states and newcomers, who could now face being stripped of both money and voting rights more easily than is possible for the bloc’s current crop of 27 countries.

As the frontrunner for EU accession, Montenegro would be the first test case for the new rules, other countries hoping to join in the coming years -- including as Albania, Moldova, and Ukraine – could also face these safeguards.

Brussels has proposed the measures partly to reassure member states skeptical of further enlargement and, as several EU diplomats put it, “to avoid another Hungary.”

This is, of course, a reference to Brussels’ decade-long struggles with Viktor Orban’s government over various rule-of-law issues, which never resulted in Budapest losing its voting rights as that move required unanimity -- something that always proved elusive.

Drilling Down

  • So, what is the European Commission proposing and how will the member states incorporate the measures into Montenegro’s accession process? Diplomats from EU member states held an initial discussion in late October, and they will return to the issue in the coming weeks. A readout seen by RFE/RL shows deep divisions among European capitals over how strict the safeguards should be.
  • Three of the safeguards -- covering economic issues, home affairs, and the EU's internal market -- were also on the table in previous enlargement rounds. If the European Commission or a current member state identifies problems involving a newcomer in one of these areas, the EU can quickly introduce temporary restrictions to prevent those problems from affecting other member states. Previously, these safeguards could be activated only during the first three years after accession. The Commission is now proposing to “significantly extend” that period, although it has not specified a new limit.
  • In discussions among EU member states, two of the main enlargement skeptics, France and the Netherlands, have called for even more safeguards in other areas, saying that that they are necessary to secure both public and parliamentary backing for adding new members to the union. Denmark agreed with this, while Belgium and Finland also spoke positively about the measures.
  • Several other member states, however, including Italy and Spain, said that the proposed measures should be exceptional and temporary and should not create some sort of second-tier membership. Austria, one of the biggest supporters of EU enlargement in the Western Balkans, added that debates over safeguards must not delay Montenegro's accession
  • Then there is the “postponement clause” -- another tool available to the European Commission and current member states can use. As the name suggests, the idea here is to simply delay another state joining the bloc if rule-of-law issues in the candidate country are considered a threat.
  • Normally, this clause applies for only one year, but the idea is now to extend this period given that it often takes more than 12 months to ratify a new EU accession treaty. Again, judging from discussions among diplomats, countries like Belgium, Denmark, and France are very much in favor of a strong postponement clause.
  • But it is another safeguard, an entirely new one, that has provoked the most debate: the institutional safeguard clause. Under the commission's proposal, it could apply for up to 15 years after accession and, if triggered, could lead to the suspension of Montenegro's EU funding and even its voting rights in the Council -- measures reminiscent of those some EU countries have previously sought against Hungary..
  • The big difference, however, would be the voting threshold. Under the proposed safeguard mechanism, sanctions put forward by the European Commission would be "deemed adopted" unless rejected by a qualified majority of member states -- a procedure known in Brussels as reverse qualified majority voting.
  • Some countries, including Greece and Spain, have voiced their opposition to this new, potential tool but others ae very much in favor, including heavyweights such as France and Germany, as well as Denmark and the Netherlands.
  • The biggest unresolved question is how to trigger the clause. The Netherlands, Germany, and Denmark support reverse qualified majority voting, while countries such as Spain and Poland want at least a qualified majority of member states (55 percent representing 65 percent of the total EU population) voting in favor before the sanctions can take effect.


Looking Ahead

The big events this week will be the two summits in Dublin: first, the meeting of the European Political Community on November 12, followed by an informal EU summit the next day.

Also worth watching is the European Parliament's two-day plenary session in Brussels on November 11-12, where lawmakers will discuss efforts to secure the return of Ukrainian children abducted by Russia, as well as the prospect of further EU sanctions against Moscow.

That's all for this week!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or via e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

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