Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods. To subscribe, click here.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two major issues: if Serbia and Kosovo can finally agree on a new deal; and the ever-dwindling EU sanctions on Ukraine's former president and his entourage.

Brief #1: Perhaps Serbia And Kosovo Can Finally Make A Deal

What You Need To Know: On February 27, Kosovo's Prime Minister Albin Kurti and Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic endorsed an EU-facilitated proposal in Brussels titled, the "Agreement On The Path To Normalization Between Kosovo And Serbia."

The agreement, which has been in the making since the fall of 2022 and covers numerous facets of the two countries' relationship, is not signed yet but has been officially published by the EU's foreign policy corps, the European External Action Service.

There are some caveats, though.

A senior EU official familiar with the talks told me that the text lacks any validity without the annex, which the two sides will work up before their next meeting in Ohrid, North Macedonia, on March 18.

This makes the final article in the 11-point agreement, which simply states that "both Parties commit to respect the Implementation Roadmap annexed to this Agreement" the most crucial one. A blueprint of this road map with a timeline of the implementation of the agreement exists but it is still very much a work in progress.

Deep Background: The agreement is essentially an addition to the landmark 2013 Brussels agreement between Belgrade and Pristina that set out to normalize relations between the pair after Kosovo declared independence in 2008 -- a move Serbia has never accepted.

Serbia, Kosovo, and the EU are trying to update the deal struck a decade ago, to help the Balkan pair kick-start their EU membership quests but without any formal obligation for Belgrade to recognize Kosovo's independence -- at least for now.

While Serbia opened negotiations with the EU a year after the initial Brussels agreement, in 2014, it has so far only managed to resolve two of the 34 policy fields.

With five EU member states still not recognizing Kosovo as a country, it remains the only state in the Western Balkans that still isn't an official EU candidate country and its application to join, submitted late last year, has still not been considered seriously by the bloc.

For now, that means Pristina can't even officially begin the process of working on the EU-mandated policy fields.

Drilling Down

• One of the main sticking points remaining from the 2013 agreement is the creation of an association of Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo. Prime Minister Kurti has built his recent political success on refusing to allow this to happen, arguing that such a structure would create similar problems to those in Bosnia-Herzegovina where political entities centered around ethnicity make any reform difficult.
• The current agreement text does not explicitly mention anything about an "association" of Serb-majority municipalities. Instead, it spells out that both Belgrade and Pristina should "ensure an appropriate level of self-management for the Serbian community in Kosovo and ability for service provision in specific areas, including the possibility for financial support by Serbia and a direct communication channel for the Serbian community to the Government of Kosovo."
• The question is if such vague, noncommittal language can fly. Perhaps. Kurti could potentially try to sell it as something other than an association of Serb-majority municipalities, even though it technically amounts to pretty much the same thing and Vucic can argue that Belgrade still has avenues to financially and politically support ethnic Serbs in Kosovo.
• Since the publication of the latest document, Vucic has been adamant that he will never recognize Kosovo's independence or accept it joining the United Nations. That stance is at odds with the provisions of the new agreement, notably Article 4, which states that "Serbia will not object to Kosovo's membership in any international organization."
• The real test for progress might come this spring. First, Kosovo is seeking to join the Council of Europe; and second, the 27 EU member states will seek consensus in order to send Pristina's EU application from the European Council, which defines the political direction and priorities of the EU, to the European Commission to prepare a legal opinion. In both cases, Belgrade has been working behind the scenes to hamper any progress, according to several EU officials familiar with the issue but who are not authorized to speak on the record.
• It is also worth noting that while the deal doesn't force Belgrade to legally accept Kosovo's independence, it does include moves that essentially mean de facto recognition, such as the need to "mutually recognize their respective documents and national symbols, including passports, diplomas, license plates, and customs stamps" and the exchange of permanent missions in each other's capitals.

Brief #2: How The 'Yanukovych Sanctions' Fell Apart

What You Need To Know: The EU's sanctions machinery has gone into overdrive recently. Last week, it passed its 10th package of restrictive measures against Russia since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine one year ago.

This included slapping visa bans and asset freezes on over 100 officials and companies, bringing the total number of sanctioned people to a record high of 1,473 individuals and 205 entities.

But that is far from all.

At the end of February, Brussels also rolled over its Belarus sanctions, consisting of 195 people and 34 firms -- plus, the bloc slapped sanctions on 32 Iranians for what it considers gross human rights violations in the country. The Iranian list now consists of nearly 200 people.

However, there is one area where the number of sanctioned people and entities is quietly diminishing and that is high-ranking Ukrainian officials that Brussels deems responsible for the "misappropriation of Ukrainian state funds."

Deep Background: These sanctions were put together immediately after the then president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, fled Ukraine for Russia in February 2014 after months of protests triggered by his decision to forgo the signing of an association agreement with the EU.

Yanukovych was listed along with his two sons, Oleksandr and Viktor, as well as 15 others in his inner circle, including the former head of the presidential administration, Andriy Klyuyev, his brother Serhiy, the former Prosecutor-General Viktor Pshonka and his son, Artem, plus two previous Ukrainian prime ministers, Mykola Azarov and Serhiy Arbuzov.

While the restrictive measures imposed were renewed in 2015, decided by consensus by all EU member states, signs that enthusiasm was waning for the measures began showing in 2016.

First, the former health minister, Raisa Bohatyriova, was taken off the list, with EU officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, telling me that it was simply due to a lack of evidence. From then on, every year, another few names were knocked off the list.

Drilling Down

• On March 1, EU ambassadors took the unanimous decision to prolong the sanctions regime by another year -- giving it a lifespan for at least a full decade. But many EU member states are questioning the wisdom of going much further, especially considering that only three out of the original 18 remain listed.
• The three are Vitaliy Zakharchenko, who served as interior minister, his deputy Viktor Ratushniak, and the businessman Serhiy Kurchenko. These are hardly the biggest names among what are informally called the "Yanukovych sanctions" in Brussels. The irony is not lost on anyone that the man himself is no longer included on the list.
• Viktor Yanukovych, his son Oleksandr, as well as Pshonka and his son were all quietly delisted in September last year without so much as a press release from Brussels. (Yanukovych's other son, Viktor, was delisted after his death in 2015.)
• That didn't mean, however, a reprieve for the Yanukovychs. In August 2022, EU ambassadors added father and son to the EU sanctions list of people who since Russia's full-scale invasion are deemed to have played a role in "undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of Ukraine and the state's stability and security." Oleksandr Yanukovych was also listed on new EU sanctions for "conducting transactions with separatist groups in the Donbas region of Ukraine."
• If you ask diplomats in Brussels why the "Yanukovych sanctions" have unraveled so spectacularly, they will point to one thing: They were put in place in haste back in 2014 and were largely based on information from the Ukrainian authorities, information that in many cases remains incomplete.
• In turn, this led to another reason for the reluctance: Many on the list, often backed by considerable personal wealth, have employed good European lawyers to take their cases to the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
• Viktor Yanukovych and his son have won three times in the Luxembourg-based court, the earliest in 2019, with the judge demanding that the EU annul its restrictive measures imposed on the pair, noting that Ukrainian judicial authorities had not provided them with the right to defense or the right to effective judicial protection.
• The only reason they remained listed until September 2022 was that the various court verdicts always concerned previous sanction periods and didn't consider that the measures had been renewed on a constant, annual basis. For example, the 2019 judgement only concerned the sanctions period between 2016 and 2018. So, in a sense, the EU sanctions regime was saved by its own slow wheel of justice.
• In the end, not even the EU could justify keeping people on the list who scored judicial victories over the bloc in its own court. There is a fear in Brussels that many Russian officials and oligarchs now sanctioned for supporting the Russian war effort will soon test Brussels in the ECJ. The legal service of the Council of the European Union recently identified weak legal grounds for the EU listings of Russian businessmen Grigory Berezkin and Sergei Mndoiants last year, even though both remain sanctioned for now.

Looking Ahead

EU defense ministers will meet in Stockholm on March 7-8. This is an informal EU defense council meeting, meaning that no concrete decisions can be taken. That said, these sorts of gatherings usually mean that ministers spend time together in a more relaxed setting, discussing pressing needs more thoroughly.

And the most pressing need right now is Ukraine and how the EU can provide the country with more ammunition.

There was already an agreement among EU member states late in 2022 that citizens of Kosovo will be able to travel to most EU countries without a visa by January 1, 2024.

This week, this decision will start to be formalized as the bloc's interior ministers meet in Brussels on March 9-10 to rubber-stamp the deal.

The European Parliament is also expected to vote overwhelmingly in favor of the move, first in the chamber's civil liberties committee on March 22-23 and then in the full plenary, either at the end of March or in mid-April.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here.

And you can always reach us at newsletters@rferl.org.

NOTE TO SUBSCRIBERS: Because I'll be traveling this week, the newsletter won't appear on March 13. But I'll be back in your in-boxes on March 20.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods. To subscribe, click here.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two major issues: How both the EU and NATO are scrambling to get more ammunition to Ukraine and how justice might be served after the war has ended.

Brief #1: Getting Ammunition To Ukraine -- And Replenishing Western Stocks

What You Need To Know: Perhaps the most pressing issue for both the European Union and NATO in relation to the war in Ukraine right now is ammunition. First and foremost, how to supply Kyiv, especially after President Volodymyr Zelenskiy during his visit to Brussels earlier this month warned about the latest Russian offensive and the urgent need for more military deliveries.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov also recently specified to Western colleagues the need to get 1 million rounds of 155-millimeter ammunition urgently.

At the same time, there is also a need to replenish Western stockpiles, which are depleting quickly. Quite how fast remains classified; no one I have spoken to is willing to share, but they can confirm that, apart from the ammunition Ukraine is asking for, there is also a shortage of HIMARS missiles and ammunition for air-defense systems. And this has forced Brussels into action.

EU defense and foreign ministers will discuss the issue when they convene in Stockholm on March 7-8. By then, EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell will come up with concrete proposals on how to scale up production both for Ukraine and domestic stockpiles that potentially can be green-lighted when EU leaders meet in Brussels at the end of March.

Deep Background: In a letter to EU capitals sent last week and seen by RFE/RL, Borrell noted with urgency that “the future of Ukraine is at stake. We have committed to standing by Ukraine as much as needed. There is no time to waste.”

He proposes utilizing the European Peace Facility (EPF), a financial tool used by EU member states outside the regular EU budget that has been tapped into to the tune of 3.6 billion euros ($3.8 billion) so far for arms deliveries to Kyiv. Another 2 billion euros ($2.1 billion) is available, but the question is: Is that enough? In a discussion paper produced by Estonia on the issue, it is noted that Russia’s average artillery use is 20,000-60,000 shells per day.

That means that Russia fires Europe's monthly artillery production rate (currently estimated at 20,000-25,000 shells per month) in a single day in Ukraine.

What is needed, according to Tallinn, is a sevenfold increase of European defense industry production -- to the tune of 4 billion euros ($4.2 billion) -- to meet Reznikov’s demand in six months. Otherwise, it will take a full four years to produce the 1 million rounds asked for.

Drilling Down

• Two of the main issues here are coordination and, by extension, joint procurement. NATO has already been doing this for years, but the EU will explore this as well, with the likely caveat that production must be in Europe. One of the main hurdles to overcome is that defense issues remain an exclusive competence of each and every EU capital, making it trickier to reach any sort of consensus.
• NATO has also agreed to help Ukraine develop a smoother procurement system in line with Western demands. But more importantly, the EU, NATO, and Ukraine have started comparing notes on the issue. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, and Borrell met in Brussels last week and agreed that their respective procurement experts will put their heads together in the coming days.
• When asked why it had taken nearly a year for this to happen, Kuleba responded that “no one expected this war would last this long” and added that it was apparent already last summer that production needed to be ramped up but that “not enough has been done.”
• NATO officials admit privately that stockpiles were pretty low even before the war, largely because no one really foresaw a large-scale war on the continent again. They also note that much of the weapons production in the West has become very specific -- even “artisanal” -- instead of focusing on the big bulks of ammunition that are now clearly in demand.
• What is needed now is a clear signal of demand from government to industry. This usually means long-term contracts, something that an increase in NATO’s target for ammunition stockpiles could trigger.
• But there are bottlenecks -- and not only bureaucratic red tape. And many of them are felt in many other industries around the globe. The worldwide shortage of semiconductors is one, but also the lack of raw materials to make ammunition shells, for example.
• One quick-term fix will be to simply reach out to international partners, with Brazil, Israel, and South Korea being singled out as having deeper stockpiles at the moment.

Brief #2: Justice for Ukraine: Will Russian Officials Ever Face Trials?

What You Need To Know: One of the big issues surrounding the war in Ukraine is the question of justice and how it can be served once the fighting subsides. Ukrainian authorities have registered more than 71,000 alleged war crimes committed by the Russian Army since the war broke out -- a number that is likely to grow both as more Ukrainian territories potentially are liberated and the war intensifies.

Ukrainian and international prosecutors, however, are already busy collecting evidence, with the International Criminal Court (ICC) playing a lead role, having set up a so-called Joint Investigation Team with over 20 countries, mainly EU member states, assisting with various investigations.

An international center for the prosecution of the crime of aggression against Ukraine is also being established in The Hague this spring in cooperation with the ICC and Eurojust -- the European Union agency responsible for criminal justice cooperation -- housing a judicial database of all available evidence. The big question, however, is: Which court will all of this work eventually end up in?

Deep Background: The most obvious answer should be a court under the auspices of the United Nations. That route, however, is complicated by the fact that Russia is a permanent -- and thus veto-wielding -- member of the UN’s Security Council.

This also complicates potential efforts to render justice via the ICC. Moscow did sign the Rome Statute, which governs the ICC, back in 2000, but never ratified the agreement to become a member. Russian President Vladimir Putin then approved the withdrawal of his country from the process of joining when the ICC ruled in 2016 that Russia’s actions in Crimea amounted to an "ongoing occupation."

The ICC can, however, still prosecute genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity committed on the territory of Ukraine because Kyiv submitted to its jurisdiction.

What the ICC cannot do is investigate and prosecute crimes of aggression committed by Russian nationals in Ukraine, as Russia is not a party to the ICC.

And the crime of aggression is crucial here.

The countries leading the process of justice for war crimes in Ukraine consider the crime of aggression to be the “supreme international crime” and the "source of all the other crimes committed in the country." It also limits criminal responsibility to individuals in leadership positions.

The conundrum is how to get these people in the dock. They all enjoy international immunity and could easily hide in countries that do not recognize the ICC’s jurisdiction. Trials in absentia could, of course, be held even if they tend to be regarded as “imperfect,” especially by victims.

Drilling Down

• With the ICC option unlikely, there could be a case of having trials in Ukraine, including at locations where Russian atrocities are alleged to have been committed. While perhaps morally satisfying, there is, of course, the same doubt as to whether Russian officials would be present at such trials, and it could be argued that the proceedings would not enjoy widespread international recognition.
• Hybrid courts, consisting of both international and Ukrainian prosecutors, could be another option, but the presence of Ukrainian nationals in decisive positions could be an issue for many nations that would prefer a more neutral setup.
• Instead, the option that is most likely to fly is the establishment of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression created through an agreement between Ukraine and the United Nations, but circumventing the UN Security Council and instead relying on the UN General Assembly (UNGA).
• No specific number of votes is needed for this to happen, but EU officials I have spoken to on condition of anonymity say they could push for it “as soon as it is clear there is enough support” and that this might happen at the UNGA in September, when many world leaders gather in New York.
• A special tribunal set up under the UNGA could potentially also solve the issue of lifting the immunity of high-ranking politicians. Such privileges, according to international law, don’t represent a roadblock to the prosecution of senior leaders for serious crimes before international criminal courts and tribunals acting on behalf of the international community.
• Can a court set up via a UNGA resolution truly represent the international community as a whole? That would probably be a question open to various legal and political interpretations, and it could ultimately come down to how many nations in the UN eventually vote in favor of such a court. One thing, however, is clear: There is no statute of limitation on crimes of aggression, so the international community can opt to play the "long game" in the quest for justice.
• It is also worth noting that there is a precedent for the UNGA setting up a court. The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, commonly known as the “Khmer Rouge Tribunal,” was established in 1997 after a UNGA resolution. It is worth noting, however, that it didn’t prosecute crimes of aggression.
• There is, of course, also the opportunity for both individuals and states to opt for civil lawsuits. The most obvious avenue here could be the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). But, after its exclusion from the Council of Europe last year, Russia ceased to be party to the European Convention on Human Rights on September 16, 2022. This limits applications against Russia and Russians to crimes committed up until that date.

Looking Ahead

The leaders of Kosovo and Serbia will come to Brussels on February 27 for their first meeting under the EU-facilitated dialogue this year. And there are indications that they might agree to a deal to further normalize bilateral relations.

There seems to be some movement on the NATO enlargement front after a number of recent setbacks. Finland’s parliament will vote on its NATO membership bill on February 28, and the Swedish government has indicated that it will follow suit in early March. Hungary’s parliament might soon ratify the Nordic pair’s accession treaty, and even Turkey has opened up for more talks with Helsinki and Stockholm in order to give its thumbs-up to let them join the military alliance.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your inbox every Monday.

And you can always reach us at newsletters@rferl.org.