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US officials have reportedly proposed easing transit sanctions on the Belarusian potash giant Belaruskali’s exports through neighboring countries. (file photo)
US officials have reportedly proposed easing transit sanctions on the Belarusian potash giant Belaruskali’s exports through neighboring countries. (file photo)

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two issues: more EU sanctions on Russia, and the US pressuring EU countries to allow Belarusian potash exports.

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Briefing #1: The EU's New 'Mini Package' Of Russia Sanctions

What You Need To Know: The European Union is poised to continue to add to its Russia sanctions.

On May 21, a new proposed black list was sent to EU member states and a first discussion was held on the topic among EU ambassadors a day later with a view quickly adopting it -- potentially as early as this week.

This comes after the bloc only a month ago approved its 20th round of restrictive measures after the new Hungarian government finally lifted its veto.

The reason for the potential quick approval is that this isn’t a big package at all.

In fact, there is even talk among EU diplomats that this isn’t a proper sanctions package as it lacks any of the traditional sectoral measures included in previous rounds, such as import bans on various Russian products or the prohibition on exporting various items into the country.

One EU official, speaking on condition of anonymity, described it as a sort of “mini package” that the bloc might be doing more of in the future on a rolling basis. But it may also be “folded into” something bigger in upcoming weeks in case the European Commission proposes more heavy-hitting stuff, like targeting Russian banks or energy resources.

Deep Background: As stated in the sanctions document seen by RFE/RL, the reason for the sanctions are the near daily attacks on the Ukrainian civilian population.

The paper notes that restrictive measures are for the “recent brutal military campaign deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure, including energy, water and health facilities, which has caused severe suffering to the civilian population and seeks to undermine Ukraine’s resilience.”

Unsurprisingly, these sanctions are aimed largely at Russia’s military machine.

This means that the Russian Patriarch Kirill, one of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s most ardent supporters, has not been proposed for sanctions -- at least not yet. Brussels has otherwise been awash with rumors that he could be included now that the new government in Budapest is no longer “shielding” him -- like the previous Hungarian administration did.

Instead, the proposal mainly includes key figures in the Rostec Corporation, described by the EU document as “the most important defense corporation in Russia, gathering the main companies of Russia’s military and industrial complex.”

These individuals are likely to be slapped with asset freezes and visa bans.

Drilling Down

  • Among the companies and organizations targeted is the League for Assistance to Defense Enterprises -- a Moscow-based nonprofit organization with representatives from the government of the Russian Federation and private military industry corporations -- which aims to promote “the development of the Russian military industry, modernization, and further growth of the military industry.”
  • There are also suggested black listings for various military companies focusing on the production of components needed for drones used in the Ukraine war, such as computer numerical control (CNC) machines, lasers, and even electric lamps and lighting equipment, which are used for what the document describes as “reconnaissance, strike, and kamikaze missions.”
  • One company, Lavochkin Research and Production Association, set up by the Russian space agency Roscosmos, focuses on the construction of “a satellite remote sensing system to improve the effectiveness of the use of military troops.” Another military company, Gefest and T, specializes in high-end equipment for Russian military planes “to calculate the parameters of the aircraft's flight and the point of release of bombs.”
  • Interestingly, it is not only Russian companies that have been proposed for sanctions. There are also two Chinese firms on the list -- which is likely to cause more friction with Beijing as it continues to support the Russian war effort while trying to appear politically neutral. China has consistently denied supplying lethal weapons to either side in Ukraine and says it strictly controls dual-use exports.
  • One of the Chinese companies that might be sanctioned is described as being among “the largest lubricant additive manufacturers and distributors based in China” and is considered a big supplier of chemical additives for mechanical lubricants, a key component for any type of machinery used by the Russian military.
  • The other Chinese company has allegedly “supplied significant volumes of components to Rustakt LLC, a Russian producer of military grade first-person-view drones.”
  • Away from the military sanctions, the EU is largely focusing on targeting the Russian shadow fleet -- ships used by Moscow to to circumvent sanctions and transport restricted oil and other commodities. Over 600 vessels have already been targeted with a so-called “service ban,” meaning that no EU port can offer assistance to these boats.
  • What these latest sanctions proposals are now suggesting is to go after shipping companies that act as commercial operators for these vessels. Most of these companies are Russian but the sanctions are also set to hit similar companies operating out of Azerbaijan, China, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.


Briefing #2: US Asks Lithuania, Poland, And Ukraine To Allow Belarusian Fertilizer Exports

What You Need To Know: US officials have proposed that Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine lift sanctions on Belarusian potash to allow the transit of the agricultural product -- a major source of hard currency revenue for Minsk -- through their territories.

An undated, unsigned, one-page document sent to the three countries bordering Belarus, which was obtained by RFE/RL, cited the March decision by President Donald Trump’s administration to lift financial restrictions on the state-run fertilizer giant Belaruskali.

“Now that the United States has lifted US sanctions on Belaruskali, US firms are interested in acquiring and transporting Belarusian potash,” the paper says. “Doing so would require transit through EU countries bordering Belarus or through Ukraine to avoid transport through Russia.”

“The United States is interested in exploring potential routes for the transit of Belarusian potash to alleviate global shortages via Poland, Lithuania, or Ukraine and looks forward to future discussions with you on this topic,” it adds.

Deep Background: Belaruskali is one of the largest potash fertilizer companies in the world, and is the largest single source of revenue for the government of strongman leader Aleksandr Lukashenko.

A high-ranking European Union official said the proposal -- known as a “nonpaper” or discussion document in diplomatic parlance -- was sent by the US State Department to the three countries. The official spoke on condition of anonymity in order to disclose private discussions.

Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry confirmed it had received the document but had no further comment.

Poland's Foreign Ministry did not respond to an RFE/RL request for comment. Lithuania denied that it had received any such proposal, but the country’s foreign minister said last week that Washington was exerting pressure to allow transit of the Belarusian fertilizer.

Drilling Down

  • Poland and Lithuania -- both EU and NATO members -- have frosty relations with Lukashenko, in part because of his close ties with the Kremlin.
  • Speaking to RFE/RL's Belarus Service on May 22, Svyatlana Tsikhanouskaya -- an exiled Belarusian opposition leader whose claim to victory in the disputed 2020 election is backed by many Western governments -- said it was "by no means the time to ease sanctions against the Lukashenko regime."
  • Tsikhanouskaya added that the US proposal to lift sanctions on Belarusian potash was "not an instruction," suggesting that Washington understands that each country can decide whether to communicate with Lukashenko "because there are a lot of interests at stake here."
  • "A safe, free Belarus is also in the interests of our neighbors," Tsikhanouskaya said at the Globsec security conference in Prague last week. "They are not naive, they understand that while Lukashenko is there, balloons are flying over Lithuania, they are demonstrating...nuclear weapons...conducting [military] exercises, so it is not the right approach to lift the sanctions."
  • The United States and the European Union hit Lukashenko and his government with major sanctions in the wake of the 2020 presidential election in which Lukashenko, in power since 1994, claimed victory.
  • Belarus’s opposition, and much of the West, called the vote fraudulent, and hundreds of thousands of Belarusians protested for weeks. The Lukashenko government waged a brutal crackdown, jailing thousands of people.
  • Since returning to the White House in January 2025, Trump has sought to renew ties with Lukashenko's government. His lead envoy on the subject, John Coale, has met with Lukashenko personally in Minsk, and negotiated the release of scores of political prisoners. In return, the Trump administration has eased sanctions on Belaruskali, the state airline Belavia, and other major companies. Coale did not respond to an e-mail seeking comment.
  • The EU, meanwhile, unanimously extended its sanctions on Belarus earlier this year. Those measures include an import ban on Belarusian potassium-based fertilizers and targeted sanctions on companies such as Belaruskali.
  • Under EU rules, imports of nitrogen-based fertilizers -- like the sort that Belaruskali produces -- were already being phased out. The document refers to the EU sanctions still in place on Belarusian potash. Transit through EU countries would require the bloc to lift sanctions or for transit countries to waive them "through an appropriate legal mechanism" the paper says.
  • By allowing the purchase of the Belarusian product, it says, the EU would also be depriving Russian potash suppliers of market share, as well as depriving Russia of transit revenues.
  • Prior to the EU sanctions, the bulk of Belarusian potash was shipped via Baltic ports, mainly Klaipeda in Lithuania. In recent years, those exports are routed on Russian railways, mainly to St. Petersburg.
  • The letter also proposed an unusual financing arrangement: directing income that EU countries earn from allowing Belarusian potash transit to go toward Ukraine’s defense against Russia’s all-out invasion.
  • The US request also comes amid warnings that the ongoing US-Israeli war against Iran -- and Iran’s retaliation and blocking of the Strait of Hormuz -- have led to a spike in global prices for fertilizer and other agriculture products.
  • The chokepoint waterway normally handles up to 30 percent of global fertilizer exports, as well as around 20 percent of global liquefied natural gas -- a key component in synthetic fertilizers.
  • UN officials have warned that this will result in price hikes rippling through food and agriculture markets -- including in the United States, where consumer prices are spiking due to high global oil prices -- and the Trump administration has looked for ways to ease inflation. In the past, Belarus has accounted for around 15 percent of the global share of fertilizer production.


Looking Ahead

EU foreign ministers are gathering for an informal meeting on Cyprus on May 27-28. One of the main discussions they will have there is how to prevent Russia from slowly being allowed back on the international stage at various sports and cultural events.

The International Gymnastics Federation recently lifted all its remaining restrictions on Belarusian and Russian competitors and the return of a Russian pavilion at the Venice Biennale in April also caused plenty of controversy.

That's all for this week! Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or via e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

Brussels has approved an expanded mandate for its advisory mission in Ukraine as part of broader efforts to prepare the country for eventual EU membership. (file photo)
Brussels has approved an expanded mandate for its advisory mission in Ukraine as part of broader efforts to prepare the country for eventual EU membership. (file photo)

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two issues: the terrorist threat Russia poses to the EU, and Brussels’ expanded mission to Ukraine.

Briefing #1: Russia's Terrorist Threat To The EU

What You Need To Know: Earlier this month, the European Union produced an internal document, seen by RFE/RL, spelling out the threat assessment facing the bloc.

The 23-page document -- prepared by the Council of the European Union, which represents the governments of the 27 EU member states -- mostly covers developments and trends from 2025.

It notes that terrorism and violent extremism "pose a significant threat to the EU," citing heightened risks from Afghanistan and Iran.

But, interestingly, it also covers Russia’s war in Ukraine and what negative spillover effects it could have for the bloc.

The text admits that the “impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine on the terrorist threat both in Europe and globally has so far been limited” but warns that it is “likely that the flow of small arms, light weapons and explosives in particular will have consequences in the medium and long term.”

Deep Background: Apart from the inflow of weapons, the memo also stresses that war in Ukraine has led to an increased threat to the EU’s internal security, including the sabotage of critical infrastructure.

There are already numerous examples of this, such as ships belonging to Russia’s so-called shadow fleet severing undersea cables in the Baltic Sea or alleged Russian agents attempting -- and sometimes successfully managing -- to set buildings on fire in several EU member states, with law enforcement in Czechia, Germany, and the Baltic states having uncovered such plots in recent years.

There is no common European definition designating sabotage like this as terrorism, even though some individual member states classify these types of actions as such.

The increased use of drones is also mentioned.

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) straying from Russia into Poland last fall caused one of the biggest crises within NATO, and drones whose countries of origin were never officially identified also caused issues at airports in Copenhagen and Oslo.

The document warns that larger terrorist attacks involving UAVs in combination with radioactive material can happen, stating that drones and other types of unmanned devices and vehicles “would allow terrorists to perpetrate attacks remotely. This would enable specific attack scenarios with a potentially magnified impact, for which unmanned aerial vehicles could also be customized and used in combination with various weapons, potentially including non-conventional agents, such as radioactive or biological material.”

The paper notes that, while there haven’t been any clear-cut acts of terrorism involving drones in the bloc so far, “recent incidents involving the malicious or irresponsible use of drones have exposed significant and growing security challenges for the EU.”

Drilling Down

  • The final challenge stemming from the Ukraine war that the document warns about is the possibility of “violent extremists fighting on either side of the front line and their possible return to or entry into the EU.”
  • Estonia cautioned back in January that former Russian soldiers do pose a threat to the EU. In a discussion paper shared with other members of the bloc, Tallinn pointed out that some 1.5 million Russian citizens have taken part in combat operations in Ukraine since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 -- including both regular armed forces of the Russian Federation and proxy units such as the Wagner Group.
  • Of those, some 640,000 remain actively engaged today. The paper also cautioned that 180,000 Russian prisoners have been released early so they can head to Ukraine, often fighting in special military units.
  • The Estonian document warned that “many returnees have already committed serious crimes. The total number of which has reached a 15-year high in Russia in the first half of 2025, and this upsurge is likely linked to the mass return of ex-combatants”.
  • Many EU countries are now fearing that some of these combatants may come to the EU to cause further trouble. In June, the bloc’s foreign ministers look set to agree to work together to prevent as many of these ex-soldiers as possible from entering the Schengen zone by placing them on a so-called Schengen entry ban list.
  • Valid for five years, this blacklisting would automatically cover all EU countries, apart from Cyprus and Ireland, as well as the non-EU Schengen members Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland.
  • Estonia has already blacklisted hundreds of Russian ex-soldiers since the start of the year, but more countries are now set to join the effort to add more names to the lists.

Briefing #2: The EU Expands Its Ukraine Mission

What You Need To Know: Earlier in May, the EU quietly managed to vote through another Ukraine-related issue that had been blocked by Hungary since late 2025 -- the expansion of the mandate of the bloc’s advisory mission to Ukraine, known as EUAM Ukraine, which largely offers help in reforming the country’s rule of law and civilian security sector, such as the police.

EUAM’s competences are now expanding further in two specific areas with work expected to start as early as this summer -- helping Kyiv combat hybrid threats from Moscow and assisting Ukrainian war veterans.

The adopted proposal, seen by RFE/RL, notes that Brussels should help Ukraine with “the protection of critical infrastructure, cyber security and countering foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) and Russia’s and other actors’ online recruitment amongst susceptible and vulnerable groups for subversive or terrorist actions against Ukraine.”

The second area that EUAM will focus on is supporting efforts to (re)integrate Ukrainian war veterans in civilian security and civil protection sectors together with the country’s ministries for veterans’ affairs, internal affairs, and state emergency services.

Deep Background: Already in November 2025, EU member states agreed to the expansion at a lower diplomatic level, but it never reached on ambassadorial level as the Budapest government of Viktor Orban refused to agree on any EU measures supporting Ukraine in the run-up to the Hungarian parliamentary elections in mid-April, which saw the defeat of Orban’s Fidesz party after 16 years in power.

It may not have gotten the same media attention as the new Russia sanctions finally agreed upon after a three-month stalemate or the 90-billion-euro ($105 billion) loan to Kyiv that Budapest had also been blocking since January, largely because it appears very bureaucratic, and on paper rather insignificant, but it will actually play a big role in transforming the war-torn country into an EU member state in the future.

For Ukraine to be able to join the EU, issues such as fundamental rights, rule of law, anti-corruption efforts, and justice reform are what Brussels is most concerned about, and the EU and its member states will demand that everything is functional before even considering Ukraine’s accession to the bloc.

Drilling Down

  • • In Brussels corridors, accession chapters 23 and 24 are the famous “fundamentals” that every EU candidate country will open first and close last in negotiations with the blov. For Ukraine, the opening of these chapters will probably happen as early as mid-June. What will follow are likely years of tough reforms.
  • But to be successful here, EUAM will play a crucial role. First, it will in many ways be the bloc’s “eyes and ears” on the ground in Ukraine in these reform efforts. Second, it will assist Kyiv as much as possible in meeting Brussels’ demands.
  • And it has already put in some of the hard miles. EUAM Ukraine began operations back in 2014, a few months after the Euromaidan revolution, which ousted a Moscow-friendly government and kickstarted Ukraine’s Western orientation.
  • The stated goal of EUAM is to make the Ukrainian civil security sector more efficient and transparent. In fact, it has been working with all the country’s law enforcement and rule of law institutions for over a decade with offices in Kyiv, Lviv, and Odesa, plus a mobile unit of law enforcement experts who travel around the country. It also had offices in Mariupol and Kharkiv that are currently nonoperational due to Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022.
  • It now has close to 400 staff and a budget of 123 million euros ($140 million), which will grow to nearly 130 million euros with the latest expansion to deal with hybrid attacks and veteran affairs. But it is not the first time the EU has expanded EUAM’s functions as Ukraine’s needs have evolved during the war.
  • With the outbreak of the full-scale invasion, the mission now also provides support to Ukrainian authorities to investigate and prosecute international crimes committed in relation to Russian atrocities. A lot of this work will feed into the not-yet-functional Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine that the Council of Europe is working on.
  • EUAM was also crucial in facilitating the flow of Ukrainian refugees to Poland, Romania, and Slovakia in the direct aftermath of the all-out invasion and assisted in the subsequent European flow of humanitarian aid into Ukraine.

Looking Ahead

NATO foreign ministers will gather in the southern Swedish city of Helsingborg on May 21-22 for an informal ministerial -- the last such meeting before the actual NATO summit in Ankara in early July.

No decisions will be taken, but expect all eyes to be on US Secretary of State Marco Rubio as Washington has threatened to withdraw some American troops from Europe amid transatlantic tensions over the war in Iran.

That's all for this week! Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or via e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org .

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here .

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