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Ukrainian flags fly outside the EU Parliament building in Brussels. (file photo)
Ukrainian flags fly outside the EU Parliament building in Brussels. (file photo)

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two issues: the EU's push to get Russian concessions and Ukraine's EU 2027 EU membership bid.

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Briefing #1: What The EU Says Russia Should Concede

What You Need To Know: The EU top diplomat, Kaja Kallas, has distributed a paper among EU member states, seen by RFE/RL, that spells out concessions Russia should make in ongoing diplomatic talks with Ukraine, which the United States is mediating. The demands include a reduction of Russian troops levels and their withdrawal from neighboring countries, reparation payments, and the need to democratize its society.

Neither the EU nor individual European nations have a seat at the table in the various negotiations that have been ongoing for close to a year to stop the war in Ukraine. Seeing as the EU funds most aid to Ukraine and a potential 20-point peace plan spells out clear Brussels competences such as Ukrainian EU membership by 2027, European leaders have bemoaned their lack of political clout in the talks.

Deep Background: The discussion paper, titled European Core Interests in Ensuring a Comprehensive, Just and Lasting Peace and Continent's Security, insists that there can be no peace or security "without the EU at the negotiating table and without taking into account [the] EU's core interests."

The document presents a very "EU maximalist" view on what Russia should do, with one EU diplomat telling RFE/RL that "we pay back to Russian maximalists demands on Ukraine." The Kremlin has so far refused to give up its goal of controlling the entire Ukrainian region of Donbas and reportedly also balked at ideas such as stationing NATO troops in western Ukraine as a post-deal security deal or paying for damages caused by the war.

Another European official familiar with the paper says: "Getting to peace isn't all about Ukraine conceding. We also have to talk about what Russia must do, ahead of sending any envoy there."

There have been discussions among EU capitals about creating an EU envoy who deals specifically with Russia even though there is no agreement who this person would be or what their mandate would be.

The paper will be discussed by EU ambassadors on February 17, and it is expected that at least parts of might come up for debate when the bloc's foreign ministers meet in Brussels on February 23.

Drilling Down:

  • In the first chapter, titled Russia to Respect Independence, Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of States, the main idea is that if Ukraine should cap its troop levels or even withdraw them from some areas -- something discussed during the US-mediated talks -- then Russia should do the same. It also demands that no "de jure" recognition of the occupied Ukrainian territories occur and that those areas are de-militarized.
  • The next chapter, A Secure and Stable Europe, includes a demand that "Russia stops disinformation campaigns, sabotage, cyber-attacks, airspace violations and interference in elections on European territory and in neighbouring countries."
  • Another ultimatum stipulates no nuclear weapons in Belarus and a "ban of Russian military presence and deployments in Belarus, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Georgia and Armenia." Russian troops have for decades been stationed in Russian-controlled breakaway regions such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdniester, as well as bases in Armenia and Belarus.
  • On the need for Moscow to adhere to international law, the call by the EU includes no blanket amnesty for war crimes, access for international investigators to sites of suspected war crimes, and that no domestic Russian law is elevated above international treaties spelling out various Russian obligations globally.
  • When it comes to reparations, the text notes that "Russia must compensate and contribute to Ukraine's reconstruction, for damages to European states and European companies, and for ecological damages it has caused."
  • The EU has frozen some 210 billion euros worth of Russian sovereign wealth assets but has so far failed to agree on a method to either legally confiscate them or leverage them to channel funds to Ukraine. Brussels has, however, sent the quarterly windfall profits of this money to Kyiv.
  • The final demands concern the domestic situation in Russia with the paper calling for free and fair elections with international monitoring, a release of all political prisoners, a return of deported civilians and children, media freedom, a repeal of the foreign agent law, ceasing "historical falsification and other laws that criminalize dissent and delegitimize independent media and civil society" and full cooperation in investigations of the killings of the Russian opposition leaders Aleksei Navalny and Boris Nemtsov.


Briefing #2: Ukraine's EU Membership Pipe Dream

What You Need To Know: The question of a speedy Ukrainian EU membership, possibly even as early as next year, has resurfaced again. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy notably tweeted, "It is important that Ukraine will do everything to be technically ready for EU accession by 2027. At least the main steps we will accomplish. I want a specific date." He elaborated at the Munich Security Conference on February 14 that "we need a date because otherwise Russia will try to block us -- directly or through maybe other countries."

In parallel, Brussels is starting to look at potential creative solutions to help Kyiv in this regard. In a meeting with ambassadors of the 27 members states earlier in February, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen floated the idea of "a reversed enlargement," meaning a country could join but without many or most of the privileges of membership such as voting rights, its own European commissioner, or even full access to funding. Such rights and obligations would be gradually phased in later as the country continues necessary reforms to become a fully-fledged member.

Deep Background: There are two reasons this potential partial membership is being examined. There's no way Ukraine can become a fully-fledged member already by next year. While the country became an official EU candidate country in 2022, it still hasn't opened EU accession talks yet. This is largely due to a Hungarian veto over what Budapest alleges is Ukrainian discrimination of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine.

Accession talks as well as the opening, closing, and sometimes even interim benchmarks of the 33 accession chapters need unanimous support of the EU member states -- there are close to 100 veto opportunities for each and every capital in this process. Even if Viktor Orban's Fidesz loses the Hungarian parliamentary election in April and a slightly more pro-Ukrainian Tisza party comes to power, Ukraine may only be able to open talks on all chapters and potentially close some by 2027.

A quick look at the European Commission's own assessment from late 2025 of Kyiv's readiness for membership shows the country only has "a good level of preparation" in a handful of the 33 chapters. To illustrate, it has taken Montenegro -- a smaller, richer, and less geopolitically complicated country than Ukraine -- 13 years of EU accession negotiations to close 13 of the 33 chapters. Ukraine joining the EU sometime in the 2030s would still be regarded as "speedy" according to most EU enlargement experts.

But the main reason for the EU's quest for creativity is the 20-point peace plan that Russia, Ukraine, and the United States are currently negotiating. One of those 20 points spells out Ukrainian EU membership by 2027. It is fair to say the Europeans aren't happy that they aren't around the table and even more so when it comes to issues they should have a say on.

Speaking to RFE/RL at the Munich conference, Dutch Prime Minister Dick Schoof remarked, "No doubt, Ukraine belongs to the European family, but the Americans and the Russian will not decide when Ukraine is going to enter the European Union. That is up to the European Union and to the European Union only together with Ukraine."

Drilling Down:

  • Several EU officials RFE/RL spoke to off-the-record acknowledge that even though a peace deal currently looks distant, they cannot be the ones torpedoing it over a single point.
  • They also agree they need to help Zelenskyy in some way. And EU membership, even partial, is one of the few sweeteners in an otherwise seemingly harsh settlement he can "sell" to the Ukrainian people.
  • Can it be done by 2027? Speaking to RFE/RL in Munich, former European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso noted that "the creativity of European lawyers is boundless when there is a real need."
  • He added: "The most likely scenario is to have some kind of expedited membership, not putting down the standards but in fact showing Ukraine that we are serious about EU membership."
  • Even something fast-tracked, partial, front-loaded, or reversed may be a step too far for the EU. Current EU Enlargement Commissioner Mata Kos pinpointed the key obstacle in a recent interview with RFE/RL. "In the accession process there are two important pillars: One is the technical process that I am leading, and the other is the dynamics in the member states so whatever we do we have to get the approval of the member states," she said.
  • A sudden change of methodology requires unanimity, and it's not only Hungary that has major reservations. Several other EU member states, according to RFE/RL Brussels sources familiar with the topic, are also wary.
  • Schoof noted that "we can find ways, but I think it is going to be a difficult discussion." Latvian President Edgars Rinkevics, asked about it in a panel discussion in Munich on February 15, was even blunter, saying, "Speaking to many EU heads of state and government, I felt that at the moment there is no readiness to agree on a date."
  • Arguments range from the "Pandora's box" one could open up by potentially changing EU treaties and the bloc being bogged down in such discussions for years to how much access Ukraine should get to EU cash cows such as regional and agricultural funding, potentially upending what already is expected to be very complex and fraught discussions of the next EU budget (2028-2034) that will consume Brussels in the next two years.
  • Others are also reluctant to commit to what is known as a "two-speed EU." "You are either in or out, that has always been the principle and the core strength of the Union", as one diplomat put it to RFE/RL.
  • There is also the question of fairness, perhaps best put by Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovic when speaking to RFE/RL on the issue. "If we will change the methodology to the geopolitical approach, then it will change not only vis-a-vis Ukraine," he said. "I support Ukraine, but it will have to change with everyone. And that will mean a big bang (enlargement), and we haven't had a big bang for many years."
  • The last "big bang" enlargements were in 2004 and 2007, when 10 Central and Eastern European countries joined the club. And that took a fundamental economic and political reorganization of the EU.
  • "Everyone," in Plenkovic's view, entails all the other EU hopefuls: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Turkey. Of those nine, Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey are technically more advanced than Ukraine as they all have started EU accession talks. They have been trying to gain membership for years, if not decades, under the current merit-based methodology.
  • But would all current EU member states agree to some sort of EU membership all for those countries as well, and if not, which ones? A sudden Ukrainian EU membership, partial or otherwise, would in other words probably create more problems than it solves.


Looking Ahead

This week is a slower one in Brussels as the legislative agenda to a large extent is synched with the February school holidays in Belgium. There is, however, a chance the bloc's ambassadors might agree on the 20th package of sanctions against Russia ahead of the fourth anniversary of Moscow's full-scale invasion of Kyiv on February 24.

That's all for this week!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here .

US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth (left) won't be participating in the upcoming NATO meeting in Brussels, but will instead be represented by his deputy, Elbridge Colby (right), who might be even more hawkish on defense spending than his boss. (file photo)
US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth (left) won't be participating in the upcoming NATO meeting in Brussels, but will instead be represented by his deputy, Elbridge Colby (right), who might be even more hawkish on defense spending than his boss. (file photo)

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two issues: New EU sanctions on Russia and its partners and a preview of the NATO meeting of defense ministers.

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Briefing #1: The EU Proposes More Sanctions On Russia

What You Need To Know: The European Commission presented its latest sanctions against Russia to EU member states late last week in the hopes of having the measures approved ahead of the fourth anniversary of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24.

If adopted, the proposal -- seen by RFE/RL -- would be the 20th round of sanctions from the bloc since the invasion. It lacks the headline-grabbing proposals of the early sanctions, as Brussels is running out of things to target and struggling to find the necessary unanimity of the 27 EU capitals.

It is clear, however, that the EU is now to a larger degree targeting countries it believes are aiding the Kremlin's war effort. The new package includes sanctions against companies in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, as well as the United Arab Emirates and China.

Arguably the biggest talking point of this round is the proposal to impose a maritime services ban related to Russian crude oil and petroleum products. The idea of the ban is that it prohibits EU economic operators from providing services to any vessel transporting these products from Russian ports.

This goes beyond the current oil price cap -- imposed by the Group of Seven and currently set at $47.60 per barrel -- in one crucial way. It would stop EU vessels from transporting these components completely while non-EU boats could still continue but wouldn't be able to rely on EU port services and insurances.

There is just one issue: The measure has to be approved by the Group of Seven first. So far, it's far from clear as to whether every country in the group will give a thumbs-up to scrap the price cap and go for a general ban.

In the meantime, more vessels belonging to Russia's so-called shadow fleet (which Brussels believe is carrying Russian oil in violation of an oil price cap) will be sanctioned, taking the blacklist to over 700 boats. The EU is also proposing restrictions on icebreakers operating in Russia as "these vessels are instrumental to support oil and gas exports from Russian northernmost areas."

Deep Background: How else will this package target Russia?

EU operators will be forbidden from engaging with the "digital ruble" that Moscow hopes to launch soon. A transaction ban will hit another 20 banks, mainly local and regional banks, meaning financial institutions in the EU essentially cannot do business with them. Most of Russia's big banks are already blacklisted, but Brussels is worried businesses are circumventing these bans by rerouting money via smaller financial entities.

New EU export bans have been proposed for various chemicals, vulcanized rubber, articles of steel, tools for metal production, and industrial tractors. These measures are also mirrored for Belarus.

Among items that will be banned from importing to the EU from Russia (and Belarus) are tanned furs and various steel products as well as a low quota of ammonia. The latter is significant as the bloc aims to completely phase out Russian gas imports as of 2027, and ammonia is the main gas derivative so far left unsanctioned.

In a move that could potentially have consequences for many third-country media outlets, the EU's broadcasting ban on Russian media such as RT and Sputnik will now apply to other outlets mirroring their content.

Drilling Down

  • The most eye-catching aspect of the sanctions proposal is the "internationalization" of the measures. While the EU has consistently targeted Belarus alongside Russia and sometimes added minor export restrictions on specific companies in China or Central Asia, this takes thing one step further.
  • For the first time, the European Union is proposing to use its anti-circumvention tool (ACT). This means it will be forbidden for EU companies to export CNC machines and radio equipment to Kyrgyzstan -- items that can be used in the war, notably for drones.
  • The sanctions document notes that for the first 10 months of 2025, imports of these types of products from the EU to Kyrgyzstan were almost 800 percent higher than before Russia's full-scale invasion and that exports from Kyrgyzstan to Russia for the same period were up 1,200 percent.
  • It also adds that the "Kyrgyz Republic has been identified as a jurisdiction where the risk of circumvention is systematic and persistent, with authorities failing to prevent the sale, supply, transfer, or export to Russia."
  • Brussels is to a larger degree looking beyond Russia now when it comes to sanctions. The package targets several companies in Kazakhstan, the United Arab Emirates, and Uzbekistan, among other places, with an asset freeze for aiding Russia's military machine.
  • There is also a transaction ban on several banks as they are deemed to have facilitated sanctions circumvention. This list includes OJSC Unibank of Armenia, Azerbaijan's Yelo Bank, and the International Bank of Tajikistan.
  • Georgia's Kulevi port is also a proposed target as it has allowed the Russian shadow fleet to operate from there. An Indonesian port is similarly targeted.


Briefing #2: NATO Defense Ministers Deal With Post-Greenland Fallout And Defense Spending

What You Need To Know: NATO's defense ministers are meeting in Brussels on February 12 for their last official gathering before the NATO summit in Ankara in early July.

No concrete decisions are expected in the Belgian capital -- instead the meeting is about two things.

First, an attempt to try to patch up what appears to be an increasing rift between European allies and the United States, which was laid bare over the recent discussions surrounding the political future of Greenland.

And second -- and not entirely unrelated to the first issue -- figuring out how to achieve the decision made in the Hague last year that all 32 allies should spend 5 percent of GDP on defense by 2035.

The Greenland controversy is still looming large over the gathering even though it isn't part of the official discussion. While one European NATO official said that there has been a "fundamental breach of trust" inside the alliance on the issue, most diplomats that RFE/RL has spoken to appear to agree that it is best if it isn't brought up for now.

Instead, the hope is that the likely launch of the Arctic Sentry operation by the military alliance just before the ministerial meeting will prove that everyone is on the same page in taking High North security seriously, and will silence any talk of a potential American takeover of the Danish territory.

Deep Background: Sources that RFE/RL has spoken to under the condition of anonymity say that there are roughly two camps in the alliance on how European capitals should respond to recent events.

Some countries, led by France, are still reeling from the US pressure and want European nations to diversify away faster from the US security umbrella.

In the other group there, are nations, especially on the eastern flank, that have concluded that there isn't much European nations can do in the immediate future and they should therefore rely on American protection and goodwill for years to come.

These countries subscribe to the view of the NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte that Europe wouldn't be able to defend itself without America, even if nations spend well over five percent of GDP. This includes US nuclear capabilities that can't readily be replaced, but also satellite technology, military intelligence, and other strategic enablers.

The hope is still that the camps will show a united front during the ministerial meeting and that this will continue when most participants dash to Munich for the annual security conference on February 13-14 where most will want to prevent a similar transatlantic fall-out to that which was on such a full display in Davos only last month.

But for that to happen, the European states and Canada need to deliver on the second issue -- stepping up on defense spending. As one European military official put it to RFE/RL: "2026 is all about implementation, implementation, implementation." With most countries just about reaching 2 percent of GDP on defense in the last year, this is a major undertaking. But it is the one point that they know US President Donald Trump and his administration will continue to hammer home to Europe and Canada.

Drilling Down

  • All NATO countries should hand in their Strategic Level Reports (SLR), outlining military spending for the next five years, ahead of the ministerial meeting. And this has some countries worried as they don't plan on spending too much in the coming years before potentially hiking spending closer to the target date, so that they fulfil requirements just in time -- an "accounting trick" known as the "hockey stick method" in NATO corridors.
  • This is something that US officials have made clear they won't tolerate and Washington will warn Europeans that they will have to be able to present credible and gradually progressive defense spending before going into the Ankara summit in order to make it a success.
  • US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth won't participate in the Brussels meeting but will instead be represented by his deputy, Elbridge Colby. Widely regarded as the man who might be even more hawkish on spending than his boss, Europeans will make sure not to cross him.
  • It is expected that his speech will focus on the need for "the Europeanization of NATO." That means essentially three things -- spending more, European nations getting combat ready, and the need to step up on various capabilities. Few are expected to challenge that.
  • But while Colby will be the most observed man in the room, part of the ministerial meeting will also be dedicated to a newbie that many are looking forward to hearing from. At the NATO-Ukraine Council session, the freshly minted Ukrainian defense minister Mykhaylo Fedorov will make his first appearance at the military alliance in his new role.
  • There is quite a buzz in Brussels about the 35-year-old "tech guy" and political "whiz kid" who previously worked for several years as the country's minister for digital transformation.
  • Officials are especially keen to see how Fedorov, who is one of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's closest confidants, will cope in reforming and modernizing the still heavily centralized Ukrainian defense ministry.
  • But NATO officials actually hope he will also share his knowledge of cutting-edge drone warfare and cyber capabilities. "He is probably the biggest expert in the room on all modern technologies" as one diplomat put it.
  • But what about financing for Ukraine? The NATO-led PURL initiative, in which European allies pledge money for US-made weapons heading to Ukraine reached, nearly 5 billion dollars in 2025. There is a push in the alliance to repeat this in the spring as Russia continues to pound the country daily with rockets.
  • But it is indicative that NATO no longer publicly announces when new PURL packages are agreed -- following a request from alliance members to remain anonymous and strategic. Some sources, however. fear that this is rather a reflection of both a reduced appetite to buy American in many European countries and mounting fatigue over financing a war that is about to enter its fifth year.


Looking Ahead

European Union leaders will gather in a castle outside Brussels on February 12 for an informal EU summit in which they will discuss how the bloc can become both more competitive on the world stage and get the EU single market going again.

The guests of honor are two former Italian premiers -- Mario Draghi and Enrico Lette -- who have both authored lengthy reports on these issues.

Expect a lot of hand-wringing about the dominance of US tech companies and voracious Chinese state firms, but few concrete actions.

That's all for this week!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org .

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here .

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