Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods. To subscribe, click here.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two major issues: How both the EU and NATO are scrambling to get more ammunition to Ukraine and how justice might be served after the war has ended.

Brief #1: Getting Ammunition To Ukraine -- And Replenishing Western Stocks

What You Need To Know: Perhaps the most pressing issue for both the European Union and NATO in relation to the war in Ukraine right now is ammunition. First and foremost, how to supply Kyiv, especially after President Volodymyr Zelenskiy during his visit to Brussels earlier this month warned about the latest Russian offensive and the urgent need for more military deliveries.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov also recently specified to Western colleagues the need to get 1 million rounds of 155-millimeter ammunition urgently.

At the same time, there is also a need to replenish Western stockpiles, which are depleting quickly. Quite how fast remains classified; no one I have spoken to is willing to share, but they can confirm that, apart from the ammunition Ukraine is asking for, there is also a shortage of HIMARS missiles and ammunition for air-defense systems. And this has forced Brussels into action.

EU defense and foreign ministers will discuss the issue when they convene in Stockholm on March 7-8. By then, EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell will come up with concrete proposals on how to scale up production both for Ukraine and domestic stockpiles that potentially can be green-lighted when EU leaders meet in Brussels at the end of March.

Deep Background: In a letter to EU capitals sent last week and seen by RFE/RL, Borrell noted with urgency that “the future of Ukraine is at stake. We have committed to standing by Ukraine as much as needed. There is no time to waste.”

He proposes utilizing the European Peace Facility (EPF), a financial tool used by EU member states outside the regular EU budget that has been tapped into to the tune of 3.6 billion euros ($3.8 billion) so far for arms deliveries to Kyiv. Another 2 billion euros ($2.1 billion) is available, but the question is: Is that enough? In a discussion paper produced by Estonia on the issue, it is noted that Russia’s average artillery use is 20,000-60,000 shells per day.

That means that Russia fires Europe's monthly artillery production rate (currently estimated at 20,000-25,000 shells per month) in a single day in Ukraine.

What is needed, according to Tallinn, is a sevenfold increase of European defense industry production -- to the tune of 4 billion euros ($4.2 billion) -- to meet Reznikov’s demand in six months. Otherwise, it will take a full four years to produce the 1 million rounds asked for.

Drilling Down

• Two of the main issues here are coordination and, by extension, joint procurement. NATO has already been doing this for years, but the EU will explore this as well, with the likely caveat that production must be in Europe. One of the main hurdles to overcome is that defense issues remain an exclusive competence of each and every EU capital, making it trickier to reach any sort of consensus.
• NATO has also agreed to help Ukraine develop a smoother procurement system in line with Western demands. But more importantly, the EU, NATO, and Ukraine have started comparing notes on the issue. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, and Borrell met in Brussels last week and agreed that their respective procurement experts will put their heads together in the coming days.
• When asked why it had taken nearly a year for this to happen, Kuleba responded that “no one expected this war would last this long” and added that it was apparent already last summer that production needed to be ramped up but that “not enough has been done.”
• NATO officials admit privately that stockpiles were pretty low even before the war, largely because no one really foresaw a large-scale war on the continent again. They also note that much of the weapons production in the West has become very specific -- even “artisanal” -- instead of focusing on the big bulks of ammunition that are now clearly in demand.
• What is needed now is a clear signal of demand from government to industry. This usually means long-term contracts, something that an increase in NATO’s target for ammunition stockpiles could trigger.
• But there are bottlenecks -- and not only bureaucratic red tape. And many of them are felt in many other industries around the globe. The worldwide shortage of semiconductors is one, but also the lack of raw materials to make ammunition shells, for example.
• One quick-term fix will be to simply reach out to international partners, with Brazil, Israel, and South Korea being singled out as having deeper stockpiles at the moment.

Brief #2: Justice for Ukraine: Will Russian Officials Ever Face Trials?

What You Need To Know: One of the big issues surrounding the war in Ukraine is the question of justice and how it can be served once the fighting subsides. Ukrainian authorities have registered more than 71,000 alleged war crimes committed by the Russian Army since the war broke out -- a number that is likely to grow both as more Ukrainian territories potentially are liberated and the war intensifies.

Ukrainian and international prosecutors, however, are already busy collecting evidence, with the International Criminal Court (ICC) playing a lead role, having set up a so-called Joint Investigation Team with over 20 countries, mainly EU member states, assisting with various investigations.

An international center for the prosecution of the crime of aggression against Ukraine is also being established in The Hague this spring in cooperation with the ICC and Eurojust -- the European Union agency responsible for criminal justice cooperation -- housing a judicial database of all available evidence. The big question, however, is: Which court will all of this work eventually end up in?

Deep Background: The most obvious answer should be a court under the auspices of the United Nations. That route, however, is complicated by the fact that Russia is a permanent -- and thus veto-wielding -- member of the UN’s Security Council.

This also complicates potential efforts to render justice via the ICC. Moscow did sign the Rome Statute, which governs the ICC, back in 2000, but never ratified the agreement to become a member. Russian President Vladimir Putin then approved the withdrawal of his country from the process of joining when the ICC ruled in 2016 that Russia’s actions in Crimea amounted to an "ongoing occupation."

The ICC can, however, still prosecute genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity committed on the territory of Ukraine because Kyiv submitted to its jurisdiction.

What the ICC cannot do is investigate and prosecute crimes of aggression committed by Russian nationals in Ukraine, as Russia is not a party to the ICC.

And the crime of aggression is crucial here.

The countries leading the process of justice for war crimes in Ukraine consider the crime of aggression to be the “supreme international crime” and the "source of all the other crimes committed in the country." It also limits criminal responsibility to individuals in leadership positions.

The conundrum is how to get these people in the dock. They all enjoy international immunity and could easily hide in countries that do not recognize the ICC’s jurisdiction. Trials in absentia could, of course, be held even if they tend to be regarded as “imperfect,” especially by victims.

Drilling Down

• With the ICC option unlikely, there could be a case of having trials in Ukraine, including at locations where Russian atrocities are alleged to have been committed. While perhaps morally satisfying, there is, of course, the same doubt as to whether Russian officials would be present at such trials, and it could be argued that the proceedings would not enjoy widespread international recognition.
• Hybrid courts, consisting of both international and Ukrainian prosecutors, could be another option, but the presence of Ukrainian nationals in decisive positions could be an issue for many nations that would prefer a more neutral setup.
• Instead, the option that is most likely to fly is the establishment of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression created through an agreement between Ukraine and the United Nations, but circumventing the UN Security Council and instead relying on the UN General Assembly (UNGA).
• No specific number of votes is needed for this to happen, but EU officials I have spoken to on condition of anonymity say they could push for it “as soon as it is clear there is enough support” and that this might happen at the UNGA in September, when many world leaders gather in New York.
• A special tribunal set up under the UNGA could potentially also solve the issue of lifting the immunity of high-ranking politicians. Such privileges, according to international law, don’t represent a roadblock to the prosecution of senior leaders for serious crimes before international criminal courts and tribunals acting on behalf of the international community.
• Can a court set up via a UNGA resolution truly represent the international community as a whole? That would probably be a question open to various legal and political interpretations, and it could ultimately come down to how many nations in the UN eventually vote in favor of such a court. One thing, however, is clear: There is no statute of limitation on crimes of aggression, so the international community can opt to play the "long game" in the quest for justice.
• It is also worth noting that there is a precedent for the UNGA setting up a court. The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, commonly known as the “Khmer Rouge Tribunal,” was established in 1997 after a UNGA resolution. It is worth noting, however, that it didn’t prosecute crimes of aggression.
• There is, of course, also the opportunity for both individuals and states to opt for civil lawsuits. The most obvious avenue here could be the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). But, after its exclusion from the Council of Europe last year, Russia ceased to be party to the European Convention on Human Rights on September 16, 2022. This limits applications against Russia and Russians to crimes committed up until that date.

Looking Ahead

The leaders of Kosovo and Serbia will come to Brussels on February 27 for their first meeting under the EU-facilitated dialogue this year. And there are indications that they might agree to a deal to further normalize bilateral relations.

There seems to be some movement on the NATO enlargement front after a number of recent setbacks. Finland’s parliament will vote on its NATO membership bill on February 28, and the Swedish government has indicated that it will follow suit in early March. Hungary’s parliament might soon ratify the Nordic pair’s accession treaty, and even Turkey has opened up for more talks with Helsinki and Stockholm in order to give its thumbs-up to let them join the military alliance.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your inbox every Monday.

And you can always reach us at newsletters@rferl.org.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods. To subscribe, click here.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two major issues: the EU's new sanctions package on Russia and a meeting of the OSCE's Parliamentary Assembly that looks set to welcome sanctioned Russian State Duma members to Vienna.

Brief #1: A New Sanctions Package On The Anniversary Of Russia's Invasion Of Ukraine

What You Need To Know: The European Union is preparing another sanctions package on Russia to coincide with the anniversary of the invasion of Ukraine on February 24. EU ambassadors had a first discussion on the measures prepared by the European Commission last week and, according to diplomats familiar with the discussion who are not authorized to speak on the record, there is every chance that the 27 member states will reach the necessary unanimous agreement on the sanctions package soon.

That agreement is likely because, just as in the previous round of sanctions agreed in December 2022, this one isn't very hard-hitting. To increase the chances of swift endorsement, a raft of potentially controversial items is being left out, such as a ban on Russian diamond imports (which Belgium would likely veto) and energy-related sanctions on, for example, the Russian nuclear sector (which both Hungary and Bulgaria have previously indicated they would nix).

Deep Background: The centerpiece of this sanctions package, seen by RFE/RL, is export bans on EU goods worth 11.3 billion euros ($12 billion), using EU-Russia trade volumes from 2021. A whole list of products, stretching to nearly 70 pages, will be banned from going to Russia. This focuses mainly on things used by the Russian military in Ukraine, such as sensors and lasers, marine and diesel engines, tractors, devices used in semiconductors such as microchips, but also rare earth metals and various types of cameras. There is also an import ban on some Russian goods, mostly various types of rubber and asphalt, coming into the EU, to the tune of 1 billion euros.

As always, there are also listings of individuals and companies on which visa bans and asset freezes will be imposed. The list, which currently consists of 1,386 individuals and 171 companies and organizations, will likely see the addition of 63 more people and up to 30 entities. In the first category, there are no new oligarchs included but rather Moscow-appointed politicians in senior positions in the Ukrainian territories partially controlled by Russia, State Duma members, ministers, military leaders, and officials the EU believes are responsible for the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children to various Russian regions.

The entities this time are arguably more interesting with the inclusion of Russian banks such as Alfa-Bank, Rosbank, and Tinkoff Bank, as well as the Russian National Wealth Fund. Several companies involved in making military equipment and machinery are also included, as is the Russian state-owned media group Rossiya Segodnya, which runs both the RIA Novosti news agency and the Sputnik media agency.

Drilling Down

• Another aspect of this package is that Iranian companies are also sanctioned for supplying the Russian war machine, including drone-making companies such as Qods and Shahed Aviation and the aerospace force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.
• It has also been suggested that some loopholes in previous sanctions rounds be closed. While it is already prohibited to both export and import so-called dual-use goods, meaning items that can have both military and civilian uses, the transit through Russia of such items will now be banned as well.
• According to the proposed package, Russian citizens will no longer be able to hold any positions in governing bodies of companies owning critical infrastructure in the EU, such as electricity generation, water supply, and telecommunications. Similarly, it will no longer be possible to provide gas storage for Russian nationals and companies.
• The EU is also stepping up its efforts to locate and map out all the Russian frozen assets in the bloc. As part of the sanctions proposal, the European Commission is demanding very detailed figures from capitals and is even proposing fining member states if they don't comply. While confiscating Russian assets to pay for the reconstruction of Ukraine is still a long way off, this could be considered a first step in that direction.
• As always, there are new derogations and new loopholes. One is that the exemption to allow Russian fertilizers to be exported to the EU and worldwide, agreed in the previous December sanctions package, should also include assets tied to this industry that are held in sanctioned Russian banks.
• Another is that the wind-down period of joint ventures with sanctioned Russian state-owned entities has been prolonged from June to December of this year. That also applies to additional professional services associated with the decoupling, such as accounting and legal advice.

Brief #2: Controversy In Vienna As Russia's OSCE Delegation Might Be Coming To Town

What You Need To Know: One of the most controversial meetings of the year so far will take place in Vienna in the coming days: the winter session of the OSCE's Parliamentary Assembly (PA).

Normally this event, which brings together some 323 parliamentarians from the organization's 57 member states with the stated goal of fostering inter-parliamentary dialogue, doesn't get much media coverage. It will this year, for two reasons.

First, visas will be issued for members of the Russian delegation, which includes several individuals who are on the EU sanctions list imposed on Moscow after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year. And second, this meeting takes place exactly on the first anniversary of that invasion, on February 24.

Deep Background: If the Russian delegation does show up in the Austrian capital this week, it will be the first time members of the Russian State Duma have been in the European Union in an official capacity since being sanctioned for supporting the war, notably by voting in favor of seizing the four Ukrainian territories of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhya. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly has met twice before since the invasion -- in July in Birmingham, England, and in the Polish capital, Warsaw, in November -- but both times the Russian delegation was denied visas.

That won't be the case this time, as the Austrian government has said it has to allow the Moscow delegation entry because Vienna has struck a so-called "headquarters agreement" with the OSCE, an international pact that Vienna says must be honored. The government did add, however, that the visas will only be valid for Austria -- and not for anywhere else in the EU -- and only for the duration of the parliamentary session.

The move has prompted both Ukraine and Lithuania to boycott the meeting. The head of the Ukrainian delegation, Mykyta Poturayev, recently wrote a letter, seen by RFE/RL, to OSCE Parliamentary Assembly President Margareta Cederfelt, saying that "we have no doubts that the Russian delegation will use the OSCE PA platform for justification of the aggression against my country, as well as for whitewashing numerous war crimes and crimes against humanity committed against the Ukrainian people. All this will undermine the integrity of the assembly and will compromise a clear and steadfast position the assembly has, so far, demonstrated with regard to the Russian aggression since 2014."

Drilling Down

• The big question is whether Austria was, in fact, right in granting visas to the Russian delegation. Being sanctioned by the EU means a visa suspension, but that can legally be lifted for a short period of time by an EU capital -- to attend international conferences, for example.
• It is, however, a political and legal gray area. Is an international obligation, such as the one struck between the OSCE and Austria, a more important obligation than that of upholding EU sanctions? And Austria has also previously denied visas to Russian officials wanting to come to Vienna for other OSCE-related meetings, showing that it can be done.
• Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the OSCE has also been very careful not to cut all ties with Russia. After Russia was expelled from the Council of Europe in March, the OSCE is the only larger pan-European political organization of which Moscow remains a member.
• Another concern is whether other countries will follow Ukraine and Lithuania's lead and boycott the meeting. Delegates from nearly a dozen countries also wrote to Cederfelt stating: "We believe the OSCE is a forum for dialogue but not an unconditional one. Russia has placed itself outside the bracket of nations committed to the principles of national law." There was also a push to postpone the meeting and potentially move it to another city.
• In a response to the delegates' letter, dated February 15 and seen by RFE/RL, Cederfelt wrote that, after a decision by her in consultation with the OSCE's senior leadership, the meeting in Vienna would go ahead as planned.
• In the letter, Cederfelt also added that "we invite you to make full use of this Winter Meeting to discuss how our Parliamentary Assembly can play its full part in the efforts to bring justice and help Ukraine restore its full independence and sovereignty within its internationally recognized borders."
• In another letter authored by Cederfelt and addressed to the speaker of Ukraine's parliament, Ruslan Stefanchuk, she said: "I would greatly appreciate the presence of the Delegation of Ukraine at our meeting in Vienna, sitting in the front row, where they will be able to hear overwhelming expressions of support from our Members."
• Probably nothing but certainly worth noting: The far-right Freedom Party of Austria, which has enjoyed close links with Moscow in recent years, is hosting its Academy Ball in another part of the grand Hofburg Palace where the OSCE assembly is taking place.

Looking Ahead

The main event of the week is U.S. President Joe Biden's trip to Poland on February 20-22. As well as meeting the Polish president, Biden will meet the leaders of the Bucharest Nine, an informal group of Central and Eastern European countries, which, along with the host Poland, includes Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia. There has been some speculation that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy will join the various meetings, or even that Biden could go to Ukraine. According to The New York Times, White House officials have "declined to say whether Mr. Biden planned to make a visit to Ukraine while he was in the area."

EU foreign ministers will meet in Brussels on February 20. In the meeting, the foreign ministers of both Ukraine and Moldova will address their colleagues and update them on recent developments in their countries. One of the issues the bloc's foreign ministers are expected to discuss is a proposal for EU member states to jointly purchase and provide 1 million rounds of artillery ammunition that Kyiv has said it desperately needs.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your inbox every Monday.

And you can always reach us at newsletters@rferl.org.