Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods. To subscribe, click here.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two major issues: the deal struck between Serbia and Kosovo, and how the EU is stepping up nonlethal military support for Georgia and Moldova.

Brief #1: Will The Serbia-Kosovo Deal Really Be Implemented?

What You Need To Know: Late on March 18, EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell announced a deal had been struck between Serbia and Kosovo after a full day of talks in Ohrid, North Macedonia. What the two parties in fact had agreed on was an annex, which was meant to spell out the sequences and timetables of the implementation of an agreement struck between Belgrade and Pristina on February 27.

While the February deal did not entail Serbian recognition of Kosovo as an independent state, it did suggest ways of tackling some of the many obstacles that have dogged relations between Kosovo and Serbia ever since the former's declaration of independence in 2008.

In particular, the February deal calls for the mutual recognition of documents and national symbols, such passports, diplomas, license plates, and customs stamps. The two parties would also exchange permanent missions, not block each other's path to the EU, and Belgrade pledged not to object to Kosovo's membership in any international organization. In exchange for this, the branch of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo would have its status formalized.

The February deal also gives backing to the creation of a Serb-majority association of municipalities in Kosovo without mentioning this association by name. Instead, the text just noted the setting up of "an appropriate level of self-management for the Serbian community in Kosovo and ability for service provision in specific areas, including the possibility for financial support by Serbia and a direct communication channel for the Serbian community to the Government of Kosovo."

Deep Background: In many ways, the agreement and the accompanying annex, if implemented fully, could form an important building block toward full normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina, providing in effect de facto recognition of Kosovo, if not de jure, and push both countries closer toward their stated goals of EU membership.

There are, however, three broad issues here:

Firstly, neither the annex nor the agreement is signed, which cast doubts about its real validity. Secondly, there isn't much of a sequencing spelled out in the annex beyond the need for Kosovo to start working on the Serb-majority association of municipalities "immediately." And thirdly, there isn't much of a threat for either side if things remain unimplemented. As one diplomat dryly remarked to me after the announcement that a deal had been made: "The carrots aren't particularly tasty, and the sticks aren't hard enough."

Drilling Down

• The issue of whether a signature is needed or not will continue to dog this process. Serbian President Alexander Vucic clearly spelled out that he won't sign any documents and dashed the hopes that initially did exist in Brussels that the deal would be signed at last week's EU summit with all EU leaders in attendance.
• The initial Brussels agreement, the first one struck by the parties back in 2013, was also not signed but at least it was initialed by both sides. Speaking to RFE/RL after the meeting, the EU's chief negotiator, Miroslav Lajcak, said that any speculation about whether the deal is or isn't valid is "meaningless" and claimed that the document is official and binding through the announcement made by Borrell in Ohrid.
• Lajcak also admitted that it was only possible to agree on 12 points in the annex but that there were a further six that they couldn't reach consensus on. As mentioned above, it is stated that Pristina should start working on the creation of the Serbian association of municipalities immediately, but there is nothing concrete on when, for example, the mutual recognition of passports or exchanges of missions should happen.
• Will Pristina really jump first without any guarantees that Belgrade will take any reciprocal steps? Kosovar Prime Minister Albin Kurti can credit his rise to the pinnacle of Kosovar politics for having been against the creation of any entities based on ethnicity within the country, often citing the need to avoid political blockages similar to those seen in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
• The chief negotiators of both sides are due in Brussels for talks starting on April 3. This should offer the first indication if the deal is, indeed, workable. All eyes will also be on how Serbia behaves internationally in the coming months. The agreement notes that Belgrade pledges not to object to Kosovo's membership in any international organizations. The first likely test of this will be the run-up to the Council of Europe summit in Iceland in mid-May -- an organization that Kosovo for a long time has sought membership in and that Serbia so far has resisted.
• The main issue will, however, remain how to cajole the two sides to start implementation. The annex calls for the creation of a joint monitoring committee, chaired by the EU, within 30 days. But there is nothing about what power this committee will have or who will sit on it. The annex also notes that "any failure to honor their obligations from the agreement, this annex, or the past dialogue agreements may have direct negative consequences for their respective EU accession processes and the financial aid they receive from the EU."
• This may sound tough, but it isn't. Kosovo is not even recognized as an independent state by the EU and probably won't be anytime soon. It is behind every single European country wanting to join the club. Serbia's EU accession talks have ground to a halt due to its failure to align with Brussels politically over the war in Ukraine. So, neither of them is poised to join the club in the upcoming years, and the EU has so far also proved to be reluctant in cutting EU cash to the countries of the Western Balkans for fear of losing out to China and Russia in the region.

Brief #2: EU Stepping Up Military Aid To Georgia And Moldova

What You Need To Know: While the EU has been busy providing Ukraine with weapons to the tune of 3 billion euros ($3.2 billion) -- a sum that will increase by a further 2 billion euros in the coming months -- the bloc is also quietly preparing to aid Moldova and Georgia militarily, even though the sums, compared to what is given to Ukraine, are rather modest and the aid to both so far is of the nonlethal variety.

According to diplomats familiar with the discussion who aren't authorized to speak on the record, the proposed assistance measures for both Tbilisi and Chisinau come amid worries within the bloc of Russia's destabilizing efforts against both countries. They also insist that the attempt by the EU to get more involved is natural, as both countries applied to join the bloc last year, with Moldova becoming an EU candidate country together with Ukraine in June and Georgia a potential candidate.

Finally, it is also noted that while not competing with NATO -- which the EU still regards as the main security supplier on the continent -- the bloc is trying to become more of a player in terms of security throughout the European continent.

Deep Background: Last week, representatives of the 27 EU member states started discussing the concept notes produced by the EU's diplomatic corps, the European External Action Service (EEAS), on how the bloc can assist the two countries. The idea is to give a green light in the coming weeks and that the projects envisaged in both papers will be implemented within the next three years.

Seen by RFE/RL, both concept notes state that the purpose of the aid is to enhance Georgia and Moldova's "operational effectiveness, accelerate compliance with EU standards and interoperability, and thereby better protect civilians in crises and emergencies."

The money should come from the European Peace Facility (EPF), the same off-EU budget vehicle that Brussels now is using to supply arms to Ukraine and that doesn't require unanimity, as member states are allowed to "constructively abstain" -- meaning that they can wave a proposal through but not actively vote for it. Both Georgia and Moldova received funds from the EPF before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year, but in much smaller quantities meant to finance smaller projects.

Drilling Down

• The proposal for Moldova is worth up to 40 million euros, with the biggest focus on getting the country ground-based mobile long-range surveillance radar, which will be provided by the Estonian Center for Defense Investments (ECDI). The radar purchase is significant as Russia in recent months has fired missiles through Moldovan airspace to hit targets in Ukraine.
• Other items that the EU pledges to provide include communication equipment, IT hardware and software, buses, forklifts, and pickup trucks. While clearly not providing lethal equipment that might be desired by Chisinau, EU officials I have spoken to believe that the investment will boost the Moldovan military, which last year had a budget of 85 million euros.
• In the Georgian plan, worth 30 million euros, modern trailers and trucks are also on the agenda -- just as with Moldova -- but here there is an increased emphasis on heavy equipment transporters and cranes. The EU will also provide vehicles that will support the mobility of the Georgian defense forces' field artillery communication systems.
• Other investments include a medical treatment facility (MTF) with updated equipment, which will complement the already existing couple of MTFs that the EU so far has funded, as well as equipment for Georgia's new Cyber Security Bureau.
• Unlike Moldova, which is military neutral, Georgia is a NATO aspirant country, meaning that the military alliance has indicated as far back as 2008 that the country one day can join the alliance. While no indication that a NATO invite is forthcoming for Tbilisi anytime soon, NATO and its member states have invested heavily in the country's military in recent years.
• Starting in 2014 and enhanced last year at NATO's Madrid Summit, the main instrument of military support for the South Caucasus republic remains the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP) to which up to 20 countries, including the United States, have contributed with know-how, equipment, and cash in 13 various areas, including air defense, maritime security, strategic communications, cyberdefense, and intelligence-sharing, often via the NATO-Georgia Joint Training and Evaluation Center that was established in 2015 to improve the capacity of the country's army.

Looking Ahead

On March 27, the Hungarian parliament will finally vote in favor of Finland's NATO accession protocol after several delays in recent months. The Turkish parliament also had an initial discussion about ratifying Helsinki's bid last week, and it is now expected that they, too, will ratify before the Turkish presidential and parliamentary elections slated for May 14. This also means that Finland in all likelihood will join the alliance before Sweden, as neither Hungary nor Turkey has signaled that they are ready to green light Stockholm's bid yet. It is, however, expected that Sweden could join the club in the run-up to or at NATO's summit in Vilnius in July.

On March 28, the EU's energy ministers meet in Brussels. One of the decisions they will take is to prolong the voluntary goal to reduce gas usage in the bloc by 15 percent until March 2024. The current proposal ends at the end of the month and was enacted last summer as the EU faced soaring energy prices due to Russia cutting most westward gas flows. Despite being criticized at the time for not being binding, gas consumption in the 27 EU member states fell by nearly 20 percent between August 2022 and January 2023 due to the mild winter and various energy-saving measures. The goal of the EU is to have gas storages filled to 90 percent by November to get through the next winter.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods. To subscribe, click here.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two major issues: Will EU leaders finally green-light more ammunition to Ukraine, and what's included in the NATO secretary-general's annual report?

Brief #1: EU Leaders Could Agree On Sending More Ammunition To Ukraine

What You Need To Know: European Union leaders will gather for another summit in Brussels on March 23-24. While the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy stole the show with a surprise visit at their last meeting in February, this gathering is set to be a more low-key affair, focusing on how to kick-start the European economy. Of course, Ukraine will still feature a good deal, especially as UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has been invited to discuss the situation in the country.

The main issue right now remains how the EU can provide more ammunition to Kyiv. The bloc's defense ministers discussed the issue when they met in Stockholm earlier this month, and EU foreign ministers are likely to agree on the main principles of a plan on March 20 before leaders can potentially sign off on it during the summit.

The idea is that Brussels will use the European Peace Facility (EPF) -- an off-EU budget funding mechanism for military investment. Of the 8 billion euros ($8.5 billion) available in this pot, over 3 billion euros has already gone to EU member states for previous weapons deliveries to Ukraine. Now the suggestion is that another 1 billion euros will firstly go to reimburse EU member states so that they can immediately donate ammunition from their own stockpiles. After that, EU member states will pledge to jointly buy 1 billion euros worth of new ammunition with the hope that the increased supply on the market will bring down prices.

Deep Background: So far, there are two main obstacles that could prevent a quick agreement. The first is that some countries, led by France, want purchases only of European ammunition. Others would prefer to buy from further afield -- countries such as South Korea -- as current European stockpiles are being depleted and production capacity on the continent might not be ramped up immediately.

Another issue is that some countries worry that all the EPF money will be used up for Ukraine -- and very quickly. The kitty of 8 billion euros was supposed to last until 2027, but with over 5 billion euros already spent or earmarked for Kyiv, those fears are for good reason. Ukraine is also likely to need a lot more ammunition going forward as there is little indication that the war will end soon.

According to an EU concept note on the issue, seen by RFE/RL, Russian forces have been firing between 20,000 to 50,000 artillery rounds per day in recent months. The corresponding figure from Ukraine is significantly lower: between 4,000 to 7,000 artillery rounds daily. The estimation is that the Ukrainian Army needs at least 357,000 rounds of all types of ammunition per month.

Drilling Down

• Ammunition is not the only Ukraine-related issue that leaders will discuss. The draft summit conclusions, seen by RFE/RL and set to be adopted at the meeting, state that "Russia must immediately ensure the safe return of Ukrainians forcibly transferred or deported to Russia, in particular children."
• The EU has already sanctioned some Russian officials that Brussels deems as being instrumental in the "kidnapping" of Ukrainian children. According to EU officials familiar with the matter but who are not authorized to speak on the record, more people could be targeted soon, even though that might not be agreed on this week.
• For now, more economic sanctions on Russia seem to be off the table, with the draft summit conclusions merely noting that "the European Union remains committed to maintaining and further increasing collective pressure on Russia."
• This won't prevent some member states, notably in the east, from pushing for more concrete language on future sanctions packages targeting the Russian nuclear industry, diamond imports into the bloc, and further restrictive measures against Russian people and companies believed to be spreading pro-Kremlin war narratives.
• There could be movement on another round of sanctions on Belarus, either in the run-up to or on the sidelines of the summit. A new set of restrictive measures against Minsk was proposed by the European Commission over a month ago, but it has been held up as Lithuania, backed by the other Baltic states, is unhappy about sanctions derogations proposed in the package for Belarusian fertilizers. Portugal is the main supporter of these derogations, arguing that Belarusian fertilizers are needed to contribute to food security, particularly in poorer countries worldwide.
• It's also possible that potential sanctions will be discussed against people or entities trying to destabilize Moldova. This is currently being explored by Brussels after a recent request from Chisinau. So far, the draft conclusions simply note that "the European Union will continue to provide all relevant support to the Republic of Moldova, including support to help strengthen the country's resilience, security, stability, economy, and energy supply."

Brief #2: NATO Secretary-General To Look Back On The Alliance's Momentous, Difficult Year

What You Need To Know: On March 21 at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg will present his annual report for 2022 -- reviewing one of the most momentous years in the military alliance's history.

In the report, which RFE/RL has seen excerpts of, he reflects on Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, noting that "President Putin wants a different Europe. He sees democracy and freedom as a threat, and he seeks to control his neighbors. So even if the war in Ukraine ends tomorrow, our security environment has changed for the long-term. There is simply no going back." He also adds that "Putin must not win. If he does, it will show that aggression works and that force is rewarded. This would be dangerous for our own security, and for the whole world."

Just like the final declaration from the NATO Madrid summit in June 2022, the annual report notes that NATO "cannot consider Russia to be a partner." The report adds, however, that "NATO remains willing to keep open channels of communication with Moscow to manage and mitigate risks, prevent escalation, and increase transparency."

Easier said than done, perhaps, as NATO officials familiar with the issue but who are not authorized to speak on the record tell me that, in reality, there is very little interaction with Russia at the moment. The NATO-Russia Council, which is the formal avenue for talks between the alliance and Moscow, has not met since January 2022 and no new meeting is foreseen anytime soon. To complicate matters further, Russia suspended its mission to NATO and ordered the closure of the NATO office in Moscow already in 2021.

Deep Background: Much of the annual report focuses on the war in Ukraine and the implications it has had on the alliance. It notes that, last year, the 30 NATO allies spent roughly $120 billion on military, humanitarian, and financial assistance to Ukraine. The United States was the largest single contributor, even though the European countries and Canada together provided over half of the overall assistance.

Total NATO military spending in 2022 was estimated to exceed $1 trillion. With heightened military tensions in Europe, that sum is expected to rise significantly in the years to come. According to a poll that NATO conducted among citizens in its member countries, 74 percent think that defense spending should either be maintained at current levels or increased, compared to 70 percent in 2021. In the latest poll, just 12 percent of respondents think that less should be spent on defense.

Drilling Down

• The annual report also notes some of the historic decisions taken by NATO last year. As a direct response to the Russian invasion, the alliance activated its defense plans, deploying the NATO Response Force, which includes 40,000 troops, in the eastern parts of the alliance for the very first time.
• There was also the agreement to establish four new multinational battlegroups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia, and to boost the four battlegroups already set up in the three Baltic states and Poland as a response to the annexation of Crimea in 2014.
• The report also notes the decision last June to invite Sweden and Finland to become NATO members at the Madrid summit, even though there is no indication when the Nordic pair can actually join. The parliamentary group of Hungary's ruling Fidesz party announced on March 17 that it would vote in favor of Finland's accession ratification in a vote in parliament on March 27, but that it would decide on the Swedish ratification at a later, unspecified date.
• Also on March 17, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that Ankara would move ahead with the Finnish bid to join the alliance, even though no date for a vote in parliament was given. Erdogan also confirmed Turkey's continued misgivings about Sweden, notably Ankara wanting Stockholm to extradite more of its Kurdish political opponents.
• Sweden has also conceded that it will probably join later than Finland and that not much is likely to happen until after the Turkish elections in mid-May. The NATO secretary-general has, however, indicated that both countries should be members by NATO's Vilnius summit in July.
• At that summer gathering, one of the main issues will be how to deal with Ukraine's aspirations to join the alliance. Kyiv officially applied for membership back in September 2022, and NATO has always said it maintains an open-door policy. In reality though, the door is pretty much shut, as there is no chance of Ukraine joining when the country is at war.
• But there is a push, notably by eastern members of the alliance, to offer Ukraine something more at the upcoming summit in the Lithuanian capital -- with ideas ranging from a more concrete partnership with NATO, postwar security guarantees, or some sort of road map detailing eventual membership. Something similar could also be in the works for another NATO aspirant, Georgia.

Looking Ahead

On March 21, the Europe ministers of the EU's 27 member states will meet in Brussels for the monthly General Affairs Council (GAC) -- a configuration that usually deals with internal issues in the bloc, such as the preparation for EU summits or rule of law issues. For this meeting, Olha Stefanishyna, the Ukrainian deputy prime minister for European and Euro-Atlantic integration, will join for an informal lunch to update her EU colleagues on how Kyiv is meeting the seven requirements Brussels set out last year for Ukraine to start EU accession talks.

On the same day, the bloc's 27 defense ministers will meet in Brussels with their counterparts from 45 other countries -- many from the Western Balkans and the bloc's Eastern neighborhood -- for the first-ever Schuman Security and Defense Forum. It is named after Robert Schuman, a former French prime minister, president of the European Parliament, and considered to be one of the EU's founding fathers. The idea behind the forum, which will take place every other year, is to bring together the EU's closest partners to discuss common security and defense threats. While many might wonder whether Europe really needs yet another talking shop, it does signal that the EU is starting to take defense matters more seriously.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

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