Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two major issues: the European Union's latest sanctions package targeting Moscow and two damning OSCE reports on Belarus and Russia.

Brief #1: What's In The EU's New Russia Sanctions Package?

What You Need To Know: EU ambassadors met in Brussels on May 10 and May 12 to formally review the European Commission's latest proposal on new sanctions targeting Russia. While it is unclear exactly how long it will take for the member states to agree, the working assumption is that the measures -- the 11th since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 -- will be adopted in the latter half of May. By EU standards, that would be pretty fast.

There are two reasons for the likely quick turnaround. First, the very same ambassadors have already been briefed by the European Commission about the content of the sanctions package in so-called "confessionals" since late April. There will be no surprises, and officials from EU member states are already familiar with the suggestions.

The second reason it's likely that the sanctions will be waved through with relative ease is that, ultimately, they are weak. In many respects, they follow the same pattern as the last five packages on Russia agreed by Brussels since last summer. They largely plug gaps and tighten screws, clarifying already-agreed provisions, and only introducing measures that won't damage the Russian economy in any significant ways.

The EU is not going after Russian gas here, nor its vast nuclear industry, including the state-owned behemoth Rosatom. Russia's lucrative diamond trade with the EU will also be left alone, and the bloc can still export goods such as lasers, cloud services, and insure Russian agricultural products.

Deep Background: One of the reasons why Brussels doesn't pursue more weighty energy sanctions is that Hungary and a few other Central and Eastern European countries, such as Bulgaria and Slovakia, have signaled that they aren't ready to agree on such moves. This is a position that will probably remain unchanged as long as energy prices remain high and risk spiking again in fall and winter of this year.

That said, in the new proposal, there are actually provisions that target Russian energy and could be approved by Budapest and other naysayers, as they are narrow and leave most countries untouched.

The new proposal states that the temporary derogation granted to Germany and Poland for the supply of crude oil from Russia through the northern section of the Druzhba oil pipeline should end. Berlin and Warsaw have said that this is acceptable, even though the former questioned the wisdom of the move as Kazakh oil, which is sometimes mixed with Russian oil, would still be allowed to flow through the pipeline.

The most significant new measure being proposed in the latest package is that Brussels is proposing to go after third countries that are knowingly circumventing EU sanctions. This is an attempt by the EU to implement so-called "secondary sanctions," which the United States has been using to great effect globally for some time already.

Drilling Down

• There are no third countries currently in the EU's crosshairs, but the bloc's trade with countries in Central Asia and the South Caucasus has skyrocketed since sanctions hit Moscow, with evidence suggesting that goods are making their way to Russia through them. The question, however, is how much Brussels -- if at all -- will ever use this proposed tool against third countries. In the initial discussions among EU ambassadors, both Germany and Italy cautioned that such a move could push countries closer to Moscow.
• In the draft sanctions proposal, seen by RFE/RL, there are certain steps that Brussels should take before doling out any punishments. The text notes that "before including a third country on the list of countries concerned by this measure, the [European] Union should inform and seek the views of the government of that country on the basis of the preliminary findings of the technical analysis and its intended remedial action." In EU speak, that means the bloc will take a gentle approach against third country offenders, at least at first.
• Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the proposal is the possible sanctioning of eight Chinese military companies that the bloc considers to have helped the Kremlin's war machine. It would be the first time the EU would target Chinese firms in the context of the Ukrainian war, and Beijing has already reacted furiously to the news. In the end, it could still be a bridge too far for some EU member states, with many of them very wary of antagonizing China.
• Other measures included in the latest sanctions proposal are: a prohibition on selling intellectual property rights to Russia; and RT Balkans will have its broadcasting license in the EU suspended, following a host of other RT channels meeting the same fate; trucks registered in Russia that transport goods by road in the EU will be banned from doing so; and the same goes for the import of steel products from third countries, if the shipments contain components from Russia.
• As always, there will be additional people and entities subjected to EU asset freezes and visa bans. The latest package includes 72 people and 29 companies -- mostly politicians the bloc deems to have been involved in the deportation of Ukrainian children, military officials, and then journalists and media companies that are accused of spreading propaganda.
• If adopted, a grand total of 1,571 people and 241 companies will be sanctioned by the EU. However, officials familiar with the negotiations but who aren't authorized to speak on the record noted that Hungary has expressed reservations about three of the 72 new people listed for sanctioning and will aim to have them removed before it can sign off on the package.

Brief #2: In The OSCE, Russia And Belarus Have Never Been So Unpopular

What You Need To Know: The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is currently the only relevant political organization in Europe in which both Belarus and Russia remain members. While there is no real momentum to kick out the pair from the Vienna-based club, a considerable majority of the 57 member states have turned increasingly hostile toward the two countries. This has manifested itself in the invocation of the organization's so-called Moscow Mechanism twice this spring, named after it was established in the Russian capital back in 1991.

The mechanism allows the OSCE to establish an ad hoc mission of independent experts to investigate a particular question or problem, often related to human rights abuses in the territory of the OSCE, and then file a detailed report of the findings. While the reports with its recommendations are nonbinding, they are considered relevant by the wider international political community and tend to be widely cited both in political debates and referred to in international tribunals.

Under the mechanism, an OSCE member state can request that a mission is created to investigate something on its own territory, but the more common invocation is when at least 10 OSCE members request that the Moscow Mechanism should be triggered to allow for a mission in a fellow member state.

Since the mechanism was established in 1991, it has been used sparingly -- only 14 times. However, since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine 15 months ago, it has been invoked four times -- including two recent investigations and reports, one looking at the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia and the second looking at the situation in Belarus since November 2020.

Deep Background: The OSCE report looking at the deportation of Ukrainian children was presented in Vienna on May 4 after a record 45 OSCE member states agreed to invoke the mechanism. This came after the International Criminal Court (ICC) in March announced that it had issued arrest warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian Commissioner for Children Rights Maria Lvova-Belova for unlawfully transporting Ukrainian children to Russia and Kremlin-controlled territories in Ukraine -- actions that the court believes could constitute war crimes.

The OSCE report goes even further in its allegations by concluding that the "practice of the forcible transfer and/or deportation of Ukrainian children to the temporarily occupied territories and to the territory of the Russian Federation may amount to a crime against humanity."

The report also notes that the mission "has not been able to ascertain the exact number of children thus deported, [although] it is clear that these numbers are measured in several thousands." It also notes that "except for few instances when the transportation of children could be justified due to imminent threat to life owing to ongoing armed conflict, the Mission has been able to establish with certainty that by and large the deportation of children cannot be qualified as voluntary" -- a claim that the Kremlin has been repeating constantly.

Drilling Down

• When discussed during the OSCE Permanent Council session in Vienna on May 4, the Russian delegation dismissed the report, noting that it presented information from "dubious sources," drew "unpleasant conclusions," and relied on "misinformation." A Russian delegate at the meeting also added that the Moscow Mechanism "has long outlived its usefulness and does not respond [to] modern realities."
• Just as Russia refused to cooperate with the rapporteurs of the report on the forced transportation of Ukrainian children, Minsk dismissed any call for assistance on the report about the human rights situation in the country. In fact, the rapporteur was not welcomed in the country and had to settle for interviewing people in Warsaw and Vilnius.
• The Belarus report focuses on the 2022 legislative and constitutional reforms, which, according to the document, means that "the Belarusian government now has a full arsenal of legislation designed to hinder any form of opposition," with the paper referring to new criminal and administrative offenses, increased liability for vaguely defined acts, extension of the death penalty, restricted access to political rights to Belarusians in exile, and limited freedom of assembly and association.
• All this put together, according to the rapporteur, could be described as "politically motivated repression," with one of the main results being a high number of political prisoners in the country. The text states that, as of April 18, there are at least 1,486 political prisoners in Belarus.
• Perhaps most eye-catching was Hungary's lack of support for the Moscow Mechanism on Belarus, making it the only EU member state not to support the measure.
• And when Sweden, on behalf of the EU, delivered a statement on the Belarus report when it was presented in Vienna on May 11, Hungary didn't sign the statement. The EU-26 text noted, among other things, that "it is the Belarusian authorities and the Belarusian leadership that bear the sole responsibility for the appalling human rights situation, which is meticulously described in this report." So far, Budapest has offered no explanation for its stance but has previously noted that it doesn't want to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.

Looking Ahead

The highlight of this week will be the summit of the Group of Seven (G7) leading industrial nations on May 19-21 in Hiroshima. There will be symbolism aplenty as the Japanese city, known for being the first military target of a nuclear bomb in human history, hosts Western leaders just as Ukrainian forces are stepping up shelling to dislodge the Russian military near the city of Zaporizhzhya, home of Europe's largest nuclear power plant.

Rafael Grossi, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), recently said that the general situation in the area near the plant "is becoming increasingly unpredictable and potentially dangerous." The talks will otherwise focus on sending arms to Kyiv, with reports that more countries might follow the United Kingdom in supplying long-range cruise missiles.

On May 16, the EU's culture ministers will meet in Brussels to discuss the state of play of the European Media Freedom Act, which was presented by the European Commission last year. The act, which arguably is the most ambitious and comprehensive legislative proposal concerning media in the EU, would mean that national governments would be banned from interfering with editorial independence and will have to be more transparent about how public funds are allocated to media companies.

Most EU member states are wary of Brussels trying to seize the initiative in an area that they regard as an exclusive national competence, and many prospective EU countries are watching the fate of this act with great interest as Brussels is often very vocal about media freedom issues in candidate countries.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

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Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two major sanctions developments: the EU's attempts to close the loopholes in its Russia sanctions framework and a new initiative to slap restrictive measures on corrupt officials.

Brief #1: How The EU Plans To Crack Down On Sanctions Circumvention

What You Need To Know: One of the most frequently asked questions in Brussels right now when it comes to its ever-growing sanctions on Russia is whether they are efficient. The 10 rounds of restrictive measures imposed on the Kremlin since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 evidently hasn't changed Moscow's willingness to continue the war. In fact, the Russian economy contracted by just 2 percent last year and is even projected to grow a little in 2023, according to International Monetary Fund (IMF) predictions.

The Brussels officials I have spoken to have pointed out that one of the main reasons for the sanctions' apparent lack of bite is that few countries outside the Group of Seven (G7) have actually bothered to impose any meaningful measures on Russia. Those same officials hope that, with some tweaks, the effects of the EU sanctions, notably the measures hitting oil and other raw materials, will be felt more keenly by Russia in the future.

The debate over the sanctions' efficiency is focused on whether the measures are as watertight as they should be and if more can be done to dissuade third countries from circumventing them. Thus, it isn't surprising there is also a push in the EU's next sanctions package on Russia -- due to be presented by the European Commission to the ambassadors of the 27 EU member states this week -- to create an anticircumvention system, close loopholes, and step up enforcement.

Deep Background: According to EU officials familiar with the forthcoming sanctions package who are not authorized to speak on the record, there will be a greater emphasis on stopping third countries -- and their companies -- from circumventing the EU measures. A two-step approach is being mooted in which countries will first receive a warning. If the warning isn't heeded, Brussels will impose sanctions on firms and individuals in these countries.

While the EU hasn't shied away from targeting both Iranian military entities and Dubai-based shipping companies for aiding the Kremlin, this particular move would bring the EU closer to the "secondary sanctions" that the United States is already applying around the globe -- essentially a framework designed to prevent or restrict third countries from trading with countries subject to U.S. sanctions.

While the new EU initiative is far from a done deal, it is telling that in the past few months David O'Sullivan, the EU's envoy on sanctions implementation, has been busy visiting various countries, notably in Central Asia. One of his main talking points is that around 770 parts imported from the EU to other countries have been found in Russian military equipment and weapons used in its war against Ukraine.

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland have all pointed out that, in 2022, exports of potential dual-use goods -- items that can be used for both civilian and military purposes -- to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan grew more than 62 percent, 83 percent, and 30 percent, respectively, compared to the previous year. Most of these items transit through the Baltic states or Poland from Western European countries such as Germany and the Netherlands.

Drilling Down:

• Various EU officials told me that the risk of dual-use goods ending up in Russian hands is high, notably because the three Central Asian states are part of the Eurasian Economic Union together with Russia, meaning items cross borders with fewer checks.
• It's likely the EU will add more tech goods to its ever-growing list of sanctioned products, even though at first sight they might not appear to have any military uses. The thinking here is that microchips extracted from refrigerators, microwave ovens, and other kitchen appliances could be used in Russian military equipment.
• Although most EU countries include end-user certificates in their export licenses, there is no established instrument to ensure goods make it to an authorized end-user when they leave EU territory. There could, therefore, be a move by Brussels to carry out more end-user checks, which would mean physical inspections at the product's final destination and the requirement of shipment verification certificates from the importing country.
• But there are also problems closer to home, such as the various loopholes in the current sanctions framework. Last year, 237 export authorizations for sanctioned dual-use goods to Russia were issued, worth nearly half a billion euros ($550 million). These were issued thanks to derogations in the current restrictive measures that allow certain trade with Moscow to continue.
• These derogations can apply to goods that can be proven to be for humanitarian, medical, and pharmaceutical purposes. Current sanctions regulations also allow for the continued export to Russia of products such as consumer communication devices or for goods that ensure "cybersecurity and information security for natural and legal persons, entities, and bodies in Russia, except for its government and undertakings directly or indirectly controlled by that government." It's likely that talks around the next sanctions packages will focus on limiting or reducing these derogations.
• There is also a problem with how the Brussels sanctions are communicated to authorities in the member states. Enforcing EU sanctions provisions is a matter for national authorities, not EU officials, so the overall overview of what is and isn't allowed can be anything but uniform as member states often divide those tasks among various institutions -- for instance, the Interior, Foreign, or Justice ministries.

Brief #2: Will The EU Finally Start Sanctioning Corrupt Officials?

What You Need To Know: After several years of debate, the EU has finally taken a decisive step to allow global corruption to be targeted with sanctions. On May 3, the European Commission presented a proposal to allow Brussels to enact restrictive measures against serious acts of corruption. This comes after a key speech last fall by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen that called for the use of sanctions to fight corruption as part of EU foreign policy.

In many ways, this proposal could be seen as a European version of the U.S. Global Magnitsky Act from 2016, which allowed Washington to impose sanctions on human rights violators all over the world, including those it deemed responsible for serious corruption.

The main question, though, is whether the framework will be fully embraced by all 27 EU member states. They all need to give the thumbs up and, given previous experience when it comes to Brussels, going after corruption in third countries has never been easy.

Deep Background: The EU currently has 41 sanctions regimes, most pertaining to geographic countries or regions -- for instance, targeting officials and companies in Russia for undermining the territorial integrity of Ukraine or targeting Belarus after the authorities cracked down on the country's opposition.

So far, only two of those sanctions regimes include the legal scope to sanction people for corruption offenses -- Lebanon and the recently created framework for Moldova -- although no one has yet been targeted.

Apart from geographic sanctions, there are also a few sectoral EU sanctions that are global in scope: for example, targeting people who have tried to carry out cyberattacks against the bloc, or the EU's own Global Human Rights Sanctions regime.

The human rights sanctions regime was established in late 2020 and has slapped asset freezes and visa bans on 34 individuals and 15 entities from places such as China, Eritrea, Libya, North Korea, South Sudan, and Russia, in response to acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, slavery, extrajudicial killings, and arbitrary arrests -- in short, similar to the Magnitsky Act. A key difference though: Unlike in the United States, corruption is not a sanctionable offense in the European version.

Drilling Down:

• When the EU's human rights sanctions regime was debated by the bloc's foreign ministers in 2018-2019, there wasn't a consensus on adding corruption as a sanctionable offense. (Notably, Hungary pushed against it.) When asked why it wouldn't be better to just add corruption as a sanctionable offense to the already existing human rights framework, an EU official with insight into the matter noted that in talks with various EU member states there was "a clear preference for a standalone [sanctions] regime [rather than] amending the current human rights regime."
• One of the fears is that the human rights sanctions regime could be watered down if it were to be redrafted. In recent years, Budapest has threatened to block the rollover of existing sanctions or the adoption of new sanctions in order to further its own interests, notably the release of withheld EU funds.
• And it isn't just Hungary that is lukewarm toward anticorruption sanctions. Some other member states, notably in southern Europe, have also expressed reservations by pointing out how far the EU really can go in terms of interfering in what could be classified as domestic issues in third countries.
• There are also concerns about obtaining enough credible evidence to impose sanctions. Brussels must go after people and companies via publicly available evidence. Corruption in distant countries can be an opaque business with few solid, available facts.
• The European Commission is still hoping all the member states will eventually come on board for at least three main reasons. Firstly, it points out in the draft proposal that "conservative estimates suggest that corruption costs the EU economy at least 120 billion euros per year." It will hammer home the idea that graft undermines the rule of law, democracy, and sustainable development worldwide but also closer to home.

Secondly, this is a foreign policy instrument, which means it's unlikely any EU citizen will be targeted, even though that possibility hasn't been completely excluded. All EU capitals will have a final say on who will be hit with visa restrictions and asset freeze, so it is difficult to imagine there will be a lot of people listed.

And finally, the definition of corruption is rather narrow and could be further narrowed by EU member states in upcoming talks. The European Commission proposal is to only go after people and companies in three categories: firstly, the "active briber," defined as "the promise, offering, or giving to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage…in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties; secondly, "passive bribery," which essentially is acceptance by a public official of the above-mentioned "invites"; and lastly, "acts of embezzlement, misappropriation, or other diversion of property by a public official for his or her benefit."

Looking Ahead

The defense chiefs of all 31 NATO members, as well as Sweden, will assemble in Brussels on May 10 for the last meeting of NATO's highest military authority, the Military Committee, before the NATO summit in Vilnius in July. They will take a look at how to strengthen NATO's defense posture, especially in the eastern part of the alliance, ahead of the summit and discuss how to further assist Ukraine, notably with more Western air-defense systems, tanks, and ammunition.

EU foreign ministers will meet in Stockholm on May 12-13 for an informal foreign affairs council. As always when it comes to informal gatherings, which are scheduled twice a year, no concrete decisions will be taken, but the ministers will spend more time discussing long-term relations with various international actors. Expect a lot of time to be devoted to China.

Before the meeting, EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell will circulate his thoughts on an updated EU-China policy. The bloc doesn't really have much of a coherent policy vis-a-vis Beijing, due largely to the various EU member states' economic interests, so there will probably be some sort of compromise referring to China as a "rival" in some fields and as a "partner" in others.