Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two major issues: the next EU sanctions package to hit the Kremlin & the talks about creating a "drone wall" on the EU’s eastern flank.

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Wider Europe Briefing: September 16, 2025

by RFE/RL

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Briefing #1: What's Next For EU Sanctions On Russia?

What You Need To Know: The European Commission will present a new sanctions package proposal on Russia to the club's 27 member states early next week to further ratchet up pressure on the Kremlin, including measures aimed at curtailing Russian oil, which US President Donald Trump has called on Europe to stop purchasing.

Measures against Russia over its full-scale invasion of Ukraine will also target more banks, the Kremlin's so-called shadow fleet -- transport for Moscow to skirt sanctions -- third-country firms, and the blacklisting of a number of individuals, especially those deemed responsible for the abduction of Ukrainian children.

The thing to look out for, according to analysts and diplomats, is whether Brussels will manage to limit Russian tourist visas and prevent Russian diplomats from moving around inside the union.

Deep Background: The EU is looking to synchronize measures with the United States after EU sanctions envoy David O'Sullivan last week went to Washington to coordinate measures against the Kremlin after Trump said he had run out of patience with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin.

Several EU officials with knowledge of the proposal note that the main scope of the new sanctions proposals offers a continuation of what the bloc already served up in previous rounds of measures.

This means targeting more Russian banks, including smaller regional banks, by cutting them out from the international banking messaging system SWIFT.

The sanctions package will also hit Moscow's ability to use crypto currencies and ban more vessels believed to belong to Russia's shadow fleet from being serviced in any way in Europe. The current list includes 444 boats, but the bloc believes the Kremlin is using at least double that amount to transport its sanctioned oil products worldwide.

There might also be attempts to target Russian oil giant Lukoil, even though some member states -- notably Slovakia and Hungary, who still rely on Russian oil imports -- will likely veto that. The EU has set a goal of ridding itself of Russian energy imports by 2027 using EU internal market rules, meaning a qualified majority of member states is sufficient to endorse that legislation as supposed to the unanimity used for regular sanctions laws.

Drilling Down:

1. Over the weekend, Trump said he is willing to impose sanctions on Russia but that Europe has to act in tandem by halting its oil purchases.
2. "Europe is buying oil from Russia. I don't want them to buy oil," Trump told reporters on September 14. "The sanctions...that they're putting on are not tough enough, and I'm willing to do sanctions, but they're going to have to toughen up their sanctions commensurate with what I'm doing."
3. Other potential energy sanctions include slapping restrictive measures on refineries responsible for exporting Russian oil to the EU as well as third-country trading companies involved in its trade.
4. The EU won't, however, heed Trump's call to slap 100 percent tariffs on India and China for buying Russian oil. Brussels is not yet ready to sanction third countries for aiding Moscow in its war effort in Ukraine but companies from those nations could be targeted.
5. It remains to be seen if there is a Belarus component in this sanctions package. In previous rounds, the bloc has imposed similar measures on Moscow and Minsk, but with the United States now lifting some of its sanctions on Belarus in exchange for the release of several hundreds of political prisoners it remains up to negotiations among EU member states how they will approach the Lukashenko regime.
6. It requires unanimity to lift sanctions, and both Poland and Lithuania have indicated they won't consider any loosening of restrictive measures against Minsk yet.
7. One other interesting proposal, first floated by the Czech Republic over a year ago, is to limit the movement of Russian diplomats inside the EU. This means their movement would be limited to the state to which they are accredited and they'd need special authorization to travel elsewhere.
8. In practice, this is quite difficult to implement due to the lack of border controls inside the EU's Schengen Zone, of which most member states are a part. The idea, therefore, is that the person would be declared persona non grata and expelled if he or she is caught traveling outside the state of diplomatic accreditation.
9. Then there is the possibility of how far the bloc will go when it comes to tourist visas for Russian citizens.
10. There is a push by some to issue a complete ban, a measure that would need a qualified majority of 55 percent of member states representing 65 percent of the population.
11. This comes after several countries in the bloc noted a considerable uptick in Russian tourists visiting during the summer months. In many ways this could pit more hawkish EU member states such as the Baltics, Nordics, and Poland against southern member states that rely to a larger degree on tourism.
12. Eventually it could just result in a general recommendation from the European Commission to try to limit member states to issue tourist visas.
13. The EU suspended its visa facilitation agreement with Russia shortly after the full-scale invasion in February 2022 and issued guidelines to member states on how to deal with Russian visa requests.
14. Those recommendations noted that "Russian visa applicants traveling for essential purposes, including notably family members of EU citizens, dissidents, independent journalists, civil society representatives, and human rights defenders should have the possibility to access the EU."
15. It also recommended that "As far as Russian citizens traveling for tourism are concerned, having a very strict approach is justified as it is more difficult to assess the justification for the journey, as compared to other purposes (business trip, family visits or medical appointment)."
16. It could very well be that the bloc agrees to tighten that up even further if there isn't agreement on a total tourist visa ban.

Briefing #2: A 'Drone Wall' On The NATO's Eastern Flank?

What You Need To Know: Russia's drone incursion into Polish territory on September 10 failed to result in much physical damage on the ground, but it did uncover a major hole in Europe's defense forces: The allies don't have cost-effective counter-measures to deal with low-cost Russian attacks. As many as 19 drones flew into Polish -- and thus NATO -- airspace.

Four appeared to have been shot down. An explanation from some European officials, who spoke to RFE/RL on background, is that priority was given to those drones that seemed to be headed toward critical infrastructure.

Given the limited damage to property and no casualties on the ground, such a strategy seemed justified. But many are asking why there was a need to rely on expensive AWACS and fighter jets such as F-35s and not a much cheaper anti-drone system, such as Sky CTRL, that Poland uses.

The answer could be, of course, that the air force automatically engages when an interloper flies above a certain altitude. In many countries that is usually anything above 3 kilometers.

Deep Background: NATO chief Mark Rutte said the alliance's response was "very successful" and "showed that we are able to defend every inch of NATO territory, including, of course, its airspace."

Still, the incident poses awkward questions, especially if the Kremlin continues to test NATO countries in a similar way in the future. It also exposes holes in how the alliance has prepared, or not prepared, for a new age of warfare where drones are used extensively. NATO's response to the drone incursion appears financially unsustainable and militarily inefficient.

As one European official, speaking under condition of anonymity, told RFE/RL: "Air-to-air missiles are extremely costly to use against cheap Russian drones, and if 800 are being sent at once, which happens in Ukraine, Europe will burn through its entire arsenal in just weeks."

It was quite telling that NATO's North Atlantic Council -- which met the day after the incursion -- requested a review of the military alliance's eastern flank deterrence for potential gaps. NATO's commander is likely find some glaring ones. Only this year there have been incidents with alleged Russian UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) in Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania.

In August, one drone slipped through undetected before exploding on Polish soil, according to the country's military.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen's annual state of the European Union speech this week made it clear the bloc needs to up its drone defense when she committed to a 6 billion loan to enter a "drone alliance" with Ukraine. But more intriguingly she also floated an "Eastern Flank Watch" that she said will provide "real-time space surveillance" to track all aerial movement from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

Drilling Down:

• She also committed to building "a drone wall" -- something her own commission initially rejected to fund when Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania asked for European cash earlier this year for just such a venture.
• There are few details about all this just yet: no concrete budget figures, precise geographical scope, or timeline other than that the European Commission is expected to present a roadmap with new common defense projects in October.
• But the fact remains that the drone wall, the flank watch, and actual drone production are part of the same picture -- and it's one being drawn up with or without EU funding. First of all, there are two ongoing and similar projects: the Baltic trio's "Baltic Defense Line" and Poland's "East Shield."
• Both projects, announced last year, will take up to a decade to complete and are designed to "fortify" borders with Belarus and Russia, including the Kaliningrad exclave. Billions of euros have already been earmarked.
• Plenty of investment will go into classical, physical obstacles such as hundreds of bunkers, fences, ditches, and moats. But there is also the technological aspect to these defense lines.
• The idea is that imagery and signal intelligence and acoustic monitoring will be used for surveillance. Base stations spread out along the defense line, as well as masts, will process the data and connect with weapon systems -- crucially drones designed to take down enemy drones.
• This is the drone wall, at least in theory. What first started as an Estonian defense industry idea last year to cover the Baltic trio, dubbed the Baltic Drone Wall, has morphed into a NATO idea -- the Drone Wall -- as German firms are keen to invest and Norway, Finland, and Poland are keen to get onboard as well.
• If the EU as an institution comes onboard with funding, it is quite possible this wall will stretch even further south even though Ukraine, arguably the leader in drone technology, essentially is covering countries like Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania with its drone arsenal.
• The key now is what this wall will look like and when it can be installed. The most complex models have up to five levels that include acoustic sensors, mobile cameras, radars, jammers, and drone interceptors.
• With all these aspects included, it is estimated it may take two to three years to set up as tens of thousands of sensors need to be planted along the borders. Depending on the geographical scope, the main challenge will largely come from sharing and integrating all the information from all systems.
• Ideally, NATO should be in charge. But the bigger issue is how and whether it will work in practice. While most technologies are more or less ready and items such as sensors easily can be scaled up, the issue right now is drones. And it is here Ukraine and the potential "drone alliance" come into the picture.
• The country currently produces some 4 million drones a year and hopes to double that capacity. Most of these drones will obviously be needed in the country as it fights off Russian attacks. What the Europeans instead want from Kyiv is know-how.
• A European official with knowledge of the matter told RFE/RL that the idea rather is to use the models and engineering ideas being tested on the Ukrainian battlefield and then scale it up inside the block, potentially with the help of European automotive giants that could free up capacity.

Looking Ahead

Both Ukraine and Moldova are currently stuck on its path towards EU membership, as are many of the EU candidate countries in the Western Balkans. But there is one country that seem to be marching towards the bloc in a brisk pace – Albania.

On September 16, the country will open negotiations on another four accession chapters, meaning that Tirana in a little over the year have open talks on the vast majority of the 33 policy chapters needed to become a member.

The key thing to join is of course to close talks in all these fields but right now the country is proceeding quickly to catch up the current EU membership frontrunner Montenegro.

That's all for this week!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two major issues: The reassurance force for Ukraine & the chances of Kyiv and Chisinau being "decoupled" on their respective EU membership paths.

Briefing #1: What A 'Reassurance Force' In Ukraine Could Look Like

What You Need To Know: The Coalition of the Willing, a grouping of over 20 Western countries, is inching closer to finalizing plans for some sort of "reassurance force" for Ukraine. Officials familiar with the talks claim that "discussions have intensified" in recent weeks in European capitals.

Briefing on background after the most recent talks in Paris on September 4, a senior European diplomat noted there has been "increased enthusiasm" for the initiative compared with earlier this year and they are taking "small steps forward" on several issues.

The sudden jolt of action in recent weeks is down to one big movement: The United States is paying attention to the project.

One diplomat speaking under condition of anonymity says Washington now can be seen as an "observer" of the coalition. Even without a concrete "American backstop" as European countries are seeking for the reassurance force to go ahead, both politically and militarily the United States has indicated one may be in the making, they added.

In what shape or form still remains to be seen, but it is believed that the most useful asset would be American intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), most likely from NATO eastern flank countries such as Poland and Romania.

Deep Background: Several unknowns still dominate the planning for a potential force beyond America's potential role -- crucially the political mandate of a mission and the rules of engagement.

When it comes to the mandate, two things are clear: The force would only become active if there is a cease-fire, and it can only operate upon an invitation from Ukraine. The latter is pretty straightforward, but the coalition is still keen to point out this is a decision by Kyiv and Kyiv only and that Russia cannot veto it in any way. This means it falls outside the auspices of the United Nations or the OSCE.

The coalition is also keen to avoid any form of international force that would include troops from more Kremlin-friendly countries such as Brazil, India, or China.

The cease-fire is a precondition for any boots on the ground, especially as no country is keen to assume any combat roles. Herein lies something of a dilemma as no European diplomat appears to believe the war is about to end anytime soon. Kaja Kallas, the EU foreign policy chief, said recently that she believes Moscow will ramp up the war effort going into the autumn and winter, and various European officials have backed this up by noting they see the conflict potentially dragging on for years.

Drilling Down:

· What about rules of engagement? So far, there isn't much agreement on those either. What is clear is the future force won't be on the contact line.

· The first line of defense is the Ukrainian Army, and the reassurance force comes as a second layer. There are still various options, but the idea is there should be land, sea, and air components.

· Turkey is the lead nation when it comes to the sea component, looking at making sure the Black Sea lanes are free for navigation and potentially being engaged in naval demining.

· Britain and France are expected to take the lead when it comes to the land forces and around eight other nations, mainly in the Nordic-Baltic region, have indicated they are ready to put boots on the ground, as well.

· The goal is to have 25,000-30,000 troops in Ukraine, but it may not be that many. Poland has indicated its role mainly will be that of a logistics hub for the force, while Germany is hesitating and would most probably need parliamentary approval to send any military, a potential obstacle many other nations face as well.

· Another dilemma here is many NATO eastern flank nations fear that officers for a future reassurance force will be pulled from the multinational troops of the NATO battalions placed in on their soil in recent years as a response to Russian aggression in Ukraine. Baltic diplomats in particular have warned the reassurance force mustn't create "gaps" in the military alliance's defense.

· The land component of the reassurance force would most likely be placed in western Ukraine, with the Lviv area being the most obvious location. The Yavoriv military base, which was used to train Ukrainian troops by Western army personnel before the Russian full-scale invasion, would according to some sources be a natural hub, especially if the reassurance force has a training component.

· Other options include placing forces around critical infrastructure such as airports and ports as well as in bigger cities like Odesa and Kyiv.

· The air component still needs to be worked out, but the idea is the skies over western Ukraine and eventually central Ukraine should be protected. But here the matter of rules of engagement becomes an issue, as no Western country is ready to, for example, shoot at Russian aircraft if they were to venture over Ukrainian skies -- thus creating a direct confrontation with the Kremlin.

Briefing #2: Ukraine And Moldova Remain Coupled For Now

What You Need To Know: The summer was full of speculation and hints from Brussels officials that Ukraine and Moldova might be separated on their respective paths to eventual EU membership.

The two Eastern European countries have been paired ever since both applied for membership of the bloc in the wake of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. They both got EU candidate status that summer, and in late 2023 EU member states signaled to both that accession talks could start.

But talks haven't started with either of them, and that has to do with Hungary blocking the entire process with Ukraine over what Budapest sees as Kyiv's discrimination of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine.

The Central European country held a consultative referendum earlier this year in which 95 percent of respondents were against Ukrainian EU membership. While most other EU member states dismissed this vote as another political stunt by Budapest, few think the country is willing to lift its veto to start the talks anytime soon.

Some think this is unfair to Moldova, as none of the 27 EU member states has anything against commencing negotiations with Chisinau.

Deep Background: The EU enlargement commissioner, Marta Kos, opened up on the idea of a formal decoupling when speaking to RFE/RL this spring. The idea seemed to gain traction over the summer when Brussels briefly was rattled by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's sudden move in July to limit the independence of two key anti-corruption agencies.

These sort of political "decouplings" have happened before, most recently last year as Albania was allowed to move forward with membership negotiations while Bulgaria has continued to veto the same steps for its neighbor North Macedonia.

But when the bloc's Europe ministers, which deal with enlargement issues, met in Denmark on September 1-2 there were no words about decoupling Moldova and Ukraine other than it was ruled out -- at least for now.

Drilling Down:

· The reason for this is threefold: a recognition not to give in to what many member states see as Hungarian blackmailing, the feeling that such a move would be strategically disadvantageous for both the EU and Ukraine at the moment, and that it would only have a limited impact on Moldova.

· On the first issue, there is an increasing frustration that Budapest is trying to dictate too much of the EU's policy toward Ukraine already. It's fair to say the country has been successful.

· EU institutional funding, via the European Peace Facility (EPF), for Ukrainian weapons has been blocked for two years already, and later this week European diplomats will most likely accept that Budapest -- together with Bratislava -- will manage to remove some oligarchs from the bloc's Russia sanctions blacklist in order to achieve unanimity for a six-month extension of all the restrictive measures.

· The thinking here is that rather than handing Hungary another win, it could be wise to wait until the Hungarian parliamentary election in April 2026 as polls show the opposition has a real chance of seizing power.

· This would not automatically mean a total reversal of Hungary's Ukraine policy, but few EU officials think while Ukraine is losing precious time, a few more months of waiting is insignificant in a bigger process that can drag on for years or possibly decades.

· Secondly, many of Ukraine's most ardent supporters in the club such as the Baltic states and the Czech Republic immediately started a diplomatic rearguard action against any type of decoupling as soon as rumors started spreading that it was considered.

· Lithuania authored a discussion paper, seen by RFE/RL, in which it argued that the EU-26 -- meaning the entire European Union bar Hungary -- should conduct informal negotiations with both Ukraine and Moldova in the meantime and that negotiations on most of the 33 accession chapters would be opened "in a fast-track manner when EU-27 support is rebuilt."

· Crucially, both France and Germany, the two EU heavyweights, came onboard against any decoupling now especially as the United States has signaled that Ukrainian NATO membership most likely is off the table in any potential future peace negotiation with Russia.

· In this sense, EU membership for Kyiv becomes even more pertinent according to most EU diplomats who see this as the most obvious political and security guarantee that European nations can offer the war-torn nation going forward.

· Finally, there were also signals from Moldova that even Chisinau wasn't too keen on decoupling, at least now. Many European officials had wanted to give the country's pro-EU government a boost ahead of what is expected to be a closely fought parliamentary election on September 28 by opening accession talks a few days or weeks before the vote.

· Others, both in EU capitals and in Chisinau, argued this would only have a limited outcome for two reasons. Firstly, few beyond the corridors of power in Brussels understand the technicalities or the significance of starting EU accession negotiations.

· As one EU diplomat put it to me: "People want to know when their country can join and what it means for them, not when some obscure diplomats meet."

· Secondly, there is a recognition among all EU candidate countries, but notably Moldova, that Ukraine's efforts to fight off the Russian invasion have reignited EU enlargement in general. Chisinau in fact jumped on the coattails of Ukraine in applying for EU membership back in 2022. For now, they will remain connected, but don't rule out that the decoupling debate might start again later in the year.

Looking Ahead

The European Union autumn political season is in full-swing again, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on September 10 will deliver her annual State of the European Union at the European Parliament plenary in Strasbourg.

The speech, which usually takes close to an hour, covers all her political priorities for the upcoming months. Look out for potential new priorities when it comes to sanctions on Russia or a renewed push for EU enlargement.

That's all for this week!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.