Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.
I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two issues: The EU's game plan in the Black Sea and whether the bloc can succeed in its second attempt to ban Russian ex-soldiers from entering the EU.
Briefing #1: The EU's Black Sea Dilemma
What You Need To Know: One of the goals of European Union officials heading to New York for the UN General Assembly's annual gathering of world leaders (UNGA) which starts on September 18, is to avoid another global food crisis like the one in 2022, when prices spiked following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, hitting developing countries particularly hard.
Back then, Ukraine and the European Union faced considerable blame in parts of the so-called Global South, fueled to some degree by Kremlin messaging. Moscow sought to portray Western sanctions as responsible for rising food prices, a narrative that found a receptive audience in certain countries, including India and South Africa, which have longstanding political and historical ties with Russia.
This forced the EU to abandon any plans to sanction Russian food and agricultural produce -- an approach that still holds today. And Brussels had to go on a big global diplomatic charm offensive to explain that the surging food prices had nothing to do with EU sanctions on Russia.
Heading into this year’s UN gathering, they know that another diplomatic charm offensive might be needed.
That's because Ukraine and Russia have traded increasingly intense blows in the Black Sea over the summer, repeatedly targeting each other's vessels.
The latest escalation began with Russia stepping up attacks on Ukrainian ships in recent months. But Kyiv is now capable of retaliating, notably with drones that can reach targets across much of Russia's Black Sea coast. One of the clearest examples came in August, when Ukraine successfully attacked Russia's largest deep-sea commercial hub at Novorossiisk, from which Russia until recently shipped some 70 percent of its grain exports.
These hostilities have made the developing world nervous, especially as a third of global wheat exports sail from Russian and Ukrainian ports in the Black Sea and the adjacent Sea of Azov.
Deep Background: The surge in fighting has already had a tangible impact.
In August last year, Russia and Ukraine exported a combined 6.3 million tons of wheat through the Black Sea. This August, that figure fell to 2.5 million tons. As a result, grain prices are around 25 percent higher than at the start of the year. While they remain well below the levels reached in 2022, they are heading in that direction.
The 2026 wheat harvest is also expected to be a disappointment due to an extensive summer drought all over Europe and higher fertilizer costs caused by disruptions to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, which has further complicated matters for farmers and consumers alike.
What has so far prevented prices from skyrocketing is that last year was a bumper year for global wheat production, so there is still plenty in storage. Farmers in the Northern Hemisphere have also just finished harvesting their own crops and don’t need imports immediately.
But the fear in Brussels is that there will be a repeat of 2022 and that the EU and Ukraine will once again face a global backlash amid rising food prices.
European officials who spoke to RFE/RL said that EU missions in third countries were already working weeks ahead of the UNGA to not only find a solution to the hostilities in the Black Sea but also work on “political messaging” -- essentially seeking to show that Russia is the main culprit for the increased prices.
On the diplomatic front, Brussels is backing Turkey to come up with something similar to the Black Sea Grain Initiative of 2022, when Ankara together with the United Nations brokered a deal to allow millions of tons of Ukrainian grain to be safely exported via the Black Sea.
Russia withdrew from the agreement a year later complaining that its own exports were facing obstacles, but Kyiv managed to continue using various Black Sea routes to get its produce out until very recently.
One proposal that’s been floated is to only allow ships from certain third countries -- such as Turkey or the United Arab Emirates -- to carry grain in the Black Sea. But with Turkish ships already having been targeted, this idea might not get very far.
There is, of course, also the possibility of a complete cease-fire on commercial shipping, something EU diplomats have been pushing for. Ukraine offered the Kremlin such an arrangement in August, but Moscow rejected the proposal, saying it wanted a broader deal involving the entire conflict. As a result, hopes of a resolution are slim.
Drilling Down
- Apart from the diplomatic push, EU officials admit there is very little scope for the bloc to offer Ukraine anything else. Back in 2022, Brussels created so-called “EU-Ukraine solidarity lanes” -- alternative transport corridors by rail, river, and road
to move Ukrainian products to European ports while the Black Sea was a theater of war. - They were successful, providing Kyiv with an economic lifeline. In the last four years some 40 percent of Ukrainian grain was exported via the solidarity lanes even though that figure had declined by the time of the recent fighting as shipping on the Black Sea is simply much more efficient -- and cheaper. For example, a single cargo ship can carry up to 70,000 tons of grain, which is equivalent to nearly 2,000 truckloads.
- Travelling overland also means longer wait times due to customs paperwork, health inspections. Ukraine's wider Soviet-era rail gauge also differs from the standard gauge used in most of the EU, creating bottlenecks at the border.
- Climate change and domestic political pressures are also not helping the EU in its quest to support Ukraine. The waterway in the biggest solidarity lane, the Danube River, has been at record low levels due to the intense summer heat. River barges, in which plenty of Ukrainian grain has passed in recent times, are now forced to underload by nearly half of their capacity to avoid running aground.
- As a result, just half a million tons of Ukrainian grain was shipped on the river in August, compared to 1.7 million for the same period in 2025. And while the situation isn’t as acute any longer, the Danube's flow is still at just 40 percent of its usual volume in some stretches, meaning that Ukraine will still export less for quite a while.
- But the biggest obstacle in helping Kyiv out comes from one of the bloc’s most influential political constituencies -- farmers, especially those in the countries close to the EU's border with Ukraine.
- For years, they have complained that the solidarity lanes do not simply carry Ukrainian agricultural products through the EU to other markets. The farmers argue that some of the produce remains in the bloc, increasing supply and undercutting local producers.
- After farmers staged border blockades, particularly in Poland, Brussels responded last year by imposing strict quotas on several Ukrainian agricultural products.
- And with several national elections in the EU scheduled for 2027, there is little appetite to lift any measure benefiting Ukrainian farmers.
Briefing #2: Will The EU Manage To Ban Russian Ex-Soldiers This Time?
What You Need To Know: Following reports that a man with a Russian passport suspected of playing a key role in drone attacks at Leipzig airport in August entered the EU on a tourist visa issued by Italy, Brussels is once again considering tighter restrictions on Russians and Belarusians entering the bloc after an earlier attempt this summer failed to win sufficient support.
Speaking at the informal EU foreign affairs council in Ireland on September 2, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said that there was “broad support” among EU member states for moving forward with a visa ban on Russian ex-combatants.
Since then, European Commission officials and EU member states’ diplomats have looked into the issue with the hope of agreeing on something more concrete this autumn even though it might take more time.
However, it is still unclear if this could have prevented the Leipzig attack, as the information available so far only states that it was a Belarusian with a Russian passport getting the visa in the Italian Embassy in Minsk. There was nothing about whether the person had fought in Ukraine or not, even though recent media reports linked the person to the Russia’s GRU military intelligence service.
Moreover, it is also not certain that “broad support” will actually lead to any drastic change any time soon. Germany is pushing for it intensively in Brussels, joining the Nordic and Baltic member states, which favored stricter rules even before the summer. But whether enough other EU countries have shifted their positions to produce an agreement remains an open question.
Deep Background: The European Commission proposed an entry ban on Russian ex-soldiers as part of the EU's 21st sanctions package against Russia, which was approved in July, but the measure was rejected, notably following opposition from France and Italy. One of the key concerns was the potential impact on tourism. Their reason was pretty clear -- tourism.
The numbers help explain why. The number of Schengen visas issued to Russians rose to nearly 480,000 in 2025 -- the highest level since Moscow launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. France and Italy, together with another tourism giant, Spain, accounted for the vast majority.
One argument made by the three countries was that screening applicants for previous military service would place too great a burden on consulates, which are often short-staffed. More than a million Russian citizens are estimated to have participated in combat operations in Ukraine since February 2022, and hundreds of thousands are believed to still be on active duty.
Drilling Down
- Many EU officials also admit that the European Commission may have chosen the wrong approach, especially by proposing to ban ex-soldiers through sanctions -- a foreign policy instrument that requires unanimity among EU member states. The thinking at the time was that there was sufficient consensus and that sanctions offered the quickest route. That calculation proved wrong.
- A potentially better avenue would be to amend the Schengen visa code -- a home affairs instrument that can be changed by a qualified majority rather than unanimity, requiring the support of at least 55 percent of EU member states representing at least 65 percent of the bloc's population.
- A change to this code would mean that it would be legally possible to allow any member state of the bloc to suspend, reject, or restrict a visa applicant that poses a risk to the EU’s security.
- Yet, the sheer size of the Mediterranean trio put together means that they only need one more member state to block this measure as well.
- According to EU diplomats familiar with the matter, the three countries have mainly stayed silent on the issue during initial discussions, with Italy seen as the country most reluctant to move ahead.
- The issue here though is that changing the code would take time and would be part of a broader Schengen reform that also covers sensitive issues such as cooperation with third countries on readmitting migrants. That reform is not expected until January 2027, unless Germany succeeds in pushing for an accelerated change.
- In the meantime, two relevant but nonbinding measures are expected in the coming weeks.
- First, the European Commission is expected to update its guidelines on issuing visas to Russian citizens. They haven’t been updated since they were first issued in 2022 and will now include recommendations to not issue tourist visas to ex-combatants.
- Second, there will also be a recommendation on what documents Russian or Belarusian citizens need to show when applying for any Schengen visa. This is likely to include any male citizen above the age of 18 from those countries being required to provide their official military ID documents, which have a record of their army service.
- In practice, this would mean more paperwork for EU member states that choose to follow the guidelines, but it would also give them a clearer basis for identifying and denying visas to specific categories of Russian men without completely halting the issuance of visas to opposition journalists and politicians, civil society activists, and people with specific medical needs.
Looking Ahead
There are also two interesting speeches to watch in the European Parliament in Strasbourg this week.
On September 16, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen will deliver her annual ”State of the Union” address, outlining new ideas for the EU. Expect quite a lot on China, environmental rules, and possibly also something on financing for Ukraine and the pace of EU enlargement.
The following day, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney will address the same chamber, with media reports suggesting that he will pitch some sort of “associate membership” of the EU for his country.
That's all for this week!
Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or via e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.
Until next time,
Rikard Jozwiak
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