Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two major issues: Sweden's NATO membership endgame and the midterm scorecard from Brussels for Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.

Brief #1: Is Sweden Finally Becoming A NATO Member?

What You Need To Know: The saga of Sweden's NATO accession is now likely entering its endgame. Having applied to join the military alliance together with Finland in the wake of Russian's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, many initially expected a quick accession. But it has turned out to be more complicated than first anticipated. Turkey signaled that it needed to see progress from Helsinki -- but notably Sweden -- in areas such as fighting terrorism, the lifting of an arms embargo on Ankara, and fulfilling Turkish extradition requests.

While the trio signed a memorandum of understanding on the sidelines of the NATO Madrid summit in June 2022, outlining what needed to be done by the Nordic duo in order to get Turkish ratification, the fact remains that, as NATO approaches the Vilnius summit in July, those issues still remain a year down the line.

The prospects looked grim earlier this year when two different protests held in Sweden truly enraged Ankara. In one, Kurds hung upside down an effigy of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan near Stockholm's city hall, while, in the other, a Swedish-Danish far-right politician and provocateur set fire to a copy of the Koran outside the Turkish Embassy in the Swedish capital.

Given Sweden's slow progress, Finland decided to decouple and enter alone, becoming NATO member number 31 in early April. Most NATO officials I have spoken to on background say that there were never really any issues with Finland, only Sweden.

There also doesn't appear to be much of an issue with Hungary, either. Budapest's refusal so far to ratify Sweden's membership is just solidarity with Turkey, according to the NATO officials I've spoken to.

Budapest hasn't actually made any concrete demands on Sweden other than a few complaints about Swedish politicians criticizing the country's rule of law, and Hungary has indicated that it won't be the last country to ratify Swedish membership.

So, in the end, it will be about Stockholm and Ankara ironing out their differences, whether ahead of the Vilnius summit on July 11-12, during, or shortly afterwards.

Deep Background: The smart money is that there will be a deal in Vilnius that will allow the Turkish parliament to ratify later in July before it goes into recess until October. "Erdogan likes to be in the limelight and, just like in Madrid in 2022, he will find a way to steal the show at the summit," a NATO diplomat who isn't authorized to speak on the record recently told me with a smile.

Swedish and Turkish officials met in Ankara earlier in June, and it is possible that they will meet again in the days and weeks ahead of the summit.

However, NATO officials have told me that there is little left to solve at this level and it is time for the countries' political leaders to reach an agreement.

There have been extraditions to Turkey, mostly Kurds on terrorism charges, although not as many as Turkey would like. "This is for the courts to decide, not the government" is a common refrain I hear from Swedish officials and diplomats.

A Swedish arms embargo on Turkey has been lifted and, as of June 1, there has been new Swedish counterterrorism legislation that could potentially make it easier to hand over people from Sweden.

While that won't stop anti-Erdogan protests in Swedish cities, it could help prevent displaying at such events flags of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which Turkey designates a terrorist group. Plus, events in which burning the Koran will occur are unlikely to get permission to go ahead in the future.

The big question is whether that will be enough for Erdogan, who told NATO's secretary-general in a phone call on June 25 that Sweden must stop protests by supporters of the PKK to get a green light on its NATO membership bid and that Sweden's change of its terrorism law was "meaningless" while such protests continued.

But if Ankara insists on seeing concrete results from the new counterterrorism law, this could potentially drag on for years. So, if the Swedish prime minister and the Turkish president can't find a compromise in Vilnius, then it might be that they'll need assistance, or intervention, from the NATO secretary-general or even the U.S. president.

Drilling Down

• The way things could be solved is a giant political package at -- or on the sidelines of -- the Vilnius summit. There might be a commitment by Washington to send F-16 fighter jets to Ankara -- something that Turkey has been eyeing for a long time. The U.S. Congress, however, has been reluctant to green-light the sale of the jets until Sweden becomes a member of the alliance. So, there might be room for maneuver there. That is not the only sweetener the United States could offer. It's possible there could be a further loosening of other U.S. arms export restrictions to Turkey. Plus, a possible visit by Erdogan to the U.S. capital in the fall.
• In the meantime, Jens Stoltenberg might be asked to stay on for an extra year as NATO secretary-general, due to a reported lack of consensus on his replacement. That would be something that Turkey would look favorably upon as Stoltenberg enjoys good relations with the Turkish leadership and, apparently, Ankara isn't too keen on any other Nordic candidate for the position. (There has been speculation that Danish Prime Minister Mette Fredriksen has been eyeing the secretary-general post.)
• Stoltenberg, who has headed the military alliance since 2014, has been adamant that he would prefer to step down after the Vilnius summit. But it could very well be that he is asked to stay on until the next summit in Washington, D.C., in July 2024, when NATO celebrates its 75th anniversary.
• Another crucial piece of a possible deal could involve an agreement on updated NATO defense plans. NATO countries have failed to reach consensus on the new plans, with several sources familiar with the issue saying that Turkey is the main obstruction to an agreement on the secret military blueprints of how NATO would respond to a potential Russian attack. According to my sources, Turkey's main objection to the updated defense plans is that it wants the Bosphorus to be called "the Turkish straits" -- something that Greece has balked at.

Brief #2: Midterm Grades For Ukraine, Georgia, And Moldova

What You Need To Know: Last week, the European Commission presented its midterm report on how EU hopefuls Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine are progressing in the various policy fields that Brussels requires improvement on in order for them to join the bloc.

Briefing first the ambassadors of the 27 EU member states in Brussels on June 21, then Europe ministers at an informal meeting in Stockholm on June 22, plus officials in Kyiv, Chisinau, and Tbilisi, the report was a snapshot ahead of the crucial EU enlargement reports coming this October.

It is these reports where the European Commission will give its final assessment on the three countries and spell out what are the next steps. EU member states will then either confirm or reject that recommendation two months later.

For candidate countries Moldova and Ukraine, the next stage would be the opening of accession negotiations. For Georgia, it would mean being where Moldova and Ukraine are right now: official candidates for membership.

Judging from the report presented last week, there is plenty of homework for the trio to do in the coming months, especially for Georgia which is clearly lagging way behind.

The European Commission has given a five-scale grading of how the three countries have done so far with the priorities it set out: "No progress"; "limited progress," meaning that reform in that area has just started; "some progress," meaning that less than 50 percent of the reforms have been implemented; "good progress," meaning that more than 50 percent of reforms have been implemented and "completed."

A lot of work still needs to be done. Of the seven priorities given to Ukraine, two are considered "completed"; Moldova has "completed" three out of its nine reform priorities; while laggard Georgia, which was given a dozen priorities, has only "completed" three.

Deep Background: Ukraine is in the very difficult position of having to grapple with these reforms while defending itself against Russia's full-scale invasion.

Ukraine has received "completed" grades with regard to passing relevant media laws and reforming the judiciary and an assessment of "good progress" on reforming the Constitutional Court. In the four remaining policy fields -- anti-corruption, anti-money-laundering, clamping down on oligarchs, and national minority rights -- Brussels said that "some progress" has been made.

This is where Ukraine will need to make considerable improvements. Among the many things the country needs to do to meet the EU requirements, Kyiv will have to tackle more high-level corruption cases, restore e-asset declarations (an electronic tool that enables Ukrainian public officials to disclose earnings and assets), and speed up the alignment of anti-money laundering legislation with international standards.

But perhaps the trickiest issue will be the ethnic Hungarian minority in Ukraine, their rights, and how Budapest will respond.

For several years, the Hungarian government has rallied behind the around 100,000 ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine, offering them citizenship and criticizing a 2017 Ukrainian law that ensures the universal teaching of Ukrainian in schools at the expense of minority languages, including Hungarian and Russian.

Many EU insiders believe that Ukraine will get the green light to start accession talks later this year, but Hungary might still veto this. In the discussion in Brussels following the presentation of the report, Hungary was very critical of Kyiv for not doing enough on minority rights.

Drilling Down​

• One scenario I recently heard from an EU official familiar with the topic is that Hungary will only sign off on Ukraine opening accession negotiations if other EU countries agree to approve Georgia's candidate status at the same time. In recent years, the Georgian government has cultivated a much closer relationship with Budapest.
• Reaching consensus on Georgia's candidate status will be tricky, to say the least, especially given how much work the country needs to do. With just "limited progress" on the need to achieve "de-oligarchization," Brussels has said that Tbilisi needs to adopt a "more systemic approach" to the issue. Regarding media pluralism, the situation looks even worse. According to the report, no progress has been made in that field and the European Commission is urging Georgia to ensure the safety of journalists and to better protect both media and media owners. The presidential pardon on June 22 of the prominent opposition journalist Nika Gvaramia, who was locked up on a charge of abuse of power that was widely described as politically motivated, is just the sort of progress the European Commission is looking for.
• In other policy fields, Georgia was deemed to have made "some progress." When it comes to addressing political polarization, the EU urged the country to end "harsh rhetoric," institute a more efficient oversight of parliament, and try more "constructive cross-party arrangements." The government also needs to address LGBT rights, resume regular and transparent consultations with civil-society groups, and appoint the remaining nonjudge members of the High Council of Justice.
• All things considered, Moldova might actually have the best report card of all three. Good progress has been made on reforms of the management of public finances and the judiciary. Chisinau is also considered to have completed what was needed when it comes to the involvement of civil-society actors in parliamentary decision-making processes and the protection of human rights, notably on gender equality.
• But Moldova still has much work to do, for example: elevating the work of the anti-corruption prosecutor; improving the quality of investigations into graft cases; stepping up work on asset recovery; and enacting more laws on combating money laundering and fighting organized crime.

Looking Ahead

On June 29-30, EU leaders gather in Brussels for their regular summit before the summer break. Discussions on Ukraine will dominate, particularly on how to provide more military aid, and how to potentially use frozen Russian assets in the bloc for Ukrainian reconstruction in the future. They are also likely to discuss the establishment of a tribunal that could prosecute war crimes against Kyiv, plus even some groundwork on a new round of sanctions against the Kremlin.

Before EU leaders gather in the Belgian capital, the bloc's foreign ministers will meet in Luxembourg on June 26. It's expected that EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell will update the ministers about his recent crisis talks with Serbian President Alexander Vucic and Kosovar Prime Minister Albin Kurti. The ministers will also discuss the EU's mediation efforts between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh. European Council President Charles Michel will host talks in Brussels with the leaders from both countries in July.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two major issues: Georgia's chances of getting EU candidate status this year and the EU's first tentative steps to prepare for new member states

Brief #1: Why Georgia Could Still Get EU Candidate Status This Year

What You Need To Know: This week, the European Commission will give an "oral update" on how Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova are faring on their respective EU membership paths. This update will first be given to ambassadors of the 27 EU member states in Brussels on June 21, and then in Stockholm when the European affairs ministers from all the bloc's capitals meet for an informal EU general affairs council.

Don't expect this update to be very detailed; it is essentially a midterm review of the proper EU enlargement package that the European Commission will present in the second half of October. That package will give a thorough assessment and, crucially, recommendations on how to proceed with the trio -- recommendations that the member states later in December, via unanimity, will either endorse or reject.

The smart money, according to several officials I have spoken to on background who are familiar with the matter, is that there will be a green light by the end of the year for Moldova and Ukraine to start EU accession negotiations. The reasoning is that they are progressing well on the various conditions that were given to them in 2022 when they became official EU candidate countries.

Deep Background: The picture is less clear, though, when it comes to Georgia. Unlike Chisinau and Kyiv, Tbilisi did not get candidate status last year but currently sits one rung below the pair as a potential candidate country.

The Georgian government says they are hoping for a candidate status recommendation from the European Commission and EU member states this year and that they are well on their way to fulfill all 12 recommendations given to them last year by Brussels, apart from one: the need to address the issue of political polarization in the country, which the government claims has not been possible due to a noncooperative opposition.

EU officials I spoke with are less enthusiastic about Georgia's progress, though, with some even questioning whether Tbilisi is really interested in closer EU ties at the moment. They point to recent events such as the attempt to enact a foreign agent law and the resumption of flights to Russia as recent examples.

Yet despite all that, there is still very much a chance that the European Commission could recommend candidate status for Georgia in October and, by the end of the year, EU member states would be agreeable. After speaking with various EU officials, there are roughly four reasons that this may happen, even though Tbilisi is considered a long way from achieving all, or even most, of the dozen recommendations set out in the summer of 2022.

Drilling Down:

• The first reason is the sense that the EU, as harsh as it might sound, has "devalued" what it means to be a candidate country by awarding this status to Bosnia-Herzegovina at the end of 2022. The status was given despite Sarajevo hardly meeting any of the 14 conditions or "key priorities," as they were called, that Brussels set out in 2019.
• In fact, the assessment that the European Commission gave Bosnia in the most recent enlargement report was scathing. An EU official described it to me as "the worst report on a country ever given by Brussels." Yet a few months later all was forgotten as Bosnia became a candidate country. Why? Partly because Moldova and Ukraine got candidate status earlier that year and some EU member states, notably Slovenia and Austria, were pushing for Sarajevo to be included as well as it looked to them like the Western Balkans, in the EU queue for so long, was being bypassed.
• Essentially all European countries that now want to join the EU are candidate countries -- the exception being Kosovo, which isn't recognized as an independent state by five EU member states and Georgia. So, the argument goes, it really wouldn't "cost" anything to let Bosnia in; it's seen by many EU officials and diplomats as low-hanging fruit.
• The second reason has to do with political momentum. Suddenly, EU enlargement is alive again after being moribund for a decade. As I describe in my second brief this week, EU member state officials are now actively talking about how an enlarged bloc would actually function.
• This momentum risks dying out as soon as next year as the EU, in 2024, will be entirely absorbed by the European Parliament elections in June and the subsequent jockeying among EU member states, political factions, and politicians to secure top positions such as the EU foreign policy chief, European Council and Commission presidents, and other important commission portfolios. There are no guarantees the potential changing of the guard in Brussels institutions will be friendly to enlargement. That has brought a sense of urgency to the proceedings and there is now a feeling that the time to make decisions on Georgia (as well as Moldova and Ukraine) is now, in order to "clear the decks" before a likely period of stagnation -- and some navel-gazing -- starts.
• A third argument that has been made to recommend giving Georgia candidate status is that it makes sense simply because Kyiv and Chisinau will get the green light this year to start accession talks. If that pair moves ahead and Georgia doesn't, there will be too much of a separation among the trio. Moldova and Ukraine are already one step ahead of Georgia, and there is a feeling in Brussels that their grouping should be maintained.
• So how to solve all of this? This leads us to the fourth reason Georgia still might get candidate status -- and it would be a classic "Brussels fudge" that I have come to understand is still on the table. It would mean Tbilisi gets candidate status but, at the same time, Brussels would add even more conditions for the country to comply with in order to reach the next stage -- opening accession talks. Brussels has a knack of being creative when inventing new conditions, and it would not be too much of a surprise if they added some more, possibly on the need to quickly align with EU foreign policy measures, for example.

Brief #2: How An Enlarged EU Could Function

What You Need To Know: The debate about how an enlarged EU should work is slowly gathering pace in various European capitals. Already last month, state secretaries for European affairs broached the topic and will do so again when they meet in Stockholm on June 21-22. EU leaders might also touch upon it when they gather in Brussels the following week.

A French-German working group on EU institutional reform, consisting of a dozen nongovernmental experts, was set up at the beginning of the year and is set to deliver its preliminary report in September. That might all sound very bureaucratic, but it is significant that the EU's two biggest member states are now openly and seriously considering enlarging the club, especially France, which for a long time has been quite skeptical about adding new members from the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe. As one eastern EU official recently told me on background: "It is clear that we are no longer talking about 'if' when it comes to enlargement but rather 'how' and 'when.'"

Of course, no one can offer any firm timelines: Ultimately that depends on how quickly countries that want to join can reform, as well as how great the desire is in all 27 current members to welcome them to the bloc. But already by December, there is hope among EU officials I have spoken to that a clear path for EU reform should be ready and that this will be a key issue on which the European Parliament elections in June 2024 will be fought.

Deep Background: Ahead of the meeting in Stockholm this week, the Swedish European Union Affairs Minister Jessika Roswall sent a letter to her counterparts in other EU member states titled Getting Ready For The Future -- A Discussion On Policy Orientation In View Of A Future Enlargement.

Seen by RFE/RL, the letter offers few concrete details about what sort of changes the bloc will need going forward, but there are some outlines with Roswall noting that "importantly, to have a fruitful discussion of substance, the starting point should not be the issue of treaty reforms. Since initiating such a process at this point would be both divisive and cumbersome, it should be embarked upon only with a broadly shared view of what we need to change."

Treaty reform has long been a difficult issue in the EU considering that it tends to lead to time-consuming referendums in various member states, so the question will be how to avoid it if the EU is to expand to include large countries like Ukraine or all six Western Balkan states. The Swedish minister noted that a working dinner on EU reforms will take place on June 21 together with former Finnish Prime Minister Alexander Stubb and Italian political scientist Nathalie Tocci joining the ministers, followed by more discussions the next day on three broad themes that she describes as "the union's general policy objectives, budgetary and financial issues, and the institutional setup."

Drilling Down:

• The most obvious challenge is likely to be the budget. It is not only that there would need to be more net contributors -- currently there are only five western EU states that pay more than they take out from the EU budget. It is likely that the budget will have to be bigger. The current seven-year EU budget stands at 1.8 trillion euros (around $2 trillion), and it took four days and nights for EU leaders to agree on it. Should the budget be agreed by unanimity and every seven years, or should there be a longer budget perspective agreed in a smoother way?
• The question of moving away from decisions taken via unanimity to qualified majority voting, meaning 55 percent of member states representing at least 65 percent of the EU population voting in favor, is always a hot potato. One idea is to start using it when agreeing on human rights statements in foreign policy or approving EU civil missions.
• The trick to accomplishing this without the need to change EU treaties does already exist within current EU laws. So-called passerelle clauses would allow the move from unanimity to consensus in some policy areas. But that move would, of course, require unanimity. Another idea is to use "constructive abstention," which means that instead of vetoing, you just don't vote. This, for example, has allowed military neutral countries such as Austria to wave through EU money for arms to Ukraine.
• A lot of these clauses could also pertain to the enlargement process. Currently there are over 80 possibilities to veto progress of a candidate country. That could perhaps be reduced to just a few, such as a vote to start accession talks, and then a final vote to approve membership once the talks are concluded.
• There is also talk of "staged accession" -- something that might appeal to the six Western Balkans hopefuls that, for nearly two decades, have been sitting in the EU waiting room. This concept could offer "carrots" such as a gradual participation in various policy fields, increased access to EU financing, and also partial participation in EU institutions. There are various ways of doing it, but such measures might mean certain countries wouldn't have veto powers, or the right to have their own European commissioner, or be able to nominate judges to the European Court of Justice.

Looking Ahead

After his trip to the United States last week, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg will make his way to another key alliance member, Germany, on June 19. While there, he will meet with the chancellor as well as the foreign and defense ministers. The upcoming July summit in Vilnius and what Ukraine could be offered both in terms of potential future membership and more immediate military aid will be high on the agenda. The leaders will also witness Air Defender 23, NATO's largest-ever air drill, involving 25 countries.

With Serbia and Kosovo once again on the brink, the EU is scrambling to come up with a diplomatic response. EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell is hoping to host both Serbian President Alexander Vucic and Kosovar Prime Minister Albin Kurti in Brussels this week for what he is calling a "crisis management meeting." No date has been set, but it is clear it won't be a regular Brussels dialogue meeting between Belgrade and Pristina in which the EU, for over a decade, has attempted to normalize relations between the pair.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

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