Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's new newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two major issues: the EU’s reluctance to use its new anti-circumvention tool and the lessons learned from an EU summit two decades ago

Brief #1: The EU Creates A Sanctions Tool It Likely Won't Use

What You Need To Know: When EU member states finally approved the bloc's latest sanctions package against Russia on June 23, perhaps the most interesting feature was a new anti-circumvention framework aimed at third countries. Although this framework for the moment very much remains an empty canvas, it has now given Brussels the legal tools to do two things: Draw up a list of products made in the bloc that it believes are being sent to Russia via third countries, and another register in which third countries can be named and hence will no longer be able to import things from the EU.

This move will, in theory, bring the EU closer to the "secondary sanctions" that the United States is already applying around the globe -- a framework designed to prevent or restrict third countries from trading with countries subject to U.S. sanctions. And there is little doubt that the new EU tool might come in handy going forward.

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland have all pointed out that, in 2022, exports of potential dual-use goods -- items that can be used for both civilian and military purposes -- to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan grew more than 62 percent, 83 percent, and 30 percent, respectively, compared to the previous year.

The EU’s sanctions implementation envoy, David O'Sullivan, has in recent months traveled extensively to both Central Asia and places such as Armenia and Georgia to hammer home the message that items, or parts of them, imported from the EU to other countries have been found in Russian military equipment and weapons used in its war against Ukraine. A senior EU official with knowledge of the matter, speaking under the condition of anonymity, noted that “we are seeing circumvention. Look at the envoy and where he is traveling. There is evidence that something is happening.”

Deep Background: The big question, however, is if the EU will ever use this instrument. The smart money is that it won’t, and that the lists will remain empty. Pretty much all of the EU officials I have spoken to essentially say the same thing: It is a last-resort measure, only to be used when all other things have failed -- notably, more intense diplomacy.

I hear that this is a tool designed for O’Sullivan to threaten the countries he travels to with, but nothing more. And people familiar with the topic also explain to me that Brussels isn’t at all keen to push countries into the arms of Russia and China. This is the sort of tool that would accomplish exactly that.

As evidence, they point to countries like Serbia and Georgia that, despite their refusal to align with EU sanctions on Moscow -- even to the point of allowing Russian flights to land on their soil -- still haven’t faced any negative consequences from Brussels for their actions.

Finally, there is the issue of unanimity, which is needed for any listing under this new framework. Right now, it is hard to see all 27 EU member states seeing eye to eye on this.

Drilling Down

• One of the reasons for the skepticism is that Germany, backed notably by Italy, worked very hard to make the sanctions text on this issue longer and more complicated. Several EU officials familiar with the matter told me that Germany was even keen to remove the possibility of listing specific third countries, but that this was resisted by most other EU member states.
• When the sanctions package with this proposal was first presented by the European Commission in early May, there were hopes in Brussels that it would be agreed on rather quickly, as it wasn’t the most comprehensive measures ever proposed by the EU. Yet it took nearly two months to reach an agreement, largely due to Berlin continuously insisting on various clarifications of the anti-circumvention language.
• Having seen both the original text, as proposed by the European Commission, and the final version agreed by member states, it is clear just how difficult it will be to do anything with this anti-circumvention instrument. And it is obvious that the EU will first exhaust all diplomatic tools available before any restrictive measures are proposed.
• Both documents spell out that “the [EU] recognizes the efforts made by national authorities in many third countries to stem the flow of goods, technology, and services that are covered by the restrictive measures adopted by the [EU] in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The [EU] should further support third countries in that endeavor” -- interestingly, the final agreed text adds “with all available means” at the end.
• The adopted text also outlines other steps that first must be taken before a third country is targeted, which includes that the EU's foreign policy chief and the European Commission must brief the member states on all technical details and outreach actions taken before any proposal for sanctioning is to be submitted.
• It is also stated that such info must include “available trade data demonstrating that the alternative measures taken have been ineffective, as well as information about the efforts carried out by the [EU] to address the matter with the third country in question, and a clear indication that such efforts were not successful.”
• But that’s not all. Before a decision is taken, Brussels must also “inform and actively seek the views of the government of that third country on the basis of the preliminary findings set out in the technical analysis by the [European] Commission and the [EU's] intended remedial action.”
• Finally, it is clearly stated that the EU member states should be “informed of all steps of the engagement and of the outcome” and that a final decision only can be taken unanimously “after the final outreach to that third country has been concluded.”

Brief #2: The Ghosts Of Thessaloniki

What You Need To Know: EU enlargement is back in vogue. EU ministers and officials are busy discussing what an EU of up to 35 member states would look like. People I speak to in Brussels excitedly point out that the portfolio of the EU enlargement commissioner, which will be vacant in 2024, is one of the most sought after, with several EU member states wanting their candidate to get the job.

The buzz is due to the way Ukraine has responded to the full-scale invasion by Russia last year. In historic speed, the country became an EU candidate country together with Moldova last year. Both have continued to reform in recent months, despite the political hardships they are facing, and all indicators point to the pair starting EU accession talks at the end of this year.

But there is a cautionary tale here that is worth revisiting. June 21 marked the 20th anniversary of the Thessaloniki summit. Now, the EU loves a summit. If there is one thing everyone in Brussels can agree on, it is that there are too many of them, with at least one gathering happening every month. But this summit, in Greece’s second city two decades ago, was historic.

It was the first-ever EU-Western Balkans summit, and the outcome was that all countries emerging from the former Yugoslavia, plus Albania, would become EU members. Then, much like now, there was hope and excitement all around. Granted, the region had just come out of the devastating wars of the 1990s, but now they were all gathered, smiling and ready to cooperate.

And the EU itself was supercharged. Only a few months before, the treaty of Athens was signed, paving the way for eight Central and Eastern European countries, including the former Yugoslav republic of Slovenia, to join the bloc in 2004. And a year before, on January 1, 2002, the first euro notes and coins started circulating in 12 EU states. The future looked bright.

Deep Background: I recently reread the Thessaloniki declaration and watched the final press conference from that gathering. And it is palpable how much has changed. And how much hasn’t.

Perhaps the key line in the declaration was that “the EU reiterates its unequivocal support to the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries. The future of the Balkans is within the European Union.” Back then, this was quite something. But perhaps the frustrating part is that there hasn’t been much more movement in the last 20 years.

When EU leaders met in Brussels last week, they adopted summit conclusions stating “recalling the EU-Western Balkans Thessaloniki Summit Declaration of 21 June 2003 and its previous conclusions, notably those of 23-24 June 2022, the European Council reiterates its full and unequivocal commitment to the EU membership perspective of the Western Balkans and its support for the acceleration of the accession process and the related reforms.” Not really much of a difference.

Yes, not all has remained the same. Croatia became a member back in 2013, and all countries in the region, apart from Kosovo, which back in 2003 hadn’t yet achieved independence, are now official EU candidate countries. But only two -- Montenegro and Serbia -- have started accession talks, and the last time any of them opened or closed any of the 30-plus policy chapters in the negotiations was two years ago. Simply put: No Western Balkan country will join the EU anytime soon.

Drilling Down

• Part of the problem is the EU itself. Two years after Thessaloniki, French and Dutch voters rejected a new EU constitution, plunging the bloc into an institutional crisis. Then, problem after problem appeared. The eurozone almost imploded during the financial crisis that started in 2008; the migration crisis of 2015-16 nearly tore the bloc apart; Brexit; the pandemic; and the Russian invasion all made the EU focus elsewhere but on the Balkans.
• To illustrate this, just go back to the Thessaloniki declaration. In the final paragraph it states that: “We have agreed to meet periodically at our level, within the framework of an EU-Western Balkan forum, in order to discuss issues of common concern, to review progress of the countries of the region in their road to Europe, and to exchange views on major developments in the EU.”
• When did the next EU-Western Balkans summit take place? In Sofia, in 2018! Since then, the summits have happened almost on a regular basis, but they have been rather unhappy affairs. In one of them, in Slovenia in 2021, some western EU member states didn’t even want to mention the word “enlargement” in the final communique.
• Contrast that with the triumphant positivity back in 2003. The Greek foreign minister, Giorgios Papandreou, confidently noted that the countries will be part of “our family” and added: “In the Balkans, people have lived through wars, they have live through times of hope that have been dashed. So, what we are providing them is a very secure road of getting there.” The European Commission president at the time, Romano Prodi, was even more cocksure: “There is no unknown future. There is a known future, a very well-known one -- they will be part of Europe. I fought for that.”
• But the optimism was apparent also among the Balkan politicians gathered at the press conference -- producing quotes that with hindsight look comical. The Bosnian foreign minister, Mladen Ivanic, for example, noted that the “Balkans is the place where cooperation is normal,” even though his own country over the last decade has been deadlocked due in large part to its two entities divided over ethnic lines.
• And the president of Macedonia, Boris Trajkovski, said that “the Western Balkans now is moving towards the EU, and it was necessary for the EU to move towards the Western Balkans.” Nothing was mentioned of the naming issue between Skopje and Athens that made him represent the “former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” in Thessaloniki and would be solved by renaming the country to North Macedonia first 15 years later.
• But perhaps the biggest irony were the words of the EU's foreign policy chief at the time, Javier Solana, announcing at the final presser that Belgrade and Pristina “clearly expressed the readiness to enter a practical dialogue on issues of mutual interest and that dialogue will begin shortly.” Due to growing tensions and other developments, those talks didn’t start until 2011.
• And despite some deals between the pair, relations between Kosovo and Serbia are currently at an all-time low: At a recent EU-mediated crisis meeting in Brussels lasting four hours, the leaders didn’t even meet; the EU is mulling whether to freeze some EU funds for Kosovo; and there are serious talks that an international conference is needed to solve the impasse.
• After the meeting, almost 20 years to the day after Solana’s hopeful announcement in Thessaloniki, the current EU foreign policy chief and fellow Spaniard, Josef Borrell, glumly told the Brussels press: “We have called on Kosovo and Serbia many times to de-escalate tensions and to return to the process of normalization of relations,” adding: “Unfortunately, so far, all what we have been witnessing is just the opposite.”

Looking Ahead

On July 6, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg will invite the foreign ministers of Finland, Sweden, and Turkey, as well as the intelligence and security chiefs from the three countries, to Brussels in a last-ditch bid to get some sort of agreement on Sweden’s accession to the military alliance ahead of or during the Vilnius summit on July 11-12.

The prospects, however, look grim. Hungary, which also has not ratified Stockholm’s accession protocol, recently announced that its parliament won’t vote on it until its autumn legislative session. Turkey has also demanded that Sweden do more, especially against various Kurdish groups that Ankara believes are engaged in terrorism. The burning of the Koran outside a Stockholm Mosque last week also incensed Ankara and is likely to further complicate the situation.

This week, I am in Tallinn to interview Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas -- one of the most outspoken leaders in Europe -- whose name is often mentioned for various top positions in the EU and NATO. The interview will focus on the upcoming NATO summit, the ongoing war in Ukraine, the chances for Kyiv to join the alliance, and how she sees the future of Russia and Belarus in the wake of Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin's recent mutiny.

Check out RFE/RL in the coming days for coverage on all of these issues.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two major issues: Sweden's NATO membership endgame and the midterm scorecard from Brussels for Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.

Brief #1: Is Sweden Finally Becoming A NATO Member?

What You Need To Know: The saga of Sweden's NATO accession is now likely entering its endgame. Having applied to join the military alliance together with Finland in the wake of Russian's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, many initially expected a quick accession. But it has turned out to be more complicated than first anticipated. Turkey signaled that it needed to see progress from Helsinki -- but notably Sweden -- in areas such as fighting terrorism, the lifting of an arms embargo on Ankara, and fulfilling Turkish extradition requests.

While the trio signed a memorandum of understanding on the sidelines of the NATO Madrid summit in June 2022, outlining what needed to be done by the Nordic duo in order to get Turkish ratification, the fact remains that, as NATO approaches the Vilnius summit in July, those issues still remain a year down the line.

The prospects looked grim earlier this year when two different protests held in Sweden truly enraged Ankara. In one, Kurds hung upside down an effigy of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan near Stockholm's city hall, while, in the other, a Swedish-Danish far-right politician and provocateur set fire to a copy of the Koran outside the Turkish Embassy in the Swedish capital.

Given Sweden's slow progress, Finland decided to decouple and enter alone, becoming NATO member number 31 in early April. Most NATO officials I have spoken to on background say that there were never really any issues with Finland, only Sweden.

There also doesn't appear to be much of an issue with Hungary, either. Budapest's refusal so far to ratify Sweden's membership is just solidarity with Turkey, according to the NATO officials I've spoken to.

Budapest hasn't actually made any concrete demands on Sweden other than a few complaints about Swedish politicians criticizing the country's rule of law, and Hungary has indicated that it won't be the last country to ratify Swedish membership.

So, in the end, it will be about Stockholm and Ankara ironing out their differences, whether ahead of the Vilnius summit on July 11-12, during, or shortly afterwards.

Deep Background: The smart money is that there will be a deal in Vilnius that will allow the Turkish parliament to ratify later in July before it goes into recess until October. "Erdogan likes to be in the limelight and, just like in Madrid in 2022, he will find a way to steal the show at the summit," a NATO diplomat who isn't authorized to speak on the record recently told me with a smile.

Swedish and Turkish officials met in Ankara earlier in June, and it is possible that they will meet again in the days and weeks ahead of the summit.

However, NATO officials have told me that there is little left to solve at this level and it is time for the countries' political leaders to reach an agreement.

There have been extraditions to Turkey, mostly Kurds on terrorism charges, although not as many as Turkey would like. "This is for the courts to decide, not the government" is a common refrain I hear from Swedish officials and diplomats.

A Swedish arms embargo on Turkey has been lifted and, as of June 1, there has been new Swedish counterterrorism legislation that could potentially make it easier to hand over people from Sweden.

While that won't stop anti-Erdogan protests in Swedish cities, it could help prevent displaying at such events flags of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which Turkey designates a terrorist group. Plus, events in which burning the Koran will occur are unlikely to get permission to go ahead in the future.

The big question is whether that will be enough for Erdogan, who told NATO's secretary-general in a phone call on June 25 that Sweden must stop protests by supporters of the PKK to get a green light on its NATO membership bid and that Sweden's change of its terrorism law was "meaningless" while such protests continued.

But if Ankara insists on seeing concrete results from the new counterterrorism law, this could potentially drag on for years. So, if the Swedish prime minister and the Turkish president can't find a compromise in Vilnius, then it might be that they'll need assistance, or intervention, from the NATO secretary-general or even the U.S. president.

Drilling Down

• The way things could be solved is a giant political package at -- or on the sidelines of -- the Vilnius summit. There might be a commitment by Washington to send F-16 fighter jets to Ankara -- something that Turkey has been eyeing for a long time. The U.S. Congress, however, has been reluctant to green-light the sale of the jets until Sweden becomes a member of the alliance. So, there might be room for maneuver there. That is not the only sweetener the United States could offer. It's possible there could be a further loosening of other U.S. arms export restrictions to Turkey. Plus, a possible visit by Erdogan to the U.S. capital in the fall.
• In the meantime, Jens Stoltenberg might be asked to stay on for an extra year as NATO secretary-general, due to a reported lack of consensus on his replacement. That would be something that Turkey would look favorably upon as Stoltenberg enjoys good relations with the Turkish leadership and, apparently, Ankara isn't too keen on any other Nordic candidate for the position. (There has been speculation that Danish Prime Minister Mette Fredriksen has been eyeing the secretary-general post.)
• Stoltenberg, who has headed the military alliance since 2014, has been adamant that he would prefer to step down after the Vilnius summit. But it could very well be that he is asked to stay on until the next summit in Washington, D.C., in July 2024, when NATO celebrates its 75th anniversary.
• Another crucial piece of a possible deal could involve an agreement on updated NATO defense plans. NATO countries have failed to reach consensus on the new plans, with several sources familiar with the issue saying that Turkey is the main obstruction to an agreement on the secret military blueprints of how NATO would respond to a potential Russian attack. According to my sources, Turkey's main objection to the updated defense plans is that it wants the Bosphorus to be called "the Turkish straits" -- something that Greece has balked at.

Brief #2: Midterm Grades For Ukraine, Georgia, And Moldova

What You Need To Know: Last week, the European Commission presented its midterm report on how EU hopefuls Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine are progressing in the various policy fields that Brussels requires improvement on in order for them to join the bloc.

Briefing first the ambassadors of the 27 EU member states in Brussels on June 21, then Europe ministers at an informal meeting in Stockholm on June 22, plus officials in Kyiv, Chisinau, and Tbilisi, the report was a snapshot ahead of the crucial EU enlargement reports coming this October.

It is these reports where the European Commission will give its final assessment on the three countries and spell out what are the next steps. EU member states will then either confirm or reject that recommendation two months later.

For candidate countries Moldova and Ukraine, the next stage would be the opening of accession negotiations. For Georgia, it would mean being where Moldova and Ukraine are right now: official candidates for membership.

Judging from the report presented last week, there is plenty of homework for the trio to do in the coming months, especially for Georgia which is clearly lagging way behind.

The European Commission has given a five-scale grading of how the three countries have done so far with the priorities it set out: "No progress"; "limited progress," meaning that reform in that area has just started; "some progress," meaning that less than 50 percent of the reforms have been implemented; "good progress," meaning that more than 50 percent of reforms have been implemented and "completed."

A lot of work still needs to be done. Of the seven priorities given to Ukraine, two are considered "completed"; Moldova has "completed" three out of its nine reform priorities; while laggard Georgia, which was given a dozen priorities, has only "completed" three.

Deep Background: Ukraine is in the very difficult position of having to grapple with these reforms while defending itself against Russia's full-scale invasion.

Ukraine has received "completed" grades with regard to passing relevant media laws and reforming the judiciary and an assessment of "good progress" on reforming the Constitutional Court. In the four remaining policy fields -- anti-corruption, anti-money-laundering, clamping down on oligarchs, and national minority rights -- Brussels said that "some progress" has been made.

This is where Ukraine will need to make considerable improvements. Among the many things the country needs to do to meet the EU requirements, Kyiv will have to tackle more high-level corruption cases, restore e-asset declarations (an electronic tool that enables Ukrainian public officials to disclose earnings and assets), and speed up the alignment of anti-money laundering legislation with international standards.

But perhaps the trickiest issue will be the ethnic Hungarian minority in Ukraine, their rights, and how Budapest will respond.

For several years, the Hungarian government has rallied behind the around 100,000 ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine, offering them citizenship and criticizing a 2017 Ukrainian law that ensures the universal teaching of Ukrainian in schools at the expense of minority languages, including Hungarian and Russian.

Many EU insiders believe that Ukraine will get the green light to start accession talks later this year, but Hungary might still veto this. In the discussion in Brussels following the presentation of the report, Hungary was very critical of Kyiv for not doing enough on minority rights.

Drilling Down​

• One scenario I recently heard from an EU official familiar with the topic is that Hungary will only sign off on Ukraine opening accession negotiations if other EU countries agree to approve Georgia's candidate status at the same time. In recent years, the Georgian government has cultivated a much closer relationship with Budapest.
• Reaching consensus on Georgia's candidate status will be tricky, to say the least, especially given how much work the country needs to do. With just "limited progress" on the need to achieve "de-oligarchization," Brussels has said that Tbilisi needs to adopt a "more systemic approach" to the issue. Regarding media pluralism, the situation looks even worse. According to the report, no progress has been made in that field and the European Commission is urging Georgia to ensure the safety of journalists and to better protect both media and media owners. The presidential pardon on June 22 of the prominent opposition journalist Nika Gvaramia, who was locked up on a charge of abuse of power that was widely described as politically motivated, is just the sort of progress the European Commission is looking for.
• In other policy fields, Georgia was deemed to have made "some progress." When it comes to addressing political polarization, the EU urged the country to end "harsh rhetoric," institute a more efficient oversight of parliament, and try more "constructive cross-party arrangements." The government also needs to address LGBT rights, resume regular and transparent consultations with civil-society groups, and appoint the remaining nonjudge members of the High Council of Justice.
• All things considered, Moldova might actually have the best report card of all three. Good progress has been made on reforms of the management of public finances and the judiciary. Chisinau is also considered to have completed what was needed when it comes to the involvement of civil-society actors in parliamentary decision-making processes and the protection of human rights, notably on gender equality.
• But Moldova still has much work to do, for example: elevating the work of the anti-corruption prosecutor; improving the quality of investigations into graft cases; stepping up work on asset recovery; and enacting more laws on combating money laundering and fighting organized crime.

Looking Ahead

On June 29-30, EU leaders gather in Brussels for their regular summit before the summer break. Discussions on Ukraine will dominate, particularly on how to provide more military aid, and how to potentially use frozen Russian assets in the bloc for Ukrainian reconstruction in the future. They are also likely to discuss the establishment of a tribunal that could prosecute war crimes against Kyiv, plus even some groundwork on a new round of sanctions against the Kremlin.

Before EU leaders gather in the Belgian capital, the bloc's foreign ministers will meet in Luxembourg on June 26. It's expected that EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell will update the ministers about his recent crisis talks with Serbian President Alexander Vucic and Kosovar Prime Minister Albin Kurti. The ministers will also discuss the EU's mediation efforts between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh. European Council President Charles Michel will host talks in Brussels with the leaders from both countries in July.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

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