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The tanker Boracay, one of hundreds of ships believed to be in Russia's so-called "shadow fleet." (file photo)
The tanker Boracay, one of hundreds of ships believed to be in Russia's so-called "shadow fleet." (file photo)

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two issues: the EU’s next sanctions package on Russia and a potential NATO-led “Arctic Sentry” operation.

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Briefing #1: A Maritime Ban In The Next EU Sanctions Package?

What You Need To Know: The European Union is slowly preparing a new round of sanctions on Russia, its 20th since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, with the goal of having the measures approved by all EU member states at the end of February to coincide with the fourth anniversary of Moscow’s attack on its neighbor.

The idea is that the European Commission, which proposes new packages, will have its round of “confessionals” in which proposed new measures and potential “red lines” are discussed with member states as early as the upcoming weekend of January 24-25.

Few EU officials believe that the measures will be sweeping and hard-hitting given that unanimity is needed in the bloc and there is a reluctance in Brussels to go for measures that could also hurt the already spluttering European economy.

Some things, however, are clear: the EU will add more names to its visa ban and asset freeze blacklist, which already includes around 2,700 individuals and entities.

There will also be more vessels belonging to the Kremlin’s shadow fleet that will be slapped with an EU service ban -- with that list already comprising some 600 ships that Brussels thinks are carrying Russian oil in violation of an oil price cap imposed by the Group of Seven that now stands at $47.60 per barrel.

Deep Background: The EU estimated late last year that around 35 percent of all vessels transporting Russian oil did so in compliance with the oil price cap, while 65 percent were part of the shadow fleet violating the cap.

Perhaps the biggest potential new sanction is a so-called full maritime service ban against any ship transporting Russian carbon-based resources that would target both the above-mentioned categories.

This “maritime ban” has been put forward in informal discussion papers on further Russia sanctions authored respectively by Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, and Sweden -- all seen by RFE/RL.

Now, this quartet are all known as “sanctions hawks” in the bloc, so the measure might not fly in the end, but RFE/RL understands that the idea is gaining traction in Brussels.

The idea of the ban is that it prohibits all EU economic operators in the bloc from providing services to any vessel transporting oil, gas, or coal from Russian ports.

This goes beyond the current price cap in several ways.

First, it includes gas and coal. Second, it would target all vessels, not only those already sanctioned. And third, the oil’s sale price becomes irrelevant.

In reality, this would stop EU vessels from transporting Russian energy completely while non-EU boats could continue but wouldn’t be able to rely on EU port services and insurances.

Curiously, the Netherlands is also arguing for a way for shadow fleet vessels to be scrapped and recycled by creating an exit mechanism. Quite how this would work isn’t spelt out in the Dutch paper, but it would likely involve big financial incentives for vessel owners to cooperate with EU port authorities rather than working for the Kremlin.

Drilling Down

  • The documents by the quartet also propose other energy sanctions on Russia that are unlikely to be accepted considering they have been vetoed so far by various other EU capitals. These include sanctions on energy giant Rosneft and Lukoil, something that Britain and the United States have already imposed.
  • Similarly, there is still hesitation to hit Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy company even though there could be scope to target the company’s leadership with sanctions, banning all new contracts with the firm and potentially even stopping uranium imports into the bloc from Russia, worth more than $116 billion a year, given that the EU could get it from other sources.
  • Lithuania is also arguing for sanctions on PipeChina, a company owned by Beijing that is involved in buying liquefied natural gas from Russia.
  • With Brussels increasingly open to showing that it can also target China for its financial and political support of Moscow’s war, this could potentially happen, even though many EU member states are wary about being too tough on Beijing due to the economic stakes involved and the fear of retaliation.
  • Expect instead that the new measures will focus on plugging gaps in sanctions already imposed by shortening phase-out dates for import bans on Russian iron, steel, and nickel from later this decade to potentially the end of this year.
  • Many also want to phase out Russian fertilizer imports, which the bloc imported to the tune of $1.6 billion last year. In 2025, the bloc agreed to gradually impose tariffs on Russian fertilizers, but these measures won’t become prohibitively steep until 2028 when they hit 430 euros ($500) per ton. Therefore, there could be a move to raise the tariffs substantially much earlier than originally envisaged.
  • Then there is the issue of sanctions circumvention, which is also likely to be addressed. As an example of such activities, Latvia in its sanctions paper pointed out that it has seen “uncharacteristically high export volumes of birch plywood from third countries with limited or no significant local production capacity such as Georgia, Egypt, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Lebanon and Kyrgyzstan into the EU market.”
  • The belief is that the product in fact comes from Russia and Belarus -- which both have regions with commercial birch forests.
  • Birch plywood from Belarus and Russia already faces an EU import ban, with the measures recently extended to Kazakhstan and Turkey after Brussels said it had identified sanctions circumvention. Expect these sorts of measures to expand further in the near future.


Briefing #2: Can A NATO-Led 'Arctic Sentry' Resolve Tensions Over Greenland?

What You Need To Know: One potential way to defuse the current political tension between Denmark and the United States regarding the future status of Greenland could be a NATO-led “Arctic Sentry” mission.

The idea was aired when the ambassadors of the military alliance met in Brussels on January 8 to discuss the White House's recent expression of interest in potentially taking over the autonomous Danish territory -- with Washington not ruling out a military intervention to achieve this goal.

It follows two similar NATO missions launched in 2025, first the Baltic Sentry operation, responding to numerous undersea sabotages in northern Europe, and then Eastern Sentry, which was launched shortly after a big Russian drone incursion into Poland.

Both “sentries” are still ongoing. They are also considered big successes, according to NATO officials RFE/RL has been in touch with on condition of anonymity.

But can something similar be repeated around -- and possibly in -- Greenland?

Belgian Defense Minister Theo Francken has publicly endorsed the idea and London and Berlin are also warming to it.

At the meeting in Brussels, there was broad agreement that NATO needs to step up in the Arctic region.

“Canada has been screaming about the need to up the game in the High North for years, so Washington is hardly the first one to bring this up,” is how one European diplomat put it.

Seven of the eight so-called Arctic countries are members of NATO, with Russia being the glaring exemption. And while the waters around Greenland aren’t full of Russian and Chinese ships right now, that could change as Arctic ice melts and new sea lanes open up.

Deep Background: The NATO supreme allied commander (SACEUR) and the top US general in Europe, Alexus Grynkewich, recently noted at a military conference in Sweden that Russian and Chinese vessels “are not studying the seals and the polar bears,” adding that they are "out there doing bathymetric surveys and trying to figure out how they can counter NATO capabilities on and under the sea. So that’s something that could grow very quickly, and we need to be mindful of it and ready.”

At the same time Grynkewich added that any concrete NATO mission right now is “premature.”

Speaking in Berlin earlier this week about a potential Arctic Sentry operation, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius also noted that such an undertaking is still months away.

Yet, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte is busy discussing with Washington how the alliance can step up -- one way or another.

European diplomats have told RFE/RL that an “Arctic Sentry” initiative would potentially neutralize the argument that the United States needs to have Greenland and prove that Europe can handle two flanks at the same time -- Russia in the east and potentially Russia and China in the Arctic.

“In many ways it's about burden-sharing here as well” one of them said, adding that one potential scenario could involve Europeans handling air and sea surveillance while the US increases its troop presence in Greenland.

The United States currently has some 200 personnel there on one base, looking after ballistic missile early warnings and space surveillance. During the Cold War, however, there were up to 10,000 US troops on the island spread out across 17 bases.

Drilling Down

  • This was based on a 1951 deal between Copenhagen and Washington that allows the United States to have military assets, including bases, as long as NATO exists. This treaty remains valid and puts no limits on the US military presence, even though Denmark will have to consent -- something that is likely to be given.
  • This would also open up the possibility for the United States to use Greenland in its “Golden Dome” missile defense program, which US President Donald Trump has mentioned in his comments about the giant island.
  • What European countries would do instead is focus on guarding the airspace and maritime routes of what is known as the “the GIUK gap,” meaning the vast area between Greenland on one side and Ireland and the United Kingdom on the other.
  • This gap has been described as a “loaded pistol” in the face of the United States because it is an entry point for actors like Moscow and Beijing to do anything from underwater sabotage to seizing potential territory, according to a source familiar with military planning.
  • Nations likely to contribute could primarily be the UK and France, but also countries like Denmark, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands and Spain, which all have naval assets.
  • This would, of course, require several types of vessels, notably cruisers and frigates but also submarines and especially icebreakers. Together the alliance only has about 40 of the latter, fewer than Russia even though there is a push to produce more.
  • Expect the alliance’s defense chiefs to discuss this in more detail when they meet in Brussels on January 21-22 and then again when NATO defense ministers assemble in the Belgian capital on February 12.
  • However, there is also hesitation within the alliance as to whether an Arctic Sentry operation is feasible. There are many practical obstacles. For example, hundreds of ships would be needed to cover such a vast area, including vessels that supply military craft.
  • Apart from the Nordic countries and Canada, there are few troops that have the experience of operating in harsh Arctic conditions -- hence the current Danish-led “Operation Arctic Endurance” in and around Greenland, in which troops from Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway are taking part.
  • And while not everyone needs to contribute, everyone has to be on board to launch such a mission. And will the Americans go along with this? At the NATO meeting of ambassadors on January 8, Denmark and the United States agreed that this is a bilateral issue for now.
  • This led to a meeting in Washington on January 14 of the foreign ministers of Denmark, Greenland and the United States, hosted by the US Vice-President JD Vance.
  • The Danish foreign minister, Lars Lokke Rasmussen, noted after the meeting that the United States hadn’t changed its position on Greenland but also that a high-level working group will be set up with US and Danish officials to discuss the issue in the coming weeks.
  • People in Brussels see this as a sign that there can be “a deal” that suits all with an expanded NATO role. While nervousness exists about a military intervention, most of those RFE/RL has spoken to still see this as “unlikely” and that the US president is using the same strong-armed business negotiating tactic he employed when he secured a 5 percent defense-spending commitment from all allies at The Hague summit last year.
  • Now, it’s about the Europeans spending more and spending it faster -- and not just focusing on their eastern flank.


Looking Ahead

All eyes are turning to the Swiss Alpine resort of Davos which is hosting its annual World Economic Forum most of this week. And it is quite a lineup with French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen speaking on January 20, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz on January 22 and -- perhaps the most anticipated address of the week -- U.S. President Donald Trump takes the floor on January 21. With plenty of transatlantic tension over Greenland and tariffs in recent days and weeks, the forum is a must-follow in the coming days.

That's all for this week!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two issues: Visa liberalization suspension for Georgian diplomats and EU-Kosovo relations after Brussels easing sanctions on Pristina.

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Briefing #1: EU Set To Suspend Visa Liberalization For Georgian Diplomats This Month

What You Need To Know: The European Union is set to follow through this month on a plan to suspend visa liberalization for all Georgian diplomatic and service passport holders after saying Tbilisi has “violated numerous commitments undertaken during the visa liberalization dialogue.”

The European Commission hinted the move was imminent when it issued its annual report on December 19, 2025, on how countries that enjoy visa liberalization with the bloc have fared on a number of issues. The Georgia assessment was scathing, with Brussels slamming Tbilisi’s controversial legislation on “transparency of foreign influence” and “family values and protection of minors," noting that “in most areas, no corrective measures were reported and, in several others, the situation has further deteriorated.”

Deep Background: While Brussels will suspend part of the visa-free regime due to democratic backsliding, other issues were also highlighted in the report, including a lack of alignment with EU visa policy for those from some third countries. The report notably highlights the growth of the Russian diaspora in the South Caucasus country, with the document stating that 160,000 Russian citizens have emigrated there since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine nearly four years ago.

“There is an increasing concern that Russian presence in Georgia may be exploited to carry foreign influence operations. Another area of concern is the potential misuse of Georgian citizenship, especially when obtained via simplified naturalization procedures by Russian nationals,” the text states, adding: “Such cases raise both illegal migration risks and broader security implications for the EU.” Other complaints include Georgian nationals “remaining illegally in the EU to access medical care or to apply for asylum on medical grounds,” as well as the lack of progress on anti-corruption measures such as the need for a dedicated asset recovery office or the recent gutting of the anti-corruption bureau.

Drilling Down

  • There are, in other words, quite a few reasons for the European Commission to make use of the suspension mechanism. And with new European legislation entering into force at the end of 2025, making it easier to trigger the mechanism, the EU executive is wasting no time.
  • One of the changes is that the commission in theory can decide on its own to suspend the visa-free regime for certain passports. It will, however, still consult with the 27 EU member states and a vote will be held.
  • The process is known as an “implementing decision,” meaning that the European Commission will start by presenting a legal act. This document can be already ready by the week that started on January 12, sources told RFE/RL.
  • Then something known in the EU as “comitology” begins. This means that a specific “comitology committee” will convene at a yet unknown date. All EU member states are represented here, and the European Commission should then ask for a formal opinion on the act in question.
  • This formal opinion usually takes the shape of a vote that isn’t legally binding but tends to be respected. If a qualified majority of the 27 capitals (55 percent of EU countries representing 65 percent of the total EU population) vote in favor of the proposed implementing act, it is adopted.
  • It is widely believed among EU diplomats that RFE/RL has spoken with that such a majority exists. To prevent the act from becoming valid, a qualified majority must vote against whereas the European Commission must come back with a revised act if there isn’t a qualified majority either for or against.
  • The timeline is not yet known but the vote is likely to take place in January. There is, however, a visa working party on January 23 in the council where home affairs experts of all the member states sit. They expect that they will get a briefing from the European Commission on the road ahead on this issue.
  • While suspending visa liberalization is very rare, the European Commission has taken a lighter version by just targeting diplomatic and service passports, not the entire Georgian population. And while Brussels has hinted that this might be the next step if things don’t improve, few EU member states have so far shown any desire to go for a blanket suspension.
  • This also means that the step is largely symbolic as all diplomats and bureaucrats also have regular passports they can travel on.
  • In many ways, the move is a way to tighten an EU decision made in early 2025 when the bloc decided to suspend parts of a visa-facilitation agreement with Georgia, meaning that Georgian diplomats had to apply for visas to travel to the EU member states that decided to implement the decision.
  • Nineteen out of 27 have so far done so. With the impending suspension of visa liberalization for diplomats and other officials, all 27 will have to carry out the decision.

Briefing #2: As The EU Eases Sanctions On Pristina, What's Next For Kosovo?

What You Need To Know: The European Union says it will start lifting sanctions this month first imposed on Kosovo in summer 2023, when Pristina implemented the results of controversial elections in the Serb-dominated north despite warnings from Brussels. The move could potentially resuscitate the Balkan country's EU hopes, allowing this to be the year its EU membership application, submitted in late 2022, can finally be assessed by the European Commission.

It may also allow for a restart of the Brussels-facilitated dialogue with Serbia after a two-year hiatus. The sanctions raised eyebrows when first adopted as they lacked precedent when it came to the bloc's relationship with an EU hopeful. For starters, they were not sanctions in a strict political and procedural sense and have been referred to as "measures" in the "corridor lingo" of Brussels. EU sanctions must be presented to the 27 EU member states in a formal legal act and then unanimously agreed. This was the case, for example, when Brussels imposed asset freezes and visa bans on individuals from EU candidate country Turkey in 2019 due to the unauthorized drilling for gas in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Deep Background: With Kosovo, nothing of the sort happened. Instead, the EU foreign policy chief at the time, Josep Borrell, wrote a letter to EU member states outlining the measures and recommending the capitals implement them even though there was no obligation. The directorate-general for enlargement, the EU's department dealing with countries wanting to join the bloc, then informed Kosovo of what would hit them. These measures were mainly EU-related, meaning funding for Kosovo from the bloc's common budget would be frozen, high-level visits would be on hold, and the Stabilization and Association Council -- the main political conduit for Brussels-Pristina relations -- would not meet until further notice.

Intriguingly, while there was no formal EU unanimity to impose the sanctions, member states later stepped in to demand unanimity to lift them. In one of his last acts before leaving office in 2024, Borrell asked for the measures to be removed, but there was no consensus and the initial decision stood. Some momentum in Kosovo's favor came with the new European Commission team starting at the tail-end of 2024 as diplomats noted that outgoing Hungarian Enlargement Commissioner Oliver Varhelyi had "a soft spot" for Serbia and prevented any real movement in favor of Pristina.

An approach of "gradual lifting" of the measures was announced, though what it entailed wasn't spelled out. Both European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and new EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas visited the country in 2025, dismissing the notion of a ban on high-level visits even though no high-ranking Kosovar politician came to Brussels on a bilateral visit that year. The political breakthrough came at an EU-Western Balkans summit in Brussels on December 17, when Von der Leyen announced that the measures would be lifted. This came after what Brussels called "smooth and peaceful" local elections in north Kosovo in October reversing the move from 2023. But that wasn't the end of the story. In the run-up to the summit France, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, and Spain pushed for a two-step lifting in which roughly half the frozen money -- 216 million euros -- could be released for Pristina imminently.

The remainder, some 205 million euros, would be distributed first after the national parliamentary elections on December 28; they argued that incumbent Prime Minister Albin Kurti could benefit too much electorally if all the cash was released immediately. A new condition had been set by largely the same countries had been instrumental in Serbia avoiding similar EU measures later in 2023 after Serb militants with alleged Belgrade backing attacked Kosovar police in the northern village of Banjska, leaving one law enforcement officer dead.While other EU member states grumbled that pro-Serbian member states yet again were causing anti-Kosovo moves, they eventually agreed as they wanted to avoid another political impasse.In the end, Kurti increased his vote share and the EU promptly put out a statement saying the second part of the frozen funds would be released in early 2026.

Drilling Down

  • The issue now is that while the political decisions have been taken to lift all the measures, the actual technical work hasn't yet kicked in. In fact, the first batch of money has been "programmed" -- meaning earmarked for various Kosovo recipients -- but has not yet been received. According to EU officials RFE/RL has spoken to, Brussels has not made the formal move to "program" the second batch even though it is expected to be a formality made later in January.
  • As these measures were imposed in an unprecedented way in 2023, there is discussion in Brussels about what is needed to technically lift them. For example, do EU member states need to be consulted again in writing or in some council working group or committee, or can the commission just go ahead regardless?
  • What is clear, however, is the European Commission wants to re-engage with Kosovo. Few in the building believe Serbia and Kosovo will be happy to take part in the dialogue to normalize relations anytime soon, but the Brussels envoy for the talks, Danish diplomat Peter Sorensen, recently had his mandate renewed for another two years.
  • It is believed that Kallas, who has yet to host a single dialogue at the highest political level, is keen to try to achieve something in the Western Balkans after a bruising start as the bloc's top diplomat.
  • With Brussels increasingly sidestepped on issues such as peace talks about Ukraine, the Gaza war, and the situation in Iran, EU officials half-jokingly note that getting Serbia and Kosovo to agree might be the "lowest-hanging fruit" available for the bloc at the moment.
  • There could also be a chance that EU member states finally agree to send over Kosovo's EU membership application to the European Commission for the EU executive to assess whether Pristina can join the club down the line.
  • The last country that truly tried to tackle the issue is the Czech Republic, which received the application during its six-month presidency of the council in the latter half of 2022. The five Kosovo non-recognizers Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain blocked any movement, however, and have made it clear to fellow EU member states holding the rotating council chair that they won't entertain the issue.
  • We can expect that nothing will happen in the first half of 2026 while Cyprus is at the helm, but there might be a change when Ireland takes over in July. Dublin has indicated it is pushing hard to conclude EU accession negotiations with Montenegro by the end of the year and hopes to push Albania, Moldova, and Ukraine closer to the club as well. With EU enlargement being one of Ireland's top priorities, it may even test the waters on Kosovo.
  • Rumors are swirling in Brussels corridors that Spain -- often the most hardened of the non-recognizing quintet -- will finally allow the commission to give an assessment so long as the process doesn't force member states to immediately tackle the issue of Kosovar statehood.


Looking Ahead

Perhaps the most anticipated event this week is the meeting between U.S Secretary of State Marco Rubio and his Danish counterpart, Lars Lokke Rasmussen, which is set to take place on January 14. There is hope, at least in Copenhagen, that the meeting will give more clarity on what the United States wants regarding Greenland, an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark. The White House has recently said that it cannot rule out taking the territory by military force, while Rubio has indicated that a potential purchase is more likely.

That's all for this week!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

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About The Newsletter

The Wider Europe newsletter briefs you every Tuesday morning on key issues concerning the EU, NATO, and other institutions’ relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe’s Eastern neighborhoods.

For more than a decade as a correspondent in Brussels, Rikard Jozwiak covered all the major events and crises related to the EU’s neighborhood and how various Western institutions reacted to them -- the war in Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, Russia’s support for separatists in eastern Ukraine, the downing of MH17, dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, the EU and NATO enlargement processes in the Western Balkans, as well as visa liberalizations, free-trade deals, and countless summits.

Now out of the “Brussels bubble,” but still looking in -- this time from the heart of Europe, in Prague -- he continues to focus on the countries where Brussels holds huge sway, but also faces serious competition from other players, such as Russia and, increasingly, China.

To subscribe, click here.

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