Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.
I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two issues: What was removed from the latest EU sanctions on Russia, and Brussels' four pillars of security guarantees for Ukraine.
Briefing #1: What The EU Didn't Include In Its Latest Russia Sanctions
What You Need To Know: The European Union finally passed its 20th sanctions package on Russia on April 23, two months after the fourth anniversary of the country's full-scale invasion of Ukraine when the package initially was supposed to be adopted.
Hungary had held up the approval but the resumption of Russian oil flowing to the Central European country last week and the impending change of government in Hungary after the ruling Fidesz party's big electoral loss on April 12 paved the way for a sudden green light by all 27 EU member states. But that didn't stop outgoing Hungarian Prime minister Viktor Orban and his Moscow-friendly government from altering some of the more hard-hitting measures initially proposed by the European Commission.
Deep Background: The first proposal from early February, seen by RFE/RL, included a trio of high-level Russian personalities involved in various sports federations. Those were removed and not listed in the adopted sanctions package due to a wish by Budapest not to target people involved in any type of sports.
The trio were Arkady Dvorkovich, president of the International Chess Federation (FIDE); Stanislav Pozdnyakov, former president of the Russian Olympic Committee (ROC); and Mikhail Mamiashvili, president of the Russian Wrestling Federation.
The proposal noted that Dvorkovich's reelection as head of FIDE in "2022 was welcomed by the Kremlin as a 'victory' for Moscow" and that he in this position "publicly supported the annexation of Crimea and called occupied Ukrainian cities 'new territories' of the Russian Federation."
The document also notes that Pozdnyakov during his reign in the ROC "made a unilateral decision to include the regional sports organizations under the Ukrainian National Olympic Committee's authority as its members, namely the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics, the Zaporozhye region, and the Kherson region."
The reason for listing Mamiashvili includes that "he is a prominent figure within Russia's state-controlled sports system and is closely affiliated with key representatives of the Russian Government. He maintains close personal and professional ties with the highest levels of Russian leadership, including President Vladimir Putin."
The interesting thing to follow now is whether the incoming Hungarian government will reconsider the inclusion of these names when the next Russia sanctions package is proposed later this summer.
Several EU officials that RFE/RL have been in touch with say that their capitals will try to push the European Commission to re-table this trio, as well as religious figures such as Patriarch Kiryl, which Fidesz previously had struck off the proposed blacklists.
Drilling Down
- Not all the watering down, however, was done by Hungary. The initial headline item of the 20th package was a so-called maritime service ban on all Russian oil products that would prevent EU economic operators from providing services to any vessel transporting these products from Russian ports.
- This would have removed the current oil price cap, imposed by the Group of Seven (G7), by completely stopping EU vessels from transporting Russian oil while non-EU boats could still continue but would not be able to rely on EU port services or insurance.
- But the final text, however, states that for such a move to really happen there needs to be prior agreement in the G7 and the so-called Price Cap Coalition, an informal group consisting of all EU member states, the G7, and Australia.
- EU member states such as Cyprus, Greece, and Malta with a big commercial seafaring sectors were never too keen on the EU imposing this ban on its own and with soaring energy prices due to the monthslong closure of the Strait of Hormuz, several EU member states are currently reluctant to also target Russian oil to further drive-up energy costs for domestic consumers.
- Perhaps the biggest new thing with these sanctions was Brussels' willingness to finally start hitting third countries that the bloc identified as helping Russia with sanctions circumvention. For the first time ever the club used its anti-circumvention instrument, introduced in 2023, to target Kyrgyzstan.
- The instrument focuses on sector-specific export bans with Brussels imposing such a prohibition of two items going from the EU to the Central Asian country: computer-controlled CNC machines that cut, drill, and shape material, as well as radio equipment. Both items can be used for drone production and have been reexported from Kyrgyzstan to Russia in very high numbers in recent years.
- But the original draft also listed companies in other countries that disappeared in the final adopted package. This included Kulevi port of Georgia that initially was included for having serviced vessels of the Russian shadow fleet and the Armenian OJSC Unibank for having traded with sanctioned Russian banks.
- Both were eventually removed from the final list after the governments of the respective countries provided updated information to the European Commission that they no longer were engaged in activities that prompted their inclusion. The Azerbaijani Yelo Bank, proposed for blacklisting in early February, was however sanctioned.
- Three Tajik banks, Dushanbe City Bank, Spitamen Bank, and the Commerce Bank of Tajikistan, all sanctioned by the EU in November 2025, were also removed after Dushanbe proved they no longer helped Moscow with sanctioned crypto-asset services.
Briefing #2: The 4 Pillars Of EU Security Guarantees For Ukraine
What You Need To Know: While the war in Ukraine rages on, the European Union is still planning on what security guarantees it can offer Kyiv, both in case there finally is a cease-fire and final peace deal but also other, smaller measures in case the war predictably rumbles on.
The most obvious European security is of course the pledge to have "boots on the ground" to safeguard a cease-fire. This is the business of individual countries of the Franco-British-led Coalition of the Willing, and most of those boots will be committed by Paris and London.
But the EU is also planning its own security guarantees. The most obvious one is of course eventual Ukrainian membership of the bloc, but despite wishes from Kyiv that process will still take years.
Deep Background: Instead, Brussels is basing its guarantees on three pillars with a fourth being designed. The first is the so-called military pillar and includes monetary assistance to the Ukrainian armed forces of both lethal and nonlethal equipment.
In this pillar you also have the European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM), located in both Germany and Poland and functional since late 2022. As of early this year, this mission has trained nearly 90,000 Ukrainian officers on EU soil and is likely to be extended beyond the expiration of the current mandate in November.
The second pillar, known as the "security pillar", has another EU mission in Ukraine, EUAM. Since 2014, this mission aims to reform the civilian security sector in the country so it will meet EU standards in areas such as policing and criminal justice and will continue to be invested in for a foreseeable future.
The same is true for the third pillar, known as the "industry pillar." This one is about merging the Ukrainian and the European defense industries. The key here is the EU's SAFE instrument, the bloc's 150-billion-euro defense fund that encourages joint procurement both between various EU countries and especially with Ukraine.
Drilling Down
- Now, the EU's diplomatic corps, the EEAS, has sent out a discussion paper to the 27 EU member states about a potential fourth pillar that they named "Shared Stability," which comprises a set of concrete activities to be launched already during the ongoing war.
- The paper, seen by RFE/RL, points out that this pillar should tackle both internal and external threats that Ukraine is facing now beyond the actual war. The internal threats include "conflict-driven vulnerabilities that may lead to increased societal tensions, stemming from war-related grievances, particularly among vulnerable groups such as war veterans" but also other potential threats such as large-scale population movements, organized crime, trafficking and proliferation of small arms.
- The external threats still come from Russia and its proxies, but rather than direct military attacks on the country, the EU believes Moscow and other players will hit Ukraine with cyberattacks, foreign malign interference, and "disinformation campaigns aimed at undermining Ukraine's stability and test Europe's resolve."
- These things are of course happening even now, but EU officials that RFE/RL have been in touch with believe these activities likely will continue or even be increased during peace times.
- The paper suggests that more financial support from the bloc's budget and member states should be directed already now to the reintegration of veterans, "leveraging their capacities and war experience to the benefit of Ukraine's security and stability such as military training and the EU's long-term security."
- Don't rule out that the EU also will be more active going forward in helping Ukraine fight cyberthreats and disinformation going forward, similarly to what Brussels did with Moldova during its parliamentary elections last year and will do with Armenia later this year as a new EU mission to counter Russian activities will be set up there.
- Other activities highlighted in the paper include financial support to ensure the safety of stockpiled ammunition and explosives, fund de-mining efforts and establish an "OPCW (The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) attribution mechanism for the Russian use of chemical weapons in Ukraine."
Looking Ahead
There is plenty of news related to Armenia this week, starting with a European Parliament debate on the South Caucasus country on April 28. The chamber will also vote on a resolution supporting Yerevan two day later, and early next week the country will host leaders from most European countries when there is a summit of the European Political Community, followed by a first ever EU-Armenia summit.
That's all for this week! Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.
Until next time,
Rikard Jozwiak
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