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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is visiting Brussels again. Will he get what he wants?
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is visiting Brussels again. Will he get what he wants?

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two issues: A preview of this week’s EU summit and Brussels' plan to train Ukrainian soldiers on their own soil.

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Briefing #1: An Agreement On Russia Sanctions But Little Else As EU Leaders Gather In Brussels

What You Need To Know: EU leaders will gather in Brussels on October 23 for their regular fall summit, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy likely to attend. But apart from potentially agreeing in principle on more sanctions on Russia, they are unlikely to make much progress on finding more money for Kyiv or advancing the country’s EU membership prospects. Instead, the big talking point might be a meeting few of them will attend -- the impending Budapest summitbetween the US and Russian presidents. Expect the host, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who has often held views contrary to the rest of the bloc on Ukraine and Russia, to give a short update at the summit about the preparation of the meeting in his capital.

Deep Background: On sanctions it is perhaps indicative that the draft EU summit conclusions, seen by RFE/RL, have two bracketed options on the latest raft of punitive measures against the Kremlin: "the European Council [welcomes the][calls for a swift] adoption of the 19th package of sanctions." The sanctions proposal, which was presented by the European Commission in mid-September, includes the complete ban on Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports by the start of 2027 and also targets the Russian shadow fleet and banks, including some in Central Asian countries. While all 27 EU member states are in agreement with the thrust of the general sanctions, Slovakia has still not given its green light. Austria had also expressed reservations as it wanted to remove some Russian oligarchs that have been on the blacklist for years in order to help Raiffeisen Bank, an Austrian lender, with legal issues in Russia. Eventually, it folder, as all other EU member states were against Vienna's proposal. It will, however, be harder to convince Slovakia regarding its objections, as its prime minister, Robert Fico, wants to have a discussion about the bloc's decision to ban the sale of all new petrol and diesel cars by 2035. This has absolutely nothing to do with the latest package of sanctions, but, in Brussels, various issues tend to get tangled up and are part of the inevitable horse-trading.

The draft summit conclusions on the Green Deal, the EU’s ambitious goal to emit zero greenhouse gases by 2050, are already now written to soften the blow for member states with a considerable automotive sector -- like Slovakia. The conclusions note that the "European Council recalls the need to intensify collective efforts to ensure Europe’s industrial renewal and decarbonization in a technologically neutral manner. It underlines in this context that particular attention should be paid to traditional industries, notably the automotive, shipping, aviation, and energy-intensive industries, such as steel and metals and chemicals, so that they remain resilient and competitive in a global market." What is likely to happen is that Bratislava will be able to extract more reassurances going forward, including a review of the 2035 combustion engine ban, and that Slovakia will eventually wave through the latest package of Russia sanctions.

Drilling Down:

  • On the possibility of Ukraine joining the EU, there will be little progress given that Hungary has long made clear that it will veto any move to allow Ukraine (and by extension Moldova) to join -- a stance that is unlikely to change before parliamentary elections in the Central European country in April 2026.
  • But other countries are moving forward with the preparatory work, and there are hints in the proposed EU summit text that things could proceed quickly if Budapest gives its green light.
  • In previous summits, the communique mentioned the opening of one out of six negotiation clusters for Ukraine. Now, there is a mention of two more clusters -- and the same language is used for Moldova. In essence, that could mean that if accession talks got going, they could do so in a wide array of policy fields immediately.
  • But perhaps the most pertinent discussion will be on the future financing of Ukraine, especially as the United States might spend less in the future. Kyiv's needs for this year are already covered but, from 2026 onwards, things are less clear.
  • The latest European Commission proposal is to leverage the roughly 174 billion euros ($203 billion) of frozen Russian assets in the EU into a “reparation loan” for Ukraine. Most of this money is being held in Euroclear, a Belgium-based financial market infrastructure group. Belgium has been lukewarm about the proposal so far, even though it hasn’t blocked it entirely. Officials from Belgium want more legal clarity, and the country is also keen that other EU member states, as well as possibly G7 countries, share the potential future financial burden.
  • Regarding the "reparation loan," France also wants Ukraine to be bound to spend some of the money on defense equipment made in the EU.
  • It is still expected that the European Commission, after the October 23 summit, will flesh out a proper legal proposal on the loan and that is something that can be agreed when the leaders meet again in December. Crucially, the European Central Bank, which initially wasn’t happy with the proposal, is now playing a constructive role.
  • Another positive sign, in terms of getting the deal done, is that most EU member states back it, with Germany already on board. Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, under a new government, might hesitate but there's unlikely to be many more dropping out.
  • And if non-EU countries, such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan join the effort, the reparations loan proposal could very well fly in the next couple of months.


Briefing #2: EU Edging Closer To Training Missions In Ukraine

What You Need To Know: The European Union is edging closer to training Ukrainian troops inside the country itself and to expanding other forms of support -- including border monitoring, assistance for war veterans, and boosting Ukraine’s cybersecurity. Brussels is also considering establishing forward positions in Ukraine in case of a future cease-fire. That’s according to strategic reviews seen by RFE/RL of the EU’s two missions dealing with Ukraine: the EU Advisory Mission (EUAM), which focuses on strengthening the civilian security sector; and the EU Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM), which has so far trained 80,000 Ukrainian soldiers on EU soil. The reviews come as the EU is still working out what security guarantees it can offer Kyiv if the war stops. The documents also note, however, that Russia "maintains its objective to redraw the European security order" and that Moscow’s "military aggression and approach to the diplomatic process demonstrate that its ultimate goal to subjugate Ukraine has not changed."

Deep Background: Deploying troops to Ukraine -- regarded by many as the ultimate security guarantee -- remains a national decision, but EU training missions allow Brussels to provide wide-ranging support to Kyiv. Changing the mandate of both EUMAM and EUAM requires unanimity, however, and this is what both reviews are actually pushing for. EUMAM, which was launched in late 2022 as a direct response to Russia’s full-scale invasion, has been one of the EU’s success stories when it comes to supporting Ukraine. Fifteen full combat brigades have been trained in 18 EU member states offering 1,750 different types of training modules, including practice with F-16 and Mirage jets -- all for a relatively modest budget of 360 million euros ($420 million). Kyiv, however, has repeatedly called for some of the training to take place on Ukrainian soil. It also aims to increase the number of trained soldiers from 4,000 to 20,000 per month. The strategic review of EUMAM notes that three training centers have already been established in the western part of Ukraine, but that none of them are fully operational due to a lack of adequate infrastructure and qualified external trainers.

Drilling Down:

  • The text points out several drawbacks to the EU mission’s lack of a presence on the ground in Ukraine, such as the logistical burden and the danger of Ukrainian troops having to travel far from the front line for training.
  • It also notes that “training on EU soil, in a peacetime environment, hampers the use of UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) systems and electronic warfare assets, which are utilized extensively in this conflict.” It also states that there is a risk of non-EU troops moving in to provide training if Brussels is reluctant.
  • Yet, the paper acknowledges that moving some or all parts of EUMAM to Ukraine would “imply that a cease-fire or any form of truce should be in place.” It also says that the deployment should be “coordinated with a US contribution or backstop to security guarantees.”
  • To allow a quick move into Ukraine -- effectively a change in the mission’s mandate -- the strategic review proposes a two-step process: first, to agree on the new strategic direction and revise the mission plan now; and second, to vote on and approve the required amendments once conditions on the ground permit.
  • Whereas EUMAM is a relatively new mission and not present inside Ukraine, EUAM has been based in several Ukrainian cities since just after the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, which ushered pro-European forces into power in Kyiv after the ouster of pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych. And it has remained in place despite the full-scale invasion, even though it had to leave its offices in Kharkiv and Mariupol due to the war.
  • Around 400 mission members are currently working alongside civil security sectors, such as the police, the national guard, the state prosecutor’s office, and the state border guards.
  • The main goal is still to work on reforming these institutions to match European Union standards when it comes to civilian oversight and governance, in order to prepare the country for eventual EU membership.
  • But the strategic review of the EUAM also suggests new areas for the mission, such as supporting Ukraine’s ability to monitor its borders with Russia and Belarus, as well as being present on any potential future contact lines in the event of a cease-fire.
  • Other new ideas based on Kyiv’s needs and requests include assistance on cybersecurity and the protection of critical infrastructure. According to the document, nearly 600 people linked to Russia were apprehended for subversive activities in Ukraine over the past year.
  • Brussels has also indicated that it is ready to help with the reintegration of war veterans across the civilian security and civil protection sectors.


Looking Ahead

There is a full European Parliament plenary in Strasbourg this week and there should be lots of Belarus-related news coming out from the chamber. Opposition leaders Svyatlana Tsikhanouskaya and Syarhey Tsikhanouski will address the lawmakers, who will also debate and vote on a resolution about the fifth anniversary of the fraudulent presidential election in the country. On top of that, it's expected that Andrzej Poczobut, an imprisoned Polish-Belarusian journalist, will win the Sakharov Prize, one of the top human rights awards that the European Parliament gives annually.

That's all for this week!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico
Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two issues: What is holding up the EU’s latest sanctions on Russia and why air defenses have become NATO’s and the EU’s main defense priority.

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Briefing #1: Why Are Austria And Slovakia Holding Up The EU's Latest Sanctions On Russia?

What You Need To Know: The European Union is edging closer to agreeing on new sanctions on Russia, the 19th round since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine three years ago, but two EU member states are still holding out before giving the green light. And perhaps surprisingly the perennial EU sanctions skeptic Hungary isn’t one of them. Instead, it is Austria and Slovakia that are hesitant to endorse the package -- and their issues aren't related to the proposed measures against Moscow at all. Bratislava has concerns about EU energy policy, as well as the future of Slovakia's automotive industry. Vienna is fretting over one of its biggest banks Raiffeisen's entanglement in the Russian market, meaning Austria is asking for the unfreezing of several already-agreed sanctions. In negotiations between EU ambassadors in Brussels, both Austria and Slovakia have so far refused to back down, with diplomats now expecting that this won’t be solved until leaders meet at an EU summit on October 23.

Deep Background: This has caused consternation in Brussels as there was hope that the sanctions would be quickly approved. Presented by the European Commission to the EU capitals in mid-September, the headline measure was a bid by the bloc to phase out completely Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports by 2027, one year earlier than initially foreseen. This move was surprisingly accepted quickly by all member states as was the proposal, first pushed by the Czech Republic, to limit the movement of Russian diplomats inside the bloc. Other measures also green-lighted include the listing of 121 Russian shadow fleet vessels; the sanctioning of banks both in Russia but also in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan; and the possibility of blacklisting ports and locks outside Russia that are suspected of being involved in aiding the Kremlin in arms imports and oil exports. Surprisingly, the proposal never touched Russian oil imports to the EU, even though there was plenty of talk around Brussels beforehand that the European Commission was keen to address this issue with either sanctions or tariffs. With only Hungary and Slovakia still directly importing Russian oil via pipelines, the EU executive likely refrained from including it in the proposal knowing very well that it would be vetoed.

Drilling Down:

  • This hasn’t, however, stopped Slovakia from objecting to these sanctions. Prime Minister Robert Fico has demanded that he first wants a real debate at the upcoming EU summit on how the EU’s restrictive measures on Moscow are driving up energy prices for European households.
  • Most EU officials expect that he wants assurances that Russian oil imports won’t be touched in the future. But Fico is also dragging his feet on the sanctions so that he might be able to get concessions on the EU's decision to ban new petrol and diesel car sales starting in 2035.
  • Brussels has included a review clause for that policy next year, but Slovakia, which has a large automotive sector, has already positioned itself to loosen this strict deadline.
  • And given that more EU member states, including Germany and the likely new Czech governmentare questioning the EU’s ambitious climate targets, known collectively as the Green Deal, it could be that Fico gets some support on this issue.
  • Austria is less likely to get much sympathy for its request -- to remove sanctions on two Russian individuals and three Russian entities -- in order not to complicate the work of its Raiffeisen bank in Russia. Yet Vienna has persistently pushed for this in recent days and has refused to green light the new sanctions package until it gets its way.
  • Austria's proposed addition to the sanctions proposal, seen by RFE/RL, looks rather innocuous. It simply notes that “the competent authorities of a Member State may, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, authorize the release of frozen funds, and attributable, directly or indirectly, to the entities listed under entry numbers 475, 476 and 477 under the heading 'Entities' in Annex I to this Regulation or to persons listed under entry numbers 929 and 1825 under the heading 'Persons' in that Annex.”
  • That makes more sense when you check who the people and entities behind those numbers are. Number 929 is the Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska, blacklisted by the EU since 2022. And Number 1825 is his business partner Dmitry Beloglazov, who was sanctioned by Brussels last year for what the EU says is “a coordinated and complex evasion scheme” devised by Deripaska. Not surprisingly the entities are Deripaska’s company Rasperia and Beloglazov’s Titul and Iliadis.
  • All this is connected to 2 billion euros ($2.3 billion) worth of frozen assets in Strabag, an Austrian construction company that once was part-owned by Deripaska, which he has tried to channel through Rasperia to Titul and Iliadis.
  • In January, Rasperia and Deripaska won a case in a Russian court in which Austria's Raiffeisen bank was forced to pay 2 billion euros in damages. While the Austrian lender then said that the Russian court's verdict wasn't binding, they now seemed to have changed their tune as Vienna's proposed addition to the sanctions proposal would allow Raiffeisen to take ownership of the sanctioned shares and, by extension, comply with the Russian court decision.
  • According to officials and diplomats familiar with the topic that RFE/RL has spoken to, all of the other 26 EU member states are unhappy about Austria's proposal for several reasons. Firstly, they are peeved that the European Commission has allowed Austria to include the proposal in the latest sanctions draft, indicating that the EU executive has sympathy for Vienna's position. The other member states are also upset that Brussels is seemingly helping Raiffeisen, given that the bank is so deeply immersed in the Russian market with over 50 percent of its total revenues last year being generated there. This comes as many other European companies have left Russia or at least reduced their business presence there since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
  • Perhaps the biggest fear from the other EU member states is the precedent this would set if Austria got its way. It would imply that Russian court rulings indirectly apply to the EU and that other sanctioned Russian oligarchs could take legal aim at EU companies still working in Russia in a bid to have their assets unfrozen.


Briefing #2: NATO, EU Discussing European Air Defense

What You Need To Know: Spending targets, continued aid for Ukraine, and air defense will all be discussed when NATO defense ministers gather in Brussels on October 15 for their first official meeting since the military alliance's June summit in The Hague. There the alliance of 32 nations committed to spending 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense by 2035. And now they need to work out how to actually achieve that. An estimated 3.5 percent of that 5 percent must go on what is known as “hard” military outlays, mostly spending on weapons, vehicles, and ammunition. At the June gathering in the Netherlands, the United States, which has strongly pushed for increased European defense spending, will be interested to see what progress has been made to meet those targets and to check that the spending splurge isn’t backloaded toward the end of the 10-year deadline.

European nations can include their military aid to Ukraine when calculating their defense spending targets, so the upcoming meeting -- where Ukrainian Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal will participate -- is expected to address the financing of the war-torn country. A meeting of the British-German-led Ukraine Defense Contact Group, also known as the Ramstein group, in which over 50 NATO and non-NATO countries coordinate military assistance to Kyiv, will follow directly after the NATO defense ministers' meeting. Especially relevant to the effort to assist Ukraine in its war against Russia is the US-led Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), an initiative that was launched in August. So far, approximately $2 billion worth of American arms designated for Ukraine, including Patriot and HIMARS missile systems, have been financially supported by Canada, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. Another package worth $500 million is in the works, bankrolled by Belgium, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Luxembourg. And it's possible that new packages will be announced in the coming days. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has praised the PURL initiative for enabling a steady flow of older US weapons to Ukraine, while Washington is happy for the boost to its defense industry’s revenues.

Deep Background: But while the Europeans understand that increasing their defense spending is good for their relations with the US, there are also frustrations. One European diplomat, speaking anonymously because they weren't authorized to speak about the issue publicly, told RFE/RL that the current scheme is not optimal as "we essentially need to pay twice: first for the US defense industry and then for ourselves." However, another European diplomat, also not authorized to speak publicly, said that this “is the only way forward for now and that we will see more countries signing up" to the defense spending initiative.

The most pressing issue is not military aid to Ukraine but Europe's integrated air and missile defense. With NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte underlining that the alliance needs to up its air defense spending by 400 percent in the coming years, the issue has been forced front and center due to increased Russian drone incursions and violations of NATO airspace. Essentially there are three Western air defense systems that can be used to counter the Russian threat: the American Patriot system, the German IRIS-T, and the Italian-French SAMP-T. Right now, the IRIS-T seems to be alliance's first choice -- even though all three can be used simultaneously. While many European nations would like to acquire Patriots, the high demand means that there is waiting list, already stretching to several years. In addition, the Patriot is focused more on long-range ballistic missile defense, whereas the IRIS-T is tailored for quick response at close to medium ranges and is particularly effective against drones. The IRIS-T is also cheaper and, at least for now, available faster for potential buyers.

Drilling Down:

  • The debate over the effectiveness of various air-defense systems reflects a broader discussion about how best to protect European airspace from a wide range of evolving threats.
  • There are currently three different and overlapping concepts that are being worked on: NATO’s Eastern Sentry initiative, the EU’s so-called "drone wall," and its complementary Eastern Flank Watch, which the European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen recently floated.
  • The Eastern Sentry, which was launched by the military alliance almost directly after Russian drones entered Polish airspace in September, will most likely become a permanent feature as NATO countries are in agreement that the military presence on its eastern border needs to be boosted. While several European countries have already contributed, mainly with jets, the question going forward is what more can be done.
  • This is where the Eastern Flank Watch initiative comes in. While still not fully fleshed out by the European Commission, the idea is to bolster the eastern land, air, and sea borders with four key elements: ground defenses such as fortifications and anti-mobility systems designed to hinder the movement of enemy forces; a "drone wall," which will detect, track, and intercept drones entering European airspace; maritime security in the Baltic and Black Seas; and a system to monitor space-based threats. With a potential common EU defense budget of over 130 billion euros ($151 billion) in the coming years, there is a lot that needs to be agreed on.
  • The most important meeting on October 15 might not be the NATO ministerial meeting but the dinner of EU defense ministers later that evening. A less formal setting often means more candid conversations, for example about the actual merits of a drone wall.
  • Both German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron have questioned the need for such a sophisticated and costly system along the EU's eastern flank.
  • While European leaders are mostly in agreement that anti-drone systems of various sorts are needed, there are also concerns that drone technology and tactics are moving forward with such speed that a "drone wall" could be redundant and outdated when it launches in two or three years' time.
  • As shown by the four large drones that disturbed traffic over Copenhagen Airport on September 22, the threat can also come from inside the bloc, both land and sea. That has European leaders and officials questioning just how much a drone wall would really help.


Looking Ahead

On October 16, we will find out who the three shortlisted candidates for this year’s Sakharov Prize are after a secret morning vote among the members of the European Parliament’s development and foreign affairs committees. The favorite is the imprisoned Polish-Belarusian journalist Andrzej Poczobut.

That's all for this week!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

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About The Newsletter

The Wider Europe newsletter briefs you every Tuesday morning on key issues concerning the EU, NATO, and other institutions’ relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe’s Eastern neighborhoods.

For more than a decade as a correspondent in Brussels, Rikard Jozwiak covered all the major events and crises related to the EU’s neighborhood and how various Western institutions reacted to them -- the war in Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, Russia’s support for separatists in eastern Ukraine, the downing of MH17, dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, the EU and NATO enlargement processes in the Western Balkans, as well as visa liberalizations, free-trade deals, and countless summits.

Now out of the “Brussels bubble,” but still looking in -- this time from the heart of Europe, in Prague -- he continues to focus on the countries where Brussels holds huge sway, but also faces serious competition from other players, such as Russia and, increasingly, China.

To subscribe, click here.

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