Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two issues: Why the EU isn’t naming a Russia envoy and the upcoming EU-Moldova summit.

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Wider Europe Briefing: Why The EU Won't Name A Russia Envoy

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Briefing #1: Why The EU Won’t Name A Russia Envoy

What You Need To Know: When EU foreign ministers gathered in Cyprus on May 27-28, one topic was dominating the conversation -- that of the bloc nominating a person to talk directly to Moscow about the war in Ukraine. But it appears nothing was settled. No mediator was named, and no mandate was put forward. “It’s a dead topic, only kept alive because you journalists keep asking about it.” That was the verdict of a senior EU official when asked about the prospect of not only agreeing on a special envoy but also that person having a clear mandate to negotiate with the Kremlin.

It is not only media speculation, however, that keeps this topic going. The main reason these discussions took place was Russia. And then because of Ukraine. And then because of individual players inside the club. Earlier in May, the Kremlin threw the ultimate curveball in Brussels’ direction when they suggested that Gerhard Schroeder, the former German chancellor and close Putin confidant, should be the EU envoy. EU officials that RFE/RL has spoken to see this as classic Russian “trolling,” with Moscow keen to take the spotlight away from losses on the battlefield or political embarrassments such as the puny and badly attended May 9 parade.

Deep Background: Moscow is also well aware of the EU’s weakness in uniting around one candidate and one message. That’s why the EU’s foreign policy chief and outspoken Russia hawk Kaja Kallas again in Cyprus warned “that it is a trap that Russia wants us to walk into, that we discuss who talks to them, and they are already picking who is suitable and who is not.” For now, it appears that she has managed to steer the EU countries to talk about “the mandate, not the person” -- a mantra that is oft repeated these days. But the question is if the EU can even agree on a mandate.

Drilling Down:

• So far, the EU member states seem to agree that the bloc can never be a neutral mediator as it explicitly supports Ukraine and that any talks will start only after a cease-fire on all sides is agreed and maintained -- something that has proven elusive after over four years of fighting.
• In February, Kallas herself issued a highly “maximalist” discussion paper calling for elections in Russia, reparations from Moscow for war damages, major reductions in Russian forces, and the withdrawal of Russian troops not only from Ukraine but also from Georgia and Moldova. The sweetener for Russia was gradual EU sanctions relief.
• Kallas’s paper was widely ridiculed and the discussion hasn’t really moved forward since then. In fact, EU ambassadors in Brussels were discussing a new sanctions package on Russia, the 21st since the full-scale invasion in February 2022, the same day as foreign ministers met in Cyprus.
• The EU will also officially start accession talks with Ukraine in mid-June. If Brussels was really serious about mediating the Ukraine conflict, now would not be the time. Instead, Brussels has long concluded that Russia isn’t particularly interested in real talks either.
• But the situation changed somewhat when Ukraine -- notably both President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha -- recently asked Europe to engage in talks.
• These requests seem to have died down a bit in recent days, however, as Sybiha, according to European diplomats, didn’t push for the EU’s involvement in talks while meeting his counterparts in Cyprus.
• Instead, he mentioned "precise, doable steps" that can complement, rather than replace, the US-led peace process such as the demilitarization of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant and the establishment of humanitarian corridors.
• EU officials have also indicated to me that they believe Ukraine’s push to involve the EU was primarily a message to Washington -- urging it to remain actively engaged in a diplomatic solution -- while the US is currently focused on Iran.
• Don’t expect the issue to go away just yet. There are, after all, individual EU member states, especially larger ones, that will keep on talking about this. Which means that media speculation about a potential EU envoy will rumble on.
• Paris, Berlin, and Rome are all annoyed that, so far, they have all been overlooked during the negotiations. Most of the names put forward so far -- the former Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi, ex-German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and Schroeder -- are former leaders from big European nations. “They are always looking for jobs and the current presidents, premiers, and chancellors, want them out of the hallways in their respective capitals,” one European diplomat told me.
• Then there are the skilled “self-promoters,” as they’re often called in Brussels. A notable example is Finnish President Alexander Stubb, whose reputation for talking to Putin is widely viewed by some EU officials as just as overhyped as his supposed “Trump-whispering” prowess.

Briefing #2: EU-Moldova Accession Talks Expected -- And More Military Aid

What You Need To Know: The European Union and Moldova will have its second ever summit on June 22 in Brussels as Chisinau finally looks set to start accession talks with the bloc in the days just before the high-level gathering. In the draft summit declaration, seen by RFE/RL, there are no hints of dates, the number of accession chapters to be opened, or the speed of the process. So far, the text just notes that “We reiterate our commitment to advancing Moldova’s EU accession process swiftly and based on credible reforms and the principle of its own merits.” There is a placeholder in brackets in the draft document acknowledging the opening of “clusters,” a reference to groups of negotiation chapters in the EU accession process.

Deep Background: The 33 negotiating chapters are divided into six clusters, and Brussels is currently awash with rumors about how many clusters and when they will be opened for Moldova and Ukraine as they are coupled in the enlargement process and so far, have taken all relevant steps together.

The 33 negotiating chapters are divided into six clusters. Brussels is currently buzzing with rumors about how many clusters -- and when -- will be opened for Moldova and Ukraine. The two countries have been closely coupled throughout the enlargement process and have taken all key steps together so far.

The enlargement buzz is in large due to the recent change of government in Hungary, which many EU diplomats hope will kick-start a number of EU initiatives as Budapest had imposed numerous vetoes. The previous Hungarian government had for two years blocked Ukraine from officially starting EU accession talks due to what Budapest said was discrimination of the Hungarian-speaking population in Ukraine; as Chisinau didn’t seek to decouple itself from Kyiv, it was, by extension, not moving either. While Hungary still has bilateral issues to iron out with Kyiv, something that is expected in various bilateral meetings in early June, it is believed that Ukraine and Moldova will open at least one of the six clusters on June 16 -- just a week before the EU-Moldova summit. And several EU officials that RFE/RL has spoken to say that they hope that the other five clusters can be opened for both countries as early as July.

Drilling Down:

• The other key takeaway from the summit declaration is that Brussels will continue to ramp up lethal military aid to Chisinau -- something it started providing last year via its off-budget credit line called the European Peace Facility (EPF).
• The EU’s decision is not without controversy, as Moldova continues to uphold military neutrality under its constitution.
• The draft paper notes that “we will continue to work towards the further integration of Moldova into the European security and defense architecture and its participation in relevant initiatives and cooperation mechanisms. We appreciate the continued and reinforced cooperation under the European Peace Facility, meant to respond to the most urgent operational needs.”
• A new concept note, seen by RFE/RL, states that Brussels is planning to provide an extra 120 million euros ($140 million) to Chisinau over the next 60 months to complement already delivered equipment “into a coherent air surveillance and defense system interoperable with EU and NATO states.” The funds are also intended to cover training and budget to ensure adequate maintenance of the equipment.
• The main EU funding for Moldova in the coming years will still come, however, from the so-called 1.8 billion euros “Moldova Growth Plan” presented in 2024. The concept note says that some 504 million euros has been released so far and that “an additional 528 million euros in financial support from the facility will be unlocked if Moldova continues at a steady pace and achieves all the reform steps due in 2026.”
• The key reforms, as always with prospective EU member states, are aimed at ensuring an independent judiciary, fighting corruption and organized crime, and protecting the rights of people belonging to various minorities.
• While not outlining all the reforms, the text of the draft declaration interestingly mentions both judicial vetting and the need to root out corruption even at the highest level, describing those goals as “essential elements of Moldova’s democratic transformation and its EU path.”

Looking Ahead

Look out for the EU-Western Balkan summit in Tivat, Montenegro, on June 5. No summit declaration will be agreed but it is expected that negotiations formally will commence just before the summit to create a mobile roaming-free zone between the EU and the six EU hopefuls in the region. Ukraine and Moldova have since January 1 enjoyed a similar “roam like home” deal.

That's all for this week! Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org .

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here .

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two issues: more EU sanctions on Russia, and the US pressuring EU countries to allow Belarusian potash exports.

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Wider Europe Briefing: More Russia Sanctions But Will Belarus Potash Restrictions Be Dropped?

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Briefing #1: The EU's New 'Mini Package' Of Russia Sanctions

What You Need To Know: The European Union is poised to continue to add to its Russia sanctions.

On May 21, a new proposed black list was sent to EU member states and a first discussion was held on the topic among EU ambassadors a day later with a view quickly adopting it -- potentially as early as this week.

This comes after the bloc only a month ago approved its 20th round of restrictive measures after the new Hungarian government finally lifted its veto.

The reason for the potential quick approval is that this isn’t a big package at all.

In fact, there is even talk among EU diplomats that this isn’t a proper sanctions package as it lacks any of the traditional sectoral measures included in previous rounds, such as import bans on various Russian products or the prohibition on exporting various items into the country.

One EU official, speaking on condition of anonymity, described it as a sort of “mini package” that the bloc might be doing more of in the future on a rolling basis. But it may also be “folded into” something bigger in upcoming weeks in case the European Commission proposes more heavy-hitting stuff, like targeting Russian banks or energy resources.

Deep Background: As stated in the sanctions document seen by RFE/RL, the reason for the sanctions are the near daily attacks on the Ukrainian civilian population.

The paper notes that restrictive measures are for the “recent brutal military campaign deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure, including energy, water and health facilities, which has caused severe suffering to the civilian population and seeks to undermine Ukraine’s resilience.”

Unsurprisingly, these sanctions are aimed largely at Russia’s military machine.

This means that the Russian Patriarch Kirill, one of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s most ardent supporters, has not been proposed for sanctions -- at least not yet. Brussels has otherwise been awash with rumors that he could be included now that the new government in Budapest is no longer “shielding” him -- like the previous Hungarian administration did.

Instead, the proposal mainly includes key figures in the Rostec Corporation, described by the EU document as “the most important defense corporation in Russia, gathering the main companies of Russia’s military and industrial complex.”

These individuals are likely to be slapped with asset freezes and visa bans.

Drilling Down

• Among the companies and organizations targeted is the League for Assistance to Defense Enterprises -- a Moscow-based nonprofit organization with representatives from the government of the Russian Federation and private military industry corporations -- which aims to promote “the development of the Russian military industry, modernization, and further growth of the military industry.”
• There are also suggested black listings for various military companies focusing on the production of components needed for drones used in the Ukraine war, such as computer numerical control (CNC) machines, lasers, and even electric lamps and lighting equipment, which are used for what the document describes as “reconnaissance, strike, and kamikaze missions.”
• One company, Lavochkin Research and Production Association, set up by the Russian space agency Roscosmos, focuses on the construction of “a satellite remote sensing system to improve the effectiveness of the use of military troops.” Another military company, Gefest and T, specializes in high-end equipment for Russian military planes “to calculate the parameters of the aircraft's flight and the point of release of bombs.”
• Interestingly, it is not only Russian companies that have been proposed for sanctions. There are also two Chinese firms on the list -- which is likely to cause more friction with Beijing as it continues to support the Russian war effort while trying to appear politically neutral. China has consistently denied supplying lethal weapons to either side in Ukraine and says it strictly controls dual-use exports.
• One of the Chinese companies that might be sanctioned is described as being among “the largest lubricant additive manufacturers and distributors based in China” and is considered a big supplier of chemical additives for mechanical lubricants, a key component for any type of machinery used by the Russian military.
• The other Chinese company has allegedly “supplied significant volumes of components to Rustakt LLC, a Russian producer of military grade first-person-view drones.”
• Away from the military sanctions, the EU is largely focusing on targeting the Russian shadow fleet -- ships used by Moscow to to circumvent sanctions and transport restricted oil and other commodities. Over 600 vessels have already been targeted with a so-called “service ban,” meaning that no EU port can offer assistance to these boats.
• What these latest sanctions proposals are now suggesting is to go after shipping companies that act as commercial operators for these vessels. Most of these companies are Russian but the sanctions are also set to hit similar companies operating out of Azerbaijan, China, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.

Briefing #2: US Asks Lithuania, Poland, And Ukraine To Allow Belarusian Fertilizer Exports

What You Need To Know: US officials have proposed that Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine lift sanctions on Belarusian potash to allow the transit of the agricultural product -- a major source of hard currency revenue for Minsk -- through their territories.

An undated, unsigned, one-page document sent to the three countries bordering Belarus, which was obtained by RFE/RL, cited the March decision by President Donald Trump’s administration to lift financial restrictions on the state-run fertilizer giant Belaruskali.

“Now that the United States has lifted US sanctions on Belaruskali, US firms are interested in acquiring and transporting Belarusian potash,” the paper says. “Doing so would require transit through EU countries bordering Belarus or through Ukraine to avoid transport through Russia.”

“The United States is interested in exploring potential routes for the transit of Belarusian potash to alleviate global shortages via Poland, Lithuania, or Ukraine and looks forward to future discussions with you on this topic,” it adds.

Deep Background: Belaruskali is one of the largest potash fertilizer companies in the world, and is the largest single source of revenue for the government of strongman leader Aleksandr Lukashenko.

A high-ranking European Union official said the proposal -- known as a “nonpaper” or discussion document in diplomatic parlance -- was sent by the US State Department to the three countries. The official spoke on condition of anonymity in order to disclose private discussions.

Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry confirmed it had received the document but had no further comment.

Poland's Foreign Ministry did not respond to an RFE/RL request for comment. Lithuania denied that it had received any such proposal, but the country’s foreign minister said last week that Washington was exerting pressure to allow transit of the Belarusian fertilizer.

Drilling Down

• Poland and Lithuania -- both EU and NATO members -- have frosty relations with Lukashenko, in part because of his close ties with the Kremlin.
• Speaking to RFE/RL's Belarus Service on May 22, Svyatlana Tsikhanouskaya -- an exiled Belarusian opposition leader whose claim to victory in the disputed 2020 election is backed by many Western governments -- said it was "by no means the time to ease sanctions against the Lukashenko regime."
• Tsikhanouskaya added that the US proposal to lift sanctions on Belarusian potash was "not an instruction," suggesting that Washington understands that each country can decide whether to communicate with Lukashenko "because there are a lot of interests at stake here."
• "A safe, free Belarus is also in the interests of our neighbors," Tsikhanouskaya said at the Globsec security conference in Prague last week. "They are not naive, they understand that while Lukashenko is there, balloons are flying over Lithuania, they are demonstrating...nuclear weapons...conducting [military] exercises, so it is not the right approach to lift the sanctions."
• The United States and the European Union hit Lukashenko and his government with major sanctions in the wake of the 2020 presidential election in which Lukashenko, in power since 1994, claimed victory.
• Belarus’s opposition, and much of the West, called the vote fraudulent, and hundreds of thousands of Belarusians protested for weeks. The Lukashenko government waged a brutal crackdown, jailing thousands of people.
• Since returning to the White House in January 2025, Trump has sought to renew ties with Lukashenko's government. His lead envoy on the subject, John Coale, has met with Lukashenko personally in Minsk, and negotiated the release of scores of political prisoners. In return, the Trump administration has eased sanctions on Belaruskali, the state airline Belavia, and other major companies. Coale did not respond to an e-mail seeking comment.
• The EU, meanwhile, unanimously extended its sanctions on Belarus earlier this year. Those measures include an import ban on Belarusian potassium-based fertilizers and targeted sanctions on companies such as Belaruskali.
• Under EU rules, imports of nitrogen-based fertilizers -- like the sort that Belaruskali produces -- were already being phased out. The document refers to the EU sanctions still in place on Belarusian potash. Transit through EU countries would require the bloc to lift sanctions or for transit countries to waive them "through an appropriate legal mechanism" the paper says.
• By allowing the purchase of the Belarusian product, it says, the EU would also be depriving Russian potash suppliers of market share, as well as depriving Russia of transit revenues.
• Prior to the EU sanctions, the bulk of Belarusian potash was shipped via Baltic ports, mainly Klaipeda in Lithuania. In recent years, those exports are routed on Russian railways, mainly to St. Petersburg.
• The letter also proposed an unusual financing arrangement: directing income that EU countries earn from allowing Belarusian potash transit to go toward Ukraine’s defense against Russia’s all-out invasion.
• The US request also comes amid warnings that the ongoing US-Israeli war against Iran -- and Iran’s retaliation and blocking of the Strait of Hormuz -- have led to a spike in global prices for fertilizer and other agriculture products.
• The chokepoint waterway normally handles up to 30 percent of global fertilizer exports, as well as around 20 percent of global liquefied natural gas -- a key component in synthetic fertilizers.
• UN officials have warned that this will result in price hikes rippling through food and agriculture markets -- including in the United States, where consumer prices are spiking due to high global oil prices -- and the Trump administration has looked for ways to ease inflation. In the past, Belarus has accounted for around 15 percent of the global share of fertilizer production.

Looking Ahead

EU foreign ministers are gathering for an informal meeting on Cyprus on May 27-28. One of the main discussions they will have there is how to prevent Russia from slowly being allowed back on the international stage at various sports and cultural events.

The International Gymnastics Federation recently lifted all its remaining restrictions on Belarusian and Russian competitors and the return of a Russian pavilion at the Venice Biennale in April also caused plenty of controversy.

That's all for this week! Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or via e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.