Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.
I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two issues: The EU's "military Schengen" and the potential next round of Russia sanctions.
Briefing #1: Is The EU Setting Up A 'Military Schengen'?
What You Need To Know: Europe is ramping up defense spending. But one issue has been largely neglected: how to move military equipment from one country to another as quickly as possible in case of conflict. The idea of a 'military Schengen' -- meaning an area in which arms and troops can move as easily as civilians around the passport-free Schengen zone that comprises most EU states -- has been discussed for years but has remained elusive for both the EU and NATO despite the war in Ukraine.
On November 19, the European Commission will present its latest attempt to achieve this by the end of the decade.
An advanced copy, seen by RFE/RL, points out two ways to achieve this: firstly, splashing the cash on hundreds of "choke points" around the Continent such as rail tracks, ports and bridges, including in EU candidates Ukraine and Moldova, which the paper considers crucial to integrate into the EU's military transport structures, and secondly, cutting red tape as disparate national legislation and bureaucracy are believed to be hindering any efforts to quickly and easily move military assets from one EU country to another.
Deep Background: The idea of a "military Schengen" has been talked about in Brussels for quite a while. Back in 2017 it became an "area of prioritym" and action plans on the topic were drawn up by the commission in 2018, 2022, and 2024 --- but with little progress.
EU diplomats, speaking under condition of anonymity to RFE/RL, have pointed out that the topic is often near the top of the agenda when EU-NATO cooperation is being discussed but that neither organization truly has embraced it.
NATO has long hoped the EU would devote more legislative power and cash to military mobility, especially now when 23 of its 27 member states are also part of the military alliance and the war in Ukraine has created more urgency to step up on all defense-related items.
At the same time, there has been frustration in the EU that NATO has been too focused on spending money on expensive military gear and much less on how to actually transport it or make it available for other alliance members. The new NATO goal of reaching 3.5 percent of GDP on military equipment by 2035 and an additional 1.5 percent on nonmilitary investment such as for example military mobility goes some way to address the issue.
But it is still very much up to individual countries, as the commission paper highlights: "While Member States remain free to decide whether to allow foreign armed forces to cross their territory as part of their national security and defense, the EU must have a framework for military mobility that balances military and civilian needs."
The goal for this European Commission, whose mandate ends in 2029, is to "set up an EU-wide Military Mobility Area by the end of 2027 as a first step toward progressively achieving a 'Military Schengen' in regulatory, infrastructure and capabilities dimensions."
Drilling Down:
- The question is whether the cash will be available this time. In the last multiyear EU budget (2021-2027) some 1.7 billion euros were earmarked for dual civilian/military use transport infrastructure, focusing on 95 projects in 21 countries. But, as the paper noted, "the demand for EU funding significantly exceeded the available resources and all calls were heavily oversubscribed."
- For the next long-term budget (2028-2034), the European Commission has therefore proposed 17.65 billion euros in dual-use transport infrastructure focusing on 500 "hotspot projects" where transport of military gear needs to become faster and smoother.
- The question, though, is if this will fly as member states always water down the commission's initial proposals and prefer to divert EU cash to "vote winner" topics such as agriculture, fisheries, and other types of social spending.
- Rail is also the mode of transport most money has been spent on when it comes to military mobility, and that is likely to continue. Earlier this year the EU agreed on four priority multimodal military mobility corridors: north, south, east, and central. The northern one, mainly connecting the Netherlands with Germany and Poland and then further to Ukraine, is for obvious reasons the most advanced.
- The document highlights a 22-kilometer railway stretch connecting western Ukraine with Slovakia and the rest of Central Europe in European nominal standard railway track gauge that opened in September. It also notes that "preparatory works are ongoing to deploy the European nominal standard track gauge on the European Transport Corridors connecting Moldova and Ukraine to EU Member States."
- The idea is very much that all of the EU, including candidate countries, will operate with the standard track gauge going forward.
- The European Commission is also keen to splash the cash on other items vital for military movements but described as "scarce" in the club such as outsized cargo airlifts, dual-use ferries, and, notably, flatbed wagons for trains via which heavy military equipment such as rockets and tanks can be transported.
- In the end, the biggest changes the EU can likely make are in legislation to better enable the movement of troops and equipment. The problem is laid bare in the document: "EU rules are not applied to military transport or are not applied coherently, national regulations diverge, and military transport is not given sufficient priority."
- The text notes that it sometimes requires 45 days to obtain permission for military transport to cross from one EU country to another. The goal, set by Brussels, is three days. Surprisingly, the EU's harmonized rules for the transport of dangerous goods do not apply to military transport, meaning ad hoc arrangements are often required. This is now set to change.
- The European Commission intends to push for more. Permission to move military equipment between member states will no longer need to be renewed annually; it will simply remain valid until revoked. Non-EU member states can also be part of this change.
- Other proposals include the exempting of military transport from certain civilian rules such as holiday traffic bans and EU cabotage rules -- specific legislation in the bloc that favors national transport companies over those from other EU countries.
- The key to this will be a European Military Mobility Enhanced Response System (EMERS) that can be triggered within 48 hours of a proposal from the European Commission or an EU member state. When activated in the case of a potential military emergency, cross-border military transport would only require a notification with a reduced advance notice of military movement and bypassing standard procedures, except for customs formalities.
- All these proposals will of course be agreed among EU member states, often requiring unanimity. Given the increased urgency for the EU to step up militarily amid the war in Ukraine, this might prove the best chance to achieve the "military Schengen."
Briefing #2: When And How Will The EU Impose More Russia Sanctions?
What You Need To Know: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently hinted that the EU is working on another sanctions package on Russia, less than a month after agreeing on a new raft of measures aimed at hitting the Kremlin over the full-scale invasion of its neighbor.
The first question is how quickly such a new proposal may emerge. EU diplomats whom RFE/RL spoke with under the condition of anonymity say they doubt fresh measures will be presented this side of Christmas. Brussels has two bigger priorities at the moment: securing funding for Ukraine for the next two years (with a so-called reparations loan still the favored option) and making sure all current EU sanctions on Moscow are renewed.
Both issues need to be solved in January at the latest. The latter requires unanimity while the former needs broad political backing.
EU officials are, in other words, wary of adding another task requiring consensus and have hinted that a new sanctions package might first arrive around the fourth anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2026.
Deep Background: This hasn't stopped EU member states from drawing up their wish-lists, though. One discussion paper seen by RFE/RL and authored by the Baltic trio Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as well as Germany Poland, and Sweden makes it clear the next goal should be to limit EU imports of Russian goods.
Noting that the bloc imported goods from the country to the tune of 35 billion euros last year, the six countries argue there still is plenty of leeway for the club to lessen its dependence on Moscow.
The bulk of these imports are in energy such as gas and oil as well as various agricultural products. Brussels already committed earlier this year to largely phasing out both Russian energy and agriculture imports by 2027.
The countries are essentially looking at the next most imported Russian item: steel.
So far this year, the club has imported Russian steel to the tune of 1.3 billion euros, or 8 percent of total EU imports from the country. Most of those steel products are so-called steel slabs, a foundation material that is crafted into more elaborate steel products.
While Brussels imposed import bans on some Russian steel already back in 2022, steel slab intakes have an exemption till October 2028. This exemption could be crossed out.
Another potential target is so-called inorganic chemicals from Russia, which constitute 3 percent of total EU imports from Russia. These include anhydrous ammonia and calcium phosphates, which can be used both for agriculture but also in the plastics and pharmaceutical industries.
The discussion paper notes the United States is currently both the largest importer and exporter of these products and potential sanctions wouldn't disrupt their European supplies.
Potassium fertilizers are a similar story. While the EU has targeted nitrogen-based fertilizers with trade restrictions, imports of those that are potassium-based actually increased in 2024 compared to 2023 and 2022.
The EU still produces its own potassium fertilizers but at a higher cost, largely due to stringent environmental regulations. But the bloc could also import from other third countries such as Canada and Israel, meaning sanctions on these Russian imports wouldn't necessarily translate into a shortage for European farmers.
Drilling Down:
- The EU also wants to figure out how to target Russia's "shadow fleet" -- often rickety vessels with shadowy ownership Moscow uses to circumvent the G7 oil cap. The cap has set a limit, currently at $47.60 per barrel, at which Russian crude oil is allowed to be traded.
- Brussels has so far blacklisted 562 vessels trying to undercut the cap. The blacklisting means they cannot be serviced at any EU ports, but it is believed there are at least another 400 that still haven't been targeted. And they are still allowed to sail in EU waters, often causing fears of oil spills and other hazards.
- France recently distributed a discussion paper among EU capitals on what more can be done in this field. The gist of Paris's proposal is that the EU and like-minded countries should focus on what it calls "a volume-driven approach."
- This essentially means regulating how much oil boats are allowed to carry. While not sketching out how this would work in practice , the document, seen by RFE/RL, notes that Brussels's next move should be to hit "all enablers of the shadow fleet's, especially its financial, commercial, and logistical networks in third countries."
- While this could obviously mean sanctions, the paper also suggests "introducing incentives to encourage owners of listed vessels to reintegrate legitimate trade channels" and "preventing further increase in tonnage through more stringent controls and due diligence requirements on the sales of ships."
- Then there is the issue of stopping boats belonging to the shadow fleet in European waters.
- Paris made headlines earlier in September when French authorities boarded the vessel Pushpa/Boracay after suspicions that the ship played a part in drone incidents in Denmark earlier that month that triggered the closure of Copenhagen airport for several hours.
- France is urging the bloc to act more forcefully against boats that in fact may be stateless, arguing that "when these suspect vessels are falsely flagged, or when they have in reality already been erased of the register of the flag State they claim, they are stateless vessels" and as such make them easier for European nations to board without falling foul under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Looking Ahead
EU foreign ministers meet for their monthly gathering in Brussels on November 20. Their Ukrainian counterpart Andriy Sybiha will brief them about the latest developments in the war against Russia with EU financing for Kyiv and further sanctions (see briefing above) on Moscow will also be discussed. Relations with Belarus is also on the agenda as neighboring countries such as Lithuania is accusing the Lukashenka regime of hybrid attacks such as sending balloons with smuggled goods over the border.
That's all for this week!
Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.
Until next time,
Rikard Jozwiak
If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.
