Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm reporting from the Globsec forum in Prague, which was dominated by discussion of the war in Ukraine.

The Briefing: The Globsec Forum In Prague

Over the weekend, the biggest gathering of think tanks in Central Europe, the Globsec forum, took place in Prague. The theme was "Taming The Storm," a reference to the myriad challenges facing Europe -- from Russia's war in Ukraine and the malign influence of China to a potential new American president less invested in the continent and the disruptive effects of artificial intelligence (AI).

Despite the ominous theme, this year's Globsec was actually rather uneventful, especially when compared to last year. Back then, French President Emmanuel Macron stole the show by telling the largely Central European crowd they were right all along about Vladimir Putin and that Paris had got its assessment of the Russian president terribly wrong.

There were also frenetic (and ultimately failed) efforts to get the Serbian and Kosovar leaders to dial down the tension in the region, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen promised (and subsequently delivered) on a 6 billion euro ($6.6 billion) growth plan for the Western Balkans for the next three years.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of this year's Globsec was that it didn't take place in Bratislava, the forum's home for the previous 18 years. Shortly after coming to power in the fall of 2023, the left-wing populist Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico withdrew both political backing and economic support for the forum, even though he was a big proponent of the event during his previous stints in office.

That appears to be a continuation of Bratislava's concerted effort to target various institutions and follows its taking-over of the governance of Slovak state TV in the spring and, more recently, sacking the heads of prominent cultural institutions around the country.

Prague provided a welcome refuge for the forum this time around -- and the Czech capital will be the host again in 2025 After that, who knows? It looks likely the Czech Republic will have its own populist, Andrej Babis, back in power next fall.

Even though Globsec is under the auspices of the pro-Western Czech President Petr Pavel, I heard from more than a few people at the three-day gathering that Warsaw is being considered as an alternative host.

Von Der Leyen Comes Out Swinging...

With no Macron this time, nor the German chancellor or the Ukrainian president, center stage was taken by the newly re-elected von der Leyen. In an apparent swipe at the governments of Hungary and Slovakia, which both have questioned the usefulness of more financial and military support for Ukraine, she noted that "today, some politicians inside our union, and even in this part of Europe, are muddying the waters of our conversation about Ukraine. They blame the war not on the invader but on the invaded; not on Putin's lust for power but on Ukraine's thirst for freedom. So, I want to ask them: Would you ever blame Hungarians for the Soviet invasion of 1956? Would you ever blame Czechs for the Soviet repression of 1968? The answer to these questions is very clear: The Kremlin's behavior was illegal and atrocious back then. And the Kremlin's behavior is illegal and atrocious today."

Von der Leyen also saved some strong salvos for Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who, in July, embarked on a much-publicized "peace mission" to Moscow and Beijing.

"We Europeans have many different histories. We speak many different languages, but in no language is peace synonymous with surrender," she said. "In no language is sovereignty synonymous with occupation. So, those who argue to stop support for Ukraine do not argue for peace. They argue for appeasement and the subjugation of Ukraine."

…And Budapest Hits Back

While most participants at Globsec tended to echo von der Leyen's view, it was interesting to hear a different take from a representative of the Hungarian government. In one of the tensest sessions over the weekend, Orban's political director, Balasz Orban (no relation), hammered home Budapest's point of view.

It would be good, Balasz Orban said, for Europe to stop "endless wars and bring peace." He underlined that this was a view shared around the world and that it was only what he called the "transatlantic liberal elite" who are in opposition to the idea.

He then pointed out that Russia has gained territories, that the war has caused millions of Ukrainian refugees to flee, that hundreds of thousands have died on both sides, that the Ukrainian economy is in ruins and bankrolled by the West. He then bluntly asked how long this could continue.

It was only when he said Ukraine would soon become "Europe's problem," as even the Democrats in the United States would realize that they couldn't finance the war for too much longer, that one of the other panelists, U.S. diplomat Kurt Volker, retorted that that would still be better than Europe having Russia "as your problem."

A Cold Winter Ahead

Amid all the bullish talk at the conference of Ukraine's urgent needs and the West needing to step up, the mood heading into the fall felt decidedly sober.

Sure, many did sense a smidgen of optimism with Ukraine's already weeks-long incursion into Russia's Kursk region. Experts agreed Kyiv could benefit both from the buffer zone it offers and use the hundreds of Russian prisoners of war as a useful bargaining chip in potential future negotiations.

But as the Prague forum took place, there was news of the Russian Army edging closer to the key Ukrainian hub of Pokrovsk, with the path to Ukraine's fourth-largest city Dnipropetrovsk suddenly opening up. The EU's ambassador to Ukraine, Katarina Mathernova, noted that, in the summer, military support from the bloc is at the same level as it was in spring 2022 -- down to a trickle -- and added that Ukrainians "cannot shoot commitments, but need real ammunition." She also warned about the possibility of a "cold and dark winter," with Russia hampering around 70 percent of Ukraine's prewar energy production.

Another telling admittance was from former Dutch Defense Minister Kajsa Ollongren, who bluntly spelled out that the Ukraine Compact, a security framework signed by all 32 NATO allies at the Washington, D.C., summit in July, was "a bit of window dressing," although she hastened to add that bilateral security deals between Kyiv and various Western capitals were still meaningful. While several European diplomats have confessed this to me privately, it was still a sobering assessment to hear it spoken out loud.

It went on in much the same fashion. In one session, Anders Carp, the deputy CEO of Saab, the Swedish aerospace and defense company, gave perhaps the most chilling comment of the weekend when he noted that European nations must continue to give special training to Ukrainian troops as "many of the Ukrainian soldiers we have trained are now dead."

Outspoken Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur asked whether "we want Ukraine to fight or do we want Ukraine to win," adding that the West is again failing to give the country what it needs.

There are some promising signs. Last week, NATO ambassadors met with Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, and EU defense ministers met among themselves in Brussels, to discuss the issue of lifting more Western restrictions on Ukraine striking inside Russia.

Despite the meetings, according to EU diplomatic sources speaking on background, there is no real movement on this yet, and Germany, Italy, the United States, and others, remain wary. Speaking about the restrictions, Pevkur said it was "like asking a boxer to fight with one hand behind the back."

Money Issues And Political Will

Ultimately, it all comes down to money and political will in the West. The Estonian defense minister was again blunt, noting that, apart from the issue of cash, the arms industry needed to plan, as there are stringent environmental assessments required for expansion and it often takes more than 18 months to navigate the bureaucracy.

In Russia, he pointed out, there are no restrictions. "If Putin decides that a sausage factory should produce weapons the next day, it's decided," he said.

With that in mind, it was illuminating to listen to Angus Lapsley, who is in charge of defense planning at NATO. While the military alliance now proudly states that a record number of 23 out of 32 allies have reached the target of spending 2 percent or more of national gross domestic product (GDP), Lapsley noted that spending needs to increase by another third, or, in some cases, double. The Cold War average for NATO was 3.5 percent of GDP, he added.

He highlighted numerous capacity gaps that the alliance needed to fill: ammunition, spare parts, air defense, long-range strike capabilities. He also said that even apparently straightforward measures such as improved integrated communications and information systems were necessary, as the militaries of various countries were sometimes unable to even send e-mails to one another.

A Feisty Balkan Clash

One surprise was when Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic said Ukraine will be a member of the EU by 2030. It wasn't clear if his comment was made in jest, as he was speaking at a rather turbulent session. Sharing the stage with Montenegrin President Jakov Mijatovic, Vucic scoffed at Mijatovic's stated goal that Podgorica will be a member of the bloc by 2028.

Vucic dismissed the idea that a Western Balkan state will join the EU this decade, saying only Kyiv has a chance. The two Balkan leaders then had a testy exchange over whether the Montenegrin language was in fact Serbian, and Vucic slammed Podgorica for recognizing Kosovo's independence in 2008.

Vucic continued in similar combative fashion, dismissing the notion that Belgrade was a Kremlin Trojan horse trying to enter the EU and spelling out that he hadn't been in touch with Russian President Vladimir Putin in over two years (although though people in his entourage had).

The Serbian president said that "the interests of the EU are from time to time different to our interests," adding that the main impediment to Belgrade's continued EU integration was its relations with Kosovo, rather than with Russia.

The EU-sponsored dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, which has been going on since 2011, has not seen much progress over the last few years. Judging from the mood in Prague this weekend, he said, it was hard to believe that will change.

Looking Ahead

The EU's Foreign Affairs Council last week was moved from Budapest to Brussels, following outrage over Orban's trip to Moscow in July. But the bloc's General Affairs Council, which brings together member states' Europe ministers, will take place in the Hungarian capital on September 3.

Some countries, notably the Baltic trio and Finland, have already said they won't send ministers to the event, so we'll see if others follow suit.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on one big issue: What to expect from the EU this autumn.

The Briefing: A Busy Brussels Autumn

The Brussels autumn normally kicks into gear by mid-September, when the president of the European Commission delivers the State of the European Union address (referred to as “SOTEU” by EU types) to the European Parliament. The speech, which tends to last about an hour, outlines policy priorities the EU executive aims to launch or complete in the coming months.

But this is no normal Brussels autumn, since the EU is in the middle of a changing of the guard. In June, EU leaders decided that former Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Costa would replace Charles Michel as president of the European Council on December 1. Weeks later, the European Parliament approved a decision by EU leaders to give Germany’s Ursula von der Leyen another five years at the helm of the European Commission. But instead of delivering another SOTEU in September, von der Leyen will be busy composing her new team of 26 commissioners, one from each of the other EU member states. Some capitals have already presented their respective commission candidates ahead of the August 30 deadline. Once von der Leyen has interviewed them all, she will earmark a policy portfolio for each one.

Calling Kallas And Axing Oliver?

So far, we know just one name and portfolio: Alongside the Costa and von der Leyen appointments in June, EU leaders decided that Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas should follow outgoing Spaniard Josep Borrell as the EU's next foreign policy chief. That is not a done deal, however. Like each of the other 25 commission candidates, Kallas will face grueling hearings among the relevant committees in the European Parliament. In Kallas’s case, that is the Foreign Affairs Committee, whose members also will sink their teeth into the next EU enlargement commissioner, whoever that may be.

I’ve heard from EU diplomats that the Kallas hearing is slated for September 29. In fact, the Brussels news cycle in the latter half of September and early October will be dominated by these hearings. They offer the European Parliament the opportunity to flex its muscles by rejecting a handful of commission candidates who it believes fared poorly under questioning. (Last time, in 2019, MEPs rejected three candidates, after which it was up to their “sponsor” states to quickly propose new individuals for new hearings.)

One who is almost certainly in MEPs’ crosshairs is Hungarian candidate commissioner Oliver Varhelyi. He has been nominated by Budapest for a new term following a controversial five years as the bloc’s enlargement supremo. Accused by many diplomats of putting Budapest’s interests ahead of Brussels’ -- with a soft spot for Serbia and Georgia but not so much for Ukraine -- he was caught in a hot-mic incident at a plenary session calling MEPs “idiots.”

While Varhelyi is unlikely to be offered the enlargement portfolio again, he is sure to face a tough task convincing lawmakers that he is the right person for any portfolio that von der Leyen might entrust him with. The hope in some quarters is that each commissioner and the new European Commission as a whole will get a pass by the European Parliament so they can start working on December 1, but don’t rule out the possibility that it drags out longer than that.

Not So Hawkish After All

None of the EU officials I’ve spoken to expects the Kallas approval to be in any real danger. But it will still be interesting to hear what she and any incoming enlargement commissioner say on Ukraine, Russia, the Western Balkans, and the prospect of adding more members to the bloc. I don’t expect any radical changes on this front. EU policy is rather set on full support for Ukraine and a renewed push for enlargement once the bloc has reformed and candidate countries are fulfilling all preconditions. But the emphasis and how these messages are delivered will be of the essence.

Kallas comes in with a reputation as a “Russia hawk” -- arguably the first EU foreign policy chief with such a strong position vis-à-vis Moscow. It should, of course, be noted that the entire bloc has moved closer to the Baltic states’ view on Russia since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began 2 1/2 years ago, but doubts remained when her name first popped up that she was too outspoken to be the EU’s top diplomat.

So expect her to tone it down slightly when she faces MEPs and for her to talk about much more than just Russia and Ukraine. In fact, it wouldn’t be surprising if she spoke at equal length about the war in Gaza, relations with countries on the southern rim of the Mediterranean, and the need for stronger relations with other big powers of the so-called “Global South,” including Brazil and India. And don’t rule out that the first foreign trip in her presumptive new post might be to visit EU hopefuls in the Western Balkans, rather than Ukraine, simply to emphasize the importance of those countries.

I also hear from Brussels diplomats that they expect that she is ready to tackle head on the thorny EU-initiated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. Current EU foreign policy chief Borrell enlisted former Slovak Foreign Minister Miroslav Lajcak in 2020 to serve as special EU representative for the dialogue, but there has been little real progress, and it appears that function might be scrapped altogether with Kallas in charge.

Enlarging The EU?

It will also be fascinating to see who von der Leyen opts for as enlargement commissioner. With EU expansion once again a hot topic -- with Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine most recently invited to join the bloc and the latter two seen as making real progress -- more EU member states are interested in securing that portfolio, unlike back in 2019 when only Budapest truly pushed for it and got it. Since Estonia, which is regarded as an “eastern” member state in Brussels, got the foreign policy position, it would be a real surprise if another “easterner” got the commission’s enlargement portfolio. My guess is that von der Leyen will look to the south or west to ensure geographical balance -- and avoid accusations that the bloc’s sole focus is Ukraine. The thing to look out for with the enlargement commissioner is, of course, any reference to dates when the next EU expansion might happen.

It is almost impossible to guess exactly when any country might be added to the bloc, but the latest high-level attempt to promote a time frame came from outgoing European Council President Michel when last year he challenged the EU to be ready for expansion by 2030. That is not his call, of course, and he’ll be out of office soon anyway; but the truth is that even that date looks ambitious, since no candidate country seems particularly close to joining. But the bigger emphasis both in the hearings and in the years ahead will likely be on the reforms the EU itself must undergo in order to accept new members.

Discussions have already started; but if Brussels is serious, those changes will have to be made rather soon. Will the EU budget be increased? (The current candidate countries all are poorer than the EU average.) And what political reforms are necessary for an EU that might go from 27 to well over 30 members in the coming years? Fewer veto opportunities for national capitals is a common refrain, but achieving that without anyone vetoing such a move in the first place is a formidable challenge. You won’t hear it this autumn, but there are persistent fears that it’s the EU itself that isn’t ready to grow bigger.

Positive Reports For (Some) Western Balkan States?

Separately, the outgoing European Commission will most likely issue its annual enlargement report outlining progress (or lack thereof) among EU hopefuls. The tone will be positive on Moldova and Ukraine, but don’t expect those countries to open any EU accession chapters this year. The screening for both -- in which the EU considers national legislation and highlights how they need to adopt it to EU rules and laws in various policy fields -- should conclude in the first half of 2025, if all goes well; only then could negotiations commence in earnest.

For Georgia, which has increasingly been at odds with Brussels for years, the report will be less pleasant: No real progress is expected, and the EU is also likely to take into account how free and fair the parliamentary elections on October 26 are before deciding on any further action. The EU has already paused high-level visits and military aid to Georgia over the recently enacted “foreign influence” law, and further sanctions loom if the situation deteriorates further.

On the other hand, genuine progress toward the EU could be in store for some Western Balkans countries this autumn. Don’t rule out Montenegro closing some negotiation chapters, something it hasn’t managed do to since 2017. This would signal that Podgorica, after years of standing still on EU membership, is once again proceeding, at least slowly. Montenegro remains the presumptive front-runner among candidate countries, with all 33 accession chapters open and some finally even starting to get closed.

There is also an expectation that Albania will start de facto accession talks this autumn, finally decoupling from North Macedonia as Skopje still hasn’t changed its constitution to reflect demands imposed by member state Bulgaria. Few expect North Macedonia to manage the feat this year. Meanwhile, although some countries are pushing for Serbia to open accession chapters, that may still be a bridge too far for EU member states rattled by Belgrade’s close relations with Moscow.

Battling With Budapest

Some political decisions might land this autumn as well. More money will have to be generated to support Ukraine, and frozen Russian assets can now be used. Hungary, which holds the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU, has kept Brussels on its toes over the summer. The EU seems unlikely to help Budapest secure the Russian oil imports that Budapest has requested, and the issue of Hungary easing working visas for Russian and Belarusian citizens will continue to reverberate, even if it’s hard to see the bloc doing anything concrete about it.

Expect both issues to arise once the bloc’s foreign ministers assemble in Brussels on August 29. That meeting, which is informal, was supposed to take place in Budapest before Borrell decided to move it to the EU capital after several member states vowed to boycott any meeting in Hungary following Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s surprise trips to Moscow and Beijing in early July.

Two other Hungary-related issues that will also be worth following this autumn: First, there’s Budapest’s refusal to greenlight the eighth tranche of the European Peace Facility (EPF) for Ukraine, worth 500 million euros of military aid. The tranche has been blocked for nearly 18 months, and few believe the Hungarians will budge during their EU Presidency, despite member states’ mounting pushes for it in the upcoming months.

Then there are further sanctions against Russia and Belarus. The bloc passed its 14th round of restrictive measures against Moscow and a separate spate of sanctions against Minsk just before the Hungarian Presidency began on July 1. The common line from most EU diplomats I’ve spoken to is that no new sanctions packages will be proposed because Hungary, which has on numerous occasions questioned their effectiveness, won’t entertain the idea of new sanctions during its six-month presidency. The question is whether the European Commission, which normally initiates new sanctions proposals, is willing to test that resolve, especially in the event of an escalation of Russian attacks on Ukraine’s civilian population or infrastructure this autumn.

Looking Ahead

On August 30-September 1, the biggest think-tank event in Central Europe, the Globsec Forum, will take place in Prague. Political leaders and experts will discuss security and defense, EU and NATO enlargement, and the ongoing war in Ukraine, among other things. I’ll be there for all three days and will share my impressions in the next edition of this newsletter on September 3.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

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