Azerbaijan’s president stood before cameras of the state TV broadcaster, grinning alongside an Israeli attack drone newly acquired for his country’s growing arsenals.
Ilham Aliyev then petted it like a dog.
The Israeli unmanned aircraft was part of an extensive fleet of Israeli and Turkish-built drones that Aliyev’s military used to devastating effect against Armenia in its successful campaign to regain control of the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023.
The weapon is a small but notable reflection of Azerbaijan’s quiet, long-standing -- and significant-- relations with Israel.
Israel’s furious, unprecedented barrage targeting Iranian nuclear and missile sites threatens to destabilize Tehran’s government. Along with Iran’s retaliatory missile attacks, the violence also threatens to possibly spark a wider war in the Middle East.
In the midst of all this, Baku is trying to thread a very small needle.
“Aliyev needs to stay on the good side of both Israel -- a continued supplier of sophisticated weapons to the Azerbaijani armed forces and a market for Azerbaijani oil -- and Tehran [due to] Iran's ability to play Armenia and Azerbaijan off against each other,” said Richard Kauzlarich, who served as US ambassador to Azerbaijan in the late 1990s.
“Azerbaijan has no interest in a war with Iran and does not support Israeli strikes on Iranian territory,” said Zaur Shiriyev, an expert on the South Caucasus at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. “Azerbaijan made its position clear that it is not part of this conflict.”
Aliyev has said nothing publicly.
Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement on June 13 -- the day Israel started its campaign -- saying Baku was “seriously concerned” about the attacks.
"We strongly condemn the escalation of the situation and urge the parties to resolve the existing disagreements only through dialogue and diplomatic means in accordance with the norms and principles of international law."
The next day, the ministry said Foreign Minister Ceyhun Bayramov had spoken with his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araqchi, and reassured him that Azerbaijan would not allow its territory to be used for attacks against Tehran.
Bayramov later spoke with Britain’s foreign secretary, expressing “serious concern about the security situation in the region as a result of the Israeli-Iranian conflict.”
Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry did not respond to e-mails seeking further comment.
On The Banks Of The Aras
Azerbaijan’s ties with Tehran are a mixed bag.
Iran is overwhelmingly Shi’ite Muslim. Shi’ites dominate in Azerbaijan as well, though there is also a substantial Sunni population. The country is officially secular and religion plays a small role in public life.
Inside Iran, ethnic Azeris are the second-largest minority after the Fars, or Persians, a fact that occasionally worries the government in Tehran. Some estimates place Iran’s ethnic Azeri population as larger than Azerbaijan’s entire population.
The northwestern city of Tabriz, which has been hit by Israeli strikes, is home to many of Iran’s ethnic Azeris.
Also thrown into the mix is Iran’s economic ties with Armenia, with whom Azerbaijan has fought two wars in the past 35 years over Nagorno-Karabakh.
Isolated by Azerbaijan’s strongest ally, Turkey, Armenia currently has only two land border crossings: one with Georgia to the north, and one with Iran. With Tehran isolated by international sanctions, Armenia is an important outlet for Iranian exports to wider markets.
With support from Turkey, Azerbaijan is angling to create a transport corridor across Armenian territory that would link up Azerbaijan and an Azerbaijani exclave to the west called Naxcivan. That would impede Iranian-Armenian trade, which would have to cross what’s called the Zangezur corridor.
And then there’s Israel.
From Tel Aviv To Baku
Since first cultivating ties in the 1990s, Azerbaijan has become a major source of oil for Israel, supplying more than half of its imports.
Israel, meanwhile, has become a major supplier of weaponry to Azerbaijan, which Baku has relied heavily on as it rebuilt its armed forces after disastrous losses during the first Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the early 1990s.
Between 2016 and 2021, Israel was the source for 69 percent of Baku’s weapons imports, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
That includes missiles as well as sophisticated drones like the Harop “loitering munition” drone, which Aliyev showed off in October 2021, or models like the Orbiter surveillance drones, which scoop up radio signals and other electronic data.
Two years later, Azerbaijan took full control of Nagorno-Karabakh, forcing out most of its ethnic Armenians.
The relationship is “strong and mutually beneficial,” Kauzlarich said, “based on perceptions in Baku that Israel will remain a supplier of arms in its ongoing conflict with Armenia and in Jerusalem that Azerbaijan supports Israeli objectives in Iran.”
Tehran has long had concerns that Israel could use its relationship with Azerbaijan for covert, or overt, action against Iran.
In an opinion piece published in 2006, a retired Israel Defense Forces general called for coordinating with Azerbaijan on the use of its air bases.
Iran’s fears were stoked further by US diplomatic cables that were leaked and published by the anti-secrecy group Wikileaks. One cable reportedly described a deep, secret relationship between Israel and Azerbaijan, prompting loud pushback from Azerbaijani diplomats.
In 2012, Azerbaijani police announced that they had arrested several people linked to Iranian intelligence who were allegedly plotting attacks on Israelis in the country.
Tehran accused of Baku of helping Israel to target Iranian nuclear scientists.
“Whenever tensions rise between Israel and Iran, there is a long-standing narrative, mostly pushed from outside, that Azerbaijan might open its airspace or provide support to Israel,” Shiriyev said. “That has never been true. Today, with advanced airpower and drones, Israel does not rely on foreign refueling or nearby airbases.”
In its current campaign to pummel Iran and its weapons programs, Israel is likely counting on Azerbaijan’s moral rather than military support, said Efraim Halevy, the former head of the Israeli spy agency Mossad.
“If there will be a war… we do not wish to involve [Azerbaijan] in military activities which would cause loss of life and/or place Azerbaijan in a difficult position,” he said in an interview with RFE/RL’s Azerbaijani Service last year.
“What we do hope is to get moral support from [Azerbaijan], to get from you support expressing your views on Iran and the way Iran is behaving, and to give us a clear view of Azerbaijani foreign policy concerning Iran,” he said. “That I think, is what we expect of Azerbaijan, and I think it is in the interest of Azerbaijan to accept this.”
“Is Baku trying to stay out of a major war on its southern border?” Shiriyev said. “Yes, but that is not simple."
"Even if Azerbaijan avoids direct involvement, it could still face consequences, including refugee flows, trade disruptions, and logistical problem,” he said.
“If the conflict deepens, or if the Iranian regime collapses entirely, the result could be serious instability across the region. Iran is not Syria or Iraq. It is much closer, and its size means that any fallout would be felt across the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan, like other neighbors, would likely be among the first to feel the pressure,” Shiriyev added.
