WASHINGTON -- Six months after US and Israeli air strikes against Iran launched a conflict that has shaken energy markets and disrupted global shipping, there is still no clear end to the confrontation. While Iran's military capabilities have suffered major damage, it retains leverage in the Strait of Hormuz.
Experts interviewed by RFE/RL from across Washington's policy spectrum see the next phase being shaped by four questions: how long Iran can withstand economic pressure, can diplomacy turn military gains into a durable settlement, what happens to Hormuz, and whether Russia and China help Tehran rebuild.
'Economic Onslaught'
Retired Vice Admiral Robert Harward, a former deputy commander of US Central Command, describes the situation as a "steady state." But he argues that the clock is ticking for Tehran.
"Time is their biggest problem," Harward told RFE/RL, saying sustained economic pressure could eventually become an internal threat to the Iranian government.
Bread-and-butter issues sparked the mass demonstrations in December-January that were put only down with brutal force involving the killing of thousands of protesters.
This is how Washington is now presenting the conflict, with Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announcing what he called an " economic onslaught" of measures to further isolate Iran on August 24. Bessent will press G20 finance ministers on this during meetings in Asheville, North Carolina, on August 31-September 1.
Harward said the pressure could become an internal threat if Tehran eventually struggles to pay the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Basij militia, and other state institutions, or if ordinary Iranians face shortages of fuel and other essentials.
Winter conditions, he said, could make the pressure particularly consequential.
China is central to the calculation.
Elaine Dezenski, head of the Center on Economic and Financial Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, said China's economic relationship with Iran is significant but not an alliance in the traditional sense.
About 80 percent of Iran's exported oil goes to China, she said, but Iranian oil accounts for only about 12 to 13 percent of China's crude imports.
"If China were to cut off its purchases of Iranian oil...that would have a huge effect," Dezenski said. So far, however, Beijing has pushed back on US pressure over its trading relationship Tehran.
The issue has a longer-term financial dimension. Iranian oil sales in yuan and payment through systems outside the US dollar network can strengthen alternative financial infrastructure.
"The way that Iran is engaging in these transactions and the way that China is supporting those transactions is an attempt to really erode the US dollar's role in the global energy market," Dezenski said.
Can Diplomacy Remerge?
While further military action has not been ruled out, officials have suggested it may have reached the limits of its effectiveness -- in other words, there's not much else to target.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said in June that Iran's defense-industrial base had suffered "massive destruction" of 80 to 90 percent attrition. President Donald Trump initially said 90 percent of Iran's missiles and launchers had been knocked out, later giving an 82 percent estimate. He has repeatedly said the navy is destroyed.
Yet what remains has proven stubbornly able to prevent shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.
For Bradley Bowman, senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, the central distinction is between military degradation and a lasting political outcome.
"America has struggled consistently in the Middle East to convert battlefield success into sustainable and positive political outcomes," Bowman told RFE/RL. "We often win on the battlefield and lose at the negotiating table."
He said a sustainable political transformation in Iran would require decisive action by Iranians themselves. Washington, he added, does not have the political will to send "thousands and thousands" of troops into Iran and sustain the casualties such an operation would entail.
Bowman also said the war has also demonstrated the scale of US weapons expenditure and raised questions about the quantities of offensive and defensive munitions available for other potential theaters.
There are mixed signals from Iran.
Some elements, including the IGRC, seem in no hurry to push ahead with talks ahead of November's midterm elections in the United States. Other key members of the clerical authorities have spoken repeatedly recently of the economic pain and of the importance of reviving diplomacy.
Hormuz: Iran's Key Leverage
For Gawdat Bahgat, a professor of national-security affairs at the National Defense University's Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, the most important development of the past six months may be the emergence of the Strait of Hormuz as Iran's principal remaining bargaining instrument.
"Even if a temporary agreement is signed, it will be temporary, but in the future they will keep threatening to close the strait," he said.
The waterway traditionally carries about one-fifth of the world's oil, liquid natural gas, and other vital commodities. This has also translated into economic pressure on the United States, as global markets push up gasoline prices.
The strait is only about 39 kilometers wide at its narrowest point. Iran and Oman both claim the maximum 22.2 kilometers allowed under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as territorial waters, meaning there are no international waters in the area.
UNCLOS is supposed to guarantee the right of transit passage for commercial vessels and prohibits their blockade. Tehran, however, never ratified UNCLOS and says it is not bound by the treaty. The United States has also not ratified it.
Bahgat says the Gulf states may eventually press for an arrangement that restores stability even if it formalizes some Iranian role in the strait. Their priority, he said, is returning to economic stability.
The more difficult question is whether Washington can accept some form of Iranian control or economic benefit from the waterway.
Bowman argues that the critical issue is whether commercial ship captains and insurers regard the route as safe.
Iran therefore does not necessarily need to close Hormuz completely. Intermittent missile or drone attacks can raise insurance costs and deter shipping, while attacks on infrastructure in Gulf states can create additional pressure on countries that cooperate with Washington.
"That actually turns our Arab partners into vehicles of leverage that Iran is exerting on Washington," Bowman said.
Iran's Helping Hand From Russia, China
Another major question is whether Iran's external partners can help it rebuild.
Bowman cited Chinese shipments of chemical precursors and Russian targeting information and drone support as evidence of growing assistance. He said Moscow is considering whether to deliver Su-35 fighters to Iran, while Beijing could move from supplying dual-use materials toward finished weapons and munitions.
The future of that support, he said, will depend heavily on how Beijing and Moscow assess the likely US response.
"The No. 1 thing China fears is secondary sanctions from the United States," Bowman said. Bessent's announcement hinted at these, but they also carry the risk of Chinese retaliation and it's not clear how far Washington is prepared to ratchet up pressure of this kind.
Iran's military recovery cannot be separated from the broader network supporting it, he said.
A study led by Bowman documented 616 incidents of security cooperation among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea between January 2019 and December 2025, covering areas including arms development and transfers, military exercises, intelligence sharing, and military diplomacy.
