Middle East
- By Kian Sharifi
The Militant Leader Who Captured Damascus
Abu Muhammad al-Jolani was for years a relatively obscure militant leader in Syria. But the 42-year-old has shot to prominence after leading a stunning military offensive that toppled longtime Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
In a sign of his rapid rise, Jolani used his real name -- Ahmed al-Sharaa -- rather than his nom de guerre as he triumphantly announced "the capture of Damascus" in a televised address on December 8.
Jolani, head of the U.S.-designated terrorist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), has long tried to change his public image. He has publicly renounced his ties to Al-Qaeda and tried to portray himself as a pragmatist and tolerant leader.
The extent of that transformation will be put to the test as Jolani, who has a $10 million bounty on his head, and the HTS prepare to play a major role in post-Assad Syria.
The HTS is a militant Islamist group that seeks to establish a state in Syria governed by Islamic law. HTS is allied with several smaller militant Islamist groups, some of which are made up of foreign fighters from Europe and Central Asia.
Aaron Zelin, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute, described HTS members as "political jihadists."
"Jolani and HTS are more pragmatic on politics -- they are sort of in between your traditional political Islamists and what we've described as global jihadists" like members of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) extremist group, he added.
The 'Wily' Jolani
Jolani was born in 1982 in Saudi Arabia to Syrian parents who came from the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.
The early years of his militant activities are murky. He is believed to have joined Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) after the U.S. invasion in 2003.
In 2012, Jolani founded Jabhat al-Nusra, or the Nusra Front, the Syrian branch of Al-Qaeda.
Based in Syria's northwestern province of Idlib, it later changed its name several times and distanced itself from Al-Qaeda. In 2017, it merged with other opposition groups to form HTS.
Jolani once sported a turban and long beard and donned military fatigues. But he ditched the hallmarks of a militant leader, opting to wear blazers, trim his facial hair, and give interviews to Western media.
The HTS leader is "wily and driven to achieve and consolidate power for himself and his organization," said Phillip Smyth, an expert on Iranian proxies and Shi'ite militias.
Despite his image makeover and attempts to remake himself into a pragmatist and moderate, concerns remain over Jolani and his group over their alleged rights abuses and ties to terrorist groups.
In a 2013 statement announcing Jolani's designation as a terrorist, the U.S. State Department referenced suicide bombings carried out by Jolani's Nusra Front and said his group's "violent, sectarian vision" is at odds with the aspirations of the Syrian public.
"Extremism and terrorist ideology have no place in a post-Assad Syria," the statement said.
In 2017, the U.S. Embassy in Syria wrote on social media that Washington remains "committed to bringing" senior figures of Al-Qaeda's Syrian network "to justice," including Jolani.
HTS's primary goal was to overthrow the Assad government, but its secondary target was to "build institutions that would be beneficial and helpful to Syrians," Zelin said.
"They have obviously had a track record of trying to do this in Idlib," he added.
But even if Jolani and the HTS keep their promises of tolerance and inclusivity, shedding their terrorism designations could take years, Zelin said.
More News
- By RFE/RL
Iran's Currency Falls To Record Low As War, US Blockade Rattle Economy
Iran's currency has fallen to a record low against the US dollar as the two-month-long conflict rattles the country's sanctions-hit economy.
Air strikes by the United States and Israel, launched at Iran on February 28, along with the American naval blockade on Iranian ports and vessels, have disrupted Tehran's vital oil exports, hampered domestic production, and fueled inflation.
Iran's national currency, the rial, dropped to a new low of 1.81 million to the US dollar on April 29 before rebounding the next day. The rial has seen its value fall by nearly 15 percent in recent days, according to Iranian media.
Iran and the United States agreed to a cease-fire on April 8, although Washington increased economic pressure by imposing a blockade on April 13, a move that has made it harder for Tehran to obtain hard currency through exports.
According to Iran's Central Bank, annual inflation, which was above 40 percent before the war, increased to 50 percent as of April 4.
Iranians say the prices of basic goods such as rice, eggs, and chicken have increased significantly since the conflict began.
Rising inflation was the catalyst for nationwide protests that broke out in January and posed one of the biggest threats to the Iran's clerical rulers since the Islamic Revolution in 1979.
The authorities responded to the demonstrations with unprecedented force, killing thousands of people, according to human rights groups.
Iran, too, has sought to impose significant economic pain on the United States and its allies. It responded to US-Israel air strikes by effectively closing the Strait of Hormuz, a key artery for global oil and gas supplies, to international shipping.
The move has rattled international energy markets and upended the global economy.
On April 29, the price of Brent crude rose by almost 7 percent to over $126 a barrel, the highest since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
- By Ray Furlong and
- RFE/RL's Radio Farda
'Endgame' For Iran's Oil Sector? How US Blockade May Impact Tehran's Calculus
Weeks of US and Israeli air strikes, sanctions, and restrictions have hit Iran hard, but it could be geology that eventually pushes it into making concessions in its ongoing standoff with the United States.
As the US naval blockade of Iran approaches the end of its third week, data from shipping and industry monitors suggests that tankers have been unable to move Iranian crude through the Strait of Hormuz toward markets in Asia.
This means that Iranian oil storage capacity is rapidly filling, and the clock is ticking before Iran will need to cease production. That's the problem for Tehran, analysts say, as it tries to withstand US pressure to negotiate a peace agreement.
'Geological Impact'
"That creates more of a geological impact rather than anything else, to do with how oil is extracted," Stephen Innes, managing partner at SPI Asset Management, a foreign exchange and commodity advisory, told RFE/RL.
Once the valves get turned off, "oil tends to settle down at the bottom of the reservoir. And it's quite viscous and it's quite thick and it takes a lot of propulsion to bring that up," he said.
The result, he added, could even be "an endgame" for the sector.
"The whole process to build up pressure again and successfully get [oil] coming up the well again, could possibly take a year…. A lot of people think it's just the end of the production because it's just going to be too costly [to restart]," Innes said.
A research note issued by Goldman Sachs on April 23 stated that "the share of country production with relatively low reservoir pressure is estimated to be higher in Iran and Iraq than elsewhere in the Gulf."
The note, which was considering oil sectors in all Persian Gulf countries, said that recovery of oil production levels "may be only partial after a prolonged closure."
Mehdi Moslehi, a UK-based Iranian risk consultant who worked in the oil sector for a decade, agreed that the timescale of any extraction shutdown would be important.
"If production at a well is stopped for a short period, say between one week up to two or maximum three weeks, then it can be brought back into operation again," he told RFE/RL's Radio Farda.
"But if a well remains shut for a long period -- especially because the oil wells in southern Iran mostly have high sulfur content, and depending on how old the well is -- there will be serious problems. Reservoir pressure may drop."
A Race Against Time?
Of course, Iran may not need to shut down production. But data released this week suggested that it's now a race against time.
A recent report by Kpler, a commodities and shipping analytics company, said "no confirmed tanker has exited the US blockade zone" since Washington began enforcing the blockade on April 13.
"Several tankers passed through the Strait of Hormuz but failed to clear the US blockade, which sits further south between the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea," it said.
This is why Iran's oil stores are filling up. Kpler estimated Iran had about 12 days spare capacity. Some analysts have suggested a time window of 2-3 weeks.
"Before, we could say time was on the side of the Islamic republic. But now we can't really say that anymore," Kpler analyst Homayoun Falakshahi told Radio Farda. "The rules of the game have become somewhat balanced."
Iran's blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, preventing oil exports by other Gulf nations, is also exerting pressure. It has led to a spike in oil prices and sent supply shocks through the world economy, hitting not only oil but also gas and other vital commodities.
As this goes on, the global pain increases.
"Right now this is a game of endurance, of seeing which side gives in more in the short term…. Prices around $100–110, even up to $120 per barrel are still levels the global economy can tolerate. However, if the Strait of Hormuz is closed in the coming days or weeks, prices will probably rise further," Falakshahi said.
On April 29, Brent crude rose sharply to $115 per barrel following a report in The Wall Street Journal that US President Donald Trump had told aides to prepare for an "extended" blockade.
In the meantime, Iran is seeking other ways to ease storage pressures. There's talk of delivering oil by train to China, which is Iran's biggest customer by far. But this would be more expensive and in smaller volumes than by tanker and so have limited impact.
Iran's next step may be further escalation.
Many other Persian Gulf producers have been able to alleviate the storage pressures Iran is facing by using other routes, such as Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline to the Red Sea. Amid curtailed output this has helped keep the pumpjacks jerking and the trunk lines pressurized.
Iran could mobilize its Houthi proxy forces in Yemen to attack this route, by targeting shipping in the Bab al-Mandab Strait, through which roughly 10 percent of the world's seaborne oil passes.
But this would also entail risk for Tehran. In recent weeks, the United States has added to its massive military presence in the region and indicated the possibility of a return to hostilities.
"The feeling around the market is that something's going to get done on the deal front between now and the next three weeks," Innes said.
- By Kian Sharifi
Iran's Conservative Camp Split Over US Talks To End War
In the face of a devastating US-Israeli bombing campaign, Iran's rival political factions cast aside their differences to unite behind the country's decision-makers.
But since a cease-fire with the United States came into force on April 8, deep-rooted political differences in the Islamic republic have spilled out into the open.
The public rupture over Tehran's attempts to negotiate an end to the two-month-long war has pitted Iran's small but vocal faction of ultraconservatives against more moderate conservatives, a confrontation that has been laid bare in the halls of parliament and on the front pages of state-affiliated media.
But analysts warn the fracture is not ideological. The main differences, they say, are not even over whether to cut a deal with the United States, but when to pursue peace and what concessions to make.
The dispute crystalized in the days following the first round of talks between delegations led by Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf and US Vice President JD Vance in Pakistan on April 11-12.
What had largely been friction behind closed doors erupted into an open media war when the Tasnim news agency -- linked to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) -- published an editorial on April 25 mocking ultraconservatives, comparing their expectations for the talks to a "magic beanstalk."
Ultraconservatives have said Iran should not make any concessions to the United States, including over its nuclear program, a nonstarter for Washington. They also insist any peace deal should extend to Iran's regional proxies and must ensure the lifting of all sanctions against Tehran.
In a separate piece, Tasnim accused Raja News, a website close to the ultraconservatives, of causing "discord" and playing into US President Donald Trump's hand by criticizing the Iranian negotiating team. Days earlier, Trump had said there was "tremendous infighting and confusion" within Iran's leadership.
Ali Afshari, an Iranian political analyst based in Washington who spoke to RFE/RL's Radio Farda, cautioned against reading too much into the public confrontation.
"I don't think we yet have evidence that this dispute represents a large structural fracture," he said.
The US-Israeli bombing campaign launched on February 28 has decapitated much of Iran's political and military leadership. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the longtime supreme leader, was assassinated and succeeded by his son, Mojtaba, who has yet to appear in public since his ascent to power.
The primary target of the ultraconservatives is Qalibaf, the country's top negotiator with the United States. Politicians linked to the Paydari Front, an influential ultraconservative faction aligned with former presidential candidate Saeed Jalili, accused the negotiating team of violating the red lines set by the new supreme leader.
Mahmoud Nabavian, a lawmaker affiliated with Paydari who accompanied the delegation to Pakistan, said talks were "pure damage" and discussing limits to Iran's nuclear program was a "strategic mistake."
Iran's parliament on April 27 voted on a statement expressing support for the negotiating team. Only seven of the 261 lawmakers, all prominent Paydari figures, refused to sign.
"Iran's oil is selling for double the pre-war price," Nabavian wrote on X the next day, calling on "cowards" to join the public whom he suggested did not back the talks. The war has rattled international energy markets and upended the global economy, and hard-liners appear hopeful this will ultimately force Washington to make concessions.
Afshari said the divide among ultraconservatives and more moderate conservatives is over the timing of peace talks.
The ultraconservatives want to continue the war and negotiate from a position of strength, he said. By contrast, Qalibaf and other more moderate conservatives want to end the war now and secure a deal while they still can.
"The disagreement exists at this level, but it doesn't go so far that anyone in the [ultraconservative] bloc is advocating for no deal at all," Afshari argued.
Political differences in Iran have been exacerbated by the absence of Mojtaba Khamenei, who is living in hiding and is reportedly gravely wounded. He has minimal contact with Iranian officials, according to reports.
"The lack of a decisive central authority due to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei's absence has likely allowed these disputes to escalate into the public domain rather than remain contained within regime channels," the Institute for the Study of War, a US-based think tank, wrote in a report on April 28.
Reza Jamali of RFE/RL's Radio Farda contributed to this report.
Iran, US Locked In Strategic 'Staring Contest' Over Hormuz, Says Former CENTCOM Official Joe Buccino
WASHINGTON -- The US Navy's blockade of Iranian ports, now in its third week, has stopped almost all of the country's maritime trade, including key oil exports. But it has also ratcheted up tensions between the two sides as they hold sporadic peace negotiations.
RFE/RL spoke with former US Central Command (CENTCOM) Communications Director and retired US Army Colonel Joe Buccino on April 27 to discuss the escalating situation and the strategic "staring contest" now defining the region.
Colonel Buccino also served as a spokesman for Secretary of Defense James Mattis during US President Donald Trump's first term and is the author of When Every Word Counts: How to Earn Trust, Command Attention, and Communicate Clearly in Any Situation.
RFE/RL: How would you describe the current US naval posture in the Strait of Hormuz, and what does the situation tell us about where this conflict stands right now?
Joe Buccino: It's a bit of a stalemate. Both sides feel like they have leverage, and I think both sides are right to feel that way. It seems the Trump administration does not feel time pressure; they don't feel a need to cave on any of their objectives at the moment. Iran probably feels the same way.
RFE/RL: We're seeing reduced traffic through the strait, with only limited vessel movement. There are also reports that Iran is allowing some ships through under specific conditions, even demanding payment in its own currency. How do you interpret that?
Buccino: Iran feels they have control of this critical body of water and that they can maintain it for the coming months. They will continue to use this as leverage over the Trump administration.
In Tehran's view, they are adding economic, psychological, and economic warfare pressure. They are claiming there are mines in the strait, although we don't really know if they remain, where they are, or what kind they are.
It is an interesting snapshot into how Iran intends to continue adjudicating this war.
RFE/RL: From a strategic standpoint, how central is the strait to Iran's leverage, and how does the United States factor that into its planning?
Buccino: When this conflict began in late February, the strait was open. Now it is effectively closed, and that shift matters globally.
Iran understands this creates economic pressure far beyond the region; oil markets, global trade, and energy security are all affected. At the same time, the US has deployed significant naval power, including three carrier strike groups -- more than at any point in the region since 2003. What you have now is essentially a staring contest: each side waiting to see who yields first.
RFE/RL: Is time working in favor of the United States or Iran?
Buccino: Both parties feel like time is on their side. Iran is looking at US domestic politics: the oil prices in the US and Europe, the polls, and the fact that we are five months away from the midterms. All of that goes into their calculus.
Meanwhile, Trump has been clearer than ever that he doesn't feel this pressure to move quickly. He feels he has the opportunity to deliver a "knockout blow" regarding Iran's nuclear capability. That has always been critical in his mind. Outwardly, at least, he isn't feeling the pressure of the clock.
RFE/RL: How are Iran's low-cost capabilities shaping US naval operations? What are commanders most focused on in protecting forces?
Buccino: The risks in the Strait of Hormuz often come from weapon systems that do not cost very much.
Think about drifting mines; these are WWI-style "dumb" mines. They aren't moored to anything; they just drift on the surface. We don't know where they are, and Iran doesn't either. They blend in with debris, wood, and fishing equipment.
Then you have the "three guys in a truck" scenario: coastal firing points shooting drones that cost only a few thousand dollars. They fly so low to the water that they are hard to pick up on radar. By the time you see them, they are on top of you.
Despite our cutting-edge assets, these are great risks. But we are publicly committed to holding this blockade until Iran opens the strait and agrees to discontinue its uranium enrichment.
RFE/RL: A recent US pilot rescue mission deep inside Iran drew significant attention. What lessons from such operations apply to the current situation?
Buccino: It demonstrates that we can move Special Forces and Marine assets into the actual territory of Iran to provide force protection.
If you think about an operation to remove enriched uranium from the country, that would require massive resources -- ground forces, overhead cover, and earth-moving equipment -- all under fire. That rescue operation proves we have the capacity to do this through the coordination of Central Command and Special Operations.
RFE/RL: Iran is also engaging internationally, including with China, Russia. How much does that relationship matter here?
Buccino: If any country has outside influence, it's probably China, though even that is limited. There is talk of China sending its newest air defense systems to Iran, which could identify an F-15, something Iran currently cannot do.
RFE/RL: Russian President Vladimir Putin met with the Iranian foreign minister on April 27, and reports indicate he "received a message" from the new supreme leader, Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei. Does that signal anything important?
Buccino: There is a reason you haven't seen the ayatollah or even heard his voice lately. He is likely two miles underground, under concrete, communicating via slips of paper. It is hard to get information to him, and hard to get decisions out.
The Iranian leadership is fragmented between the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the parliament, and the mullahs. There is a massive time lag because you have to wait for word back from Mojtaba Khamenei.
I was never under the illusion this would take a few weeks. The regime's priority is protecting the ayatollah, and that complicates any potential negotiations.
RFE/RL: If tensions escalate further, what indicators are you watching for?
Buccino: I'll be looking to see if we move on Kharg Island. To me, that is the natural progression.
We've already "softened" the island by destroying most of its air defense systems. We have the 82nd Airborne Division in theater ready to conduct an aerial assault to seize the oil. If you seize that oil, you hurt the regime's ability to pay and resupply the IRGC.
If the IRGC stops getting paid and runs out of ammunition, they might start putting down their weapons. That is where you deliver the knockout blow. We are a long way from that -- we are still hoping for a negotiated end to the uranium program -- but if we reach that goal, this will all have been worth it.
The interview has been edited for clarity and length.
US To Send Witkoff, Kushner To Pakistan For New Talks, But Iran Participation Uncertain
WASHINGTON -- The United States will send a delegation to Pakistan this weekend for a new round of talks with Iranian officials, the White House said, as Washington tests whether a fragile cease-fire can translate into diplomatic progress.
White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt told reporters on April 24 that the delegation would include President Donald Trump's special envoy Steve Witkoff and son-in-law Jared Kushner, and would depart for Islamabad on April 25.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi arrived in Islamabad late on April 24, but there was no immediate confirmation from Tehran that he or other officials would meet with the US delegation.
The spokesman for Iran's Foreign Ministry said Iranian officials did not plan to meet with the US team, although it was unclear if the statement represented the view of the government.
"No meeting is planned to take place between Iran and the US. Iran's observations would be conveyed to Pakistan," spokesman Esmail Baqaei wrote on X.
However, The Washington Post quoted an unnamed US official as saying Witkoff and Kushner had received confirmation from Tehran that Araqchi would meet with them.
US and Iranian teams held peace talks in Islamabad on April 11-12, but they ended without an agreement and a second round that had been expected earlier this week did not materialize.
US Vice President JD Vance, who led the US delegation then, was not traveling with Witkoff and Kushner but would be on "standby" and "will be willing to dispatch to Pakistan if we feel it's a necessary use of his time," Leavitt said.
Trump, Vance, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio "will be waiting here in the United States for updates," she said.
Leavitt said Washington had seen "some progress" from the Iranian side in recent days, adding that it was Tehran that requested the new meeting.
"Iranians want to talk," she said. "We're hopeful that it will be a productive conversation and move the ball forward toward a deal," she said.
Trump later told Reuters that the Iranians were "making an offer" aimed at satisfying U.S. demands and "we'll have to see" how it looks.
Trump has said that in any deal to end hte US-Israeli war with Iran, which began on February 28, Iran must give up its enriched uranium and allow free passage through the Strait of Hormuz, a cruicial oil and gas transit artery that Tehran has effectovely blocked through most of the conflict.
Asked who the United States was negotiating with, Trump said: "I don't want to say that, but we're dealing with the people that are in charge now," Reuters reported.
Tempered Expectations
Vance remaining in Washington unless negotiations reach a breakthrough stage is a decision analysts said reflects tempered expectations.
Ryan Bohl, a senior Middle East analyst at the risk management company RANE, described the move as a sign Washington is “in a reactive diplomatic state.”
“They're waiting for the Iranians to make some sort of first move or gesture,” Bohl told RFE/RL. “Sending a lower-level delegation suggests they want to test whether momentum is real without overcommitting political capital.”
“This is more of a listening session than a negotiation,” Jason Brodsky, policy director at the nonprofit United Against Nuclear Iran, told RFE/RL. “If the two parties were close to inking a deal, then senior leadership on both sides would be in the room.”
Bohl said the United States is unlikely to soften its core demands, including significant Iranian nuclear concessions and unilateral steps to ease tensions before sanctions relief is considered.
For analysts, the White House's statement that Tehran initiated the expected talks raised questions about whether Iran is seeking a genuine diplomatic off-ramp or simply buying time.
Bohl argued that while Iran faces long-term economic pressure, its short-term strategy favors delay.
“There is urgency economically, but not in the immediate sense,” he said. “Iran can afford to drag out talks as long as it avoids renewed military escalation.”
Brodsky offered a slightly different view, pointing to the strain of US pressure following weeks of air strikes on Iran, which ended with a cease-fire that took effect on April 8 and that Trump extended before it was due to expire on April 22.
“The noose is tightening with the US naval blockade,” he said. “That sharpens the choices facing Iran’s leadership.”
The US has maintained that its blockade of Iranian ports remains fully in place, with Trump calling it “100 percent effective.” Iran says the blockade is a violation of the cease-fire and demanded it be lifted.
Lebanon And Beyond
The diplomatic push comes amid a fragile calm in the region, including a cease-fire between Israel and Lebanon, home of Iran-backed Hezbollah -- but Lebanon's Health Ministry said six people were killd in Israeli strikes on southern Lebanon on April 24.
Bohl said that de-escalation on that front is critical to sustaining talks.
“It’s one of the few ways the US can build trust,” he said, noting deep Iranian skepticism about US intentions given continued American military deployments in the region.
At the same time, divisions remain between Washington and Israel over how to handle Hezbollah -- a militant group and political party that controls much of southern Lebanon. It is considered a terrorist organization by the United States, while the European Union has only blacklisted its armed wing.which Tehran backs.
“The Israelis want to press their advantage,” Bohl said. “The US is more willing to preserve the cease-fire to keep diplomacy alive.”
Brodsky predicted Hezbollah will remain a destabilizing force regardless of the talks.
“As long as the current regime is in power in Iran, Hezbollah will continue to be a problem,” he said.
Araqchi is to travel to Oman and Russia following his visit to Pakistan. Bohl described the regional outreach as a mix of damage control and strategic hedging.
“They’re shoring up support,” he said. “Oman is about repairing regional relationships, while Russia is critical for economic and military backing if the confrontation drags on.”
Brodsky said the visits would likely focus on practical concerns, including the Strait of Hormuz and securing political support from Moscow.
Russian, Chinese Lifelines Keeping Tehran's Military Reconstruction Alive, Experts Warn
WASHINGTON -- With tensions high and the prospects for a deal to end the US-Israeli war with Iran uncertain, analysts say a "two-way street" of support from Russia and China is a crucial element of Tehran's ability to weather the effects of weeks of air attacks and keep its military machine running after severe losses.
At a forum hosted by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy on April 23, experts described deepening partnerships that have helped Iran replenish its military, improve targeting, and blunt Western operations during the conflict.
"A decisive factor in the future of this contest will be Iran's ability to resupply and reconstitute its own military capabilities," said Grant Rumley, the institute's senior fellow and director of its program on Great Power Competition and the Middle East.
"Tehran's backers are willing to provide some level of support to keep the regime in power," he added.
Rumley, a former Pentagon official who served in both the first Trump administration and the Biden administration as an adviser for Middle East policy, said the central question now is whether that external support will prove decisive as Iran seeks to rearm and reposition itself in preparation for what's next, whether it's peace or more warfare.
A 'Two-Way Street' With Moscow
While Iranian officials have long emphasized self-reliance, panelists said battlefield evidence points to a far more interconnected war effort, particularly with Russia.
Nicole Grajewski, an assistant professor at Sciences Po and a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said the Russia-Iran relationship has evolved far beyond the simple purchase of hardware.
"The relationship is not only based on components.... It's also based on learning and sharing data between each other," said Grajewski, the author of a recent book on Russian-Iranian ties.
She noted that the "signatures" of Russian drone tactics, refined during the war in Ukraine, have surfaced in Iran's recent operations. "You see some of the signatures of Russian swarm elements...and Iran actually incorporating that in this recent war."
Beyond tactics, Grajewski highlighted the critical role of "offshore" intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support -- support from abroad.
She noted that Russia has reportedly provided Iran with satellite imagery and "damage assessments," enabling Tehran to constantly improve its strikes against US and regional targets.
China's 'Low-Cost' Strategic Play
If Moscow provides the tactical blueprint, Beijing appears to be providing the industrial and technological backbone.
Hasan Alhasan, a senior fellow for Middle East Policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), said Chinese assistance spans so-called dual-use components, such as rocket fuel ingredients, and sophisticated satellite data.
"There are multiple indications that China has been providing Iran with various forms of military support...that support may have had a tangible impact on Iranian military performance," Alhasan said.
He pointed to a Chinese company using AI to analyze satellite imagery of US assets at Prince Sultan Air Base in Riyadh just days before a "devastating" Iranian attack.
For Beijing, the conflict serves a dual purpose. "China does here see a low-cost opportunity to entangle the US militarily on the strategic level in Iran and then, tactically speaking, test some of its capabilities against the United States in a real conflict environment," Alhasan said.
Endurance and Geography
Matthew Tavares, a defense analyst and former Pentagon official with nearly two decades of experience in Russia strategy, said the revitalization of the Russian defense industrial base has directly benefited Iran.
"The Alabuga facility not only is producing equipment based on Iranian designs, but is improving on that equipment," Tavares said of a compound in Russia's Tatarstan region that includes a drone assembly plant, adding that he believes contractual arrangements likely allow for these systems to be sent back to Iran if the regime is attacked.
Tavares warned the conflict has shifted into a "factory versus factory" war and said Iran and its backers are producing inexpensive precision weapons systems that can "wear out" the "expensive, exquisite systems" favored by the United States and its Persian Gulf partners.
Despite the influx of external support, the experts cautioned that Tehran's own strategic posture remains the foundation of its survival.
Alhasan noted that Iran's ability to hold the Strait of Hormuz "hostage" and its high tolerance for "punishment" are indigenous strengths that external powers only augment.
"Iran's biggest assets during this war have been, on the one hand, its endurance...and then, on the other hand, its ability to leverage its systems and geography," Alhasan concluded.
Zelenskyy In Saudi Arabia For Defense Talks As Russia Continues To Pound Ukraine
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy arrived in Saudi Arabia for security talks, marking his second visit to the region since the start of the US-Israeli war with Iran, now under cease-fire, as Russia continued to pound Ukraine with deadly strikes.
"Today, we are advancing our agreements with Saudi Arabia in the areas of security, energy, and infrastructure. It is important that the strengthening is mutual," Zelenskyy wrote on X on April 24.
The Ukrainian president's visit comes almost a month after Kyiv and Riyadh signed a defense cooperation agreement, as waves of relentless retaliatory strikes from Iran targeted civilian and energy infrastructure across the Middle East.
Having previously secured a number of bilateral agreements with European countries -- such as joint drone construction with Germany -- since the first Shahed drones struck the Gulf, Kyiv has sought to bring its battle-proven technologies and military expertise to the region.
Shahed drone technology, which originated in Iran, has long become central to Russia's domestic drone production, as Tehran supplied Moscow with military equipment and know-how during the first years of its full-scale war against Ukraine.
Russia has since often launched around 100 Shahed-type drones at Ukraine at a time. In response, Kyiv has developed cost-effective interceptor drones, saying the technology allows it to cut off about 90 percent of incoming drones.
Both Tehran and Moscow have been publicly skeptical about how useful Kyiv's support to the Gulf countries would be, with Iranian envoy to Ukraine calling it "nothing more than a joke and a showy gesture."
Separately, US President Donald Trump said Zelenskyy was the last person he would ask for help in Washington's military efforts in Iran, despite reports that the United States had held talks with Ukraine on the matter.
Days prior to Zelenskyy's latest visit to the Saudi Arabia, Reuters cited five sources familiar with the matter, saying the United States had introduced Ukrainian drones at its key air base in Saudi Arabia.
Meanwhile, on its own front lines, Ukraine has continued to suffer deadly Russian air attacks, which have occurred almost every day over the past week.
According to regional Governor Serhiy Lysak, a married couple, both 75 years old, were killed in the attack on the Ukraine's major southern port city of Odesa on April 24, adding 17 other people were injured.
A local Odesa resident told RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service that she was covered in blood after an explosion blew out a window and its frame in her apartment.
"The explosion blew a window and a frame right onto me…. Everything was falling. I was frightened," she said at the scene of the aftermath.
Separately, Moscow and Kyiv reported that 193 Russian and Ukrainian prisoners of war were swapped on April 24. Zelenskyy said those who returned to Ukraine included soldiers, border guards, and police who had been injured or faced criminal charges in Russia.
In his comment to RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service, the country's ombudsman, Dmytro Lubinets, said those returned home had been held in Russia's Chechnya region.
Lubinets added that most of them had not been confirmed as prisoners by the International Committee of the Red Cross, and that one of them had been considered missing.
With reporting by Reuters
- By Firuza Azizi and
- Sahar Lewal
Afghan Refugees In Qatar Wait For Relocation After US Transfer Deadline Passes
Hundreds of Afghan refugees remain in limbo at the As-Sayliyah camp in Qatar awaiting information about the countries they may be transferred to after a US State Department deadline to move them passed last month.
In interviews with RFE/RL's Radio Azadi, several of those waiting said they were told that the camp near the capital of Doha would close by March 31 and that they might be transferred to other countries.
In the meantime, the uncertainty of not knowing where they may be headed looms over them, making it impossible to know what their future holds or if they even may be returned to Afghanistan despite the perils they could face.
"The authorities here told us that As-Sayliyah camp will be closed on March 31, and according to the newly announced US policy, you may be transferred to another country," one Afghan refugee, who did not want their name to be published and has been living in the As-Sayliyah camp for the past 15 months, told Radio Azadi.
"People were waiting until March 31. Even after that, when asked, they said there was no news yet. People still ask, which are these second and third countries that we can go to? We are not told which countries they might send us to."
Fleeing After Cooperating With US Forces
According to some American officials and Afghans living in the camp, about 1,100 people are currently living at the As-Sayliyah camp. Many of the refugees at the camp are civilians who cooperated with US forces during 20 years war; more than half are women and children.
They had expected to end up in the United States after international forces left Afghanistan in August 2021. Evacuation flights got them out of the country as the Taliban regained control of the war-torn country.
Those hopes were dashed, however, after all immigration requests relating to Afghanistan were halted in November 2025 after an Afghan national shot two members of the National Guard, one of whom died a day after the shooting near the White House.
A spokesperson from the US State Department told RFE/RL that work continues on "voluntary resettlement options" for the refugees at the camp and that relocation to a third country "is a positive resolution that provides safety for these remaining people to start a new life outside of Afghanistan while upholding the safety and security of the American people."
The spokesperson did not specify any third countries that could be included in the program, but The New York Times reported on April 21 that the Trump administration is in talks to send many of them to the Democratic Republic of Congo. The report cited an aid worker briefed on the plan.
Some media outlets, including The Wall Street Journal, say Washington has held talks with two African and one Asian countries about taking in Afghan refugees living in the camp, which Qatar has reportedly asked to be closed.
US Democrat lawmakers Gregory W. Meeks, ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Sydney Kamlager-Dove, ranking member of the Subcommittee on South and Central Asia, issued a statement condemning the situation saying the administration "has failed to uphold America’s word to these Afghan allies."
They added that "we made a promise to protect them after the Taliban’s takeover. Abandoning that commitment not only betrays our allies, it sends a dangerous message to future partners that U.S. promises cannot be trusted."
Another Afghan refugee, who did not want their name to be published, said they have been waiting in the As-Sayliyah camp in Qatar for the past 18 months.
"They told us in this camp that they would transfer us to a third country by March 31, but we have not been transferred yet, and they have not promised anything, and they have not said anything," the person said.
"We spoke to the officials, including the head of this camp, and they say that whenever there is an order, news, or instruction from Washington, we will share it with you. They say, for now, we are waiting and we will see what happens."
Rwanda Option
Meanwhile, a number of Afghan refugees who were previously living in an Abu Dhabi camp say that 27 people were transferred to Rwanda in August last year.
They say that they were promised that they would be transferred from there to another country, but that since their arrival, no action has been taken.
"It has been about eight months since we were transferred from Abu Dhabi to Rwanda. They offered us five countries to transfer us to within three months. These countries were the US, Canada, Australia, and France," one of the Afghan asylum seekers told Radio Azadi.
"They said that if there was a problem, they would send us to Brazil for a while and then to other countries, but so far they have kept us here. When we ask them, they say that they cannot do anything," the asylum seeker, who asked not to be named for fear of reprisal, added.
The State Department spokesperson told RFE/RL that while Afghan nationals at the Qatar camp do not have a "viable pathway" to the United States, voluntary repatriation remains an option, with Washington offering a stipend to those who take the option.
The Taliban government says it is committed to implementing a general amnesty but reports from the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and other agencies show that a number of soldiers and people who cooperated with the Americans during the republican government have faced imprisonment, torture, and even death threats -- something the Taliban has denied.
"The answer has been the same for four years. Bring them here [to the United States]. They're vetted. They earned it on the ground, in uniform, next to our people," said Shawn VanDiver, the head of AfghanEvac, a group dedicated to help coordinate relocation and resettlement efforts of Afghans impacted by the US mission in Afghanistan.
The US government has said that no one will be forcibly returned, nor has it released how many people have accepted the offer to receive money and return to Afghanistan.
Camp As-Sayliyah was established after the Taliban retook power in 2021 to house Afghans who had cooperated with US forces and were awaiting transfer to the United States.
Some members of Congress have called the closure of the camp a "deep betrayal.”
The State Department has said that Afghan refugees were not properly vetted under the Biden administration, which AfghanEvac and other advocacy and rights groups dispute.
With reporting by Alex Raufoglu in Washington
Rachel Ehrenfeld: Why Targeting Iran's 'Shadow Economy' Hits The IRGC Where It Hurts
WASHINGTON -- With a cease-fire in the US-Israeli war on Iran due to expire on April 22, US actions at sea are drawing renewed attention to a central issue: how deeply Iran's military establishment is embedded in the country's economy.
The disabling on April 19 of the M/V Touska, a container ship reportedly linked to Iranian trade networks, highlighted the control of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) over key industries, from banking and energy to shipping and telecommunications.
In an interview with RFE/RL, Rachel Ehrenfeld, director of the American Center for Democracy and the Economic Warfare Institute and author of multiple books on terrorism financing, said the IRGC's economic reach is not incidental but rather a crucial foundation of its power.
She argued that targeting infrastructure and commercial activity directly affects the regime's military capabilities.
RFE/RL: You've long argued that the IRGC's dominance over Iran's economy is central to its military power. How significant is the US seizure of the Touska in that context?
Rachel Ehrenfeld: It depends who owns the ship, which foundation. The IRGC has the biggest foundation in Iran. When Ayatollah [Ruhollah] Khomeini started in 1979 with the Islamic Revolution and took over Iran, he thought about how to make sure the economy would flourish and that it would be resilient and protected from outside sanctions, for example.
So what do you do? You create foundations, and different elements in the revolutionary forces of Iran were allocated different portions of the economy. As a charity organization overseeing charities, they named them different names, and the biggest is the IRGC.
He decreed that this would be the system.... [And former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei] in 2004 issued what was essentially a fatwa or directive through Iranian legislative bodies, and it was actually enshrined in law. This is the structure that allowed the IRGC to develop Iran's shadow economy. It is part of the economy, but it is not accountable. They do not pay taxes. In Iran, everybody has to pay taxes.
This helps them circumvent international sanctions, because you have a charitable organization sending money here or there. They are using all kinds of financial institutions and banking systems all over the world.
Within the big foundation -- they call them "bonyads" in Farsi -- they have subdivisions, and those parts are also involved. So now they control banking, real estate, telecommunications, transportation, mining, energy, defense, chemicals, petrochemicals -- you name it, they have possession of it.
I do not know if this [ship] belongs to the IRGC or not, but since their system is such, everybody should actually know.... To my surprise, the Americans -- the administration -- have really not explained how the economy is working there.
And that is to their detriment; they are getting a lot of criticism because, "Oh, you are going to destroy the infrastructure." Well, they own the infrastructure, most of it. There is private, civil commerce, and some civil economy, but it is not large, and it also can be taken away easily by the regime.
In the last couple of weeks, with the closing of the Internet by the regime, many people who had private businesses -- civil, civic businesses -- were using the Internet to do business. This was closed down. It cost billions. People cannot communicate and cannot do business.
So destroying most of the large infrastructure, including shipping, would be part of the forces -- armed forces, if you want -- even if they are not supposed to be armed merchant ships that are serving the purposes of the Iranian regime for war, not for peace.
RFE/RL: You described the IRGC as operating a "state within a state." Given recent leadership shifts, how much of Iran's economy does the IRGC control today, and is it even possible to separate civilian governance from military power?
Ehrenfeld: Well, sort of. The civilian, whatever civilian there is, is under the thumb of the IRGC. From the last data that I could actually surmise, they control something around two-thirds of the economy.
This goes back to what Khamenei, and before him Khomeini, called a "resistance economy." They wanted to create an economy that is resistant to the enemy.
People should know about it so they will stop criticizing when infrastructure is hit, because these are all serving the IRGC, which is the strongest force in Iran.
RFE/RL: Reports suggest a "military council" has sidelined the Pezeshkian administration. Does this indicate the IRGC has effectively consolidated control over the Iranian state?
Ehrenfeld: It looks like it did, because we heard one day that the straits (Strait of Hormuz) were open, and then immediately afterward, a couple of hours later, no -- they were closed. So this clearly indicates there is some power struggle going on.
But as far as I understand, the IRGC is really the group that is running the regime.
RFE/RL: By using disabling fire against a container ship, is Washington signaling that it now views the IRGC's commercial fleet as a legitimate military target?
Ehrenfeld: Of course it is, because you do not know what they are carrying. What they are carrying can be arms, can be ammunition, can be something that will solve their needs.
Even if it is something like dates from somewhere in the desert, the money from the sales will go to the pockets of the IRGC. Everything that is moving there now is able to move because the IRGC is allowing it or intending it to move.
RFE/RL: The Touska was reportedly carrying dual-use goods. In your research, how commonly does the IRGC conceal military-related materials within civilian shipments?
Ehrenfeld: They are notorious for dual use. And again, even if it was something that they can sell, or something that they can refurbish and use for something else, it is all about the value -- the financial value.
How much does it cost? They sell it, they make money, or it saves them money. So everything that comes and goes is benefiting them.
RFE/RL: You've argued that targeting infrastructure can be more effective than direct military confrontation. Are current US actions an example of that strategy being put into practice?
Ehrenfeld: If the United States -- and hopefully other countries, not only Western countries, but also Iran's neighbors -- implement the blockade properly and stick to the sanctions, Iran's economy will collapse, not before long.
RFE/RL: There are reports of a "selective blockade" near Larak Island. Does the IRGC's deep involvement in the economy shield it from such pressure or make it more vulnerable?
Ehrenfeld: They are also threatening commercial shipping in other places, like near Bab al-Mandab. They are trying really to disrupt international maritime shipping.
They have to be prevented from doing it. This kind of blackmail cannot be allowed.
RFE/RL: As we approach the April 22 cease-fire deadline, how do you assess the regime's economic endgame? Are there signs of strain?
Ehrenfeld: I do not know. The IRGC is running it, and this is a radical, ideological regime. Their goal is to cause as much chaos as possible, to kill as many "infidels" as possible, and to die for their beliefs so that the 12th Imam can come.
When you believe in such an ideology, which most people in the world do not understand, I do not know what will prevail. But the optimal thing that can happen is regime change.
RFE/RL: If the cease-fire lapses without progress, what do you expect next?
Ehrenfeld: I think that military power should bring this regime to its knees -- eliminate as many leaders as possible or force the regime to disappear.
I hope the people of Iran will go out to the streets and force change. There are many people who are dissatisfied. We have seen demonstrations, and we know that the IRGC and Basij have been killing demonstrators.
Many people do not want this. The leadership has been stealing billions, enriching themselves, and sending their families abroad while ordinary people suffer.
RFE/RL: What are the most likely next moves from Washington?
Ehrenfeld: Do you know anyone who knows what President Trump thinks? I have no idea. But I think he will find a way to do what he wants and what he promised.
RFE/RL: If talks fail, should IRGC-controlled infrastructure such as ports be primary targets?
Ehrenfeld: It is difficult to get rid of [the IRGC] because they are divided into cells throughout the country. It is not just about hitting headquarters.
But the infrastructure has to be hit very hard. And there should be a blockade, freezing Iranian money anywhere it can be found -- in foreign banks and financial institutions -- really starving them economically so they will have to change course.
RFE/RL: Finally, does this moment represent a broader shift in how economic warfare is being used against state actors like Iran?
Ehrenfeld: There will be many lessons learned from this war. Economic warfare has many stages and can help a great deal, especially since Iran's economy was already in a bad situation before the war.
If you want to win, you have to use the best strategies: economic and kinetic warfare together. Hopefully not for long, because both hurt innocent people as well.
And that is very unfortunate. But this regime has been in place for decades, and those trying to stop its expansion cannot simply be blamed for taking action now.
Prospects For New Round Of US-Iran Talks Clouded As Cease-Fire Nears Deadline
The prospects for a new round of face-to-face peace talks between the United States and Iran remained unclear amid confusion over the US negotiators' plans and uncertainty over whether Tehran would agree to take part.
US President Donald Trump told the New York Post on April 20 that a delegation led by Vice President JD Vance was due to arrive in Pakistan "tonight," but there was no immediate confirmation that Vance had left the United States.
"We're supposed to have the talks…. So I would assume at this point nobody's playing games," the Post quoted Trump as saying in a brief interview it said was held shortly after 9 a.m. Eastern time (3 p.m. CET).
"They're heading over now," Trump was quoted as saying. While he did not specify whether that meant the delegation was already in the air, he said, "They'll be there tonight, [Islamabad] time."
However, sources told RFE/RL on condition of anonymity that the plane Vance normally uses, Air Force Two, remained on the ground at Joint Base Andrews outside Washington a few hours later.
Reuters, citing two unnamed sources, reported that Vance had not yet departed, and several media reports cited sources as saying he would do so soon. The time in Islamabad is nine hours ahead of Washington.
Trump had said a day earlier that US negotiators would travel to Islamabad for talks and would arrive on April 20. But neither Iran nor mediator Pakistan confirmed at that time that talks were planned.
"We have no plans for the next round of negotiation, and no decision has been made in this regard," Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baqaei said several hours before Trump spoke to the Post.
Later, Reuters cited an unnamed senior Iranian official as saying Tehran was "positively reviewing" its participation in potential peace talks with the United States but that no final decision had been made.
Pakistan, which hosted and mediated an initial round of face-to-face talks in Islamabad on April 11-12, has been trying to organize another meeting. The first round ended with the United States and Iran blaming each other for the failure to reach an agreement.
The uncertainty over the talks comes as a two-week cease-fire between Iran and the United States is due to expire on April 22. The sides have accused each other of violating the fragile truce.
Even if the talks in Islamabad proceed, public statements indicate Tehran and Washington remain far apart on key issues, including Iran's nuclear program and its chokehold on the Strait of Hormuz, which the Islamic republic has effectively closed since the US-Israeli bombing campaign began on February 28.
Cease-Fire 'Violations'
During his weekly press briefing, Baqaei said the United States was not serious about pursuing diplomacy, citing what it called "violations" of the truce.
He said a US attack on an Iranian cargo ship early on April 19, the ongoing US naval blockade on Iranian ports, and delays in implementing a truce in Lebanon were all "clear violations of the cease-fire."
Trump said US forces intercepted the Iranian-flagged ship as it tried to pass through a US maritime blockade and have "full custody" of it.
Iran's joint military command claimed the move violated the cease-fire and threatened to retaliate "soon" against the "armed piracy," according to state media.
Tehran has said it will not participate in talks if the US blockade of Iranian ports is in effect, while Trump has said it will not be lifted until a peace deal is signed.
Trump repeated that on April 20, writing that "we will not take [the blockade] off...until there is a 'DEAL.'" He also wrote that "things are going very well" in the war and that he is "under no pressure whatsoever" to reach a deal with Iran but that "it will all happen, relatively quickly!”
Iran also reiterated its criticism of the blockade. In a phone call with his Pakistani counterpart, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi said Tehran "considered the provocative actions and continuous violations of the cease-fire by the United States, especially threats and aggression against Iranian commercial ships, and contradictory positions and threatening rhetoric against Iran, as a fundamental obstacle to the continuation of the diplomatic process," the Iranian Ministry said on X.
Araqchi said "Iran will take a decision on how to continue the path [after] considering all aspects of the matter," suggesting Tehran was mulling whether to take part in a new face-to-face talks.
Separately, Araqchi told Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov that what he called the "illegal behavior and contradictory positions" of the US were incompatible with diplomacy, Iranian state media reported.
Earlier in the week, there were hopes that the Strait of Hormuz, which usually accounts for around one-fifth of global oil trade, would open after more than a month of being closed as Tehran announced it was open to commercial shipping traffic.
However, Iranian forces fired upon at least three civilian ships, two of which reportedly were Indian and one French-flagged vessel, and announced the reclosing of the strait.
Lebanon Front
Iran also said delays in implementing a cease-fire in Lebanon, where Israel is waging war against Hezbollah, an ally of Tehran, was also a violation of the truce.
Hezbollah is a militant group and political party that controls much of southern Lebanon. It is considered a terrorist organization by the United States, while the European Union has only blacklisted its armed wing.
Israel and Lebanon agreed a separate 10-day cease-fire that went into effect on April 17. The truce included Hezbollah, which entered the war to defend Iran and has fired rockets at Israel.
The cease-fire ended weeks of heavy fighting between Hezbollah and Israel, which invaded southern Lebanon. It was agreed after the United States hosted talks between the Israeli and Lebanese ambassadors to Washington on April 14, the first direct talks between the neighboring countries in decades.
A senior US official told RFE/RL on condition of anonymity that the second round of ambassador-level talks between Israel and Lebanon will take place at the State Department on April 23.
Both sides have both accused each other of violating the truce, and Israeli forces continue to occupy much of the south with the aim of maintaining a buffer zone to shield northern Israel from Hezbollah attacks. Hezbollah has said it maintains the "right to resist" Israeli occupation.
Israel's military on April 20 warned Lebanese civilians against returning to southern Lebanon. But that has not stopped thousands of people displaced in the war from making their way back to their homes.
With reporting by RFE/RL Washington correspondent Alex Raufoglu, Reuters, and AFP
- By RFE/RL
Trump Says US-Iran Deal 'Very Close' After Tehran Declares Strait Of Hormuz Open
Iran said it has opened the Strait of Hormuz to commercial shipping traffic for the remainder of a 10-day cease-fire between Israel and Lebanon, and US President Donald Trump again said Washington and Tehran could reach a deal to end the war with Iran in the near future.
"We're very close. Looks like it's going to be very good for everybody. And we're very close to having a deal," Trump told the news agency AFP by telephone on April 17. The media outlet Axios quoted Trump as saying, "I think we'll get a deal in the next day or two."
The Strait of Hormuz, which leads to the Persian Gulf and was the conduit for 20 percent of global oil and liquefied natural gas shipments before the war began on February 28, will be "completely open" for the duration of the Israel-Lebanon truce, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi said in a social media post.
The strait had been effectively closed to traffic amid Tehran's strikes at targets around the Middle East, sending oil prices skyrocketing and shaking the global economy. Oil prices dropped sharply and stock prices rose on world markets following the announcement.
The US-brokered 10-day cease-fire Israel-Lebanon took effect on April 16 and can be extended by mutual agreement. Iran has repeatedly said that an end to Israeli attacks on Lebanon, where Israel has been targeting Iran-backed Hezbollah sites since March 2, was a requirement for its own peace negotiations with the United States.
A militant group and political party that controls much of southern Lebanon, Hezbollah is considered a terrorist organization by the United States, while the European Union has blacklisted its only armed wing. A two-week cease-fire agreed by Iran and the United States on April 7 does not include Lebanon.
Shortly after Araqchi's post about the strait, Trump posted a message of gratitude on his Truth Social platform.
"IRAN HAS JUST ANNOUNCED THAT THE STRAIT OF IRAN IS FULLY OPEN AND READY FOR FULL PASSAGE," he wrote in a reference to Hormuz. "THANK YOU!"
"Iran has agreed to never close the Strait of Hormuz again. It will no longer be used as a weapon against the World!" Trump wrote in a subsequent post.
In yet another Truth Social message, Trump said a US blockade on Iranian ports would "remain in full force...until such time as our transaction with Iran is 100% complete." The United States imposed the blockade, aimed at preventing ships from entering or leaving Iranian ports, on April 13.
Iran, however, didn't sound happy about that. Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baqaei said Tehran would take "necessary reciprocal measures" if the blockade continued.
Trump said he expects a resolution of the conflict with Iran will come "very quickly," asserting that "most of the points are already negotiated."
It was part of a string of upbeat comments from Trump on the prospects for a deal to end the war, which is halted by the cease-fire that expires on April 22.
"I think the deal will go very quickly. We're getting along very well with Iran," the Reuters news agency quoted Trump as saying in a phone interview on April 17. He said more talks will be needed to reach a deal and that these would take place "probably over the weekend."
"The Iranians want to meet. They want to make a deal. I think a meeting will probably take place over the weekend. I think we will get a deal in the next day or two," Axios quoted Trump as saying by phone.
In a post on X, the Axios reporter who spoke to Trump cited unnamed senior US officials and "sources knowledgeable on the matter" as saying the United States and Iran have made progress in negotiations on a three-page memorandum of understanding to end the war.
In the brief call with AFP, Trump asserted there were "no sticking points at all" left with Tehran.
Speaking on condition of anonymity, however, a senior Iranian official told Reuters that serious negotiations were required to overcome differences.
Iran hopes a preliminary agreement can be reached in the coming days with Pakistan continuing to mediate and with the possibility of extending the cease-fire to "create space for more talks on lifting sanctions on Iran and securing compensation for war damages," Reuters quoted the official as saying.
A day earlier, Trump said he believed the United States was "very close to making a deal with Iran."
Trump has given few details about a prospective deal with Iran, and Tehran has said even less, but on April 17 the US president repeated his suggestion that Tehran has agreed to give up its stocks of enriched uranium -- which, enriched to a certain level, can be used in nuclear weapons.
"The U.S.A. will get all Nuclear 'Dust'.... No money will exchange hands in any way, shape, or form," Trump said in another post. US news outlet Axios has reported that Washington was considering a $20 billion cash-for-uranium deal.
Reuters cited Trump as saying Washington would work with Iran to recover the enriched uranium and would then bring it to the United States. "We're going to get it together. We're going to go in with Iran, at a nice leisurely pace, and go down and start excavating with big machinery.... We'll bring it back to the United States," he said.
He referred to "nuclear dust" and said it would be retrieved "very soon," Reuters reported, adding: "Trump's mention of 'nuclear dust' is a reference to what he believes remains after the United States and Israel bombed Iran's nuclear installations" in June 2025.
But the news agency quoted the senior Iranian official as saying that "no agreement has been reached on the details of the nuclear issues."
Separately, Trump took an unusually tough tone with Israel, saying that the longtime US ally "will not be bombing Lebanon any longer. They are PROHIBITED from doing so by the U.S.A. Enough is enough!!!"
In a message issued after Iran's announcement that the Strait of Hormuz was open but before Trump's post, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said he had agreed to the "temporary cease-fire in Lebanon" at Trump's request but that Israeli forces remained stationed in southern Lebanon to defend against "the near threat."
"There are things we plan to do regarding the remaining rocket threat and the drone threat, which I will not detail here," Netanyahu said. He said Israel still aims to dismantle Hezbollah and that this "requires sustained effort, patience, and endurance, and it requires wise navigation of the diplomatic field."
With reporting by RFE/RL's Radio Farda, Reuters, and AFP
US Lawmaker Wilson Flags Western Chips Still Flowing Into Russian, Iranian Drones
WASHINGTON -- A senior Republican lawmaker has raised concerns over continued US-origin components appearing in Russian weapon systems amid Ukrainian reports that recent drone strikes show evidence of Western microelectronics manufactured as recently as 2025.
Representative Joe Wilson of South Carolina told RFE/RL in an interview on April 16 that reports of US technology found in Russian and Iranian-linked drones "must be addressed," amid growing scrutiny over the effectiveness of export controls designed to cut off Moscow's access to sensitive components.
Wilson's remarks come against a backdrop of continued Ukrainian warnings that Shahed-type drones used by Russian forces still contain Western-made microelectronics despite sweeping sanctions imposed after Moscow's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. He said the persistent presence of such components highlights the difficulty Western governments face in enforcing restrictions across complex and fragmented global supply chains.
The issue gained further urgency following a large-scale Russian drone and missile attack early on April 16 that Ukrainian officials said killed at least 19 people, including a child, and injured more than 100 others. Asked by RFE/RL's correspondent about the strikes, US President Donald Trump said : "I think it's terrible."
Ukrainian Prime Minister Visits Washington
On Capitol Hill, lawmakers from both parties met Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko on April 16, a day after what senators described as one of Russia's deadliest attacks this year.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Member Jeanne Shaheen of New Hampshire, Senate Democratic Whip Dick Durbin of Illinois, and Senate Ukraine Caucus Co-Chair Roger Wicker of Mississippi were among those attending the bipartisan meeting, alongside Republican Lindsey Graham and Democratic senators Michael Bennet, Ruben Gallego, Richard Blumenthal, Amy Klobuchar, Jacky Rosen, and Sheldon Whitehouse.
Shaheen said the timing of the meeting underscored "the urgency of this moment for the people of Ukraine," adding that Washington must increase pressure on Moscow.
Durbin said Russia's latest assault showed "Vladimir Putin's evil knows no bounds," while Wicker stressed that the United States must remain firm in its support for Ukraine and continue both military assistance and expanded sanctions.
Vladyslav Vlasiuk, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's commissioner for sanctions policy, told RFE/RL in Washington a day earlier that Ukrainian forces have recovered Shahed drones containing microelectronics manufactured as recently as 2025, including parts linked to major US semiconductor companies such as Advanced Micro Devices and Texas Instruments.
He said Ukraine has repeatedly documented Western-made components inside Iranian-designed drones used by Russia, arguing that the problem lies not only in formal export restrictions but in indirect supply routes that remain difficult to fully disrupt.
"The key point is availability, not just revenue," Vlasiuk said, adding that relatively small quantities of specialized chips are sufficient to sustain large-scale drone production.
He noted that while some components may be counterfeit, many appear genuine, indicating continued diversion through intermediary markets and reexport networks.
Problems Deep In The Supply Chain
Vlasiuk added that joint investigations with US and European partners are ongoing but said enforcement remains challenging because procurement networks are highly adaptive and difficult to dismantle.
Analysts say the continued appearance of Western components in Russian weapons systems reflects structural weaknesses in sanctions enforcement rather than a lack of restrictions.
George Barros, director of innovation and open-source tradecraft at the Institute for the Study of War, told RFE/RL on April 16 that the US Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) must take stronger action against intermediaries and shell companies facilitating sanctions evasion.
"The Russians are very creative about infiltrating markets," Barros said. "Until OFAC starts imposing serious penalties on companies that support the sanctions evasion supply chain, American goods will continue finding international buyers who are willing to reexport them to Russia."
He said enforcement must target "the entire supply chain of evasion," including transit hubs and third countries that continue to maintain trade links with Russia.
Barros warned that without sustained pressure on facilitators, Western-origin components will keep reaching Russian defense production despite formal export controls.
Wilson said the issue reflects broader challenges in confronting Russia's war effort and its reliance on external supply chains.
"Indeed, with Ukraine, the American people have been very clear in their support for sovereignty and freedom. Every effort must be made to stop what Vladimir Putin is doing -- he is attacking civilian targets and using massive numbers of drones and missiles," Wilson told RFE/RL. "When we see American companies mentioned in these systems, it is something that must be addressed, and whatever information we can receive, we should act on it."
He added that he views Russia's war as part of a wider geopolitical effort by the Kremlin to reassert influence across former Soviet states and undermine democratic governments in the region.
For Kyiv, the conclusion remains stark: Cutting off access to key components would significantly degrade Russia's ability to produce Shahed drones and other strike systems.
In Washington, however, lawmakers and officials increasingly acknowledge that the challenge lies not only in sanctions design, but in enforcement across fragmented global supply chains and reexport networks -- a gap some officials describe as the "last mile" problem in sanctions policy.
- By Frud Bezhan
Iran Thinks It's Winning. That View Is Guiding Its War And Diplomacy.
The United States and Israel's bombing campaign has devastated Iran's military, decapitated much of its leadership, and destroyed critical infrastructure.
Yet Tehran still believes it is winning the weekslong confrontation. That Iran's theocracy has survived at all has been touted in the Islamic republic as a victory. The country has also obtained a new and powerful card: control of the Strait of Hormuz.
Since the war began on February 28, Iran has effectively closed one of the world's key arteries for global oil and gas supplies, a move that has rattled energy markets, upended the global economy, and handed Tehran new leverage.
Iran's perception of victory has shaped the country's conduct in the conflict, where it has refused to capitulate despite suffering enormous material losses. The Islamic republic's confidence has extended to the negotiating table, where it is aiming to end the war on its own terms.
"In some ways, Iran is in a more favorable position now than it was before the war. It finally played a card it had threatened for years -- closing off the Strait of Hormuz -- and it paid off," said Arash Azizi, a postdoctoral associate and lecturer at Yale University.
"Iran showed it could affect global trade and make the US sweat," he added. "It also showed that it could weather foreign attacks without risking regime or societal collapse so far. But Iran has also borne a massive economic cost and will need an end to the war and help for reconstruction."
'New Security Order'
Iran's goal in the war is no longer just to survive, experts say, but to use its leverage to end its international isolation and the crippling sanctions that have cut it off from the global economy.
Mahdi Mohammadi, a senior adviser to Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, said in an April 7 post on X that Iran had "clearly and openly won the war" and would only accept an outcome that established "a new security order in the region."
Iran's Supreme National Security Council, the country's key policymaking body, said in an April 8 statement that the country's goal in peace talks with the United States is to create "new security and political equations" in the Middle East that recognize the country's "power and leadership."
"Iran sees this moment of crisis as an opportunity to reshape the regional order," said Azizi. "This could be either a way of integrating itself into the region, having other countries recognize it as a significant regional power and not a pariah. Or it could be that it simply shows its revisionism is here to stay and won't be cowed so easily."
Underscoring Tehran's new tougher line, Iran published a 10-point peace plan ahead of talks with the United States in Pakistan on April 11 that ultimately failed to produce a deal.
Many of the points were maximalist demands that are likely to be nonstarters for Washington, including recognition of Iran's control of the Strait of Hormuz, the United States withdrawing tens of thousands of its troops and closing over a dozen bases in the Middle East, and billions in reparations to Iran for war damages.
Before the Islamabad talks, Tehran threatened to back out of the negotiations at the last minute if the United States and others did not unfreeze billions in Iranian assets held in foreign banks. The demand was rejected.
"Iran thinks it has won the war, so it has entered negotiations with more confidence," said Sina Azodi, an expert of Iran's military and history and an assistant professor of Middle East politics at George Washington University.
He said Iran has displayed resilience on the battlefield, where it has repeatedly hit sensitive targets deep inside Israel, damaged heavily protected US bases and military hardware in the Middle East, and imposed severe economic pain on key US allies in the Persian Gulf.
"Iran feels that it can show more resilience at the negotiation table, as well," said Azodi.
Risk Of Overplaying Its Hand
Tehran and Washington reached a last-minute, two-week temporary cease-fire on April 7 after President Donald Trump had threatened that "a whole civilization will die tonight," in reference to Iran.
But the shaky truce has threatened to collapse over a dispute over whether the cease-fire extended to Lebanon, Iran's failure to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and a US decision to blockade the strait with the aim of stopping Iran exporting its oil and gas.
Still, the sides are in indirect talks to extend the cease-fire and hold a second round of negotiations in Islamabad.
Experts say Iran and the United States have both showed little flexibility in negotiations so far.
Vice President JD Vance, who headed the US delegation in Islamabad, said after the failed talks that "they have chosen not to accept our terms," suggesting he handed the Iranians a take-it-or-leave-it deal that they rejected.
Even as experts say time is on Iran's side and Trump faces pressure to end the war given soaring global energy prices and mounting domestic and international backlash, Tehran is at risk of further hardening US positions and prolonging a costly war.
"Iran heavily risks overplaying its hand," said Azizi.
He said Iran's history since the Islamic Revolution in 1979 is dotted with examples where the authorities overreached and failed to turn military gains into diplomatic advantage.
The most prominent example is the devastating 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. In 1986, Iranian forces seized Iraq's Faw peninsula. Instead of trading its control of the strategic area for political gains, Iran refused and was ultimately forced to accept a cease-fire in 1988 on less favorable terms.
- By RFE/RL
Trump: US, Iran Could Meet For Second Round Of Talks, 'Very Close' To Deal
US President Donald Trump said the United States and Iran are "very close" to a deal to end the war and that US and Iranian negotiators could meet for a second round of talks this coming weekend.
"We're going to see what happens. But I think we're very close to making a deal with Iran," Trump told reporters outside the White House on April 16, repeating the word "close" more than once and adding, "There's a very good chance we're going to make a deal."
In an event later in Las Vegas, Trump repeated the sentiment, telling a crowd that the war was going "swimmingly" and that it "should be ending pretty soon."
Trump gave few details about potential elements of an agreement to end the war that began with US and Israeli air strikes on Iran on February 28, but said Iran has agreed to "give us back the nuclear dust," meaning its stocks of enriched uranium, which at a certain level of enrichment is a key ingredient in a nuclear weapon.
He said he wasn’t sure a two-week cease-fire that expires April 22 will need to be extended and that “if there’s no deal…fighting resumes,” though he didn’t specify a timeline.
Trump also reiterated an announcement he made on social media hours earlier, saying Israel and Lebanon have agreed to a 10-day cease-fire starting April 16 at 5 p.m. US Eastern time, and that the cease-fire incudes Hezbollah.
A militant group and political party that controls much of southern Lebanon, Hezbollah is considered a terrorist organization by the United States, while the European Union has blacklisted its only armed wing.
Trump said he expects to host Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Lebanese President Joseph Aoun at the White House within a week or two. In a video statement, Netanyahu said he agreed to the 10-day cease-fire and that there was a chance to make an historic deal with Lebanon after decades of conflict.
Seeking 'Lasting Peace'
"The US hopes this cease-fire will help accelerate discussions between Lebanon and Israel to achieve a permanent peace agreement between the two countries," a senior White House official said on condition of anonymity. The US State Department issued a statement that was agreed to by Israel and Lebanon and said the 10-day cease-fire could be extended by mutual agreement.
"Lebanon and Israel have reached an understanding in which both nations will work to create conditions conducive to lasting peace between the two countries, full recognition of each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and establishing genuine security along their shared border, while preserving Israel’s inherent right to self-defense," it said.
Israel has been launching strikes targeting Iran-backed Hezbollah militants in neighboring Lebanon since March 2, two days after the start of the US-Israeli war with Iran, when Hezbollah forces opened fire in support of Tehran. An ongoing two-week cease-fire in the Iran war has not applied to Lebanon.
The current Israeli campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon comes 15 months after another major outbreak of hostilities.
Iranian authorities have repeatedly said that an end to Israeli attacks on targets in Lebanon was a requirement for its own peace negotiations with the United States. Pakistan, for its part, has said that peace in Lebanon is crucial for its efforts to mediate between the United States and Iran.
Following the announcement, the Iranian government hailed the cease-fire and said it was part of the earlier two-week cease-fire reached between Iran and the US, according to Iranian state media.
'Good Relationship With Iran'
Trump asserted that Tehran wants to make a deal.
"We have a very good relationship with Iran right now, as hard as it is to believe. And I think it's a combination of about four weeks of bombing and a very powerful blockade," he said, referring to a US blockade in place since April 13 and aimed at preventing ships from entering or leaving Iranian ports.
The question of Hezbollah's adherence to a truce is crucial. Reuters cited senior Hezbollah lawmaker Hassan Fadlallah as saying earlier in the day that the group had been informed by Iran's ambassador to Lebanon that a one-week cease-fire could begin on April 16.
"Asked if Hezbollah would commit to the truce, Fadlallah said everything was tied to Israel's commitment to halt all forms of hostilities, and credited Iran's diplomatic efforts for the possible cease-fire," Reuters reported.
Trump's cease-fire announcement came two days after the Israeli and Lebanese ambassadors to Washington met, the first major high-level engagement between the two governments in more than three decades. The meeting ended with the sides agreeing to launch direct negotiations at a mutually agreed time and venue.
The gap between Israel and Lebanon had remained wide ahead of the announcement: Lebanon made a full cease-fire its precondition for further talks while Israel refused, with a spokesman for Netanyahu saying there would be no cease-fire with Hezbollah. Netanyahu has said the Israeli campaign's goal is the disarmament of Hezbollah.
More than 2,100 people have been killed in Lebanon since the renewed fighting began and over 1 million displaced, according to Lebanese health officials. Hezbollah attacks have killed two Israeli civilians, while 13 Israeli soldiers have died in Lebanon since March 2, Israel says.
Possible Second Round Of Peace Talks
An initial round of Iran-US peace talks took place in Islamabad on April 11-12 and ended without an agreement. The White House said on April 15 that a potential second round would likely again be held in Pakistan.
A Pakistani military delegation led by army chief Asim Munir landed in Tehran on April 15 carrying a new message from Washington, in the latest effort to revive negotiations.
Hegseth: Iran Will Never Have A Nuclear Weapon
US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told reporters on April 16 that Washington "will ensure that Iran will never have a nuclear weapon" and called on Tehran to "choose a deal which is within your grasp."
Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said US forces remain “postured and ready” to resume military operations “at a moment’s notice.”
On April 17, attention will also turn to a separate but linked crisis as French President Emmanuel Macron and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer co-chair a video conference aimed at restoring freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, a vital waterway that has been largely choked off since the start of the Iran war.
Discussions are expected to cover possible financial sanctions on Iran if it continues blocking the waterway, alongside steps to work with the shipping industry to resume transit.
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has carried out several confirmed attacks on merchant ships and reportedly laid sea mines in the strait in retaliation for the US-Israeli aerial campaign. Begore the war, the Strait of Hormuz carried roughly a quarter of the world's seaborne oil and a fifth of its liquefied natural gas.
A European official familiar with the summit told RFE/RL that Europe would take action only after there is a peace agreement between Iran and the United States. The official said the EU's "substantial" reluctance to join a military effort to reopen the strait stems from the lack of anti-drone defenses in the bloc's naval capabilities.
"Even our brand-new minehunter that will be operational in September doesn't have anti-drone tech onboard," the source said.
The conference, the official said, is meant to serve as "a gesture of goodwill to Trump...with the goal not to torpedo the NATO Ankara Summit," scheduled for July 7-8. Trump has expressed his disappointment with NATO for not joining the war with Iran.
The United States is not participating in the Paris summit after Trump said securing the waterway was not Washington's responsibility. Trump has instead ordered a separate naval blockade of Iranian ports, which Britain has declined to join.
"For as long as it takes, we will maintain this blockade," Hegseth said.
With reporting by RFE/RL Washington correspondent Alex Raufoglu, RFE/RL's Radio Farda, Reuters, and AFP
No More Waivers: Ukrainian Sanctions Czar Vlasiuk Praises US Decision To End Relief For Russian Oil
WASHINGTON -- In a significant shift in energy policy, the United States has confirmed it will not renew sanctions waivers that previously allowed the purchase of certain Russian and Iranian oil, handing Kyiv a sought-after victory.
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced the move on April 15 from the White House podium, signaling the end of a "general license" for oil that was already in transit before mid-March -- a mechanism the administration had used to stabilize global energy prices amid volatility in the Strait of Hormuz stemming from the US-Israeli war with Iran.
Vladyslav Vlasiuk, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's commissioner for sanctions policy, told RFE/RL in an interview that any relief for Moscow only serves to extend the war.
RFE/RL: The United States has decided not to renew waivers that had allowed certain purchases of Russian and Iranian oil. What did that decision mean when it was first announced, and what does it mean now for Ukraine?
Vladyslav Vlasiuk: We certainly didn't like any waivers or extensions of sanctions. We would like to have sanctions against Russia that are as tough as possible, and this is something that we've constantly been asking from our partners. Why? Because we see that sanctions are working well, and the more sanctions are applied against Russia, the quicker we will see success in peace negotiations. This is a very simple hypothesis.
Of course, we were disappointed when the waiver on Russian oil was imposed a month ago. Likewise, we are happy now it has not been extended. Even better, there is no indication that it will be extended in the future. This is very good. We did not know the specific reasons behind the waivers. We've seen public statements suggesting they were introduced to mitigate market volatility driven by the Hormuz blockade, but to us that seemed ungrounded.
The Hormuz trade accounts for something like 30 percent of global oil shipments, whereas Russian oil is only about 4 percent or 5 percent. That calculation was never going to work, anyway. It seems everyone understood this from the very beginning; it did not work and it did not help. Perhaps that was taken into account when the decision was made not to extend any waivers. So, we are happy that no waiver is being prolonged.
We are pleased that the sanctions against Russia, Rosneft, and Lukoil are still very much in force. We see many indications that those sanctions are particularly meaningful against the Russian economy. In February, we saw a record low in Russian oil revenues since the full-scale invasion -- below $10 billion.
That's a clear sign sanctions are working. We also believe that because of those waivers the Russians gained an extra $2 billion to $4 billion, of which $1.7 billion was denied thanks to the Ukrainian Armed Forces conducting "kinetic sanctions" against Russian ports in Ust-Luga, Primorsk, and Novorossiysk. This is an ongoing situation. Ukraine has every right to protect itself with these types of sanctions, but we will also continue our work on applying more restrictions to deny Russia oil revenue. This is key.
RFE/RL: US officials have argued the waiver was a short-term measure to prevent larger economic disruptions. Do you see any merit in that argument?
Vlasiuk: That could be. But again, the quantity of Russian oil available on the market and the quantity of oil blockaded because of the Hormuz trade are not comparable. You cannot save a market facing a deficit of roughly 16 million barrels per day by allowing back only two or three million barrels per day. The calculation simply doesn't match. It couldn't have worked from the very beginning.
RFE/RL: In terms of Russia's war chest, how did these financial gains from the waiver period translate into their actual battlefield capacity and military budget?
Vlasiuk: Good question. They continue to increase the total amount of money spent on their war efforts. We believe this year's war budget is around $60 billion. Even $2 billion, $3 billion, or $4 billion is a significant portion of money that they will use exclusively for war purposes.
They've cut many other budget expenditures to accommodate this. What we've observed is they reached their planned annual budget deficit in only three months. From now on, the deficit continues to increase toward record highs. They are really struggling economically.
RFE/RL: When the United States applies these periodic, temporary waivers, does it undermine the long-term structural integrity and psychological impact of the broader sanctions regime?
Vlasiuk: We were told from the beginning that this temporary waiver would never impact the general weight of the sanctions. While it allowed the Russians to make some extra money, it did not allow them to solve their structural economic problems.
We are glad this waiver was not extended. We see that Russia is spending more and more on the war effort while their profits and overall revenues are decreasing. It may not be a popular opinion yet, but we believe time is playing against Russia. Their economy is struggling, and they cannot survive many more years of this level of war effort.
RFE/RL: During this waiver period, we saw major players like China and India increase their intake of Russian oil. With the waivers now expired, how difficult will it be to reverse those trade flows and ensure full enforcement?
Vlasiuk: Before the full-scale invasion, India was not buying Russian oil. Afterward, India became the No. 1 buyer, and we do not like this. It seems unfair to call for a quick resolution to the war while simultaneously helping one side with effective budget revenues. Nobody should be buying Russian oil as long as Russia is not negotiating for peace in good faith.
Sanctions help to disincentivize potential buyers. This is why we were so happy when the administration applied sanctions against Russian oil, and why we've worked so much with the EU, UK, and Canada to keep the pressure on exports. All of this helps to deny Russia revenue. It works: we see a record deficit and no GDP growth. All countries that truly want Russia to withdraw from Ukraine should not be buying Russian oil or gas.
RFE/RL: Considering the broader US perspective, the administration is juggling tensions with Iran and threats to the Strait of Hormuz. How can Washington maintain a maximum pressure campaign via sanctions without triggering a global economic crisis?
Vlasiuk: One of the takeaways from the Hormuz situation should be the level of threat that dual-use items pose. Iran has shown that operating cheap drones can cause massive economic damage. For instance, the Qatari LNG facility was put on hold just because of two Shahed UAVs. Each costs maybe $30,000, yet they impacted a facility representing 20 percent of the global market.
The awareness of the threat posed by UAVs is something we've talked about for years, and that awareness has finally risen. We are trying to use this momentum.
Beyond energy and freedom of passage, the key point is the components used by Iran to destabilize multiple countries. This is the game changer. Hopefully, more countries will now pay attention to supply chain evasion and sanctions efficiency. It isn't just about having the money to buy something; it’s about the ability to obtain specific tools and parts.
If a country wants to build UAVs to destroy those around it, it will buy the necessary parts. This is why we talk so much about critical components with our partners. We must ensure that the microchips manufactured by Western companies are not freely available on the market for terrorist regimes like Russia or Iran. It's about availability, not just revenue.
RFE/RL: Ukraine has repeatedly documented the presence of US-made components within Iranian and Russian drones. Have you addressed this specific issue with your US counterparts, and what has been their response regarding the failure of export controls?
Vlasiuk: Yes. For the last three years, we've been observing American microelectronics in Russian weapons. It is even worse in the Iranian drones we saw in 2022 and 2023. This creates a lot of challenges for the US export control system and for manufacturers. We raise this issue constantly. We know the US government is prioritizing this and working to deny these items to terrorist regimes, but it remains a pressing challenge.
It was a highlight of my meetings today. It is not an ideal situation. In late March, a vast territory of Ukraine was attacked by Shahed UAVs that appeared to have been produced that same month. In those drones, there were American components apparently produced as recently as late 2025. I say "apparently" because a portion of the American parts turn out to be counterfeit, but many are genuine. American, Japanese, German, and Chinese parts are unfortunately still available to the Russian defense sector.
We believe that the day Russia stops receiving Western parts, they will no longer be able to produce Shahed UAVs or cruise missiles. It is that critical. Some countries, like the Emirates, were initially hesitant, saying "business is business," but that has changed. I have a good feeling that key countries in the region have changed their attitude toward these dual-use items and will no longer help Russia or Iran obtain them.
RFE/RL: Are there joint investigations under way with the United States on this issue?
Vlasiuk: Yes, quite a lot of work is being done by law enforcement in the US, Ukraine, the Netherlands, Germany, and others. The truth is that these supply chains are not easily shut down. The Russians are very creative about infiltrating markets. Furthermore, they don't need a massive volume; to produce 50,000 Shahed UAVs, you only need 50,000 specific microchips. That is a small enough amount to be purchased through various indirect means.
RFE/RL: Can you identify the specific US tech companies whose products are most frequently recovered from the battlefield?
Vlasiuk: It's not a big secret. Any big American tech company -- like AMD, Texas Instruments, Analog Devices, or Linear Technology -- produces microelectronics that are then found in Russian UAVs or missiles. They know it, and they have been trying to address it. We are pragmatic: As long as we find new American parts in Russian weapons, it is a clear indication that current efforts are not enough.
RFE/RL: We have seen strong calls from lawmakers like senators [Lindsey]Graham and [Richard] Blumenthal for even tougher measures. Have you been coordinating directly with them on potential legislation?
Vlasiuk: I have a lot of respect for senators Graham and Blumenthal for their actions against Russia. They are truly on the side of Ukraine. However, it seems the key decisions on sanctions are taken at the White House rather than on Capitol Hill. That doesn't mean the pressure from Congress isn't helpful; it probably is. I would love to see some of those bills passed and signed.
RFE/RL: Specifically, what unique enforcement tools or authority would the current bills in Congress provide that the administration doesn't already possess?
Vlasiuk: These tools would essentially oblige the government to take action against anyone who buys Russian oil. It is one of the strongest instruments available because it cannot be ignored by buyers. It is simple but efficient.
On the other hand, we shouldn't limit ourselves to just tariffs; we must continue regular sanctions work: Let's target the shadow fleet, their captains, and further list Russian oil majors. I support the bills, but I also think the US government should explore more "classical" sanctions instruments, as increasing the pressure will help us negotiate for peace properly.
RFE/RL: I ask because US officials, including the secretary of state, have occasionally suggested the "low-hanging fruit" is gone and there are no targets left to sanction. Is that an accurate assessment from your perspective?
Vlasiuk: I’ll give you one number: Over the last year, Ukraine has adopted 60 sanctions packages against Russia. Clearly, there are still many potential targets. You can always sanction the oil industry further or turn back to the LNG sector. There are many targets in the military-defense sector, the oligarchs, and the financial sector. Maybe 50 banks are under sanctions, but there are 250 more waiting. There is also the area of Russian nuclear energy, which is not yet sanctioned.
RFE/RL: Finally, looking at the geopolitical nexus between the Strait of Hormuz, global oil prices, and the front lines in Ukraine, what is the most critical takeaway for the US public?
Vlasiuk: We think Russia received an extra $2 billion to $4 billion in oil revenue because volumes were released and prices went up. They benefited significantly. We have tried to mitigate those benefits through our own "kinetic" sanctions quite successfully. We really hope the situation in Hormuz will be resolved soon, and we expect Russian oil revenues to continue to shrink. That is what is truly important.