ALMATY, Kazakhstan -- Kazakh voters will head to the polls on October 6 to decide whether to approve the construction of the first nuclear power plant in Kazakhstan -- the world's largest producer of uranium.
And the question on the ballot will be just that: "Do you agree to the construction of a nuclear power plant in Kazakhstan?"
But the debate surrounding nuclear energy is far more complex, taking in the heavy legacy of Soviet-era nuclear tests, long-standing nuclear-phobia, and unanswered questions around the companies -- and countries -- that would build the plant if voters endorse it.
Ahead of the first referendum in Central Asia on nuclear power, RFE/RL takes a closer look at that conversation.
What The Government Says
In many countries, national referendums can divide governing coalitions and spark cabinet resignations, but there is no sign of anything like that in Kazakhstan -- the political elite is firmly behind the plan to build a nuclear power plant.
That extends from the government to the legislature, where all six parties support the idea, and where at least one lawmaker who initially opposed the plan now says he changed his mind.
The government's main argument is that only nuclear power has the capacity to provide near-zero carbon energy on the scale required to cover a power deficit that grows year-on-year, especially in the southern half of the country.
Why Not Renewables?
While wind and solar's overall share of the fossil-fuel-heavy national energy mix has grown to around 6 percent in recent years, Energy Minister Almasadam Satkaliev argues that renewables' dependence on "natural and climatic conditions" make them too "unpredictable" on a large scale.
President Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev first floated the idea of using nuclear power in 2019.
Like other officials, he has assured Kazakhs that a future nuclear plant will be built with the latest technology to ensure the highest safety standards.
As the world's largest uranium producer, he says it is time for Kazakhstan to move up the nuclear-fuel cycle.
Why Hold A Referendum?
That is a good question, given that any sort of popular vote carries a protest risk, and Kazakhstan's authoritarian regime has only recently held parliamentary elections (March 2023) and a presidential election (November 2022).
But the country's leadership knows that the issue is contentious -- not least because the nation's introduction to nuclear power began with the Soviet Union's first nuclear bomb test in 1949, with hundreds more taking a terrible human and environmental toll in the northeastern Semei region.
Toqaev has argued that holding a plebiscite on nuclear power is in line with his "Listening State" concept, which translates to hearing people out.
And with the so-called "administrative resources" firmly on the government's side and a long history of controlled elections in Kazakhstan, few are expecting a resounding win for "yes."
Government-approved polling from last month shows that only 22.3 percent of Kazakhs are now against the idea, down from 32.5 percent in August.
Polling not sanctioned by the government is illegal, meanwhile, and at least two citizen journalists and one media outlet were slapped with fines after sampling the public's opinion on nuclear power in the run-up to the vote.
Is There A 'No' Campaign?
To the extent that Kazakhstan allows such things, there is.
But nuclear naysayers have been repeatedly blocked from holding demonstrations against the plan in various cities, and most recently found that a hotel in the largest city, Almaty -- where they had earlier agreed to hold an event -- was suddenly unwilling to host them.
At least five Kazakh activists opposed to nuclear power have been placed in pretrial detention on charges of plotting mass unrest early this month, while others have faced administrative punishment.
Public debates held in Kazakh cities over the space of the past year were emotional, particularly in Almaty, Astana, and Ulken, which is the town closest to the expected site of the proposed facility on the southern shore of Lake Balkhash.
One prominent voice adding authority to the "no" campaign is Aset Nauryzbaev, a former top manager of the national electricity grid.
He has argued that even the government's $10 billion-$12 billion estimate for the plant is too expensive for Kazakhstan, necessitating either a steep rise in electricity rates or huge subsidies for power production.
Nauryzbaev maintains that ramping up production of renewables would be both feasible and four times cheaper than the nuclear option.
Other opponents say the project that authorities expect to build over eight years will become a magnet for corruption, like so many other Kazakh megaprojects before it, compromising safety.
The government has countered that necessary oversight of the project by international organizations like the International Atomic Energy Agency will ensure high levels of compliance and minimize corruption risks.
Will Russia Build It?
The word "Russia" will not feature on the ballot. But for many it is one of the most important questions to be asked.
Moscow made a major contribution to global nuclear-phobia in the early weeks of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, when Russian military forces occupied the territory surrounding the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, sparking fears of war-related nuclear fallout.
And Moscow's nuclear energy giant Rosatom, which is slated to build a smaller nuclear facility in next-door Uzbekistan, could represent a sanctions risk in the future, even if the company is not currently targeted with the kind of retaliatory measures that Western governments have slapped on other Russian companies.
To date, Rosatom is just one of four contractors whose reactors are under consideration for the prospective plant along with EDF of France, the China National Nuclear Corporation, and South Korea's Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power.
Intriguingly, Kazakh authorities have mentioned the prospect of an international consortium working on the project -- a fine example of the "multivector" foreign policy that Astana has been promoting vigorously since the Ukraine war began.
But sky-high geopolitical tensions would surely make Russia an undesirable partner for Seoul and Paris, if not for Beijing.
And with the Kremlin already irritated by ally Kazakhstan's neutral stance on the war, the cost of completely snubbing Moscow on such a strategic project might be too great for the Central Asian country to contemplate.
