Nico Lange, a fluent speaker of Russian and Ukrainian, is a German politician from the center-right Christian Democratic Union and a senior fellow at the Munich Security Conference. Previously serving in the German armed forces, including stints in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, Lange was the chief of staff for the German defense minister from 2019-2022.
He spoke to RFE/RL's Georgian Service about the asymmetrical warfare against Israel by the Palestinian radical group Hamas -- designated a terrorist organization by the U.S. and EU -- and how the new pressure on U.S. ammunition stocks could affect Ukraine's defense against Russia.
RFE/RL: The situation in Israel is described as a new theater of war. Not sure about new, but if it's indeed a theater, what's the play that's being staged? Who are the actors? The director? The protagonists and antagonists?
Nico Lange: There are many elements that are quite surprising as to what happened in Israel last weekend. The Israelis will have to clarify some of that, because the size of the operation looks like it took long to prepare. And to be overrun by this in that way -- and taking such a long time for a response -- that, at least to me, is very surprising when it comes to the Israel Defense Forces.
The Tavberidze Interviews
Since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Vazha Tavberidze of RFE/RL's Georgian Service has been interviewing diplomats, military experts, and academics who hold a wide spectrum of opinions about the war's course, causes, and effects. To read all of his interviews, click here.
There are some elements we know from other conflicts that seem to point to the future of warfare, [which] are a problem everywhere: slow, low-flying objects and drones being a problem for air defenses [and] small-unit tactics, [where] dispersed small units using unconventional instruments of warfare [against] conventional armies. That is something that we are observing, and Hamas is using this for its terror attack. But, for example, we have seen that Ukraine has successfully been using small-unit tactics against the Russian Armed Forces.
We see some elements of the future of warfare, [and there] have to be lessons for us. Apart from that, when it comes to the security response and to the support of the United States, those things are connected. But when it comes to the wars itself, I do not see a connection between Ukraine defending itself against Russia, Azerbaijan attacking Armenia, or Hamas attacking Israel.
The connection is that the United States and its partners have to support Israel and Ukraine now at the same time. And it will lead to a resource management issue. From my point of view, this is the most important connection at the moment. Because there is no priority: We have to do both.
RFE/RL: How was this attack possible in the first place? Many have pointed fingers at the foreign intelligence agency, Mossad, even though it was Shin Bet, Israel's domestic intelligence agency, that was also responsible. What are we dealing with?
Lange: It is, for sure, extremely difficult to protect yourself against terrorism. We have seen before that it's difficult to prevent terrorist attacks. But still, the level of this, the scale of the preparation [over] a long time, communications that must have happened between the Hamas leadership and Iran. To me, it's surprising that it was not on the radar…of Israeli [intelligence]. And I'm sure that Israeli society will discuss this after the war is over. I mean, now is not the time.
It points to these new elements of warfare I talked about. It's increasingly the case that barriers or structures of protection are not working the way they were intended to. Because there are, for example, new drones or new kinds of cheap and accessible equipment that you can use to destroy [or] overcome expensive barriers. It started in Ukraine to have commercially cheap drones and drop [explosives] from those cheap drones. And now we have seen the same technique applied to Israeli watchtowers. So, there are some new developments that make the defense more complicated.
RFE/RL: As long as you put a barrier, there will always be somebody who will try to get over it.
Lange: Yeah, you can never feel secure if you build a barrier. Maybe the Israelis felt too secure about defense and the border barriers.
RFE/RL: Is it too early to talk about winners and losers?
Lange: The history of warfare shows that if a smaller force has initial success by generating an element of surprise, then over time the true balance of power will show. If that law of military warfare applies here, then I will say that Hamas might have brought destruction upon itself by this initial success they had.
RFE/RL: What about the external actors? Who wins and who loses?
Lange: It's very difficult to tell if, for example, [Lebanese political party and militant group] Hizballah will join in and make Israel's life extremely complicated with a war on two fronts. Surely Iran will try to mobilize its proxies. Because that is what we are seeing: It's Iran and the proxies of Iran attacking Israel. But it seems other parts of the Arab world are not interested in joining. That's why Iran is also not fighting openly, but using Hamas and Hizballah. But it's [too] early [to say].
RFE/RL: Regarding the impact this might have on the Ukraine war, you've told me it's going to be a battle on two fronts for the United States when it comes to military assistance. Do you see Europe stepping up in this regard, providing a helping hand to the United States, if Washington now has to divide its attention between Kyiv and Tel Aviv?
Lange: When it comes to the concrete resources that the United States at the moment is supplying to Israel and what it is supplying to Ukraine, [they] are different things mainly. So there is no immediate problem. But the longer this goes on, there will be conflicts when it comes to air defense and air-defense ammunition, because that is what both Israel and Ukraine need very much.
The United States took artillery ammunition from stocks from Israel to supply to Ukraine. At the moment, the Israel Defense Forces don't need it. But if the conflict should be broadened in the [region], they might also need the artillery ammunition, and then there is this conflict of resources. So [regarding] air defense, air-defense ammunition, [and] artillery ammunition, the Europeans must now increase the industrial capabilities in these areas to be prepared for a possible conflict of resources.
RFE/RL: 'Must' is a peculiar word. Will they?
Lange: Yes, I know. I understand your question, because the reality is that [for the Ukraine war] they did not scale up industrial production in the amount that would be needed. I'm worried -- and I will also continue to argue for it -- because European countries should not try to return to the normal order of business.
It's [only] days after the terror against Israel began. I would expect European leaders [to be] sitting together right now to discuss how Europe can step up. This will not solve itself. Unfortunately, this includes my country, Germany. Industrialists in Europe are ultraslow in scaling up industrial production. They started, but they have to become much faster, especially in air-defense and artillery ammunition. That's really critically important.
RFE/RL: Speaking of Germany, how is the policy of Zeitenwende going? (Zeitenwende refers to the so-called turning point in German foreign policy after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced a large increase in military spending, which was a break from Germany's previously cautious defense policy.)
Lange: There was a lot of hope in the beginning because of the speech by Chancellor Scholz [to the Bundestag on February 27, 2022]. Everyone who was interested in the matter really thought, OK, now they have understood; finally, Germany is getting on track.
Unfortunately, what we have observed is, in some areas, Germany is doing better now. And Germany has to also get credit for that -- for example, [the country's] military assistance to Ukraine is much better than its reputation.
But in other areas, unfortunately, Germany has a habit of falling back into old patterns of behavior. That is, of course, not a Zeitenwende -- that's the opposite of Zeitenwende. And you start wondering, what is supposed to happen until Germany really changes its security [and] defense policy? We have a major war in Europe. We have an attack on Israel. What is needed to really push Germany to do what is necessary? Germany reacted to pressure, so the pressure has to be kept up, that's part of the truth: internationally, [from] the public, but also from the expert field…. But we are not where we should be when it comes to Zeitenwende.
RFE/RL: The very fact that there needs to be constant international pressure for Germany to do the right thing also speaks volumes, doesn't it?
Lange: That's unfortunately true. In the end, it doesn't matter why you do the right thing; it's important that you do it. But I would like to see my country not only reacting to things, but making proposals itself and asking others to be part of proposals. We have seen this a little bit with the European Sky Shield [Initiative], where Germany proposed this [European air-defense system] and other countries are joining in.
If a powerful, big, centrally located country in Europe makes a proposal, at least everybody's looking into it. Germany has a good chance if it brings something to the table that others will [come aboard]. But, unfortunately, Germany is in bureaucratic reactive mode most of the time. That is not enough.
RFE/RL: Is there a price in Germany itself for not delivering on Zeitenwende? If Scholz comes short on his promise, yes, sure, your international partners, the Americans, the Brits, will criticize you, but what would be the mood in Germany? Would there be domestic consequences for the government?
Lange: I can give you a provocative answer. If the idea was, "Oh, let's go slow, let's not do too much, because there will be resistance, there will be populism. And then there will be bad election results for the governing parties." Guess what? We had federal elections in federal states [just recently]. Despite going slow and despite all of this argumentation, there are bad results for the governing parties and there is [also a] rise of populism. So, maybe this whole theory is wrong, and it's better to just show leadership and to proceed with things instead of being hesitant and slow.
RFE/RL: One way to show leadership would probably be to provide Taurus air-launched cruise missiles to Ukraine. And Chancellor Scholz seems to be very reluctant to do that. Why?
Lange: It's from a military perspective that I'm looking at things. It's not understandable to me. The initial mistake was that Germany was not delivering [Swedish-German] Taurus [missiles] immediately, when Britain and France decided to deliver [their] Storm Shadow and SCALP-EG [cruise missiles]. Because of that, it became a single-issue question and widely debated and much more complicated than necessary.
There is [also] this paradigm of escalation that seems to motivate the White House and the [German] chancellor's office very often to think about things [for a long time]. The Ukrainians have shown that there is no further escalation if you attack Crimea or the Crimea Bridge or do other things. But still, that seems to be a paradigm that is in the heads of decision-makers always worried about escalation. I'm afraid they are making escalation even more likely, because the Kremlin will perceive this as a sign of weakness.
The nature of this war now, from my point of view, is that Russia cannot achieve anything militarily anymore. They have not achieved their military goals. So, from a Russian point of view…the achievements might be political: splitting the West, exploiting weaknesses, hoping for elections to turn the other way. And we have to understand that Russia is now conducting a military war but aiming for political goals.
RFE/RL: I wanted to ask you about this long-war strategy that Putin seems to have settled into: the idea that, in the end, he'll out-suffer the entire West; the West will blink first, break first. I don't know if you are a betting man or not, but who would you bet on in this situation? The West or Russia? Who will out-suffer whom?
Lange: It's not about suffering. That's the Russian perspective, but the capabilities of democracies are far higher than the capabilities of Russia. The question is: What does it need for us to unlock the capabilities we have? How bad does it have to get?
There's the false idea in the heads of policymakers that somehow, if you support a little bit, this will lead to a stalemate and then there will be negotiations. This is a total misjudgment of Putin's intentions. Because he will immediately, if such a moment comes, try to have further demands and go further on the attack.
I have no doubts that the democratic countries will prevail in this. But I would argue that they should unlock the capabilities much faster and not wait for [miracles]…. Our slowness produces dead Ukrainians and devastates Ukraine as a country. If you look at the material side of this, Germany spent 300 billion euros ($318 billion) on social [payments] to dampen the effect of [increased] energy prices. Weapons for Ukraine [have so far cost] 3 billion euros. If we unlock our capabilities, then we could do much more and help more decisively.
