Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's new newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.
I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two issues: fresh military aid for Moldova and a conversation with the EU's Kaja Kallas.
Briefing #1: EU Ramps Up Military Aid For Moldova
What You Need To Know: On April 9, European Union ambassadors will green-light the bloc's biggest-ever lethal military aid package to Moldova, worth 20 million euros.
The move is significant as the country is constitutionally neutral and the EU has previously only provided aid that was considered "nonlethal" such as military vehicles, air surveillance, and equipment boosting cybersecurity.
This changed last year, however, when Brussels provided 9 million euros for air-defense systems' short-range interceptors.
Now, the EU is more than doubling that in a reflection of what EU diplomats told me was the vulnerable situation Moldova is under with an increasingly belligerent and active Russia putting pressure on countries wanting to move closer to the West.
According to the proposal, seen by RFE/RL, the money will cover "eight short-range air-defense systems consisting of approximately eight launchers and approximately 24 missiles." The document notes that the implementation of this will be carried out by the Estonian Center for Defense Investments, which supplied Chisinau with equipment last year as well.
Deep Background: The proposal notes that "the proposed assistance measure will improve the performance and operational effectiveness of the Moldovan Armed Forces by replacing outdated Soviet-era equipment and/or establishing new capabilities."
Moldova ambitiously aims to join the EU this decade, and accession talks are formally set to start in the coming months. The paper notes that the measures are also aimed at bringing Chisinau closer into the fold, adding that the actions are undertaken "with a view to strengthening the Republic of Moldova's capacities to participate in [EU] military common security and defense policy missions and operations, accelerating compliance with Union standards and interoperability."
The approval of these measures comes only a week after the same EU ambassadors gave a thumbs up to another package of financial assistance meant to supplement this one.
The other package, worth 40 million euros, is what the bloc calls nonlethal military aid. Of that sum, half will pay for an estimated 33 high-mobility tactical vehicles to replace old Soviet-type armored vehicles. The other 20 million euros is for what is called a short-range air-defense tactical integration system, essentially allowing the launchers and missiles provided in the "lethal" package to function smoothly.
Drilling Down
• The 60 million euros combined is the largest yearly amount heading to the small Eastern European republic since Brussels started this type of support in 2021.
• The total figure since then will now reach 197 million euros, all coming under the European Peace Facility (EPF), an off-EU budget facility that has also allowed the EU as an entity to provide billions of euros in lethal assistance to Ukraine since the Russian full-scale invasion of the country over three years ago.
• Another interesting aspect of the proposal is that there is a hint that the United States, under the new Trump administration,, might step away from playing an active role in Moldova's defense sector. The paper notes, "In the past, the United States have been a major contributor in the defense sphere in Moldova, both regarding training and equipment support. Decisions by the new US administration on support to be provided in the future are pending."
• It does add, however, that "according to preliminary feedback by the Moldovan Ministry of Defense, the potential downsizing of US training support would not affect equipment provided under [EPF] assistance measures."
• What's interesting is that approval of the Moldova EPF was plain-sailing, with discussion among EU working groups on the issue proceeding without major hiccups.
• This is in sharp contrast to the EPF requests for Ukraine that Hungary has blocked for nearly two years, as well as a recent new proposal for Armenia with which Budapest also took issue. Hungary delayed the first-ever EPF funding for Yerevan, worth 11 million euros, for several months last year before approving it and is now repeating the stalling tactic.
• The new package, seen by RFE/RL, contains 20 million euros earmarked primarily for medical equipment for the Armenian armed forces. Like last year, EU diplomats are telling me Budapest is holding off approval by arguing that Azerbaijan, which enjoys close relations with the Fidesz-led Hungarian government, should be offered something similar.
Briefing #2: The Kallas Conversation
What You Need To Know: It's fair to say Kaja Kallas has had a tough start as the EU foreign policy chief. Four months into the job and the club's diplomats are already complaining to the media about how the Estonian is handling the bloc's top diplomatic job.
Now, Brussels is famous for bureaucrats privately berating high-ranking colleagues and officials. It's the veritable fuel that at least keeps the EU media circles spinning, and I've heard plenty of it myself in conversation with my sources -- just as I encountered similar things about her predecessors.
Some of the criticisms of Kallas are warranted, while others are not.
Not securing a bilateral agreement with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio when going to the United States in March was a blow and demonstrated that Brussels hadn't done enough diplomatic footwork ahead of the trip.
Saying the EU wants Ukraine to win the war against Russia instead of the agreed-upon EU line of "supporting Ukraine for as long as it takes" was to northern and eastern member states a sign of ambition to reshape the narrative.
To others, however, it stoked fears that Kallas only cares about the bloc's eastern neighborhood and that she's obsessed with Russia -- a charge one often hears in Brussels against any Baltic politician.
In truth, she has spent much more time in the south than in the east, traveling several times to the bloc's southern rim, including Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Palestine. Her biggest diplomatic win so far has arguably been securing the EU's Syria sanctions rollback despite some initial howls from EU capitals.
Deep Background: Another charge has been her failure to get some of her initiatives over the line, but this largely has to do with some EU capitals working against her.
Take the push to get fresh money for Ukraine if the United States suddenly halts funding. Her proposal was largely based on EU member states chipping in based on their economic size, so via gross national income (GNI). Both Paris and Rome shot this down, mainly because it would mean they would have to pay up more than they have so far when it comes to Ukraine military aid.
Then there's Kallas's push to sanction the Georgian political leadership even though both Hungary and Slovakia had indicated in lower diplomatic circles in Brussels that this was unacceptable for them, denying her the needed consensus.
One of the more plausible explanations I got for this is that she is the first prime minister to become EU foreign policy chief, while the others have all been foreign ministers and have had some experience of how the EU foreign affairs council works.
They work differently from EU summits, where heads of government assemble in Brussels and where Kallas has cut her teeth. At the latter, there tend to be deals, negotiations and negotiations to be had -- often dragging on for hours, even days. At ministerials, things tend to be structured, carefully choreographed and most items agreed upon beforehand.
Drilling Down
• What's next for Kallas? In a wide-ranging interview with RFE/RL last week on the sidelines of the European Parliament plenary in Strasbourg, she offered me some hints about a number of issues.
• Her views on the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, which she has inherited from her predecessors, was perhaps what I found the most interesting. The dialogue, initiated in 2011, is an attempt to normalize relations between Serbia and Kosovo but it last happened at the leader level nearly two years ago.
• "We have to keep the end goal in mind, the normalization of their relationship, so that they could both proceed in their European path. So maybe it's the dialogue, or maybe it is another tool. I'm willing to look into it," she told me, hinting that a new format for the talks may be under way.
• What that format can be is anyone's guess at the moment, but something tells me her focus on the Western Balkans will grow in the coming months with the aim of speeding up the region's EU integration. She is currently on a trip to Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Montenegro and will be in Serbia in May. Developments here are worth watching.
• What also became clear is her limits on doing something new in Georgia: "What we have done is to help the NGOs and civil society, so the funds that we had for the government, we have redirected them to the civil society to help them to really go on the European path."
• Yet, she admitted that no EU restrictive measures are on the table going forward: "You know, we have to have the agreement by 27 countries. And that is a problem here."
• Dealing with Hungary will be a challenge. In EU foreign policy, things are decided via unanimity, meaning that Budapest be a headache for the foreseeable future. She did, however, manage to get the bloc's Russia sanctions extended recently despite loud Hungarian protests.
• But it is not only on sanctions policy. Take Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's visit to Hungary last week. He's been indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC), and Budapest should have tried to arrest him. Instead, he was welcomed with open arms and the country announced its intention to leave the court.
• When I asked Kallas if she fears something similar will happen if the Russian President Vladimir Putin, another ICC-indictee, comes to EU territory, her answer was worryingly deflective: "The problem is that the EU is not the member of the convention, it's the member states. If a person comes to their territory, they also have to implement the ICC decisions."
• Therein lies very much her problem: She is beholden to the whims of all EU member states, with Hungary the most problematic at the moment. Being a former EU prime minister, she understands that. But it will frustrate her at every turn she makes.
Looking Ahead
The NATO HQ in Brussels will host two meetings this week that aren't strictly related to the military alliance.
On April 10, defense ministers of the "coalition of the willing" -- a gathering of largely European nations led by Britain and France -- are assembling to continue work on "a reassurance force" for Ukraine after a potential permanent cease-fire has been agreed.
The day after the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (known as the Ramstein group), chaired this time by Britain and Germany, will come together to look at more military contributions to Ukraine.
That's all for this week!
Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.
Until next time,
Rikard Jozwiak
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