Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two major issues: The reassurance force for Ukraine & the chances of Kyiv and Chisinau being "decoupled" on their respective EU membership paths.

Briefing #1: What A 'Reassurance Force' In Ukraine Could Look Like

What You Need To Know: The Coalition of the Willing, a grouping of over 20 Western countries, is inching closer to finalizing plans for some sort of "reassurance force" for Ukraine. Officials familiar with the talks claim that "discussions have intensified" in recent weeks in European capitals.

Briefing on background after the most recent talks in Paris on September 4, a senior European diplomat noted there has been "increased enthusiasm" for the initiative compared with earlier this year and they are taking "small steps forward" on several issues.

The sudden jolt of action in recent weeks is down to one big movement: The United States is paying attention to the project.

One diplomat speaking under condition of anonymity says Washington now can be seen as an "observer" of the coalition. Even without a concrete "American backstop" as European countries are seeking for the reassurance force to go ahead, both politically and militarily the United States has indicated one may be in the making, they added.

In what shape or form still remains to be seen, but it is believed that the most useful asset would be American intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), most likely from NATO eastern flank countries such as Poland and Romania.

Deep Background: Several unknowns still dominate the planning for a potential force beyond America's potential role -- crucially the political mandate of a mission and the rules of engagement.

When it comes to the mandate, two things are clear: The force would only become active if there is a cease-fire, and it can only operate upon an invitation from Ukraine. The latter is pretty straightforward, but the coalition is still keen to point out this is a decision by Kyiv and Kyiv only and that Russia cannot veto it in any way. This means it falls outside the auspices of the United Nations or the OSCE.

The coalition is also keen to avoid any form of international force that would include troops from more Kremlin-friendly countries such as Brazil, India, or China.

The cease-fire is a precondition for any boots on the ground, especially as no country is keen to assume any combat roles. Herein lies something of a dilemma as no European diplomat appears to believe the war is about to end anytime soon. Kaja Kallas, the EU foreign policy chief, said recently that she believes Moscow will ramp up the war effort going into the autumn and winter, and various European officials have backed this up by noting they see the conflict potentially dragging on for years.

Drilling Down:

· What about rules of engagement? So far, there isn't much agreement on those either. What is clear is the future force won't be on the contact line.

· The first line of defense is the Ukrainian Army, and the reassurance force comes as a second layer. There are still various options, but the idea is there should be land, sea, and air components.

· Turkey is the lead nation when it comes to the sea component, looking at making sure the Black Sea lanes are free for navigation and potentially being engaged in naval demining.

· Britain and France are expected to take the lead when it comes to the land forces and around eight other nations, mainly in the Nordic-Baltic region, have indicated they are ready to put boots on the ground, as well.

· The goal is to have 25,000-30,000 troops in Ukraine, but it may not be that many. Poland has indicated its role mainly will be that of a logistics hub for the force, while Germany is hesitating and would most probably need parliamentary approval to send any military, a potential obstacle many other nations face as well.

· Another dilemma here is many NATO eastern flank nations fear that officers for a future reassurance force will be pulled from the multinational troops of the NATO battalions placed in on their soil in recent years as a response to Russian aggression in Ukraine. Baltic diplomats in particular have warned the reassurance force mustn't create "gaps" in the military alliance's defense.

· The land component of the reassurance force would most likely be placed in western Ukraine, with the Lviv area being the most obvious location. The Yavoriv military base, which was used to train Ukrainian troops by Western army personnel before the Russian full-scale invasion, would according to some sources be a natural hub, especially if the reassurance force has a training component.

· Other options include placing forces around critical infrastructure such as airports and ports as well as in bigger cities like Odesa and Kyiv.

· The air component still needs to be worked out, but the idea is the skies over western Ukraine and eventually central Ukraine should be protected. But here the matter of rules of engagement becomes an issue, as no Western country is ready to, for example, shoot at Russian aircraft if they were to venture over Ukrainian skies -- thus creating a direct confrontation with the Kremlin.

Briefing #2: Ukraine And Moldova Remain Coupled For Now

What You Need To Know: The summer was full of speculation and hints from Brussels officials that Ukraine and Moldova might be separated on their respective paths to eventual EU membership.

The two Eastern European countries have been paired ever since both applied for membership of the bloc in the wake of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. They both got EU candidate status that summer, and in late 2023 EU member states signaled to both that accession talks could start.

But talks haven't started with either of them, and that has to do with Hungary blocking the entire process with Ukraine over what Budapest sees as Kyiv's discrimination of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine.

The Central European country held a consultative referendum earlier this year in which 95 percent of respondents were against Ukrainian EU membership. While most other EU member states dismissed this vote as another political stunt by Budapest, few think the country is willing to lift its veto to start the talks anytime soon.

Some think this is unfair to Moldova, as none of the 27 EU member states has anything against commencing negotiations with Chisinau.

Deep Background: The EU enlargement commissioner, Marta Kos, opened up on the idea of a formal decoupling when speaking to RFE/RL this spring. The idea seemed to gain traction over the summer when Brussels briefly was rattled by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's sudden move in July to limit the independence of two key anti-corruption agencies.

These sort of political "decouplings" have happened before, most recently last year as Albania was allowed to move forward with membership negotiations while Bulgaria has continued to veto the same steps for its neighbor North Macedonia.

But when the bloc's Europe ministers, which deal with enlargement issues, met in Denmark on September 1-2 there were no words about decoupling Moldova and Ukraine other than it was ruled out -- at least for now.

Drilling Down:

· The reason for this is threefold: a recognition not to give in to what many member states see as Hungarian blackmailing, the feeling that such a move would be strategically disadvantageous for both the EU and Ukraine at the moment, and that it would only have a limited impact on Moldova.

· On the first issue, there is an increasing frustration that Budapest is trying to dictate too much of the EU's policy toward Ukraine already. It's fair to say the country has been successful.

· EU institutional funding, via the European Peace Facility (EPF), for Ukrainian weapons has been blocked for two years already, and later this week European diplomats will most likely accept that Budapest -- together with Bratislava -- will manage to remove some oligarchs from the bloc's Russia sanctions blacklist in order to achieve unanimity for a six-month extension of all the restrictive measures.

· The thinking here is that rather than handing Hungary another win, it could be wise to wait until the Hungarian parliamentary election in April 2026 as polls show the opposition has a real chance of seizing power.

· This would not automatically mean a total reversal of Hungary's Ukraine policy, but few EU officials think while Ukraine is losing precious time, a few more months of waiting is insignificant in a bigger process that can drag on for years or possibly decades.

· Secondly, many of Ukraine's most ardent supporters in the club such as the Baltic states and the Czech Republic immediately started a diplomatic rearguard action against any type of decoupling as soon as rumors started spreading that it was considered.

· Lithuania authored a discussion paper, seen by RFE/RL, in which it argued that the EU-26 -- meaning the entire European Union bar Hungary -- should conduct informal negotiations with both Ukraine and Moldova in the meantime and that negotiations on most of the 33 accession chapters would be opened "in a fast-track manner when EU-27 support is rebuilt."

· Crucially, both France and Germany, the two EU heavyweights, came onboard against any decoupling now especially as the United States has signaled that Ukrainian NATO membership most likely is off the table in any potential future peace negotiation with Russia.

· In this sense, EU membership for Kyiv becomes even more pertinent according to most EU diplomats who see this as the most obvious political and security guarantee that European nations can offer the war-torn nation going forward.

· Finally, there were also signals from Moldova that even Chisinau wasn't too keen on decoupling, at least now. Many European officials had wanted to give the country's pro-EU government a boost ahead of what is expected to be a closely fought parliamentary election on September 28 by opening accession talks a few days or weeks before the vote.

· Others, both in EU capitals and in Chisinau, argued this would only have a limited outcome for two reasons. Firstly, few beyond the corridors of power in Brussels understand the technicalities or the significance of starting EU accession negotiations.

· As one EU diplomat put it to me: "People want to know when their country can join and what it means for them, not when some obscure diplomats meet."

· Secondly, there is a recognition among all EU candidate countries, but notably Moldova, that Ukraine's efforts to fight off the Russian invasion have reignited EU enlargement in general. Chisinau in fact jumped on the coattails of Ukraine in applying for EU membership back in 2022. For now, they will remain connected, but don't rule out that the decoupling debate might start again later in the year.

Looking Ahead

The European Union autumn political season is in full-swing again, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on September 10 will deliver her annual State of the European Union at the European Parliament plenary in Strasbourg.

The speech, which usually takes close to an hour, covers all her political priorities for the upcoming months. Look out for potential new priorities when it comes to sanctions on Russia or a renewed push for EU enlargement.

That's all for this week!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two major issues: Ukraine’s wobbly week and Iceland’s flirting with EU membership.

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Wider Europe Briefing: Ukraine Does An Anti-Corruption U-Turn; Iceland Reconsiders EU Bid?

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Briefing #1: Questions Persist Despite Zelenskyy U-Turn

What You Need To Know: The European Union has breathed a collective sigh of relief after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s swift U-turn this week over legislation that would have limited the independence of two key anti-corruption agencies. But questions and speculation remain about what triggered it, what it says about Kyiv’s ruling class and how it will affect the war-torn country’s chances of joining the bloc. On July 22, Zelenskyy signed a bill approved by parliament that placed the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) under the auspices of the Prosecutor General, a position appointed by the president. Within hours Ukrainians, despite Russian air strikes earlier in the day, took to the streets to protest the move, which critics said undermined the independence of the institutions in a country long known for deep-seated corruption.

The response from Brussels was also immediate. Both European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and the president of the European Council, Antonio Costa, called Zelenskyy, demanding an explanation and expressing “strong concerns.” European enlargement commissioner Marta Kos said in a post on X that “independent bodies like NABU and SAPO are essential for Ukraine’s EU path.” Within two days Zelenskyy had done an about-face, putting forward new legislation that would reverse course and ensure independence for NABU and SAPO.

Deep Background: But the damage was already done. Speaking on condition of anonymity, one diplomat said Zelenskyy had “managed to shoot himself in the foot for no apparent reason,” as it gave ample ammunition to the many in the 27-nation bloc who claim that Kyiv is hopelessly corrupt. Another noted that it seemed that Ukraine had suddenly been transported back to the era of former President Viktor Yanukovych, who constantly battled to control the judiciary. Yanukovych was ousted from power in 2014 during the Maidan protests, sparked by his decision not to sign a political association and free trade deal with the EU, instead choosing closer ties with Moscow. Grumblings over this week's legislative rollercoaster were also directed against Zelenskyy’s head of office, Andriy Yermak, a powerful but deeply polarizing figure in European circles. Sources said questions persist about whether this was the “real face” of Zelenskyy and his entourage, given that many officials have long held fears about what they call his “tendencies to want to centralize power.” Zelenskyy admitted that demonstrations in the country, the first such show of defiance against the government since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, made him change his mind. EU officials saw the change as positive -- signaling a healthy and empowered civil society that also highlighted Zelenskyy’s democratic credentials -- in contrast to the considerable backsliding, for example, that has been seen recently in Georgia.

Drilling Down

• It appears as though pressure from Brussels may have also helped Zelenskyy's decision. Everything was on the table, admits one official, and the bloc made that known.
• That would mean freezing some of the billions of euros in funds that the EU provides to Ukraine on a regular basis. A lot of this cash is conditioned on reform efforts, notably when it comes to the judiciary.
• One of the benchmarks for Ukraine to get visa liberalization to the bloc, back in 2017, was the setting up of NABU. While no one was openly suggesting the suspension of visa liberalization, as is currently being mooted with Tbilisi, the threat of looking into it was enough to rattle Kyiv.
• Then there was the delicate issue of de-coupling Ukraine from Moldova, allowing the latter to proceed alone in the EU accession process. That would be a heavy blow to Ukraine, given the pair have so far moved closer to membership hand in hand.
• The discussion about this started in Brussels in the spring, with Hungary reluctant to give Kyiv the green light to start accession talks.
• The idea was very much alive before the latest developments in Ukraine, and EU officials have indicated to RFE/RL that it may come up again in early September with a view to giving Moldova’s ruling pro-EU government a boost before its crucial parliamentary election later that same month.
• The fact that Hungary appears to be unlikely to change its position on the issue ahead of its own national elections in April next year has made the issue even more pressing. Many EU member states believe that this decoupling would be unfair as it essentially would give in to Budapest’s “blackmail.”
• Yet some diplomats admitted that the latest events had weakened their argument, regardless of the subsequent Ukrainian backtracking.
• Highlighting the diverging paths, the same day Ukraine's parliament approved the controversial law, Greek police arrested the Moldovan oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc, arguably the country’s most wanted man.
• A former politician and one of Moldova's richest people, Plahotniuc is allegedly the mastermind behind the theft of $1 billion from Chisinau a decade ago -- a charge he denies. At this moment, Moldova’s and Ukraine’s efforts to fight corruption couldn’t have contrasted more in the eyes of some in Brussels.
• Interestingly, there is a feeling in Brussels that the Ukrainian frustration with the Hungarian veto and the bloc’s inability to deal with it could have driven Zelenskyy to care less about EU “hobby horses” such as corruption.
• Rumors are swirling that several of the bloc’s leaders told him at a recent conference in Rome that he should be ready to accept that Moldova might move ahead of Ukraine.
• That, coupled with less focus on the issue from the new American administration, gave him an opportunity to deal with long-standing nuisances such as pesky anti-corruption officials, diplomatic sources said. He may have overplayed or revealed his hand. Either way, the EU has taken note.

Briefing #2: Is Iceland The Next Country To Join The EU?

What You Need To Know: When predicting which country would be the next to join the European Union, the smart money seems to be on Montenegro given that it has been negotiating for years and has advanced the furthest of all candidates. Others point to Albania, which is currently making great strides toward Brussels as the next member. There are also some who think that Moldova -- a reform-oriented and ambitious country in the bloc’s eastern neighborhood -- stands a decent chance of becoming the EU's 28th member state in the coming year. But the right answer may actually be Iceland.

The Trump administration's overtures to annex the Danish territory of Greenland and the prospect of a trade war between its security provider, the United States, and its biggest trading partner, the European Union, have created unease on the North Atlantic island. The current Icelandic government, which came to power last year, has announced that a referendum on resuming accession talks with Brussels will be held before 2027. Polls suggest a majority would support restarting talks.

Deep Background: The country has been here before. It was badly hit by the 2008 global financial crisis, when three of its major banks collapsed. EU membership -- and especially joining the eurozone -- was seen as a way out of the crisis, and negotiations with the bloc began in 2010. Talks were suspended three years later by a newly elected right-wing government. By then, the eurozone was itself engulfed in the same financial crisis, so joining the club and adopting its ailing common currency was no longer seen as a panacea. In those three years of accession talks, Reykjavik opened most of the 33 accession chapters and closed 11. By comparison, the current EU accession frontrunner, Montenegro, has managed to close a mere seven chapters in more than a decade of talks.

It’s not for nothing that EU officials believe that Iceland could wrap up the entire process in a couple of years if it was to resume its application -- which, according to the European Commission, remains valid. It helps, of course, that the country is part of the European Economic Area (EEA), which means that it -- together with other EEA members Norway and Liechtenstein -- is already applying the EU’s internal market rules. When European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen visited the island last week, she was quick to point out that the issue of future EU membership is “a sovereign decision that the people take here. So, it’s not a topic for me to comment on.” But, she added, “Iceland is familiar and integrated into the single market, we share values, we know each other very well, we are like-minded -- all this is an asset.” Speaking on condition of anonymity, a European diplomat familiar with the topic was even more forthright. “It would be good if a Western European country would join the EU, especially after Brexit,” they said. “It would show that the club truly is attractive.” Integration would prove seamless, given that Iceland is richer than the EU average and -- with a population of 300,000 -- would be the smallest member state if it joined.

Drilling Down

• While Brussels officially is trying to stay out of the Icelandic debate on membership, it is quietly doing everything to edge it closer.
• During her visit, von der Leyen promised a trade review to potentially upgrade the EEA agreement. She also struck a deal to protect critical infrastructure that is essential for Iceland, such as subsea cables, and started negotiations on a new security and defense partnership agreement, which would allow closer cooperation on cyber and hybrid threats.
• The partnership, expected to be ready by year’s end, is especially important for Iceland, which is acutely aware of the need for security cooperation, particularly as both Russia and China are becoming more active in the Arctic region.
• The United States has also rattled the country recently with talk of taking over Greenland, sparking debate there about rejoining the European Union after leaving the European Communities -- a precursor of today’s EU -- back in 1985.
• While Washington hasn’t made similar claims on Iceland, there is a certain nervousness, as the US provides for the country’s defense on behalf of NATO via a bilateral agreement signed in 1951.
• To this day, Iceland is the only NATO member without its own army and there are no imminent plans to create one. In 2006, the United States announced it would continue to provide for the island’s defense but without forces being permanently stationed there. That policy still stands, and the former US air base in Keflavik remains a hub for NATO exercises.
• But it is the transatlantic trade tension that is really making Iceland twitchy. Reykjavik wants Brussels to consult them on the EU-US trade talks, but that is not something that EU officials can promise without full membership.
• And it is trade in general that could spark conflict during eventual membership negotiations, especially on agriculture and fisheries, which are key industries on the island.
• Those two items are excluded from the EEA for good reason. There is a fear that the EU’s common agriculture policy would kill farming on the island by flooding it with cheap food products from other EU member states.
• Fishing is even more delicate. Reykjavik claims proudly that its management of fishing stocks is superior to Brussels. And it would be very reluctant to give up its exclusive rights to fishing within its 200-mile economic zone to Danish, Dutch, Irish, Spanish, or French fleets.
• Then there is commercial whaling, which is still permitted in Icelandic waters despite the EU’s push for a global moratorium.
• The fact remains that most political parties in the Icelandic parliament are against EU membership.
• And while polls show that the population is keen to restart talks with Brussels, they are less sure that they actually want to become members. In Brussels, officials remain hopeful but see obstacles for a small yet fiercely independent nation to voluntarily give up its sovereignty. “It’s a long shot on their side, not ours,” one said.

Looking Ahead

The Helsinki Final Act celebrates 50 years, and the anniversary is marked by a whole day of high-level speeches and panels in the Finnish capital on July 31. The agreement, signed by 35 nations including the Soviet Union and the United States back in 1975, was a high watermark of Cold War détente and paved the way for today’s Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

That's all for this week!

Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here.