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China In Eurasia

Zhang Jun, China’s ambassador to the UN, speaks at the Security Council in New York on November 15 about a resolution calling for more humanitarian corridors to be set up in the Gaza Strip.
Zhang Jun, China’s ambassador to the UN, speaks at the Security Council in New York on November 15 about a resolution calling for more humanitarian corridors to be set up in the Gaza Strip.

For Chinese Ambassador to the EU Fu Cong, the Israel-Hamas war laid bare the West’s double standards and how Beijing sees it falling out of touch with the rest of the world.

Speaking in Brussels in mid-November, shortly after the October 7 outbreak of hostilities in Israel and Gaza, Fu railed against the bloc’s labeling of China as a “rival” on the global stage, saying that if having different foreign policy views makes Beijing a rival then Brussels will find it has many other competitors.

“From the Middle East to Africa, from Asia to Latin America, there are many countries who obviously do not see eye to eye with Europe when it comes to values,” he said. “We can clearly tell [this] from the divergence of responses to the ongoing Gaza crisis in the Middle East.”

Those comments have come to crystallize China’s long-term effort to gain clout across the so-called Global South -- featuring countries such as China, India, Brazil, South Africa, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Nigeria -- where nations are looking for alternatives to the Western-led world order.

Bloody conflicts -- in Ukraine and most recently in Gaza -- have exposed global divisions over the plight of Palestinians and lingering resentment over perceived Western hypocrisy about the use of force and civilian casualties that Beijing is looking to capitalize on.

“This is a huge victory for China [in its campaign] in the Global South to demonstrate the hypocritical and ideological nature of U.S. foreign policy towards Palestine, which indirectly affects the views of the Global South towards the war in Ukraine,” Haiyun Ma, a Chinese foreign policy expert at Frostburg State University in Maryland, told RFE/RL.

Palestinians inspect the rubble of destroyed buildings following Israeli air strikes on the town of Khan Younis in the Gaza Strip on October 26.
Palestinians inspect the rubble of destroyed buildings following Israeli air strikes on the town of Khan Younis in the Gaza Strip on October 26.

As U.S. President Joe Biden tied American support for Ukraine and Israel together in October -- describing the countries as democracies fighting enemies determined to “annihilate” them -- many in the developing world heard a double standard.

China and many other countries saw it as hypocritical for the West to condemn an illegal Russian occupation in Ukraine but to stand staunchly behind Israel, which has occupied parts of Palestinian territory for decades and has settlements on the West Bank.

The White House has recently grown more critical of Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, but many leaders of countries in the Global South that have historically supported the Palestinian cause have noted the differing Western reaction to both crises.

Experts say these perceived gaps in Western policy -- galvanized recently by scenes of civilian casualties from Israel’s attack on the Gaza Strip -- have presented an opportunity for China to better position itself as an alternative to Washington’s global leadership and could work to undermine the United States’ attempt to rally global support to isolate and punish Russia for invading its neighbor.

Since the deadly attack in Israel on October 7, China has presented itself as a peace broker while taking aim at the West.

Chinese diplomats at the UN and Chinese state-run news outlets that broadcast globally in local languages have stepped up their criticism, saying that U.S. military support for Israel is contributing to the war. Meanwhile, Beijing has looked to build up its clout by calling for an immediate cease-fire in Gaza and hosting a peace conference with Arabic and other Muslim ministers in November.

“It was tried with Ukraine, but now with the Israel-Hamas war, it’s clear what China is trying to do,” Etienne Soula, a research analyst with the German Marshall Fund’s Alliance for Securing Democracy, told RFE/RL. “They’re portraying the West -- and the United States in particular -- as isolated, while China is surrounded by Arab and African countries on the side of the Global South.”

The Ukraine, Gaza Tightrope

China has been seeking to expand its influence across the Global South for years and recently concentrated its efforts in the Middle East, culminating in a Chinese-mediated deal in March that restored relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Beijing has looked to build off that diplomatic win, and in both Gaza and Ukraine, China has tried to balance its message to varying degrees and avoid blowback, though still working to discredit the United States.

A Ukrainian mortar unit fires on Russian positions near the devastated city of Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine.
A Ukrainian mortar unit fires on Russian positions near the devastated city of Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine.

“Beijing wants to pin responsibility for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on Washington and [demonstrate] that the [United States] and Europe have significantly weakened their capacity to uphold the existing world order,” Michael Schuman, a China analyst at the Atlantic Council, wrote in November.

On Ukraine, Beijing has refused to condemn Moscow’s invasion and offered economic support to Russia that has helped the Kremlin survive Western sanctions. Beijing has also kept its diplomatic distance from Kyiv, with Chinese leader Xi Jinping not speaking directly with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy until 14 months after Russia’s full-scale invasion.

But China has also tried to appear as a neutral party, despite Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin declaring a “no-limits” partnership in February 2022. Beijing unveiled a 12-point proposal to broker peace in Ukraine in February that was widely dismissed in Western capitals, but China later stepped up efforts in the spring by dispatching Li Hui, a special representative on Eurasian affairs, to travel to several European capitals, including Kyiv and Moscow.

Those talks have gone nowhere, and Beijing appears to have stepped back from engaging diplomatically as the war edges towards the two-year mark with no end in sight.

In Gaza, China has refused to condemn Hamas -- declared a terrorist group by the EU and the United States -- and remains critical of Israeli treatment of Palestinians, especially due to the rising civilian death toll. In its first statement in October following the Hamas attack in Israel that killed at least 1,200 people, China urged both sides to “exercise restraint” and embrace a “two-state solution.”

Russian President Vladimir Putin (left) and Chinese President Xi Jinping attend a meeting on the sidelines of the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing on October 18.
Russian President Vladimir Putin (left) and Chinese President Xi Jinping attend a meeting on the sidelines of the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing on October 18.

That statement drew immediate backlash from Israeli and U.S. officials for minimizing the brutality the Palestinian militants had visited on Israel on October 7, with Yuval Waks, a senior official at the Israeli Embassy in Beijing, saying: “When people are being murdered, slaughtered in the streets, this is not the time to call for a two-state solution.”

Soula says China has moved more carefully since then in its messaging regarding Israel -- with whom it had been building strong ties prior to the war -- and in showing its sympathy for the plight of Palestinians. Still, Beijing has looked to channel the collective voice expressed by other leading Global South countries, such Brazil and South Africa.

“In terms of success, it’s hard to say,” said Soula. “I think that China has followed the way that the wind has blown. Where the global majority leans, you can see China adopt a stance in that direction.”

Hearts And Minds

Soula and his colleagues at the Alliance for Securing Democracy have been tracking Chinese messaging from its diplomats and state-run news outlets for the wars in Ukraine and Gaza.

A February study focused on Ukraine found that officials online and in Chinese media have provided “rhetorical cover for the Kremlin” in Ukraine despite Beijing's official stance as a neutral party in the conflict.

“To weaken Western democracies and their allies, China also has tried to isolate those countries by appealing to the Global South,” the report said. “In the context of the war in Ukraine, Chinese messaging has consistently argued that countries supporting Ukraine are hypocrites and indifferent to the rest of the world.”

A companion study released in November looking at Chinese messaging around the Israel-Hamas war also documented how Chinese state-run news outlets have leveraged their global networks, especially across Africa and the Middle East, to blame the United States as the alleged malign cause for the war in Gaza.

Fire and smoke rise following an Israeli air strike on Gaza City on October 8.
Fire and smoke rise following an Israeli air strike on Gaza City on October 8.

But it is still unclear exactly how much influence these campaigns have translated into. While the Israel-Hamas war has complicated the West’s argument that Russia’s invasion is a danger to the current world order, Beijing has not emerged as a deciding diplomatic force in either war.

Giulia Sciorati, a fellow at the London School of Economics (LSE) focused on China’s role in the Global South, says that while “China has successfully played on shared worldviews with the Global South,” it’s unclear if Beijing’s positions have truly placed itself as a de facto leader for non-Western countries.

“On paper, this [stance] may comply with the perceived priorities of the Global South,” she told RFE/RL. “[But] it has shown not to comply with the expectations of Global South countries overall, [many of] which had wished for China to take on a more prominent role in peace negotiations.”

Global opinion surveys also paint a more nuanced picture for how China’s bid to woo the Global South is shaping up.

While recent polling has shown that anti-China sentiment in many Western countries is growing, China’s narratives do seem to be resonating across the Global South, where the West has failed to win over countries like India and Gulf nations into supporting sanctions against Russia.

A poll released in late February by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) found that while strong majorities in Western countries stand in support of Ukraine, those surveyed across the Global South were less supportive of continued war, more likely to sympathize with Moscow's grievances, and to be suspicious of Western leaders' motives.

But a follow-up public opinion poll released in November by the ECFR that surveyed 21 Western and non-Western countries found that people had lost faith in Western policy and instead favored “an a la carte arrangement” where their governments can choose which major player to partner with depending on the issue at stake rather than be locked into a clear geopolitical bloc.

Frostburg State University’s Ma says Chinese foreign policy will grapple with challenges in the coming years as it’s likely to face more competition from the United States and the EU in courting the Global South, but there’s no guarantee that China will “lose some of this newfound influence if the West is able to reassert itself.”

“First of all, once China gains, it will consolidate and even expand,” he said. “Second, even if the West returns and reasserts, it takes time to recover credibility and to channel resources.”

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin make a toast during a reception at the Kremlin in Moscow on March 21.
Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin make a toast during a reception at the Kremlin in Moscow on March 21.

Welcome back to the China In Eurasia briefing, an RFE/RL newsletter tracking China's resurgent influence from Eastern Europe to Central Asia. This will be the last briefing of the year as I'll be off for the holidays starting next week. Thank you for subscribing and helping grow this newsletter. See you in 2024!

I'm RFE/RL correspondent Reid Standish and here's what I'm following right now.

Listen to the Talking China In Eurasia podcast. Apple Podcasts | Spotify | Google | YouTube

Is The Wind Now At Xi and Putin's Backs?

From deepening cracks in Western unity for Ukraine to questions over resolve to support Taiwan, both Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin appear to be feeling that time is on their side.

But are Xi and Putin truly entering 2024 with the wind at their backs?

Finding Perspective: Putin seems convinced that the answer is yes.

Addressing officials at a December 8 reception at the Kremlin, the Russian president seemed emboldened, saying Kyiv is running out of time and weapons, and that Ukraine has "nothing, they have no future."

Putin's optimism stems from U.S. funding for Ukraine continuing to be held up due to political battles in Congress, leading to warnings from the White House that funding to send weapons and assistance to Ukraine could run out by the end of the year.

Adding to this are recent reports that previous years of budget cuts combined with advanced support for Ukraine has left most European militaries weakened and their weapons arsenals empty.

A series of recent polls also show Donald Trump leading U.S. President Joe Biden by several percentage points, a development likely to be welcomed by Beijing and Moscow as it could lead to a more isolationist United States that would weaken support for U.S. allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, particularly Ukraine and Taiwan.

Why It Matters: 2024 is shaping up to be a major inflection point.

The battlefield in Ukraine has slipped into stalemate and Western unity is likely to show more cracks with elections in Europe -- not to mention the upcoming U.S. presidential election -- likely to turn support for Kyiv into a ballot box issue.

January elections in Taiwan are set to be an early litmus test, and it's difficult for any candidate running to credibly say they're confident Washington will come to its aid given the waning support facing Ukraine at the moment.

But some added perspective is needed here as it can be easy to lose track that Xi and Putin are facing immense pressures as well.

Xi is grappling with a slowing economy and has recently done a sweeping reshuffle of Beijing's upper echelons, including removing foreign and defense ministers this year.

Putin has managed to reorganize the Russian economy for the war effort, and the Kremlin has mostly successfully navigated Western sanctions. Polls also show that a majority of Russians still support the war nearly two years in.

But Russia's long-term economic prospects look much more bleak, and the high casualties from the war have only increased the country's demographic pressures.

In the end, it may come down to who blinks first.

When I interviewed Taiwanese Deputy Foreign Minister Roy Chun Lee in May and asked him if he believes Western support for Ukraine has surprised and deterred Chinese designs on Taiwan, his answer was that it's still too soon to say. "I think China is waiting to see what happens two years from now and three years from now," he said.

A lot can happen between now and then.

Podcast Corner: How Von Der Leyen Became the EU's Top China Hawk

Listen to the latest episode of the China In Eurasia podcast. You can find the show on Spotify, Apple, Google, and YouTube.

European Union leaders used a high-profile summit in Beijing last week to press Xi and China's leadership on a host of contentious issues ranging from trade to Ukraine.

This sharpening approach from Brussels has largely stemmed from a policy turn championed by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who has pushed to reduce the bloc's dependencies on China.

But what's behind von der Leyen's views and what do they mean for the future of the EU and China?

On the latest episode of Talking China In Eurasia, I explore this with RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, who explains von der Leyen's rise and the deepening competition between Beijing and Brussels. Listen here.

Be sure to listen and leave a review on your listening platform of choice. I'd also love to hear what you think. Reach out at Standishr@rferl.org

Three More Stories From Eurasia

1. EU-China Summit Wrap-Up

The EU held its long-awaited summit in Beijing with Xi last week. The meeting wrapped up with few deliverables and mostly laid out the rules of the road for their relationship in the future.

Here are the main takeaways.

The Details: Ahead of the summit, EU officials told RFE/RL that they were pleased they were able to secure a working lunch meeting with Xi for von der Leyen and European Council President Charles Michel.

In the lead-up to the summit, many in Brussels felt frustrated that Beijing wasn't taking their geopolitical concerns seriously enough, as I reported here.

The mood after the meeting was hardly one of optimism, but both von der Leyen and Michel said they felt heard after the summit and that Xi and other top officials are now clear on what Brussels sees as the problems in their relationship.

Von der Leyen said the two sides had an "intense discussion on the topic of trade imbalance and the root causes," citing in part a slowdown in the Chinese economy that is reducing domestic demand and prompting Chinese companies to divert their products to the European market.

The EU officials said before the sit-down that Brussels planned to focus on Ukraine and would continue to back Kyiv even if American support fades or stops altogether. Von der Leyen said they pressed China to use its influence to bring Moscow to the negotiating table.

However, given post-summit comments by Wang Lutong, the director general of the Chinese Foreign Ministry's European Department, those calls didn't seem to make much headway.

"Sometimes European politicians say to us that China needs to speak to Russia, you need to speak to President Putin about withdrawing their soldiers," he said. "This is a very independent, sovereign nation. President Putin is making his decision based on his own national interest and security."

2. Lukashenka's China Trip

A few days before the EU's top brass arrived in Beijing, Xi hosted Belarussian strongman Alyaksandr Lukashenka to strengthen "political mutual trust and international coordination," according to Chinese state media.

What You Need To Know: Lukashenka, of course, is a staunch ally of Putin, and Belarus has supported Russia amid its war in Ukraine. Belarus was a staging ground for Moscow's full-scale invasion and a Yale University study published in November reported that Belarus also has facilitated "Russia's systematic effort to identify, collect, transport, and re-educate Ukraine's children" during the war.

Lukashenka was in Beijing in October for Xi's Belt and Road Forum and previously had a bilateral visit with the Chinese leader in February.

Like with that visit in February, Lukashenka was once again courting Chinese investment, which once flowed into the country but has generally stalled due to Western sanctions and Minsk's poor relations with the EU, which have limited its appeal to Beijing as a transit hub between China and the bloc.

Lukashenka left with no formal agreements.

Xi was quoted as saying by the official Xinhua News Agency that China "opposes external interference in Belarus's internal affairs" and that both leaders "also exchanged views on the Ukraine crisis," although no details were offered.

3. Blocked

Protesters with relatives imprisoned in Xinjiang through the western Chinese province's vast internment system targeting Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and other Muslim minorities were blocked from approaching the Chinese consulate in Almaty, RFE/RL's Kazakh Service reported.

What It Means: The relatives are part of a small group that has been picketing the consulate for years, calling for the release of their family members and protesting against Beijing's policies that led to an internment camp system in Xinjiang.

The protesters have faced pressure before, with some members being arrested and stopped by attending rallies or events in the past. They had planned to picket the Chinese Consulate on December 4, which they said was their 1,000th day of gathering, but were blocked by police when approaching.

Across The Supercontinent

In Custody: Russia's FSB said its officers arrested a Belarusian citizen on December 9 who it says is responsible for bombing railway connections linking Russia to China in the country's Far East in late November.

Hacked?: The cybersecurity platform Hacker News reported that the Uzbek Foreign Ministry's servers came under an attack in early December through a "remote access Trojan" program called SugarGh0st RAT, which they say is linked to China and used similar code used by Chinese actors in the past.

Winter Virus: Kazak health officials are moving to stamp out rumors spreading online that a respiratory illness spiking in China has spread across the border to Kazakhstan.

Zaure Akhmetova, Kazakhstan's deputy chair of the Committee for Sanitary and Epidemiological Control, said the government has no data supporting this and that the virus suspected for the growing case load in China contains "neither new nor unknown pathogens."

New Targets: Faced with slow growth, Reuters reported that China's leaders met for a closed-door meeting this week to discuss economic targets and map out stimulus plans for 2024.

One Thing To Watch

It's become something of a tradition for Xi and Putin to hold a virtual meeting in December, and they often tend to show where the strategic winds for Beijing and Moscow are blowing for the upcoming year.

In 2021, the two leaders had a 90-minute call, setting in place much of the agreements and rhetoric that would later form the basis of the "no limits" partnership that they announced in February 2022 at the Beijing Olympics. The following December, Xi seemed to double down on that sentiment despite fallout from Moscow's invasion, saying that "China is ready to work with Russia and all progressive forces around the world that oppose hegemonism and power politics."

What will be the focus of this year's call?

That's all from me for now. Don't forget to send me any questions, comments, or tips that you might have.

Until next time,

Reid Standish

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your inbox every other Wednesday.

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About The Newsletter

In recent years, it has become impossible to tell the biggest stories shaping Eurasia without considering China’s resurgent influence in local business, politics, security, and culture.

Subscribe to this weekly dispatch in which correspondent Reid Standish builds on the local reporting from RFE/RL’s journalists across Eurasia to give you unique insights into Beijing’s ambitions and challenges.

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