China In Eurasia

As NATO leaders gathered in Washington for a landmark summit and issued "irreversible" support for Ukraine and deep criticism of Beijing for its support of Russia, China was holding maneuvers with Belarusian troops on the alliance's eastern edge.

The 11-day joint military exercises named Eagle Assault 2024 kicked off on July 8 -- the eve of the NATO summit -- and are under way near the Belarusian city of Brest, some 5 kilometers from the Polish border.

The first of their kind between China and Belarus, the drills reflect growing defense ties between the two countries and are designed to send a message of resolve toward NATO, analysts and officials say.

"The timing is hardly a coincidence," Sari Arho Havren, an associate fellow at London's Royal United Services Institute, told RFE/RL. "There are lots of elements coming together here to send a clear message that China is deepening its ties with a like-minded country in Europe that supports its broader aims."

The military exercises are “part of a pattern," NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said on July 11 in at the alliance's summit in Washington. "It just confirms how authoritarian regimes are aligning more and more and also how China is coming closer to NATO in Europe, in Africa, the Arctic, and elsewhere.”

At a July 5 briefing ahead of the drills -- which the Belarusian and Chinese Defense Ministries have billed as anti-terrorism exercises -- Vladimir Kupriyanyuk, the deputy head of the General Staff of the Belarusian armed forces, said the maneuvers were a response to the "West's aggressive foreign policy toward Belarus" and to "Ukrainian provocation."

"The NATO grouping on the border with Belarus is growing rapidly, which leads to an increase in tension in the region," the Belarusian Defense Ministry said in a post on Telegram, as it warned of a "harsh reaction" should anyone "cross Belarusian borders."

The ongoing exercises take place just days after Belarus became the 10th member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a regional defense bloc helmed by China and Russia.

At the NATO summit in Washington, the alliance moved from blander comments made previously about China and openly accused it of supplying Russia's war effort against Ukraine. The joint declaration by all 32 NATO members called Beijing "a decisive enabler of Russia's war" and warned about unspecified consequences to "its interests and reputation" for enabling "the largest war in Europe in recent history."

Beijing promptly called the accusations "lies and smears," and said that the exercises were not aimed at any country. But the declaration and the ongoing drills are likely to contribute to rising tensions between China and NATO.

"There's been a slow update for Western allies when it comes to what China's game with Russia and countries like Belarus actually is," said Arho Havren. "But there is a growing recognition to focus on what China does and not what it says."

NATO's Eastern Flank

The Belarusian Defense Ministry said that as part of the joint exercises, Belarusian and Chinese troops will practice airborne assaults, a river crossing, and residential-area combat.

The Chinese Defense Ministry said in a statement that the forces will also practice hostage-rescue and counterterrorism operations.

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NATO Allies Map Out Commitments To Ukraine, 'Irreversible' Path To Membership

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"What's being done now in Belarus is fairly limited as military exercises go, but for Minsk it's a valuable and convenient message to show that the regime doesn't only depend on Russia," Katia Glod, a fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, told RFE/RL.

Belarus has been one of Russia's closest allies following its 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, providing logistical support and air bases for the war while recently deploying Russian tactical nuclear weapons on its territory.

For Belarus's authoritarian leader, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, the exercises come as he continues to rely heavily on Russia -- his main sponsor and ally -- since becoming a pariah in the West in 2020 following a crackdown triggered by his disputed reelection that the opposition and the West denounced as rigged.

Since then, Lukashenka has become increasingly antagonistic toward the West and NATO in particular.

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In addition to offering a springboard for Russia's war effort, Poland has accused Minsk of letting thousands of undocumented migrants into Belarus and directing them towards their shared border, an entry point to the European Union.

"There is a hybrid war ongoing on the Poland-Belarus border, as well as on the Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian borders," Polish Defense Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz said prior to the start of the Belarus-China drills.

The exercises, along with Minsk's close military ties with Russia, have also raised tensions with NATO's Baltic members.

"Lithuania is in a dangerous neighborhood," Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis said on July 9 at the Hudson Institute in Washington. "Any attack on NATO in our region would happen through Belarus. There's no other way around it. It's plain geography."

Warming Relations

China has become another key element -- and an increasingly important economic player -- of Lukashenka's geopolitical calculus in recent years as he navigated between Beijing, Brussels, Moscow, and Washington to leverage strategic gains and secure much needed loans and investment.

Previously a very active investor in Belarus, China has not offered a new project or loan to Minsk since 2019 and seemed to have stepped back from the country amid its domestic crisis that cut Lukashenka off politically from Europe and made him a less appealing partner for Beijing.

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That has left Lukashenka politically and financially dependent on Russia, though still eager to bolster ties with China.

One area where cooperation has continued to grow is the two countries' military ties, which Belarus and China have a history of, especially around technology transfers. In 2015, Minsk announced the completion of its Polonez multiple-rocket-launcher system, which military experts say uses modified Chinese designs and was developed with China's help.

The development of the Polonez came after Moscow refused to sell its Iskander missile system at a discount to Belarus, leading Lukashenka to turn to Beijing in a bid at the time to gain strategic distance from Russia.

"Once Lukashenka lost his ability to maneuver with the West, he needed another option to diversify away from a major reliance on Russia," Glod said. "China has given room to be this partner for Belarus."

Belarus's entry into the SCO is seen as part of this trend and something of a new role for Minsk as it secures its footing between China and Russia amid their own deepening partnership since Moscow launched the full-scale war against Ukraine.

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Navigating that new terrain was also the topic of discussion in Washington amid the NATO summit.

The Western military alliance invited Indo-Pacific partners Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea to Washington, where they discussed how to deepen cooperation and coordinate pushback against potentially expansionist designs from Beijing in the South China Sea and elsewhere in the region.

In addition to concerns raised by Poland and Lithuania, other NATO countries close to the Ukraine war also warned how a Ukrainian defeat could embolden China.

A Russian victory "doesn't only mean that the security in Europe will be worse," Czech President Petr Pavel said at a NATO Public Forum on July 10.

"It will be much worse globally, because it will also encourage China to be more assertive and aggressive."

BELGRADE -- Driven by a need to diversify its energy sector and pivot away from cheap Russian gas, Serbia is moving to end the country’s decades-old policy banning the construction of nuclear power plants on its territory.

Several Serbian ministries announced on July 10 that the country is weighing whether to end the 35-year-old, Yugoslav-era ban on nuclear reactors and said public debate was being opened on the shake-up of Belgrade’s long-standing energy policy.

If successful, the Serbian government could also find itself on a new geopolitical fault line involving nuclear energy in Eastern Europe as countries look to move away from relying on Russia -- which has dominated the nuclear energy sector -- and consider alternative partnerships with countries like China, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic is looking to navigate the new realities created by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and deploy the same hedging strategy for the country’s nuclear future that’s been used by Belgrade to play the United States and the European Union against Russia and China on a host of security and foreign policy issues.

“Even though Serbia has not been hard on Russia like the European Union has, it’s looking to preserve a balancing act with the West,” Stefan Vladisavljev, program director at Foundation BFPE, a Belgrade-based think tank, told RFE/RL. “That means distancing away from Russia for big strategic projects, but where exactly that leads Belgrade remains to be seen.”

Prior to the start of Russia’s February 2022 war, Serbia relied on cheap local labor and discounted Russian gas to make its mining and manufacturing industries competitive and attractive to investors. But Western sanctions and market turbulence have increased the price of Russian gas and seen Brussels and Washington attach a political price tag to making new deals with Russian companies.

That leaves Vucic walking a tightrope between the need to improve Serbia’s energy security by adding nuclear power and the geopolitical considerations brought by the country Belgrade decides to partner with.

Serbian officials have actively weighed their options, having already held meetings with Britain’s Rolls-Royce and France’s state-owned Electricite de France (EDF), in April, when a memo was signed “assessing the potential for the development of the civil nuclear program in Serbia.”

In June, the Energy Ministry said it is “laying the groundwork” for an assessment on partnering with EDF.

EDF did not respond to RFE/RL’s requests for details on what cooperation with Serbia would entail but, in the meantime, China has also entered the mix.

The state-owned China National Nuclear Corporation’s (CNNC) could supply small modular reactors (SMRs), which proponents say are less cumbersome to build and may better suit a country like Serbia’s more modest nuclear power needs.

Another option involves buying a stake in the still under construction Paks 2 nuclear power plant -- a joint Hungarian-Russian project launched in 2014 that is 100 kilometers southwest of Budapest -- which could then send power south to Serbia.

The Serbian Energy Ministry told RFE/RL in a statement that it is currently exploring all potential partnerships.

“After changing the legislative framework, Serbia will analyze the potential for cooperation at the regional and international level with countries that already have a developed nuclear program, both with China as well as with France, the United States, Russia, Japan, and other relevant countries,” it said.

The New Nuclear Chessboard

While Russia has lost its dominant position in oil and gas exports since the 2022 start of the Ukraine war, it continues to be the biggest player globally in providing nuclear fuel, accounting for more than 40 percent of the global market. Russia also has a complete monopoly on the production of advanced nuclear fuel that will be needed to power the next generation of nuclear reactors.

For countries with Russian-made reactors this dependence runs even deeper, with Russia’s state-owned nuclear power giant Rosatom operating 18 reactors across the EU, the bulk of them in Central and Eastern Europe.

This reliance has so far left Rosatom and Russian nuclear materials off sanctions packages passed in Brussels, but the United States, Britain, France, and important Western nuclear fuel providers have announced plans to expand their own capacity to enrich uranium and build reactors across Europe.

It’s against this backdrop that Belgrade must make a decision and plan for the long-term implications. Currently, Serbia gets almost 70 percent of its electricity from coal, but has committed to completely phase it out by 2050. Incorporating nuclear power along with more green energy is necessary to meet that goal.

“Where a country gets its reactor from is extremely important and keeps them tied together,” Jennifer Gordon, the director of the Atlantic Council's Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative, told RFE/RL. “The buyer-vendor relationship can be a 100-year relationship when you take into account building the reactor, its lifespan, and then needing to decommission it.”

Countries like the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Finland, and Bulgaria have relied on Russian nuclear-fuel imports to make up for the lack of Russian gas and oil as a result of the war, but they’ve also begun to pivot away from Rosatom for any future plans.

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Bratislava, Helsinki, and Prague have excluded the Russian company from future tenders, and the Czech energy company CEZ has signed contracts with the U.S. firm Westinghouse Electric and the French company Framatome to supply fuel assemblies for its plant in Temelin.

Westinghouse is also constructing two new reactors in Bulgaria, where it is to also become the country’s main supplier of fuel rods.

For Belgrade, the nuclear decision could also be a harbinger for where Vucic is looking to take his country.

While Serbia remains nonaligned, Vucic insists his goal is membership in the EU, but talks have made little progress in 12 years amid EU concerns over the rule of law and the status of Kosovo.

Serbia has a traditionally close relationship with Moscow, but Belgrade has been looking for distance from Russia since the war in Ukraine.

Vucic has also built strong ties with China, which has invested heavily in the Balkan country and often tops Serbian opinion polls as the most popular foreign power. Serbia, along with Hungary, were also the only two European countries Chinese leader Xi Jinping visited in May after his state visit to France.

“Xi’s visit opened up new frontiers for cooperation,” said Vladisavljev. “China is already a leader in renewable energy sources and is looking for new ways to expand its presence. For Belgrade, the best way to utilize its ties with China is to focus on areas that Serbia can’t do on its own.”

Vucic has also strengthened ties with French President Emmanuel Macron, who has made developing nuclear energy across Europe and championing European firms a key part of his “strategic autonomy” policy, which seeks to reshape the political order across the continent.

The View From Belgrade

While France’s EDF -- once the world’s leading nuclear energy developer -- appears to be making headway with Belgrade, Serbia’s other options are still in contention.

The Serbian Energy Ministry told RFE/RL that an analysis on whether to choose a conventional reactor or SMRs will be carried out in the near future, and Vucic said in March at an energy summit in Brussels that “we are interested in getting at least four small modular reactors to replace 1,200 megawatts” of output.

Prefabricated SMR units can be manufactured and then shipped and installed on site, making them potentially more affordable to build than large power reactors, which are often custom designed for a particular location and sometimes lead to construction delays. But some estimates have shown the cost for SMRs could be similar or more expensive than traditional reactors in the long term due to higher maintenance costs.

China and Russia are racing to pull ahead in the SMR field, but a collection of American and European firms are also making advances in the market.

Serbia’s presidential administration and the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade did not respond to RFE/RL’s request for comment about Beijing’s potential role.

One major obstacle for an SMR deal could be the cost.

In his March comments, Vucic said the price for four SMRs could total 7.5 billion euros ($8.1 billion) and that external funding would be required because he “doesn't know how it would be financed.”

A less costly option is buying a stake in Hungary’s Paks 2 plant, which is an idea that Vucic first discussed with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban in 2021.

“We are ready to be a minority owner in order to ensure our energy security, especially because of our strong economic activity,” Vucic said in 2021.

Buying a stake in Hungary’s nuclear reactor is appealing to Belgrade as it would avoid needing to build a nuclear reactor on its own soil and face any potential public backlash.

But the Hungarian project spearheaded by Russia’s Rosatom has been delayed and over budget. While Hungarian officials say the main reactor is still planned to be shipped from Russia, Paks 2 CEO Gergely Jakli told the Hungarian financial newspaper Portfolio in May that Russia’s involvement is increasingly expensive and he is considering bringing on other investors’ to complete the project.

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China has been floated as a potential option, especially since Budapest and Beijing signed a nuclear-energy cooperation agreement during Xi’s visit in May, and China is looking for opportunities to showcase its nuclear expertise overseas.

Framatome is also a subcontractor in Paks 2 and while Chinese and French nuclear companies have partnered together in the past, souring relations between Beijing and the West along with growing resistance to allowing Chinese firms to build strategic infrastructure in Europe could derail any such cooperation.

This leaves Serbia balancing the technical and financial dimensions to any offer, as well as the strategic ones, as it pushes ahead in its pursuit for nuclear energy.

“This is about a civilian nuclear energy program,” the Atlantic Council’s Gordon said. “But whatever option Serbia chooses, it will have a geopolitical bearing.”

Written and reported by RFE/RL Balkan Service correspondent Mila Manojlovic in Belgrade and RFE/RL correspondent Reid Standish in Prague