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A monthslong RFE/RL investigation on four Chinese-run projects in Tajikistan -- including three gold-mining ventures -- shows how Chinese firms are tapping into Tajikistan’s vast mineral wealth and polluting the environment in the process, but still get preferential treatment from the government.
A monthslong RFE/RL investigation on four Chinese-run projects in Tajikistan -- including three gold-mining ventures -- shows how Chinese firms are tapping into Tajikistan’s vast mineral wealth and polluting the environment in the process, but still get preferential treatment from the government.

PANJAKENT, Tajikistan -- For the some 150 people in the tiny Tajik village of Khumgaron, the pollution and waste from the Chinese gold-mining operation nearby is not what they bargained for.

"How will we live if the air and water are polluted?" asked one villager. "What meaning does life have when a person loses their health?"

Fed up with the severe pollution in their village caused by the Zarafshon mining company, a group of angry women traveled to the nearby city of Panjakent last year to file an official complaint on behalf of the village.

But instead of the local officials promising to look into the issue, the women say they were taken to the police station and harshly warned to stop criticizing the sprawling Chinese mining project near their village.

The women, who spoke to RFE/RL on condition of anonymity, say the intimidation has been effective and many villagers are still afraid to voice their grievances about the nearby gold mine.

Ever since the Chinese-run gold mine started operating in western Tajikistan in 2007, villagers say government officials have turned a blind eye to growing air, water, and land pollution in the area -- on land they say the mining company is using without their permission.

This situation near Tajikistan's remote northwestern border with Uzbekistan provides an up-close look at how Dushanbe's growing economic reliance on Chinese investment is playing out on the ground, where Chinese firms are tapping into the country's vast mineral wealth while receiving impunity and preferential treatment from the Tajik government.

A monthslong RFE/RL investigation on four Chinese-run projects in Tajikistan -- including three mining ventures -- highlights this pattern.

A sign showing Chinese leader Xi Jinping (right) and Tajik President Emomali Rahmon outside the entrance of a Chinese-Tajik agricultural project in Yovon in May 2023.
A sign showing Chinese leader Xi Jinping (right) and Tajik President Emomali Rahmon outside the entrance of a Chinese-Tajik agricultural project in Yovon in May 2023.

Stolen Land?

A resident who asked to remain anonymous showed RFE/RL property deeds in her name for farmland where the Chinese mining operation has built refineries for the gold they extract.

She says this was done without her permission and she has neither been compensated nor received an official response despite raising the issue with Panjakent officials several times. Other villagers make the same claim.

While locals living near these multimillion-dollar investments grapple with environmental degradation and health concerns stemming from the chemicals used in the vast mining and agricultural projects, Tajik officials protect the Chinese companies from public scrutiny because China is Tajikistan's main source of foreign investment.

In the case of the Zarafshon mine, which accounts for 70 percent of the gold mined in Tajikistan, officials at various levels of government who spoke with RFE/RL -- including a high-ranking Environmental Protection Committee official -- praised the company and defended their support for Chinese companies.

They pointed to the firms' economic importance in the investment-starved country and dismissed complaints about environmental pollution.

Tajik President Emomali Rahmon also put his stamp of approval on the Zarafshon plant when he visited it in July 2023.

A pool of runoff from the gold-refining process at the Zarafshon mine, which contains cyanide, can be seen from a nearby ridge in May 2023. Villagers have complained to the government that the emissions are harmful to them and the environment.
A pool of runoff from the gold-refining process at the Zarafshon mine, which contains cyanide, can be seen from a nearby ridge in May 2023. Villagers have complained to the government that the emissions are harmful to them and the environment.

Please Don't Go

But the high-level official from the Tajik Environmental Protection Committee, the country's main environmental agency, told RFE/RL on condition of anonymity that the state body has been ordered to turn a blind eye to any environmental or health issues stemming from the Zarafshon mine.

"We also have complaints about environmental pollution, but if we put too much pressure on Zarafshon or increase inspections and fines, the Chinese investor may leave Tajikistan," he said. "This would be very harmful for our economy because [the Chinese company] produced some 2.2 billion somoni ($201 million) worth of [gold] in six months of 2023."

He added that Tajikistan's gross domestic product (GDP) in that period was 54 billion somonis ($4.9 billion).

"So imagine the harm that the firm's failure would cause the country's economy," he said.

The official said the taxes levied on the gold mine make up a large part of the budget of Sughd Province, where the mine is located, and that officials don't want to jeopardize this crucial source of revenue by issuing fines for pollution or allowing public criticism to mount.

"If we end the mining operations, the budget will lose millions of dollars," he said.

The official said a similar dynamic exists at other Chinese-run projects that were investigated by RFE/RL, including a gold mine in Pokrud; a lead, zinc, and copper mining site in Zarnisor; and a cotton farming venture in western Tajikistan.

"There is currently no other option but to put up with this situation [of the Chinese companies polluting the environment]," he added.

Facilities under construction that are owned by TALCO Gold, a joint gold-mining venture between Tajikistan's state metals firm TALCO and China's Tibet Huayu Mining Co., in western Tajikistan in 2021.
Facilities under construction that are owned by TALCO Gold, a joint gold-mining venture between Tajikistan's state metals firm TALCO and China's Tibet Huayu Mining Co., in western Tajikistan in 2021.

A New Dependency

The poorest country in Central Asia, Tajikistan's economy has struggled over the years as it has grappled with the fallout from a devastating civil war in the 1990s and has relied on Russia for trade, investment, and loans. With a major shortage of jobs, Tajik migrants have flocked to Russia and the remittances they send home are estimated by the World Bank to be more than 40 percent of Tajikistan's GDP.

But autocratic President Rahmon, who has ruled Tajikistan with an iron fist since 1994, has moved the country closer to Beijing and is an enthusiastic member of its flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Since 2010, China has emerged as the country's largest trade partner, foreign investor, and lender, with Beijing owning more than half of Dushanbe's foreign debt.

As Dushanbe has increasingly looked to the East, China has taken pole position in the country's economy, building new roads and investing in sectors such as telecommunications, agriculture, and mining -- where Tajikistan needs financial help to develop the expensive infrastructure required to exploit its mineral wealth.

Chinese construction firms have also built several important government buildings in the heart of Dushanbe, the capital, including the country's new parliament building.

Tajikistan's newly constructed parliament building, which was built in Dushanbe by Chinese firms.
Tajikistan's newly constructed parliament building, which was built in Dushanbe by Chinese firms.

Rahmon said in Dushanbe on July 5 during an official visit by Chinese leader Xi Jinping that China invested more than $4 billion in Tajikistan from 2007 to 2023 and that more than "700 companies with Chinese capital" are operating in the country.

The Tajik president added that the work of Zarafshon is "a clear example of effective investment cooperation between the two countries."

Beijing's oversized economic footprint has translated into political influence, with China becoming an important pilgrimage for Rahmon and members of his powerful family. Beijing has also played a growing security role in the country with joint counterterrorism exercises, police exchanges, and approval to operate a series of outposts inside Tajikistan near its southern border with Afghanistan.

Tajikistan's increased dependency on its eastern neighbor has fueled fears about its growing influence and the concern that the majority of Chinese investment in Tajikistan has come as loans, which Dushanbe might not be able to repay.

Tajiks have already paid a steep price for the country's indebtedness: In 2011, Tajikistan ceded more than 1,000 square kilometers of its territory to China in return for canceling an unspecified debt.

A similar dynamic is at play in Tajikistan's mining sector, where two Chinese-operated mines -- Zarafshon and Pokrud -- account for 84 percent of the country's annual gold output. In the case of Zarafshon, the mine alone paid some $40 million in taxes in 2021 compared to a total national budget of nearly $3.9 billion.

In 2016, the Tajik government banned the publishing of official statistics about gold production in the country, but statements by ministers in 2019 and 2023 claim it has been rising by more than 10 percent annually and China's Zijin company has continued to expand its operations at Zarafshon. The profits made in Tajikistan by the Chinese mining companies are also not made public.

Tajik authorities have also continued to green-light new Chinese investments in the mining industry, often with seemingly little public debate.

In 2019, for instance, the Tajik parliament approved a deal with China's Kashgar Xinyi Dadi Mining Investment Company to develop the Yakjilva silver deposit in the remote eastern district of Murghob after less than 30 minutes of debate.

The Tajik government has defended China's growing position within the mining sector by claiming that Chinese firms have set themselves apart by being the only foreign companies willing to take on such large projects.

"Only the Chinese are willing to invest and develop mines [in the country]," Zarobiddin Faizullozoda, the former head of the Industry and New Technologies Ministry, which oversees the mining industry, said while minister in 2019.

Tajik President Emomali Rahmon (left) and Chinese leader Xi Jinping attend a welcome ceremony in Dushanbe as part of a July 5 state visit.
Tajik President Emomali Rahmon (left) and Chinese leader Xi Jinping attend a welcome ceremony in Dushanbe as part of a July 5 state visit.

Green Tomatoes

Asadullo Rahmonov, a 62-year-old farmer from Khumgaron, says the quality of the produce he grows has diminished in recent years as the scale of operations at Zarafshon has expanded, including a new 30-hectare area granted by the government in December.

"The tomatoes don't ripen very well anymore, and I've been planting cucumbers for three years. They bloom, their flowers fall off, but they don't grow," he said. "The peaches also only ripen halfway and then fall from the tree. This wasn't the case even a few years ago."

Five other local farmers who spoke to RFE/RL on condition of anonymity for fear of reprisal for criticizing the Chinese mining operation also claimed that the nearby gold refinery is affecting harvests and the environment at large, pointing to a dark-colored dust that is found in streams and on agricultural fields.

The gold mine in Zarafshon has been operational since 1994 and was managed by the British-based Commonwealth and British Mineral firm until Zijin acquired a 70 percent share in 2007. The remaining 30 percent of the mine is owned by the Tajik government. Profits from the gold that is mined are divided based on ownership percentage.

The gold mine currently employs some 2,800 workers, with Zarafshon Deputy Director Bobokhon Bobokhonov telling RFE/RL that 98 percent of workers are Tajik citizens. And job security seems good, as he added that Zijin recently had its rights to the land extended by 20 years.

The mined gold is refined nearby as well as at refineries near Panjakent -- which is some 20 kilometers to the east -- for further purification, and locals primarily blame this process for the adverse effects on the environment.

Operators from the Chinese-operated Zarafshon mine move limestone and gold to be refined, a process that locals say is polluting nearby areas.
Operators from the Chinese-operated Zarafshon mine move limestone and gold to be refined, a process that locals say is polluting nearby areas.

The dominant method in the world for refining gold involves using cyanide: a highly toxic chemical used to extract gold from the rock that can be fatal to humans.

Flaviano Bianchini, the director of Source International, an NGO focused on environmental pollution, said cyanide should only be used in controlled environments and that even small amounts in the environment can contaminate an entire area.

"If you lose 1 kilogram of cyanide into a water supply, that could easily kill 200 people or completely destroy the environment around it," he told RFE/RL.

The crushed rock from the mine is transported to the refinery where it is treated with cyanide, which dissolves the gold from the rock. While cost-effective, it is considered very damaging to the environment. The use of cyanide in mining operations has forced the displacement of many communities around the world.

Most scientists agree that cyanide decomposes in sunlight and is not dangerous if greatly diluted, but its use can also release harmful metals from the rock. Multiple studies have shown that cyanide can convert into other toxic forms and persist, particularly in cold climates.

Gold mining itself is also a waste-intensive process. Some estimates say that 10-15 grams of gold can be found for every one ton of rock, leaving more than 999 kilograms as waste, which can also take the form of harmful dust.

A resident of Khumgaron village near Panjakent sits in her vegetable garden. Her house is not far from the pool where mine runoff and emissions are stored. The villagers are demanding compensation from the Zarafshon mine for polluting the nearby environment.
A resident of Khumgaron village near Panjakent sits in her vegetable garden. Her house is not far from the pool where mine runoff and emissions are stored. The villagers are demanding compensation from the Zarafshon mine for polluting the nearby environment.

Stillborn Babies

Villagers from Khumgaron told RFE/RL that they believe cyanide is being used in high levels and has seeped into the ground, polluting the environment, damaging fruit and vegetable harvests, and causing health issues for residents.

In 2022, village residents signed a letter and sent it to the Tajik President's Office complaining of worsening health issues that they associate with the nearby mine.

"[Villagers] are getting sick more often, childlessness in young families due to the number of stillborn babies has increased," the letter read.

Residents also complain that the air in the village is dirty because of the pollution emitted by the Zarafshon gold and lime refineries and say there is a foul odor when the wind blows. Residents from Shing -- a village near the Zarafshon mine in the Panjakent region -- told RFE/RL that the number of people who complain of breathing problems has increased.

The Health Ministry in Panjakent told RFE/RL it does not have cumulative statistics on health issues affecting the people of Khumgaron and said to contact the Health Ministry's main office in Dushanbe. So, too, did the Central Hospital and the Sanitary and Epidemiological Department in Panjakent.

But the Health Ministry did not supply any information to RFE/RL despite a formal inquiry sent in November 2023 and in direct talks with a ministry spokesperson.

Mass Die-Off Of Fish In Tajikistan's Shing River
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Mass Die-Off Of Fish In Tajikistan's Shing River

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Zarafshon mine officials would not agree to an interview with RFE/RL or respond to written requests for comment.

Despite refusing to acknowledge criticism of the mining site in Zarafshon and people's complaints of pollution and its adverse health effects, Tajik officials have issued some token fines to the Chinese company over the years.

The operation was fined in 2019 for dumping waste from a lime production plant attached to the mine in Shing into the Shing River. Tajik authorities said the dumping was responsible for a mass die-off of fish in the river.

Yet the company was only fined the equivalent of about $1,100.

A far more severe fine came four years later when Tajik Prosecutor-General Yusuf Rahmon (an in-law of President Rahmon) announced in April 2023 that the Zarafshon mine operators would be fined the equivalent of $1.7 million for causing some $14.6 million in environmental damage. No details about the damage were given, but the head of Panjakent's Environmental Department told RFE/RL that the fine was issued because part of the onsite refinery was built without applying for regulatory documents.

A road in Shing, near Zarafshon. Heavy vehicles working at the mine regularly drive on this road and cause damage that is not repaired.
A road in Shing, near Zarafshon. Heavy vehicles working at the mine regularly drive on this road and cause damage that is not repaired.

Broken Promises

The years of complaints from Khumgaron residents led to the mining company beginning a community outreach program in 2021 with promises to build four kilometers of a new road, renovate a school (costing about $90,000), and install plumbing to bring drinking water into the villagers' homes.

The company also agreed to pay a lump sum of $13,700 per month to the villagers -- approximately $90 per resident. It says the money will be paid "until the Tajik government provides land plots to 47 farmers and their families."

But besides the cash payment to the village, Khumgaron residents said the company's other grand promises went unfulfilled.

As part of government requirements for companies to keep a mining license, firms engaged in mining must make some improvements for local residents, such as building a school, a hospital, or a road.

But in a very rare bit of public criticism in 2018, then-Industry and New Technologies Minister Shavkat Bobozoda said at a press conference that none of these obligations had been fulfilled by the Zijin mining company.

"They have already extracted 20 tons of gold, but they could leave tomorrow [and] what else would remain there?!" he exclaimed to a room of reporters.

A 2023 visit by RFE/RL to the village showed that none of the construction projects had begun and the main road remained in disrepair, which residents say is damaged by the heavy trucks carrying rocks that constantly travel back and forth from the mine.

Sanat Rahim, the head of the Tajik industry and mining sector's inspection service, said at a press conference in July 2023 that one of the government's "strategic goals" is "rapid industrialization."

He explained that setting up an industry leads to the establishment of "a refinery, a garbage dump, [etc.], and new businesses are created. Ecology and industrialization do not go hand in hand [but]…. We specialists must as much as possible reduce the [environmental] damage caused by industrialization."

The beginning of the Romit River where a basin was created for the Pokrud gold mine that sends discharge from the mine into the river.
The beginning of the Romit River where a basin was created for the Pokrud gold mine that sends discharge from the mine into the river.

'It Could Kill People'

Some 350 kilometers from Khumgaron and the Zarafshon mining operation sits the Pokrud gold mine, another vast Chinese mining project where locals say pollution is contaminating rivers and nearby land.

Here, the China Nonferrous Gold (CNG) company operates a gold concession with 100 percent ownership, with internal CNG reports from 2021 seen by RFE/RL saying that the company "has a strong relationship with the government of Tajikistan." In the same report, the firm lauds its environmental standards and claims it has a strong relationship with the local communities.

Located in Tajikistan's Romit Gorge, villagers living close to the mine say that the only benefit they've felt from the gold mine is that CNG has built a road to access its deposits that villagers from the remote, mountainous area can also use.

But they say contamination is increasing from the Chinese-owned mine.

Residents of several upstream villages in the area told RFE/RL that the company pours wastewater from its refinery directly into the sprawling Romit River. Several villagers said that they stopped using drinking water taken from the river after several people became ill.

Large hoses connected to the discharge pools from the Pokrud gold mine can be seen feeding into the river, where they emit white runoff into the water. (June 2023)
Large hoses connected to the discharge pools from the Pokrud gold mine can be seen feeding into the river, where they emit white runoff into the water. (June 2023)

During a 2023 visit to the mouth of the Romit River near the Pokrud mine, RFE/RL reporters saw a pipe coming directly from the refinery and feeding untreated wastewater into the river.

Bianchini, the mining expert from Source International, said such a practice is highly dangerous.

"The water that comes out from the [refining] process is poisoned," he said. "You can't leave water like that. It's not just an issue of polluting the river. It could kill people."

Despite these big concerns, the Chinese company has received minimal scrutiny from Tajik authorities. At the same time, the operation has received high-level political backing.

When the first gold bar from the mine was poured in 2016, Rahmon visited the site and -- in scenes shown on state television -- praised the $256 million Chinese investment while proudly holding two gold ingots.

Tajikistan's Environmental Protection Committee told RFE/RL that it inspected CNG's refinery in the summer of 2023 -- a few weeks after RFE/RL saw the wastewater being dumped into the river -- and said it found a "number of deficiencies, including nonobservance of solid household waste management procedures and an excessive discharge of waste into the atmosphere."

The committee did not comment on the video of the wastewater being discharged into the river.

A building owned by the Tajikistan-China Mining Industry Company (TCMIC) in Zarnisor houses Chinese workers in the town.
A building owned by the Tajikistan-China Mining Industry Company (TCMIC) in Zarnisor houses Chinese workers in the town.

Big Promises Amid Water Shortages

In Zarnisor -- a town in northern Tajikistan of some 5,000 people about 60 kilometers north of Khujand on the Uzbek border -- there is another high-profile Chinese mining project that is affecting nearby communities.

Established in 2007 as a subsidiary of the Chinese state-owned Tibet Everest Resources, the Tajikistan-China Mining Industry Company (TCMIC) mines lead, zinc, and copper from the area. The mining process for those minerals requires vast quantities of water, which residents say is creating a shortage for them.

Idiboy Fozilov, a pensioner who lives in Zarnisor, said that since the Chinese operation started people have only had access to clean drinking water for one hour a day and people are forced to store drinking water in tanks.

He said that during the Soviet era locals built a water line to bring potable water to the village. But he added that residents have only had access to drinking water for one hour per day -- in the evening -- since the Chinese company arrived.

In addition to shortages, several villagers who spoke to RFE/RL said the company is not upholding its pledge to invest in the local infrastructure.

TCMIC had agreed to repair and refurbish a day-care center, local roads, and provide street lighting for the village. But with the exception of the road that leads to the company's main office, the other roads in the area remain in poor condition and the day-care center is decrepit.

A dilapidated kindergarten building in Zarnisor
A dilapidated kindergarten building in Zarnisor

RFE/RL reported very poor roads in Zarnisor, streets not well lit, and the village school dilapidated and in urgent need of repair -- though the road to the central office of the Chinese company and the dorm for its Chinese workers is paved.

As with other Chinese companies involved in Tajikistan's extractive sector, TCMIC plays a particularly large economic role in the country.

In July 2022, its parent company, Tibet Everest Resources, pledged to build an industrial park in Tajikistan that would create 10,000 new jobs. But two years later, there has been no update about the project.

Other numbers issued by Tibet Everest Resources suggest its economic activities also do not add up.

In interviews and public statements over the years, TCMIC executives have claimed the company employs more than 4,000 people in Tajikistan -- but other times have said their workforce totaled about 3,000.

Similar inconsistencies have occurred over the amount of taxes and fees the firm contributes to the state budget.

In 2022, the independent Tajik news agency Asia-Plus quoted TCMIC head Li Yaohui as saying the company had paid 33 billion somonis (some $3.1 billion) in taxes and fees since it began operating in the country in 2009.

But in public comments made in 2021, Li said the company had paid a much smaller amount -- 4.2 billion somonis (about $383 million) -- to the government since its founding.

In comments to RFE/RL, TCMIC defended its record of working with local communities and building infrastructure, claiming it had made school repairs in Zarnisor while also constructing a town hall and repairing a hospital in Guliston, a nearby city of some 50,000 people. The company also funded the reconstruction of 38 kilometers of a remote road linking the towns of Buston and Zarnisor that cost some 100 million somonis ($9.1 million).

An official with the Guliston city government told RFE/RL that TCMIC and the Tajikistan-China Mountain Company are developing a plan to better supply the city and surrounding area with drinking water.

The official added that there are parts of Guliston that only have access to water at certain times of the day but the workers for the Chinese company living in a series of four-story buildings on Rafoqat Street have water 24 hours a day. Tajik security forces would not allow RFE/RL correspondents to enter the Chinese mining company's office building or a nearby hostel housing Chinese workers to confirm the information. The road leading to the buildings was very well maintained.

After complaints from other people living on Rafoqat Street who had a very limited supply of water, access was increased to 12 hours per day.

Tajik tractor drivers spread fertilizers over cotton fields in the Yovon district as part of a Chinese agricultural project. The tractor drivers say that they do not know what kind of fertilizer is used.
Tajik tractor drivers spread fertilizers over cotton fields in the Yovon district as part of a Chinese agricultural project. The tractor drivers say that they do not know what kind of fertilizer is used.

Cotton-Farming Woes

While forays from Chinese companies into Tajikistan's lucrative mining sector have left a trail of health and environmental concerns, so has an ambitious cotton-farming initiative involving Chinese farmers working on land in western Tajikistan's Yovon district -- just 25 kilometers from Dushanbe.

Mirzoali Azizov, the head of the Yovon district's Agricultural Department, told RFE/RL in June 2023 that the Chinese are renting 960 hectares of farmland in Yovon. Local residents told RFE/RL that in the late 2000s, when public land was allotted for agriculture, most Tajik farmers did not have the money required to buy seeds, machinery, and the other costs needed to farm and many people went to Russia to find work.

Locals said the Chinese took advantage of this situation and started leasing land in 2014.

Yovon district agricultural officials told RFE/RL that the amount of land being used by the Chinese was immense at first but later some Tajik farmers took over some of the land from the Chinese.

Both officials and local residents said the Chinese farmers have more money and financial options, such as bank loans, and can therefore use better fertilizer and farming equipment than Tajiks.

As a result, officials say Tajik farmers yield an average of four tons of cotton per hectare of land, while Chinese farmers in Tajikistan harvest nearly seven tons per hectare.

But many locals are concerned about the overuse of certain fertilizers and the lack of regulations for which and how many chemicals can be used.

The Chinese firm Agricultural Development of Tajikistan and China owns almost 1,000 hectares of land in the Yovon district while Juntai-Khatlon-Sin Silu owns 3,365 hectares of land in the southwestern Dusti district.

Saidjafar Usmonzoda -- the former chairman of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan who was a member of parliament in 2019 when the issue of leasing land to Chinese farmers was being debated -- told RFE/RL that she raised questions about which fertilizers would be used but was never given an answer despite the government approving the deal. (Usmonzoda was arrested on June 14, 2024, for "plotting to overthrow the government.")

"Couldn't the land be turned into a desert after years of overuse?" she recalled asking at the time.

Despite the concerns raised by Usmonzoda and local farmers, experts told RFE/RL that no independent research has been done on the types of fertilizers or other chemicals used by the Chinese farmers and whether or not they could have harmful effects on the land. Yovon district agricultural officials also told RFE/RL they lack the lab equipment needed to conduct such tests.

Ruzimurod Boimurodov, an associate professor of agricultural chemistry and soil science at the Agrarian University of Tajikistan in Dushanbe says that excessive use of fertilizers and pesticides is a major concern, because a large percentage of the fertilizers are not absorbed by the crop and instead go into the soil, which can cause long-term, adverse effects.

"There are delayed effects from these remaining substances and in the future they can have a negative effect on the composition, quality, and fertility of the soil and plant growth," he told RFE/RL.

Boimurodov said that according to his research, Tajik farmers typically use around 450-600 kilograms of nitrogen fertilizer per hectare or 200-260 kilograms of phosphorus fertilizer per hectare.

A Chinese farmer tends to plants in a greenhouse in the the town of Bustonkala, 100 kilometers south of the Tajik capital, Dushanbe, in 2011.
A Chinese farmer tends to plants in a greenhouse in the the town of Bustonkala, 100 kilometers south of the Tajik capital, Dushanbe, in 2011.

'A Safe Future For Our Children'

But Usmon Yatimov, a Yovon district agricultural official, told RFE/RL that according to his data, Chinese farmers growing cotton on these plots of land are using around 1,500-1,600 kilos of both nitrogen and phosphorus fertilizer.

The overuse of fertilizers and other chemicals has long been an issue in China, leading to large harvests but a decline in soil quality over time. Farmers in China have in recent years begun to cut back on fertilizers, but their application is still high compared to global averages.

Despite Tajik residents' widespread concern and complaints about polluted air, land, and rivers due to the work of Chinese companies, as well as a lack of investment in the communities the Chinese firms are working in, officials in Tajikistan continue to support these enterprises.

Many residents of the areas where Chinese firms are operating told RFE/RL that they are not against the companies, they only want them to take care of the environment and invest reasonably in the communities where they work, as the firms have pledged to do.

But due to the decrepit state of its economy and low standard of living, Tajikistan's great dependence on China and its economic resources will allow the Chinese companies to operate as they wish.

A villager who lives next to the Chinese gold mine in Khumgaron summed up the feelings of many.

"We don't want money from the Chinese -- we just want a safe future for our children."

Edited by Reid Standish and Pete Baumgartner
Illustration by Juan Carlos Herrera Martinez
Chinese and Russian naval forces conduct joint exercises near Zhanjiang, China, on July 15.
Chinese and Russian naval forces conduct joint exercises near Zhanjiang, China, on July 15.

Welcome back to the China In Eurasia briefing, an RFE/RL newsletter tracking China's resurgent influence from Eastern Europe to Central Asia. To subscribe, click here.

Starting next Wednesday, July 24, this newsletter will be going out every week. Be sure to follow along for the latest news, unique analysis, and reporting from the ground that's assembled for you in an easy-to-read format and sent directly to your inbox.

I'm RFE/RL correspondent Reid Standish and here's what I'm following right now.

NATO Eyes Its China Era

In a NATO summit in Washington centered on the war in Ukraine and extending support to Kyiv, the Western military alliance also took aim at China for being "a decisive enabler of Russia's war" by supplying Moscow with dual-use products.

Finding Perspective: Beijing promptly batted away the label as "lies and smears" but the criticism continued to mount in Washington.

NATO has steadily increased its focus on China over the last several years, with Beijing's support for Moscow amid its full-scale invasion of Ukraine marking a tipping point for the alliance to shift how it views the world's second-largest economy.

At the summit, which wrapped up on July 11, the joint declaration by all 32 NATO members warned about unspecified consequences to "its interests and reputation" for enabling "the largest war in Europe in recent history."

Speaking on stage in Washington, Benedetta Berti, NATO's policy planning director, said that China's steady supply of critical dual-use goods was the reason why Russia has been able to keep waging its war against Ukraine.

And while there was no official announcement, several NATO officials said that the alliance was discussing how -- and whether -- it could reclaim some Chinese-owned infrastructure projects in its member states. Those investments are now seen as security liabilities should a wider conflict with Russia break out in the future.

For NATO, such moves are seen as giving China a choice: stop supporting Russia's war effort and build a constructive relationship with the West or be treated as an adversary.

NATO also invited Indo-Pacific partners Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea to Washington, where they discussed how to deepen cooperation and coordinate pushback against potential Chinese designs in the South China Sea and elsewhere in the region.

Counterprogramming: There were signs, however, that this message was not well received.

On the eve of the NATO summit, China and Belarus kicked off 11 days of joint military exercises near the Belarusian city of Brest, some 5 kilometers from the Polish border, as I reported here.

Beijing said the exercises were not directed at any particular country, but Vladimir Kupriyanyuk, the deputy head of the General Staff of the Belarusian armed forces, said the maneuvers were a response to the "West's aggressive foreign policy toward Belarus" and to "Ukrainian provocation."

While small in scope, the drills highlight growing cooperation between Beijing and Minsk at a time of high tensions.

As Katia Glod, a fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, told me, that's valuable for Belarus's autocratic leader, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, as he spars with the West, but looks to balance his dependence on Russia with a tighter embrace of Beijing.

In addition to the drills in Belarus, Chinese and Russian naval forces kicked off a joint exercise at a military port in southern China on July 14.

Why It Matters: Realistically, there are few cards up NATO's sleeve that can stop Chinese companies from assisting Russia's war effort, but the alliance can apply new pressure on Beijing in Europe and elsewhere.

NATO is a defensive alliance focused on Europe and there has been concern and pushback from its members over too much emphasis on Asia, but as the maneuvers in Belarus show, China is also active along the alliance's borders in Europe.

Beyond the new messaging against China, the elephant in the room at the summit was the looming U.S. presidential election and former U.S. President Donald Trump leading the polls.

Both Trump -- and J.D. Vance, his newly announced running mate -- have been critical of NATO in the past and many on the Republican side are advocating for drawing down U.S. support for Ukraine in order to better direct resources towards China and the Indo-Pacific.

But as China's close ties with Russia and the series of drills around the NATO summit show, those two different theaters in Europe and Asia are becoming increasingly blurred together.

Three More Stories From Eurasia

1. China's Big Economic Meeting

After months of unexplained delay, top officials from China's ruling Communist Party gathered in Beijing on July 15 for the so-called third plenum, a major closed-door meeting held roughly once every five years to map out the general direction of the country's long-term social and economic policies.

The Details: The conclave is important because it signals the direction forward for the Chinese economy as it faces major challenges and deepening tensions with the West.

China's businesses and consumers have suffered in recent years through stumbling growth, a property-sector meltdown, and a blight of debt among local governments.

Officially, China's economy is doing well. Gross domestic product (GDP) grew 5.3 percent year on year in the first quarter, a solid rate that Beijing says validates its strategy of redirecting resources away from property and local government infrastructure projects, which once drove nearly a third of the economy, and into advanced industry instead.

Proof of the success of this new model, Chinese officials say, is China's emerging dominance of green-energy-transition industries such as electric vehicles. A new report from Global Energy Monitor found that China is building two-thirds of the world's wind and solar projects, and that figure doesn't even include the expansion under way outside of the country.

But the country is also dealing with economic problems on the back of years of stringent pandemic controls that have triggered mounting social frustration over falling property prices and reduced employment opportunities that have seen ordinary Chinese curb their spending.

On July 15, Beijing released new data that showed a sharp slowdown in economic growth. China also registered a record $99 billion trade surplus in June, adding to concerns that Beijing is leaning on exports to try and pull itself out of an economic slump.

2. Taiwan For Ukraine?

At the Republican National Convention on July 15, Trump chose Senator J.D. Vance as vice president on his ticket.

Vance has been one of the U.S. Congress's most vocal opponents of aid for Ukraine and previously stated the biggest threat to the United States was a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

What You Need To Know: While it's by no means clear how much sway Vance would have over a future Trump administration's foreign policy, it's safe to say that his selection amplified doubts about continued U.S. support for Kyiv should Trump be elected.

As a senator, Vance has said that he wants to limit U.S. attention on Europe and reorient the country's resources toward countering China's rise.

In February, Vance told the Munich Security Conference that the United States needed to focus its efforts in Asia instead of Ukraine, a region that he argued would dominate U.S. foreign policy for the next 40 years. He also argued that manufacturing Patriot system missiles for Ukraine would deny such weapons to Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion.

It's also worth noting that Taiwanese officials, speaking to me and to other reporters, have actually advocated for strong U.S. support for Ukraine, saying that not allowing Russia to gain from its war is the best way to deter China from deciding to launch its own invasion.

Vance has based his support for Taiwan in mostly economic terms, saying the self-governing island that China has vowed to retake by force, if necessary, must be protected because of the risk that an invasion could "decimate our entire economy."

3. Serbia's Nuclear Energy Chessboard

Driven by a need to diversify its energy sector and pivot away from cheap Russian gas, Serbia is moving to end the country's decades-old policy banning the construction of nuclear power plants on its territory.

But in doing so, Belgrade also finds itself on a new geopolitical fault line involving nuclear energy in Eastern Europe, Mila Manojlovic of RFE/RL's Balkan Service and myself reported.

What It Means: Several Serbian ministries announced on July 10 that the country was weighing whether to end the 35-year-old, Yugoslav-era ban on nuclear reactors and said public debate was being opened on the shake-up of Belgrade's long-standing energy policy.

Prior to the start of Russia's February 2022 invasion, Serbia relied on cheap local labor and discounted Russian gas to make its mining and manufacturing industries competitive and attractive to investors.

But Western sanctions and market turbulence have increased the price of Russian gas and seen Brussels and Washington attach a political price tag to making new deals with Russian companies.

That leaves Vucic walking a tightrope between the need to improve Serbia's energy security by adding nuclear power and the geopolitical considerations brought by the country Belgrade decides to partner with.

Serbian officials are actively weighing their options, with companies from France, Britain, and China leading the pack, along with a potential plan to buy a stake in a Hungarian nuclear plant near the two countries' shared border.

Across The Supercontinent

Belarus Joins The SCO: As expected, Belarus became the 10th member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), as the regional security bloc continued to position itself as an alternative to the West.

Central Asia Spotlight: After the SCO summit in Astana, Chinese leader Xi Jinping went to Tajikistan for a state visit, where he repeated the growing Chinese talking point for the region by promising that Beijing will defend the "territorial integrity" of Tajikistan.

Modi Between China and Russia: Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi wrapped up a high-stakes visit to Moscow on July 9, where his growing frictions with Beijing may be leading him to bolster relations with Russia, my colleague Dragan Stavljanin writes.

Saudi Hedging: Is Saudi Arabia replacing the United States with China in its security mix? Riyadh is building rapport with Beijing and increasing its imports of Chinese weapons amid pressure from Washington over human rights issues.

One Thing To Watch

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban made headlines with his controversial trips to Moscow, Beijing, and Mar-a-Lago, where he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Xi, and Trump, respectively.

The private meetings sparked backlash in Brussels and were focused around the war in Ukraine, with Orban saying in a private letter to EU leaders -- seen by RFE/RL -- that Trump will quickly demand peace talks between Russia and Ukraine if he wins November's U.S. presidential election and has plans to do so.

In the letter sent to European Council President Charles Michel and other EU leaders, Orban also noted that Xi believes it is likely that "the next round of international peace talks will take place already before the end of the year" with both Ukraine and Russia in attendance.

That's all from me for now. Don't forget to send me any questions, comments, or tips that you might have.

Until next time,

Reid Standish

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About The Newsletter

In recent years, it has become impossible to tell the biggest stories shaping Eurasia without considering China’s resurgent influence in local business, politics, security, and culture.

Subscribe to this weekly dispatch in which correspondent Reid Standish builds on the local reporting from RFE/RL’s journalists across Eurasia to give you unique insights into Beijing’s ambitions and challenges.

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