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A Chinese vessel is seen near oil tanks at the China National Petroleum Corporation's petrochemical facility in Dalian, China.
A Chinese vessel is seen near oil tanks at the China National Petroleum Corporation's petrochemical facility in Dalian, China. (File photo)

US sanctions against Russian oil giants Rosneft and LUKoil have sent shockwaves across global energy markets and left China's largest state oil companies pausing their imports of Russian crude.

Despite being now exposed to crippling penalties if it deals with the sanctioned Russian companies, China – one of Russia’s top customers – has its own playbook to deal with the impact, experts say.

China has already been stockpiling oil, shielding itself from potential disruption for months, and Chinese oil firms could find ways to navigate sanctions and continue bringing in discounted Russian oil.

A halt in Chinese imports of Russian crude could put a major strain on Moscow’s oil revenues as the administration of US President Donald Trump looks to ramp up pressure on the Kremlin as part of its efforts to broker a negotiated end to war in Ukraine.

The US sanctions announced on October 22 cut off the Russian companies from American banking systems, preventing them from operating in US dollars. Violators can face stiff penalties, including secondary sanctions.

Will US Sanctions On Russian Oil Slow The Kremlin's War On Ukraine?
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But analysts say the impact of the US sanctions will largely depend on how strictly they are enforced and if Washington is prepared to impose secondary sanctions on countries that continue to do business with Rosneft and LUKoil.

“It is unclear yet whether the United States will match the threat of secondary sanctions with actual enforcement of the new sanctions measures it has already enacted,” David Goldwyn, a former US special envoy for international energy affairs and Andrea Clabough, fellow at the Atlantic Council, wrote for the Atlantic Council, a Washington-based think tank, on October 23.

“Chinese refiners are already well practiced in evading US sanctions, for their part, and can usually find workarounds if they still want these Russian cargoes at bargain-basement prices.”

How Much Russian Oil Does China Buy?

China relies heavily on Russian oil imports. Rosneft and LUKoil supplied about one-quarter of Russia’s oil exports to China last year, according to data analytics firm Kpler.

As much as 20 percent of China’s crude imports – roughly 2 million barrels a day in the first nine months of 2025 – came from Russia, making it one of the country’s leading sources of oil for processing into products such as diesel, gasoline, and plastics.

And since the European Union cut most oil imports from Russia in late 2022, China has purchased around 47 percent of Russia’s oil and India has bought 38 percent, according to the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air.

Most of China’s oil purchases from Russia are delivered by sea, and energy analysts say that Rosneft and LUKoil sell most of their oil to China through intermediaries instead of directly dealing with buyers.

According to Reuters, Chinese national oil companies PetroChina, Sinopec, CNOOC, and Zhenhua Oil will refrain from buying Russian seaborne oil, and independent refiners are also expected to pause purchases as they assess the impact of sanctions.

The new sanctions mean that buyers will be reluctant to buy Russian oil directly, forcing the companies to rely on longer chains of intermediaries to charter tankers and sell their oil, which brings about extra costs and complications.

But it's unclear how long this suspension will last.

It’s also uncertain how the sanctions will impact the approximately 900,000 barrels per day of Russian oil by pipeline imported into China. That flows through a long-term contract between Rosneft and state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation.

What Has Beijing Said So Far About US Oil Sanctions?

Beijing pushed back against the US move, with Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun saying on October 23 that “China consistently opposes unilateral sanctions that lack a basis in international law and have not been authorized by the United Nations Security Council.”

The EU separately agreed to a phased ban on the import of Russian liquefied natural gas, and added two Chinese oil refiners – Liaoyang Petrochemical and Shandong Yulong Petrochemical – to its sanctions list.

Beijing said it also lodged protests with Brussels over the move.

“China strongly deplores and firmly rejects the EU’s repeated illicit unilateral sanctions against Chinese companies over Russia-related issues,” Guo said. “We have stressed on multiple occasions that China did not create the Ukraine crisis, nor is China a party to it.”

Will China Be Able To Still Buy Russian Oil?

The reach of US sanctions is vast and losing access to the US financial system could be an existential threat to many large Chinese banks and conglomerates.

“The Trump administration’s best bet is to make a few high-profile examples of sanctions’ enforcement, while simultaneously promising China and India that they will not be cut off from Russian oil for very long – if [Russian President Vladimir] Putin comes to the negotiating table,” Goldwyn and Clabough wrote in their report for the Atlantic Council.

Russia has a month to prepare before the restrictions take full effect in late November, and along with Chinese entities, have several moves to avert a worst-case scenario.

Moscow has long found ways to evade Western sanctions through opaque trading schemes as well as its “shadow fleet” network, which relies on ageing vessels sailing under obscure flags and managed through shell companies in the Middle East and Asia.

Since Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Beijing has limited its big banks’ transactions involving Russia and Russian firms. In the past, China has used smaller banks with limited exposure to the Western financial system and the broader Chinese economy to conduct business with sanctioned suppliers, such as oil imports from Iran.

China also appears to have been stockpiling oil since the beginning of the year.

While Beijing doesn't publish precise figures on its oil reserves, analysts at the US bank JPMorgan have said that their calculations show that roughly a million barrels a day were put away for future use.

Their estimates show that China’s inventories currently sit at 1.25 billion barrels and are projected to reach 1.5 billion barrels next year, allowing Beijing to weather a short pause as it assesses the impact of the sanctions. For comparison, the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve currently holds 831 million barrels.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in Samarkand on April 3 ahead of the EU-Central Asia summit.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen (left), Uzbek Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov (center), and European Council President Antonio Costa in Samarkand on April 3 ahead of the EU-Central Asia summit.

The European Union kicked off a high-level summit with top officials from Central Asia, the Caucasus, and other neighboring countries on October 20 as the bloc aims to make new inroads in a region where China and Russia wield longstanding influence.

At the top of the agenda is the Trans Caspian Transport Corridor – also known as the Middle Corridor – an emerging 6,500-kilometer-long trade route that connects China to Europe through Central Asia and the Caucasus by bypassing Russia.

The gathering in Luxembourg is “specifically focused on the issue of establishing a well-functioning so-called Middle Corridor stretching across the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea towards Central Asia,” Eduards Stiprais, the EU’s special representative for Central Asia, told RFE/RL in an interview.

The summit is something of a watershed for the 27-member EU as it looks to grow its regional standing at a time when Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has shifted the geopolitical balance and China's economic expansion has left the region more integrated with Beijing.

According to a draft program for the summit seen by RFE/RL, the EU is hosting ministers from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Georgia was also invited but declined to attend.

The aim of the summit is to launch a new regular format for diplomatic engagement focused on connectivity, trade, digital development, and energy around the Black Sea and the broader region.

“In response to the evolving geopolitical landscape, the EU is actively advancing cross-regional cooperation to foster stability, resilience, and prosperity,” the document states, which goes on to say that diversifying trade routes will “create economic opportunities” and “ultimately enhance regional security and stability.”

Stiprais says that the meeting will look to build on past summits and will focus on how best to use funds raised through the Global Gateway, the EU's infrastructure partnership plan launched in 2021 that's seen as an alternative to China's worldwide Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

“The money is there,” he said. “The issues are where we need some political decisions and agreements on how to proceed, because we are speaking about crossing several borders and those are countries which over the previous 30 years were very much focused on asserting their sovereignty.”

Can The EU Deliver On The Middle Corridor?

At a much-lauded inaugural EU-Central Asia summit in April, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Antonio Costa met with the region’s five presidents and announced an additional 12-billion-euro ($14 billion) investment in the Global Gateway to kick-start a new digital and infrastructural development project.

The EU’s Special Representative For Central Asia On Developing the Middle Corridor
The EU’s Special Representative For Central Asia On Developing the Middle Corridor
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The EU’s Special Representative For Central Asia On Developing the Middle Corridor

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Out of that total, 3 billion euros ($3.5 billion) are earmarked for the Middle Corridor, which adds to a previous 10 billion euros ($11.6 billion) pledged in 2024.

Central Asian governments -- and Kazakhstan in particular -- are some of the biggest supporters of the Middle Corridor and see the trade route and deeper ties with Brussels as necessary steps to diversify their economies and lessen their political dependence on China and Russia.

The EU, a single market of 27 countries, is the region’s biggest foreign investor, but questions remain over how big a player Brussels can be in Central Asia.

“Central Asia wants more EU involvement, but regional leaders are not overly optimistic,” Temur Umarov, a fellow at the Carnegie Eurasia Center in Berlin, told RFE/RL. “The EU hasn’t yet provided the kind of funding that would make it a true ‘third player’ helping the region rely less on Russia and China.”

Roman Vassilenko, Kazakhstan’s ambassador to the EU and NATO, told RFE/RL that investments around the Middle Corridor are still “in the early stages” as they prepare feasibility studies and that an EU-Central Asia Economic Forum scheduled for November in Uzbekistan will be an important litmus test.

Still, Vassilenko says he is optimistic about the Middle Corridor’s future and what it represents for Kazakhstan. He pointed to new rail projects built in the country and a 35-million-euro loan ($41 million) Astana received from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to upgrade infrastructure at the port of Aqtau, a Kazakh city on the Caspian Sea that is one of the most critical links in the corridor.

“The current geopolitical situation actually allows Kazakhstan to become a genuine bridge between East and West,” Vassilenko said.

What Obstacles Remain For Brussels?

EU officials involved in preparing for the summit in Luxembourg told RFE/RL that the new regional format is seen as “quite significant” in Brussels.

One EU official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the summit could be the start of “a replacement for the Eastern Partnership,” the bloc’s previous initiative for engaging with countries on its eastern borders.

But Brussels will need to overcome decades of entrenched influence from Beijing and Moscow if it is to grow its clout in the region.

Despite its attention being focused on its invasion of Ukraine, Russia is still an important political player, and China has grown into a leading trade partner and top foreign investor.

In Central Asia, bilateral trade with China, the region’s largest individual trade partner, has been rising steadily in recent years, hitting a record high of $94.8 billion in 2024.

Beyond Central Asia, Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party has pivoted closer to Russia and seen its relations with the EU deteriorate in recent years.

Tbilisi has also increasingly relied on China for infrastructure investment by turning to state-backed Chinese firms over European bids to build its $1 billion cross-country highway. Georgia also announced in May that a Chinese consortium won the contract to build a deep-sea port in Anaklia on the Black Sea.

Few details have emerged about Anaklia since the Georgian government’s announcement, but the port is seen as a crucial part of the Middle Corridor if the route is to function as projected.

Stiprais, the EU special representative for Central Asia, says that the bloc is in a “symbolic competition” with China and Russia when it comes to developing trade routes and infrastructure across the region, but that “there is plenty of space for everybody in this endeavor.”

“There are some advantages that we have compared to both China and Russia,” he said. “And one thing is the quality of our investments [and] that they are coming with very clearly delineated conditions.”

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In recent years, it has become impossible to tell the biggest stories shaping Eurasia without considering China’s resurgent influence in local business, politics, security, and culture.

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