China In Eurasia

Welcome back to the China In Eurasia briefing, an RFE/RL newsletter tracking China's resurgent influence from Eastern Europe to Central Asia.

I'm RFE/RL correspondent Reid Standish and here's what I'm following right now.

A Warning From The Baltics

Former Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis offered a clear warning for those who say that China is able to mediate an end to the war in Ukraine.

Finding Perspective: Speaking to the French international affairs outlet Geopolitique.eu, Landsbergis stamped down the idea.

“China is waiting for a moment of weakness to step in and offer ‘solutions’ and I fear that some in Europe would accept this offer because it’s a cheap alternative to us stepping up, in the same way that you buy a Chinese car because it’s cheaper. The same goes for their peace proposals.”

Landsbergis was commenting on a recent interview with outgoing U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and The New York Times, where Blinken said that one of the reasons that Moscow had not escalated into a nuclear war in Ukraine was because of China.

“If you follow that line of reasoning, it means that China has become a protector of Europe. That would be the beginning of a new paradigm,” Landsbergis said.

“If we accept that China, which in my view supports Russia and is therefore an adversary of the countries supporting Ukraine, is now the guarantor of nuclear deterrence on our continent, it would be a dangerous mistake and a failure.”

Why It Matters: Landsbergis’s warning comes as U.S. President-elect Donald Trump takes office and Europe anxiously looks at a very different geopolitical reality.

Trump’s tariff threats and less traditional approach to Washington’s relationship with Europe is a source of consternation in European capitals and there is talk in some corners about having a more amenable position toward Beijing to balance the Trump administration.

On January 14, Chinese leader Xi Jinping spoke with European Council President Antonio Costa to begin what many analysts believe will be a charm offensive from Beijing toward the continent.

But while Trump may have a rockier relationship with Brussels and various capitals than his predecessor, Beijing is also facing a different playing field than when U.S. President Joe Biden took office.

China’s support for Russia amid the war in Ukraine has strained ties with Europe, and Brussels is taking aim at Chinese companies in some sectors, a trend that looks set to continue.

EU High Representative Kaja Kallas has also voiced strong criticism of China, especially for its stance around the war in Ukraine and its long-term repercussions.

Landsbergis shared similar sentiments, saying that “Ukraine is central to what will happen in the future” between China and Taiwan.

“I mentioned earlier that [Russian President Vladimir] Putin has managed to change the nuclear doctrine by getting us to accept, at least for now, that resisting an attack is a form of escalation and therefore a nuclear strike is justified.”

“One can imagine a situation where China imposes a blockade, even a partial one, on Taiwan and they resist and we try to lift it, then China could use the Russian playbook,” he said. “I don’t think we collectively understand how reckless it is.”

Three more stories from Eurasia

1. The Taliban Courts Chinese Capital

My Afghan colleagues at RFE/RL's Radio Azadi and I reported about a new road built by the Taliban in northeast Afghanistan that the hardline group is hoping can better connect the country to neighboring China.

The Details: The first section of the road in the Wakhan Corridor was completed a year ago in early 2024, and the Taliban is looking to build out the connections further to one day open up more trade with China.

The road link is part of a series of announcements and groundbreaking ceremonies in 2024 -- from oil deals to mining rights -- that the Taliban are hoping will keep moving ahead in the coming year.

But the main questions remain over whether the militants can finally calm China's long-standing security concerns.

Haiyun Ma, an associate professor at Frostburg University, told me that, despite the lofty deals, Chinese investment is still not flowing in Afghanistan and that there are growing frustrations under the surface between Beijing and the Taliban.

Ma says that the announcement in 2024 helps bring prestige and legitimacy to the Taliban as it adapts to governing and that it offers a low-risk, low-commitment way for Beijing to signal long-term intent toward the country.

But he adds that China is in no hurry to have a footprint in Afghanistan.

China is yet to set up a border crossing in the area where the Wakhan road leads and despite all the resource deals, Beijing has plenty of already developed alternatives elsewhere in the world to help meet its domestic needs.

2. Trump, Greenland, China, And The Arctic

Incoming U.S. President Donald Trump has once again kicked up a storm by refusing to rule out the use of force to gain control of Greenland.

As my colleague Todd Prince writes, Trump’s pursuit shines a light on the complicated national-security picture in the Arctic between the United States, China, Russia, and other players.

What You Need To Know: While China is not an Arctic nation, it is seeking to be a major player in the region. In recent years, Beijing has sought to buy ports, other infrastructure, and mining rights on Greenland though it has not been successful.

Todd writes that the United States suspected China's real interest in those projects was to place dual-use sensors and radars in the Arctic Circle to help control their military satellites and gather intelligence on U.S. space-based operations in the region.

3. U.S. Energy Sanctions Hurt Chinese, Indian Purchases Of Russian Oil

Chinese and Indian refiners are looking for new fuel supplies as they adapt to hard-hitting new U.S. sanctions on Russian oil producers and tankers.

What It Means: Many of the newly sanctioned tankers brought oil to China and India, and both Bloomberg and Reuters reported that the sanctions have led to a jump in prices and driven Chinese refiners back to sellers of oil that is not restricted.

The sanctions were announced on January 10 and they target Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas, two of Russia's five largest largest oil producers, as well as 183 vessels transporting Russian oil and oil products to foreign markets.

The Biden administration also sanctioned “opaque” traders of Russian oil, more than 30 Russia-based oil-field service providers, and more than a dozen leading Russian energy officials and executives.

The Chinese refiner Yulong Petrochemical has previously bought Russian crude, but, according to industry data, it purchased 4 million barrels of crude from the United Arab Emirates following the sanctions.

After the sanctions announcement, Unipec, a subsidiary of China’s state-owned energy giant Sinopec, booked four large carriers of crude from the Middle East which the data intelligence firm Kpler said could carry a total of up to 2 million barrels.

Across The Supercontinent

Kyiv’s China Consultations: Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry told RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service that 2024 was a year of “developing” political dialogue in Beijing, pointing to the extensive high-level talks with their counterparts in the Chinese Foreign Ministry.

Ukrainian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Heorhiy Tykhyi added that Kyiv considers China one of the countries that can and does have influence on the Russian Federation. And we will continue to maintain this contact with the Chinese side.”

Parting Shots: In a speech at the State Department on January 13 summing up his administration’s record, Biden said the United States has widened its lead over competitors like Russia and China.

"Our adversaries are weaker than they were when we came into this job four years ago. Let's consider Russia. Putin invaded Ukraine. He thought he'd conquer Kyiv in a matter of days. But the truth is, since that war began, I'm the only one that stood in the center of Kyiv, not him," Biden said, referring to his visit to the embattled nation last year.

The China Connection: As Russian forces have intensified their advances in eastern Ukraine in recent weeks, they're being helped by a new tool on the battlefield: drones that fly with the use of fiber-optic cables, RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service and I reported.

Some Ukrainian experts have said that the drone models used by Russia are very similar to China’s commercially available Skywalker drone. There are also growing reports in Ukrainian media of high-quantity orders being placed at Chinese factories by Russian companies for large spools of fiber-optic cables.

One Thing To Watch

Trade between China and Russia reached a record high in 2024, according to official data released on January 13 by China’s General Administration of Customs.

The figures show how Beijing and Moscow’s efforts to strengthen their relationship are paying off in the face of tough Western economic sanctions on Russia.

While the 2024 trade data reached an all-time high, the year-on-year growth rate slowed significantly compared to the 26.3 percent surge seen in 2023.

That’s all from me for now. Don’t forget to send me any questions, comments, or tips that you might have.

Until next time,

Reid Standish

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WASHINGTON, D.C. -- Incoming U.S. President Donald Trump has once again kicked up a storm with his pursuit of Greenland, this time refusing to rule out the use of force to gain control of the Arctic island from ally Denmark for national-security reasons.

But Washington was interested in acquiring Greenland to mitigate threats emanating from the Arctic long before Trump came along, even offering Denmark $100 million in gold for the icy island shortly after the conclusion of World War II.

That interest has only expanded in recent years as Russia and China step up their military and commercial activities in the Arctic, conduct joint military exercises, and invest in new weapon systems like hypersonic missiles.

"Greenland is growing in importance as we find ourselves in a global competition with China and in a new technological revolution with regards to warfare," Rebecca Pincus, director of the Wilson Center's Polar Institute and a former adviser to the U.S. Defense Department on Arctic strategy, told RFE/RL.

"So, Greenland is important from a missile-defense perspective, from a space perspective, and from a global competition perspective, in which shipping and maritime sea lanes are increasingly important," she said.

Weakest Link In Homeland Defense

An autonomous territory of the Kingdom of Denmark, Greenland is physically closer to the United States with just 1,900 kilometers separating the state of Maine from the arctic island's shores.

As a territory of Denmark, it is part of NATO, but Greenland is pursuing independence from Copenhagen and some experts fear that could open a door for Russia and China to gain a foothold in the country.

While the United States already has a space base on Greenland for missile defense and space surveillance, control of the entire island would enable Washington to better defend against naval and air threats emanating from the region as well as dangers from space.

Russia has a much greater military presence in the Arctic than the United States and has continued to invest heavily in its defense capabilities in the region despite the war in Ukraine.

Retired U.S. General Terrence J. O'Shaughnessy, who served as commander of the U.S. Northern Command, told a Senate hearing in February 2020 that if Russia were to attack the United States, it would likely do so via the Arctic.

"The Arctic is no longer a fortress wall, and our oceans are no longer protective moats; they are now avenues of approach," he told the hearing.

Jahara Matisek, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College who spoke to RFE/RL as an independent expert and not on behalf of the government, said U.S. military infrastructure in the Arctic has languished, calling it the weakest link in homeland defense.

"If you want to be a powerful space-faring nation and be able to project space power in terms of offensive and defensive space weapon systems and other sorts of ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), you have to have infrastructure in the Arctic Circle -- not to mention the Antarctic Circle -- to seamlessly communicate and control all of your satellites," he said.

Chinese Ambitions

While China is not an Arctic nation, it is seeking to be a major player in the region. In recent years, Beijing has sought to buy ports, other infrastructure, and mining rights on Greenland though it has not been successful.

Matisek said the United States suspected China's real interest in those projects was to place dual-use sensors and radars in the Arctic Circle to help control their military satellites and gather intelligence on U.S. space-based operations in the region.

"If China can disrupt our 'Kill Chain' -- our space-based assets, our satellites -- then we will struggle to shoot things down. We will struggle to target, identify, attack, so that's why Greenland ends up actually mattering a lot," he said.

Pincus said the United States needs more ISR in the Arctic.

"That's our biggest gap that we need to close. So, we need more sensors from space to the seabed. And we need a data fusion capability to integrate all of that sensor data and observations into something that's a usable product for decision makers," she said.

Pincus said it makes sense that Russia and China would carry out joint military exercises in the Arctic.

"It's not surprising that they're focused on the Arctic, because the U.S. is weak in surface presence in the Arctic," she said, pointing out that the United States has no more than two functioning icebreakers compared to about four and a few dozen, respectively, for China and Russia.

Northern Passage

As ice continues to recede in the Arctic due to rising temperatures, it is opening a path for ships -- including military vessels -- to transit from Europe to Asia via the waters above Greenland and Canada.

"Chinese merchant shipping will increase passage along the northern route as it's shorter for them, but presumably Chinese warships will also use that route," Ben Hodges, a retired U.S. lieutenant general and former commander of U.S. Army forces in Europe, told RFE/RL.

Military vessels coming into the Atlantic Ocean from the Arctic would have to pass through the GIUK gap -- the stretch of water between Greenland, Iceland, and Scotland. During the Cold War, NATO forces tracked Soviet submarines coming into the North Atlantic through that gap, Hodges said.

Receding ice will also make it easier to mine Greenland's massive reserves of natural resources. They include metals critical for the production of high-technology goods, electric vehicles, and wind turbines.

China dominates many of those metals markets, including their mining, refining, and processing -- and Beijing has expressed interest in developing Greenland's natural resources.
The monetization of those natural resources is crucial for Greenland's dream of independence. The island still depends on subsidies from Denmark.

"When you have a nation like Greenland, they need money for investment. China and Russia will throw money at this problem," Philip M. Breedlove, a retired four-star U.S. Air Force general who led U.S. forces in Europe and served as NATO's supreme allied commander from 2013 to 2016, said in an interview with The Cipher Brief.

"Guaranteeing a Western-leaning Greenland is extremely important," he said, adding it "doesn't have to be through sovereign ownership."

Matisek said Trump may simply be trying to get the United States to "really take Greenland seriously" because of the integral role it plays in North American defense.

It is also "obviously an attempt to make sure the Chinese and Russians don't get a footprint there," he said.