A recently released 800-page cache of contracts and correspondence shows that Russia is helping China prepare its military for a potential invasion of Taiwan, according to an independent think tank that received the files and had them independently verified.
Oleksandr V. Danylyuk, an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), who obtained the leaked files along with his co-author, Jack Watling, spoke to RFE/RL about what the findings mean for future China-Russia military cooperation and why Russia may be in favor of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, the self-governing island of 23 million people that Beijing claims as its territory.
According to RUSI, the documents indicate that Moscow agreed in 2023 to sell a suite of military equipment to China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), including assault vehicles, anti-tank guns, and airborne armored personnel carriers. The armored vehicles would be equipped with Chinese specifications, and Russia would train a battalion of special Chinese paratroopers to use them.
The contracts also state that Russia would transfer technologies to China that will allow it to make similar weapons.
Such an agreement would bolster China’s air maneuver capabilities, one of the few areas where Moscow’s military still has an edge over the PLA, and intensify concerns that Beijing could seize infrastructure inland even as it storms ports and beaches along the coast as part of a potential invasion.
The approximately 800 pages of contracts and collateral materials "appear genuine" and details from within the documents have been independently verified, RUSI said. However, there is also the possibility that parts of the documents have been altered or omitted, it added.
Moscow has not commented on the leaked documents.
The interview below has been condensed and edited for clarity.
RFE/RL: Can you briefly explain what are the key elements of those deals and why they are significant for Beijing in regards to a potential invasion of Taiwan?
Oleksandr V. Danylyuk: So, in a few words, the deal is about getting some very specific equipment which is needed for airborne landing operations.
It's the set of equipment for landing a heavy airborne battalion and also specific equipment for special forces. Both of these sets are needed for an airborne invasion, which in turn would set the stage for a seaborne invasion by the Chinese military.
The idea is to actually have a special forces team on the ground and by using this Russian equipment, they would be able to jump from civilian cargo aircraft from a very high altitude and glide to Taiwanese territory without being detected. And they would also use these automatic systems to deliver equipment -- like Russian airborne tanks and fighting vehicles --– there so that not every [special forces soldier] would actually need to parachute to Taiwan -- a lot of them could enter Taiwan legally as tourists ahead of time.
We believe that this heavily equipped battalion would be just a part of a bigger number of battalions, so perhaps one battalion using Russian equipment and two or three using Chinese equipment.
That’s enough for taking control of at least Taipei port, which in our opinion is the key target for such an operation as it gives the Chinese control of a vital port for a coming seaborne invasion by the People’s Liberation Army.
RFE/RL: The conventional wisdom has always been that Russia is very wary of exporting military equipment in more advanced areas to China out of fear that this would be stolen and reverse engineered. So why do you think that that's changing now, and what does that mean moving forward?
Danylyuk: Politically, this type of military cooperation is super important for the Russians because they don’t want to be in this club of completely isolated countries. We can say that some kind of axis of likeminded countries [Editor’s note: analysts have begun to refer to political and military coordination between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as the “Axis of Upheaval”] exists and for the Russians the most important element of this axis is China.
Russia has also invested so many resources into the means of war, and the only way they can convert that means into a proper geopolitical power is through a wider, global war. And the most desirable theater for that war is the Indo-Pacific.
So the Russians appear ready to do anything to push China toward invading Taiwan, especially if that would lead toward an actual conflict between the United States and China.
And I think the Russians are not interested in a Crimea-type scenario for the invasion of Taiwan where there is limited resistance and not much of a negative international reaction. Rather, the Russians would like China to invade, but have the blitzkrieg attack stall and have it be as protracted as possible because that would actually create the possibility for escalation.
It could then actually bring the Americans and some other nations, like Japan, into the war, which I believe is what they want.
RFE/RL: Ok, so I can summarize a bit because I think there’s a lot to unpack. You’re saying not only do these documents indicate to you that Moscow would be supportive of the Chinese invading Taiwan, but that they’re also looking for ways to influence the situation so that it could happen?
Danylyuk: Yes, absolutely, that’s right.
Right now, you can’t influence Chinese society the same way that you can a democratic one and I’d expect Russia to have some levers of influence on the Chinese government, although I don’t know that.
But the easiest way for Russia to actually create these preconditions for making the war and the invasion of Taiwan feel inevitable is to actually influence Taiwanese society, and to be honest, American society and American politics.
In terms of those preconditions in Taiwan, look at what’s going on in Taiwanese politics. The real stage zero is not infiltration by special forces but actually political destabilization.
The current political situation in Taiwan, where you have parliament, controlled by the KMT, and then [President Lai Ching-te] from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), split and spending much of the past year blocking bills and stalling constitutional court appointments, which has led to fights in parliament and mass protests.
This is an ideal precondition to try and stoke a political crisis, which is needed for destabilization of the command and control system in Taiwan, both politically and militarily.
RFE/RL: So, beyond this aerial capability outlined in the documents you’ve examined, what are other other areas that you think China's military would need to look to Russia to improve in regards to a potential invasion of Taiwan?
Danylyuk: An obvious one would be some feedback about Russian missile and drone attacks.
So, how do you suppress air defenses and also how do you deplete them of ammunition? Russia has lots of recent, first-hand experience with that and it’s all very transferable to a Taiwan scenario.
RFE/RL: With this type of military cooperation that we’ve been talking about in mind, what else are you watching for a scenario around Taiwan?
Danylyuk: I think that the key question is to what extent Taiwanese society can actually avoid confrontation and polarization, and if it can unite around the need to protect the island, which is an even more difficult task.
The natural reaction from Washington to this is to give Taiwan more military capabilities, but in my opinion, they have enough capabilities. The issue is more about if they can actually be united and determined about resisting and fighting against an invasion.
An invasion of Taiwan would be extremely costly for the Chinese, so the real immunization against Taiwan being invaded lies in the field of morale and unity, and also the ability of the United States to offer a clear message of support.
Because, the reality is pretty simple: China is getting stronger and there is still a crisis in Europe. So, we will see.