The European Commission presented its annual enlargement report on October 30, with a different tone from last year’s release, when the EU executive made historic recommendations: It proposed opening accession talks with Moldova, Ukraine, and conditionally for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and proposed granting candidate status for Georgia.
This year, the report did not contain any such big news or significant recommendations.
The very fact that it was issued on a school holiday week in Brussels, with many EU officials far away from the office, and that the European Commission prioritized a report on improving civilian and defense preparedness tells you quite a lot about how much importance the bloc gives to further enlargement at this point.
In fact, the most anticipated aspect of the entire package was how hard the European Commission would be on Georgia, fresh out of parliamentary elections with reported irregularities that gave the ruling Georgian Dream party an improbable majority.
And it was pretty damning on Georgia, by EU standards.
Citing the recent adoption of the controversial “foreign influence” law, similar to Russia's so-called "foreign agent" law, and anti-LGBT laws, as well as “strong anti-EU narratives from Georgian officials,” the document concluded that “unless Georgia reverts the current course of action which jeopardizes its EU path, and demonstrates tangible efforts to address outstanding concerns and key reforms, the [European] Commission will not be in a position to consider recommending opening negotiations with Georgia.”
Last time around, the European Commission gave Tbilisi nine conditions in various policy fields to complete in order to start accession talks. Here, Brussels simply concluded that the South Caucasus republic had made “insignificant progress” and noted a lack of “sufficient political commitment of the authorities” to undergo necessary reforms.
Yet, apart from halting Georgia's EU accession, something that de facto was concluded by EU leaders already in June, there’s not much else happening now. The truth is that the bloc is unsure of how to read the Georgian elections on October 26.
A Divided EU
The report refers to the OSCE's preliminary findings issued after the vote, noting “several shortcomings that occurred in a tense and highly polarized environment,” such as intimidation and compromises on vote secrecy. It talks of “comprehensive electoral reform” and “constructive and inclusive dialogue across the political spectrum.”
But like previously issued statements, it is not declaring the election null and void. And the truth is that the EU is divided on this.
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban raced down to Tbilisi to congratulate his political allies, while Europe ministers from 15 EU member states issued a statement at least questioning the fairness of the vote and underlining that Orban wasn’t speaking on behalf of the bloc.
These divisions will make potential future sanctions on Georgia’s current leadership hard to agree on. Hungary, and probably also Slovakia, will be vetoing them.
And then there is the issue of actually finding some offense that is sanctionable, pinpointing it on high enough officials, and then backing it up with evidence. Right now, that seems like a tall order for Brussels.
What is left, apart from cutting more funds to Tbilisi, is to suspend visa liberalization, which only requires a qualified majority of member states to back.
But is there really an appetite to punish the entire population?
The EU will be discussing this at the informal EU summit in Budapest next week and when EU foreign ministers meet in Brussels later in November. But don’t expect sweeping steps.
So, what about the more positive aspects of the reports? The European Commission hopes that both Moldova and Ukraine will open EU accession chapters “as soon as possible in 2025.” Brussels will look to Chisinau to further step up anti-corruption and “de-oligarchization” to proceed further on its membership path, whereas Kyiv needs to keep on fighting organized crime and continue to improve legislation for national minorities.
Tit-For-Tat
The thing to look out for here is a potential link to Serbia -- and the politicking that can ensue. For the third year running, the European Commission recommends that Belgrade should be allowed to open more EU accession chapters. This is something that Hungary, which currently holds the rotating EU Presidency, is keen on as well.
Many other EU member states, however, are not impressed with Belgrade’s close links with Moscow. Don’t rule out that Budapest might want to trade a green light for Serbia moving ahead in late 2024 with giving its OK to Ukraine sometime in 2025.
There is also happy reading for Albania and Montenegro. Earlier in October, Tirana opened its first cluster of accession chapters, and in December the European Commission hopes that member states will open yet another batch. It also endorses the country’s highly ambitious goal to close accession negotiations by the end of 2027.
This is really in the hands of member states, but right now Albania is the “feel-good story” of the otherwise rather sorry tale of Western Balkan EU enlargement.
For Montenegro, which already has opened all the 30+ chapters, the European Commission hopes that some chapters actually can be closed by the end of the year, which should be feasible, and that talks conclude at the end of 2026, as is Podgorica’s goal, which may just be a bridge too far.
But if any country ends up joining the club this decade, the smart money is on Montenegro.
Seemingly Hopeless
Then there are the seemingly hopeless cases of Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Pristina’s EU application is languishing in the European Council, where member states still aren’t too keen to send it over to the European Commission for an opinion on membership feasibility -- at least not before the February parliamentary elections in the country.
North Macedonia remains stuck as long as it doesn’t change its constitution according to Bulgaria’s wishes, something that doesn’t look likely to happen anytime soon.
And then there is Bosnia-Herzegovina, which potentially could start accession talks in the foreseeable future but that so far has failed with basic conditions such as appointing a chief negotiator to the EU talks, a team to do the heavy lifting during those talks, and a national plan to transpose EU laws to the national legislation -- again reflecting Sarajevo’s dysfunctional internal politics in which the country’s entities rarely can agree on any way forward.
