Middle East
What Is THAAD And Why Is The U.S. Deploying It To Israel?
The United States has said it will deploy an advanced antimissile system and around 100 soldiers to operate it to Israel, a key ally.
The Pentagon said on October 13 that the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system will bolster Israel’s already formidable air defenses. It is unclear when the system and the U.S. soldiers will arrive in Israel.
What Is THAAD?
The THAAD is one of the most advanced and powerful antimissile systems in the U.S. arsenal.
Israel currently uses several systems developed with the United States -- the Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow -- to intercept rockets, drones, and missiles at different altitudes and distances.
The THAAD system has advanced radar, which detects missiles from longer distances. Its interceptors also have a longer range.
“It is a far superior antimissile system,” said Hossein Aryan, a Britain-based defense expert. “Its range is vastly [more] extensive” compared to Israel’s air defense systems.
Why Is The U.S. Sending THAAD To Israel?
The U.S. decision came after Iran fired around 180 ballistic missiles on Israel on October 1, an attack that some experts say exposed vulnerabilities in Israel’s air defenses.
Aryan said Iran’s attack prompted Washington to boost Israel’s antimissile defense capabilities in the event of “another potential attack from Tehran.”
Tehran’s massive missile barrage -- its biggest-ever direct attack against its archenemy -- was in response to Israel’s invasion of Lebanon and its recent assassinations of key Iranian allies in the region.
Israel downplayed the damage caused by Iran’s attack. But satellite imagery appeared to show around 30 ballistic missiles landed in and around the Nevatim air base in southern Israel. The images show damage to buildings and craters on the runway at the base.
The Nevatim base houses U.S.-made F-35 fighter planes. Experts say Iranian missiles only narrowly missed some of the fighter planes stationed in the base.
Meanwhile, one missile landed close to the headquarters of Mossad, Israel’s spy agency, in Tel Aviv, causing a deep crater.
Israel has vowed a severe response to Iran’s missile attack.
Meanwhile, a drone attack by Hezbollah, the armed group and political party that controls much of southern Lebanon, killed four Israeli soldiers in a base on October 13.
Shashank Johsi, a visiting fellow at Kings College London, said Washington is deploying the THAAD system “because it anticipates that Israel's retaliation to the recent Iranian missile barrage will be a large and significant attack.”
That, in return, is “likely to prompt yet another Iranian strike,” he said.
Joshi, who is also the defense editor of The Economist magazine, said Israel has a range of options, from striking Iranian weapons facilities to targeting its leadership or nuclear sites.
“Whichever option it chooses, Iran's leadership is likely to retaliate in force,” he said.
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- By Amos Chapple
'Unjammable' Drones Pioneered In Ukraine Emerge In Middle East War
When an armed quadcopter buzzed over Lebanon’s southern border into Israel on May 19, one Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldier raced up a nearby hill and attempted to snag the drone’s fiber-optic control cable with a piece of scrap metal.
The remarkable scene captured by photojournalists at the militarized border provided the clearest example yet seen of the fiber-optic drones -- first pioneered by Russian soldiers and now ubiquitous in Ukraine -- being used by Iranian-backed Hezbollah militants.
It also highlights the vulnerability of even the world’s most advanced militaries to the cheap drone innovation.
In the past month, Hezbollah militants have killed three IDF soldiers and one Israeli civilian using kamikaze drones controlled through kilometers-long fiber-optic cables.
In response, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced the formation of a team to counter the tethered drone threat. Israel is furnishing the task force with an “unlimited budget,” amid growing controversy in the country over the lack of preparedness for a weapon that first emerged in 2024.
The IDF reportedly declined earlier offers from Kyiv to train Israeli forces in anti-drone techniques, but on May 17, Netanyahu claimed he warned of the threat of weaponized quadcopters years before the current crisis over the devices.
“After I saw the war in Ukraine, I thought this could also serve as a tool on our battlefield,” Netanyahu said at a government meeting.
Unlike radio-controlled drones, which are vulnerable to electronic jamming and require a clear line of sight to a transmitter, fiber-optic drones can be navigated to virtually anywhere there is space to fly.
In Ukraine, veteran drone pilots have been documented flying their devices through windows and searching for soldiers in buildings several kilometers inside enemy territory.
That freedom of flight, limited only by battery life and the length of the drone’s cable, raises the specter of militants emerging from tunnels to launch a drone before operating it unseen from beneath the ground.
Tethered quadcopters leave no traceable radio or heat signature, and are small enough to evade many radar systems, provided they fly low against a cluttered background.
Some experts believe the emergence of fiber-optic drones piloted by Hezbollah militants indicates Russia is feeding Iran intelligence about this technology, others believe an arguably more worrying potential is more likely.
Nicole Grajewski, an expert on Russian-Iranian relations, told RFE/RL that the fiber-optic drone photographed on May 19 (below) appears identical to configurations used by Russian forces in Ukraine.
She points to large stockpiles of Russian weaponry held by Hezbollah as a potential indicator that the tethered drone technology is “either coming directly from the Russians or through the Iranians via Russia.”
Moscow has denied supplying weapons to Hezbollah.
But with the Russian invasion of Ukraine being the most visually documented war in history, other analysts believe Hezbollah militants have been able to piece together their own hardware and tactics based on videos from the Russian invasion.
“It doesn't take much intelligence," Yaakov Lappin told RFE/RL. "Hezbollah observed FPV drones in use with significant effect on Ukraine's battlefields and decided to adopt it.” The Israeli military analyst adds that all components for the drones, aside from the explosive warheads, “are freely available off the shelf on online websites.”
Some Chinese portals openly market fiber-optic drone components, including spool containers holding up to 30 kilometers of cable.
Monika Ahlborn, an analyst behind the popular Drone Wars social media account also believes the emergent Hezbollah quadcopters could be a simple case of imitation. She points out that visibility through social media “means concepts, configurations, and tactics can diffuse relatively quickly across different theaters.”
Similar dispersion of battlefield innovations has been seen in recent years, including the use of drone-dropped bomblets. The tactic was first seen in propaganda videos by the extremist Islamic State group in early 2017 and later adopted by fighters in Ukraine and elsewhere.
Lappin says, "None of the existing [Israeli] defenses are designed for the threat of tethered FPV drones."
Early efforts being floated in the country to counter the new threat, he says, include “interceptor drones, electro-optic and acoustic sensors, computerized gunsights, and potentially lasers and/or machine guns directed by sensors.”
Both Russia and Ukraine have developed kinetic anti-drone devices that include lightweight hand-launched interceptors and net guns that have had some documented success on the battlefield.
Afghan Migrants In Iran Face Growing Hardship Amid War Fallout
Every morning, Faisal stands along a road on the outskirts of the Iranian capital, Tehran, waiting for a day job.
The 27-year-old migrant from neighboring Afghanistan used to find manual work on most days, earning up to 10 million rials ($7.50), most of which he sent to his wife and five children back home.
But the informal manual work Faisal relied on to eke out a living has dried up since the United States and Israel launched a bombing campaign of Iran on February 28. The 11-week war has devastated Iran's already-battered economy, left much of the country's infrastructure and industries in tatters, and seen prices for basic food items skyrocket.
The economic fallout from the conflict has hit the estimated 4 million Afghan refugees and migrants in Iran -- many of whom fled war, poverty, and persecution in Afghanistan -- especially hard. Many Afghans have no legal status and are deprived of basic rights in the Islamic republic.
"On most days, I don't find any work. When I do, the pay is half of what I used to get for the same work," Faisal, who spoke on condition that his full name not be used for security reasons, told RFE/RL.
The war has also created a securitized atmosphere in Iran, deepening Afghans' fears of arrest or deportation. Iranian authorities have responded to the conflict by deploying security forces in major cities, cutting off the Internet to many Iranians, and arresting critics.
'Everything Became More Expensive'
Many Afghans in Iran work as day laborers, street vendors, and construction workers.
Among them is Hafizullah Nayebi, who moved to Iran in 2024 with his wife and four children. Living in Iran's central city of Isfahan, Nayebi said the prices of basic food items have soared since the war began.
"The price of flatbread went from 30,000 rials ($0.02) to 200,000 ($0.15)," Nayebi, a welder from Afghanistan's northern Faryab Province, told RFE/RL.
"The price of chicken increased by more than four times," he added. "My salary stayed the same, but everything else, like rice and cooking oil, has become more expensive."
The conflict has exacerbated the economic crisis in Iran, which was already grappling with rising inflation and unemployment. In March, the cost of food surged by 110 percent compared to the same month in 2025.
'People Are Scared'
Afghans who spoke to RFE/RL said the authorities were no longer extending visas for migrants, leaving some in limbo.
More than 1 million Afghans have been deported in recent years as part of Tehran's plan to expel all undocumented migrants. Afghans suffer widespread abuse and discrimination in Iran, where they have often been blamed for insecurity and unemployment.
Faisal said he fears the war could trigger a new crackdown on Afghans. A former member of Afghanistan's security forces under the Western-backed government, he fled when the Taliban seized power in 2021. He has since lived in Iran without a residency permit.
"I live here, trying to hide from the authorities. I live in constant fear of being caught," he said.
In January, Faisal said he tried to leave Iran for Turkey but was turned back at the border. Returning to Afghanistan is not an option. He fears retribution by the Taliban, which has been accused of arresting, torturing, and killing former members of the security forces.
Despite the risks to Afghans, Iran has continued to deport them in large numbers. Over 120,000 Afghans were deported from Iran in the first three months of 2026, according to official Iranian government data.
"People are scared," said Basija Saeedi, an Afghan rights activist based in Iran. "They don't know if they will be able to stay another day."
As Trump Pauses Iran Attack, CSIS Analyst Mark Cancian Says US Searching For An 'Exit'
WASHINGTON -- After US President Donald Trump said he is postponing potential strikes on Iran, questions are mounting over whether Washington and Tehran are edging closer to a deal or simply buying time before a wider regional confrontation.
In an interview with RFE/RL, Mark Cancian, senior adviser with the Defense and Security Department at Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the Trump administration is focused on finding an "exit" from the crisis -- even as major disagreements remain over sanctions, nuclear restrictions, and Iran's claims over the Strait of Hormuz.
Cancian argued that while many of Iran's reported demands are nonstarters, there are signs both sides may be narrowing differences on a possible nuclear arrangement and maritime de-escalation.
RFE/RL: Trump says he's holding off on Iran attacks at the request of Gulf states. What does that tell you about where diplomacy stands?
Mark Cancian: Apparently the Iranians have sent another proposal to the United States. It's not clear what's in that one, but that is one element of Trump's decision: He has always wanted to get a negotiated end to the war. He believes he has the upper hand and negotiations will produce an acceptable compromise. Several times he has called off prospective military operations in favor of negotiations. We'll see if anything comes of this new Iranian proposal.
RFE/RL: Reports suggest Tehran is demanding war reparations, sanctions relief, and recognition of sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. From a US negotiating standpoint, are those opening positions or outright nonstarters?
Cancian: There are certainly some nonstarters. But there is a deal that could be made. They've closed the gap on nuclear capabilities, including the possibility of Iran sending at least some of its material to a third party and guaranteeing it won't enrich uranium for a period of time. Trump wanted, I think, 20 years. They don't want to go that long -- maybe 10 years, something like that.
Both sides would need to lift their blockade of the strait. Maybe Iran continues to claim sovereignty as long as it doesn't try to exercise it and the United States relieves some sanctions, maybe on oil. I don't think there would be any chance of reparations, but that might be a deal both sides could live with. It's edged toward that, at least on the nuclear side.
RFE/RL: If Tehran is tying negotiations to control over the Strait of Hormuz, does the crisis shift from a nuclear confrontation into a global energy security crisis?
Cancian: Energy security is certainly a key element, but it's a broader question than that. There are many straits around the world where countries might choose to claim sovereignty. Think of the Strait of Malacca and Indonesia, for example. There are many others.
If Iran can claim sovereignty over this strait, then other countries will likely do the same, and we'll have a very chaotic international situation -- very disruptive to shipborne commerce, but also creating the potential for conflict, since many countries would not recognize those claims.
RFE/RL: How seriously should the world take the possibility that Iran could militarize the strait further by imposing tolls or restricting access?
Cancian: They're already doing that. They restrict access, and the only vessels they allow through are those of friendly countries or countries that have paid a toll or transit fee or something similar.
Now, the US doesn't accept that. Most countries don't accept that. But that's where we are right now, and that's what the United States has to prevent in any final agreement.
RFE/RL: Trump appears to be balancing deterrence with delay. Is postponing an attack a sign of strategic patience or evidence the administration is searching for an exit ramp?
Cancian: There's no question the administration is looking for an exit. They very much want to end the conflict. They're facing elections in the fall. The economy is doing fine, but gas prices are up, and that's causing stress for US citizens.
So they've made several diplomatic approaches to try to make a deal, but so far that has not succeeded.
RFE/RL: China signaled this week its opposition to any Iranian effort to weaponize the strait. Did Chinese President Xi Jinping just distance Beijing from Tehran?
Cancian: I don't think so. He did say the strait should remain open. China uses the strait extensively, and they buy a lot of oil from the region, so they have an interest in keeping it open.
But he didn't agree to pressure Iran. He didn't denounce the Iranian regime. And our understanding is that China is still providing some covert support to Iran. So I don't think Beijing is distancing itself in any major way.
RFE/RL: Six months from now, what's the more likely headline: a new Middle East deterrence deal or a regional conflict spilling beyond the Strait of Hormuz? Are we still trying to prevent a wider war, or simply manage escalation one step at a time?
Cancian: Things that cannot go on forever don't. In this case, a blockade of oil leaving the Gulf and a blockade of materials going into Iran, cannot continue indefinitely. Both sides will increasingly feel the economic pressure, so there will be more and more pressure to make a deal.
By six months, that will have to happen. I thought it would have happened by now. At some point there will be a deal both sides can live with. The question is simply how long it takes and what that deal ultimately looks like.
This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
- By Reid Standish and
- Colin Hood
Putin Heads To Beijing Seeking Energy Deals, Show of Solidarity
Russian President Vladimir Putin is set to arrive in Beijing for a two-day state visit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping as both navigate strained relations with the West and an ongoing war in Iran that has choked global energy supplies.
Putin's May 19-20 visit, his 25th to China since he first came to power more than two decades ago, comes less than a week after Xi hosted US President Donald Trump in the Chinese capital.
The trip coincides with the 25th anniversary of the Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship signed in 2001, and Moscow said Putin and Xi plan to discuss economic cooperation between the two countries, with Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov adding that they also plan to sign a declaration on building a "multipolar world" and "a new type of international relations.”
“I sincerely appreciate President Xi Jinping's commitment to long-term cooperation with Russia. I believe that our good, friendly contacts help us chart our boldest plans for the future and bring them to fruition,” Putin said in a video address released on May 19 ahead of his trip.
Putin and Xi are set to meet on the morning of May 20, but Ushakov did not reveal details beyond saying that “key international and regional issues” will be discussed. Those are expected to include the war in Iran and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, as well as future energy deals between Beijing and Moscow and Xi’s recent summit with Trump, which the Kremlin said Putin would be briefed on.
The war in Ukraine, now in its fifth year, is also set to feature in the discussions, and Putin’s visit comes after months of sustained Ukrainian strikes deep inside Russia that have hit oil infrastructure and civilian centers like Moscow.
“It's about imagery and optics, and I think on the Chinese side, there is a balancing effort, hosting President Trump one week and President Putin the next,” Michael Kimmage, director of the Kennan Institute, a Washington-based think tank, told RFE/RL. “That's a gesture of politeness toward Putin, as if he's on par with the United States and with China.”
Energy Security Moves To The Forefront
China has become Russia’s top trading partner, and Beijing is now the top customer for Russian oil and gas supplies, which Moscow expects the war in Iran to further boost.
The war in the Middle East has added new urgency to Moscow's case. Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz has disrupted roughly one-fifth of global oil supplies, squeezing China's energy imports and reinforcing arguments for securing overland pipeline alternatives.
Beijing has bought more than $367 billion worth of Russian fossil fuels since the start of the war in Iran, according to data collected by the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air.
The crisis has also renewed attention on the proposed Power of Siberia-2 gas pipeline. During Putin’s last visit to China in September 2025, Russia and China signed a memorandum to move forward with the 2,600-kilometer project that would bring gas from Russia's northern Yamal Peninsula to China via eastern Mongolia.
But the two sides have yet to agree on pricing and other crucial details, with analysts cautioning that the negotiations could drag on for years and potentially never come to fruition.
“In terms of immediate impact, there is not much upside to be expected in terms of pipeline gas to China. Power of Siberia-1 is pretty much full; it was at capacity last year,” Anne-Sophie Corbeau, a researcher at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, told RFE/RL. “The next increase in terms of capacity will be with the 12 bcm Far East pipeline, but this one will only start in 2027 and progressively ramp up volumes.”
Beijing has been buying more Russian crude at a discount since Western sanctions were imposed following Moscow's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has led to further oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) purchases.
But it’s unclear if the new global energy crunch will lead to any true progress on the Power of Siberia-2.
Beijing has maintained a diversification strategy when it comes to its energy supplies and has also held discussions on supply deals with Turkmenistan.
Russia also agreed in 2025 to supply an additional 2.5 million metric tons of oil annually to China via Kazakhstan.
“In a way, Russia is the answer, but Russia is a very slow answer for China, and quite possibly too slow, especially if the war does get resolved in the next couple of months,” said Kimmage.
Russia’s Growing Reliance On China
The war in Ukraine will also loom over the talks in Beijing.
Trump's summit with Xi last week produced only a brief reference to "the Ukraine crisis" in China's official readout, and no mention of Ukraine at all in US summaries of the meeting.
China's role in sustaining Russia's war effort has drawn sharp criticism from Western governments. In addition to being a steady and growing energy customer, Beijing has also been a major source of dual-use goods critical to Russia's military-industrial capacity.
China has consistently denied supplying lethal weapons to either side in Ukraine and says it strictly controls dual-use exports.
But analysts note that the two countries’ relationship has grown increasingly asymmetric, with Russia now deeply dependent on China for trade and investment.
“The war in Ukraine has made Russia much more dependent on China,” Timothy Ash, an associate fellow at Chatham House, a London-based think tank, told RFE/RL. “I think Putin will be very eager that there's no warming in the US-China relationship to the detriment of Russia.”
Trump-Xi Summit Reveals China's Careful Balancing Act On Iran
WASHINGTON -- The Trump-Xi summit offered fresh clues about how Beijing is positioning itself on Iran amid growing tensions over sanctions, regional security, and the future of energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz.
While US President Donald Trump said both sides agreed Iran should never obtain a nuclear weapon and supported reopening the Strait of Hormuz, analysts noted that China avoided making concrete public commitments on sanctions enforcement, reducing Iranian oil purchases, or pressuring Tehran directly.
Instead, experts say, Beijing appears focused on protecting its strategic and economic interests while avoiding deeper entanglement in the conflict.
Support For Stability, Without Pressure
Publicly, China has committed itself to the broad principles of de-descalation, freedom of navigation, and opposition to Iranian nuclear weapons.
But analysts noted Beijing stopped short of endorsing tougher measures against Tehran.
Jason Brodsky, policy director at United Against Nuclear Iran, said the gap between China's rhetoric and actions remains significant.
"While readouts from the summit suggested China wants the Strait of Hormuz to be open and for there to be no tolling, China's ambassador is criticizing the US-Bahraini draft UN Security Council resolution demanding Iran reopen the Strait of Hormuz," Brodsky told RFE/RL on May 15.
"China also says it does not want the conflict to continue but is supplying Iran with dual-use components for its missile and drone program," he added.
That dual-track approach -- supporting regional stability while maintaining ties with Tehran -- was a recurring theme in expert assessments following the summit.
At Washington's Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), analysts noted that Beijing emphasized keeping the strait open and ensuring oil continued flowing through the Persian Gulf but avoided publicly committing to sanctions enforcement or cuts in Iranian oil imports.
Zongyuan Zoe Liu, Maurice R. Greenberg senior fellow for China studies at CFR, told RFE/RL China's language remained "vague but useful with regard to de-escalation," adding Beijing wanted to show support for stability without assuming responsibility for enforcing it.
"China wanted to show that the message is clear: Keep the oil flowing, keep the strait open," Liu said. "But they haven't really made any commitment to police stability or provide stability."
Oil Flows And Strategic Interests
Much of China's posture appears tied to energy security.
China remains Iran's main oil customer and depends heavily on Gulf shipping routes. Analysts say Beijing's overriding objective is likely to preserve stable access to energy supplies while avoiding a direct confrontation with Washington.
That calculation was also reflected in comments from Brian Mast, a Republican from Florida and chairman of the US House Foreign Affairs Committee.
"They have a substantial relationship with Iran, have bought a significant amount of oil from Iran, and would love to continue to do so, or not have other Gulf oil bottled up from them," Mast told an audience at CFR.
At the same time, in response to an RFE/RL question, Mast argued that China has avoided fully backing Iran militarily.
"They are not coming to Iran's defense," he said. "Did China participate in targeting assistance for the Iranians? Absolutely, yes. Would I say that they dove into this? No, they didn't."
Mast said Beijing appears to be balancing competing strategic interests: whether prolonged instability benefits China by drawing US attention and resources deeper into the region, or whether restoring secure navigation and oil flows better serves Chinese economic priorities.
"They're absolutely trying to balance which one of those is better for them," he said.
The summit also fueled speculation about possible behind-the-scenes discussions involving sanctions relief.
Trump suggested sanctions on Chinese "teapot" refineries processing Iranian crude may have been discussed during talks with Xi. Analysts in Washington say such comments could indicate the US is exploring ways to encourage Chinese cooperation through incentives rather than relying solely on pressure.
Rush Doshi, former deputy senior director for China and Taiwan at the National Security Council during the Biden administration, said Trump's comments raised the possibility of a broader arrangement involving Chinese purchases of US crude oil and flexibility on sanctions enforcement for some refiners handling Iranian crude.
No agreement was publicly announced, however, and Beijing has not confirmed such discussions.
Questions Remain
Another issue hanging over the summit involved reports that Chinese companies may have considered providing weapons or additional support to Iran.
Chris McGuire, a senior fellow for China and emerging technologies at CFR, noted that concerns already exist regarding Chinese transfers of dual-use technologies supporting Iran's military capabilities.
Trump said Xi committed not to sell weapons to Iran, though analysts cautioned such assurances would likely be closely scrutinized over time.
Meanwhile, China has continued pushing back against US sanctions targeting firms linked to the Iranian oil trade.
Liu noted that before the summit, China's Commerce Ministry issued an injunction opposing US sanctions on several Chinese refineries accused of purchasing Iranian crude.
The move highlighted Beijing's broader resistance to what it views as extraterritorial sanctions enforcement and suggested China is unlikely to publicly align itself with Washington's pressure campaign against Tehran.
Luke Coffey On How Tehran Has Adapted Kremlin Negotiation Tactics
WASHINGTON -- As Washington weighs its next steps with Tehran, some analysts see familiar patterns emerging -- not from the Middle East, but from the Kremlin's playbook.
In an interview with RFE/RL, Luke Coffey, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute focusing on national security and transatlantic relations, said Iran appears to be borrowing directly from Russia's negotiation strategy: Prolong talks, seek concessions incrementally, and avoid making meaningful commitments while maintaining the appearance of diplomacy.
RFE/RL: When you look at Iran's response to recent peace proposals, do you see parallels with Russia's approach to negotiations over Ukraine -- publicly embracing diplomacy while privately hardening its demands?
Luke Coffey: There are a lot of similarities, because Iran has watched the [US special envoy Steve] Witkoff playbook over the past year or so with Russia. The Iranians know what they can get away with. They know how to drag the discussions out, make it look like Trump is achieving something, when in reality, he'll achieve nothing. And they have learned this from the Russians.
RFE/RL: Both Moscow and Tehran want sanctions relief before making major concessions. Is that diplomacy or leverage politics dressed up as diplomacy?
Coffey: From their point of view, it makes sense to sequence it this way. They're going to ask for this whether or not the Trump administration will lift sanctions beforehand remains to be seen.
In the case of Russia, you could argue that maybe the lifting of the oil sanctions on Russian crude oil -- while many observers thought it was linked to global markets and Iran -- was in fact a concession given to Russia by the Trump administration.
If I was Iran or Russia, I would want international sanctions lifted. I would want frozen assets released. But it would be a mistake to do so at this point because Russia is the aggressor here. In the case of Iran, Iran has a 47-year track record of conducting terrorism across the region, especially targeting US interests. It should be up to them to make the first move, not the United States.
RFE/RL: Russia wants frozen assets returned, while Iran wants access to frozen funds and economic normalization. How dangerous is it when negotiations become less about peace and more about financial recovery for authoritarian regimes?
Coffey: It's a slippery slope, and this is one of the reasons why nothing should be agreed until everything is agreed when it comes to these peace talks, whether it's with Russia or with Iran. Both will try to take whatever they can get while giving back the least amount required.
RFE/RL: Iran wants negotiations tied to Israel's actions in Lebanon. Russia talks about addressing the "root causes" of its war in Ukraine. Is this the same tactic, expanding the conflict to avoid accountability?
Coffey: The situation is a bit different, because there are different motivating factors.
For Russia, this is about rebuilding an empire, and for Iran, it's about spreading a revolution. If we were dealing with the Soviet Union, maybe there would be more similarity. But because we're dealing with imperial Russia, the Russia we're dealing with today is like it was during the time of the czar. We have a 21st-century Russia with 19th-century ambitions.
A similarity is this sense of almost ethnic superiority. Ethnic Russians think they are superior to the other constituent ethnic groups, whether inside the Russian Federation or those that used to be part of the Soviet empire, almost to a level of snobbery.
The same is the case with Iran and the Arabs, in particular the Gulf states, where the Persians see themselves as this established power -- kind of like old money -- and the Gulf states are these nouveau riche Arabs who don't know how to behave or handle their newfound resources.
RFE/RL: You've spent years studying NATO and Russian strategy. Do you think Tehran concluded from the Ukraine war that persistence eventually exhausts the West politically?
Coffey: I think they do watch what's happening in Ukraine. But I think they draw even more lessons from America's experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, and from the unwillingness -- or lack of political appetite -- to deploy US military forces on the ground in Iran.
They know that it's very unlikely President Trump would agree to this, so they know they can probably ride out this war. They can absorb and withstand the bombardment, the bombings, and the air strikes and come out the other end surviving.
And for Iran, all they need to do is survive. They don't necessarily need to win. If the US is unwilling to put boots on the ground, then achieving some of the objectives outlined by Trump seems really difficult, if not impossible.
RFE/RL: Trump recently called Iran's latest response "totally unacceptable." How much of this is Iran testing Washington -- or testing Trump personally -- because it believes the White House still wants a deal badly enough to stay at the table?
Coffey: Trump wants a deal, and Iran knows this. These Iranians are not stupid. These are very sophisticated, savvy people. They may be extremists, they may be Islamists, but they are not dumb, and they understand the political dynamics at play in America.
They understand midterm elections are coming up. They understand the summer holidays are coming up and that gasoline prices impact Americans.
They saw the latest inflation figures that were released -- 3.8 percent, the highest rate of inflation in more than three years. So they are quite happy to remain in the status quo.
Yes, it's difficult for them. Yes, they're not generating much revenue. Yes, the Strait of Hormuz is effectively closed for them, although you do hear stories of ships passing through the US blockade. But they're willing to withstand this because, in their society, the way the state structures oppress and suppress the people means they can endure a terrible economic situation. They can withstand inflation in a way that elected leaders in the US cannot, because American politicians will be punished at the ballot box.
Trump talks about regime change. There are new people in Iran -- and he says similar things about Maduro in Venezuela -- but this isn't really regime change. It is a leadership change while the regime itself remains fully intact. Maduro's internal security apparatus, intelligence services, and armed forces remain intact, as if he were still there. The same is true with Iran. The tools used for internal oppression -- the IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps], for example -- remain fully intact.
Yes, they have fewer missiles. They have fewer drones. They have fewer airplanes. They effectively have no navy. But the internal security structures remain. Until these are degraded, the people of Iran will not feel safe or comfortable taking to the streets. And this is the dilemma Trump will face going forward.
RFE/RL: At what point does diplomacy become performative? Critics argue that both Iran and Russia use negotiations as strategic delay mechanisms while continuing military pressure.
Coffey: You always run the risk that it becomes performative. Symbolism matters in international affairs, so perhaps negotiations are at least partly inherently performative, as both sides posture to try to get into a stronger negotiating position.
That's why you need wise and experienced statesmen and stateswomen to determine when a deal can be made. When a deal cannot be made, you have to walk away from the table and start pursuing other policy options. But you have to know when you're at that point, and you have to be realistic about it. And I'm not so sure this is exactly the case right now with the administration.
This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
Lego, Hip-Hop, And Deepfakes: How Iran Uses AI To Shape Western Opinion
WASHINGTON -- From viral Lego-style videos and AI-generated hip-hop tracks to fabricated battlefield imagery, the war in Iran is revealing how artificial intelligence (AI) is being weaponized in modern warfare and statecraft.
To discuss this rapid shift, RFE/RL spoke with Max Lesser, senior analyst on emerging threats at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation.
RFE/RL: You have tracked Iranian influence operations closely. How sophisticated has Iran become online? Are we watching the world's first real AI war unfolding around Iran right now?
Max Lesser: Iran has become increasingly sophisticated in its online influence operations. There's definitely been a big shift. The AI Lego videos are probably one of the most successful propaganda efforts that I've ever seen come out of Iran targeting foreign audiences.
But that's just one type of Iranian influence operation. They've conducted successful hack-and-leak operations, for example against the [US President Donald] Trump campaign leading up to the 2024 elections, and they've had a long history of aggressive influence operations targeting foreign audiences.
Whether this is the first AI war, I wouldn't say that personally. In previous conflicts, for example during the 12-day war [in June 2025], Iran was creating deepfakes and spreading deepfakes on state media and things like that. But a lot of that was more focused on their domestic audience and trying to convince their own domestic audience that they were having military successes.
What distinguishes this moment is that there is a long history of Iran using AI in influence operations targeting foreign audiences, but I don't think they had done that particularly successfully until now. They're doing it more successfully now because they're figuring out how to use AI to communicate to Americans in ways that resonate with Americans -- using hip-hop music, using Lego videos. Apparently, sympathetic Americans are even telling them what they should put in their next video.
So it's not the first time that Iran has used AI in propaganda and influence operations. It's not the first time they've done it during wartime. But I think it's the first time where we've seen their use of AI in influence operations make such a splash.
'Psychological Warfare Is Crucial'
RFE/RL: To understand the scope of this, when people in the West scroll through social media during this conflict, how much of what they are seeing could actually be fake?
Lesser: It's hard to put a number on it because everybody's feed is different, based on preferences and algorithms. But in terms of fakes and deepfakes specifically, whenever people see videos claiming to show strikes or battlefield footage, they should verify them before believing them. Sometimes there is real footage of successful strikes, but there are also many techniques being used to fabricate or manipulate imagery.
It's not just Iran doing this. I actually started tracking this type of behavior years ago when the Houthis -- an Iranian proxy -- were using AI-generated imagery of ships going up in flames during attacks in the Red Sea.
There's definitely a precedent for this type of behavior. It's been happening for years. Whenever people encounter those sorts of images, they should exercise caution and look for verification outside social media.
RFE/RL: Is Iran using AI mainly to spread propaganda or to deliberately create confusion and panic inside the West? What exactly are they trying to communicate through these campaigns?
Lesser: A huge part of it is telling their story and spreading narratives like the US being imperialist and Iran portraying itself as resisting that oppression. A lot of the messaging tries to align the Iranian government and its struggle against America with progressive causes in the US.
In one of their recent Lego videos, they showed an Iranian man speaking with an anti-Trump liberal in Portland. They also referenced Black Lives Matter protests and anti-Trump demonstrations.
There's a lot of messaging designed to appeal to specific audiences in America: people who are anti-war, anti-Trump. Surprisingly, you even saw rainbow imagery, even though Iran is an extremely anti-gay country. They are strategically using imagery and narratives they believe will resonate with Western audiences.
Another major theme is [American financier and convicted child sex offender Jeffrey] Epstein. They frequently refer to American and Israeli elites as the "Epstein class" and try to portray themselves as part of a global resistance movement against corrupt elites. Again, the most powerful thing is storytelling. That's what gets clicks.
RFE/RL: Do we know who inside the Iranian system is running these campaigns? And how much of it is automated, involving bots, synthetic influencers, AI-generated accounts, etc.?
Lesser: One important actor is the Basij, Iran's voluntary paramilitary force. The Basij has units focused specifically on propaganda and psychological operations. A lot of that is domestic. The Basij uses influence operations as a tool of domestic control against the Iranian population.
They flood Iranian social media platforms and Western platforms like X with Persian-language propaganda targeting Iranians and the diaspora. We've documented hundreds of these accounts at FDD, though we believe there are probably thousands engaging in this activity.
Then there are different units inside the [Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps], as well as Iran's Intelligence Ministry, known as MOIS. These groups have all been involved in influence operations, cyberattacks, and information warfare.
Iran's state broadcaster, IRIB, also plays a role by seeding propaganda domestically that later spreads abroad. But there's also a gray zone where pro-regime civilians participate independently or semi-independently.
For example, the creators of the Lego videos initially denied ties to the Iranian government but later admitted the Iranian government was one of their customers. What remains unclear is whether they are taking direct orders from Tehran or simply producing content the government later distributes.
RFE/RL: Beyond X and TikTok, are there particular platforms Iran is weaponizing against the West, such as Telegram, Instagram, or others?
Lesser: Definitely. Telegram is widely used for coordination because it's less popular among Americans and offers fewer restrictions. We've seen Iranian influence operations use Telegram to crowdsource and coordinate participants.
Meta also released a report earlier in the conflict explaining that Iranian operatives were posing as Americans on Facebook and Instagram to engage directly with American audiences.
They were also creating fake media outlets and fake news organizations. Platforms like Meta tend to enforce policies more aggressively, which is why Iran often uses more covert tactics there.
RFE/RL: You've warned about authoritarian influence ecosystems. How closely are Iran, Russia, and China now working together online?
Lesser: It's very difficult to prove direct operational coordination. Personally, I haven't seen concrete evidence of them messaging each other behind the scenes and coordinating propaganda campaigns directly. But they absolutely use each other's content, mirror each other's narratives, and copy each other's tactics.
Russia was really one of the pioneers in this space with fake accounts, hack-and-leak operations, and covert influence campaigns. Iran and China learned from those models and developed their own versions.
For example, Russia carried out the hack-and-leak [operation] against the [Hillary] Clinton [presidential] campaign in 2016, while Iran conducted a high-profile hack-and-leak operation targeting the Trump campaign in 2024.
While I can't say there's confirmed coordination, they are clearly learning from one another, echoing one another, and sometimes directly copying each other.
RFE/RL: Is the United States prepared for this kind of AI-powered psychological warfare?
Lesser: No, I don't think so. You can look at what happened with the Lego videos. There really wasn't a meaningful response from the United States. But it's also hard to know what the response should be. We can't simply take these videos down. We have a free and open Internet and protections for free speech.
Even if you remove them from one platform, they'll reappear elsewhere -- Telegram or other platforms with less moderation. So this isn't just about takedowns. America has to educate its own people about who the Iranian regime is, how it oppresses its population, and how it uses propaganda strategically. That's what will ultimately make people less susceptible to these campaigns.
RFE/RL: Are Iranian influence networks targeting American and European audiences differently in order to exploit political polarization inside Western democracies?
Lesser: They definitely tailor messaging. For example, they've promoted Scottish independence narratives through covert accounts targeting audiences in Scotland. They've also created fake French media outlets and localized campaigns in Europe.
But many of the narratives they use in America also resonate in Europe: anti-Trump messaging, anti-war messaging, anti-establishment narratives. Essentially, they're saying: “You're anti-Trump? We're anti-Trump too. You're against this war? We're against this war, too.” Then they package those narratives into emotionally engaging Lego videos with catchy music, and people begin feeling emotionally aligned with them.
The American government needs to do a better job informing the public about how brutal the Iranian regime actually is, how it treats its own people, and how long it has supported terrorism and repression.
Iran is telling a story. The United States needs to tell a stronger and more truthful story in response.
This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
The Islamic Republic 3.0: Who Holds Power In Iran?
For decades, power in Iran was centralized in the hands of a single man: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. But since his killing at the onset of the US-Israeli war with Iran on February 28, decision-making in Tehran has become increasingly decentralized, experts say.
Mojtaba Khamenei has not been seen in public since he succeeded his father in early March. In his absence, a cohort of senior Iranian officials have been effectively running the country.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), a dominant political player, has now become the decisive force in Iran, experts say. Reformists and moderates have been relegated to the political fringes, leading to a more hard-line and ideologically rigid system.
Key power centers and figures have emerged in what some observers call the Islamic republic 3.0. While many of these figures are aligned on major policies, some fissures have surfaced.
Mojtaba Khamenei: New Supreme Leader
As supreme leader, the 56-year-old has the ultimate say on all state matters. But his authority has been undermined from the outset.
Khamenei was a controversial pick as supreme leader. The cleric had never held public office, and some argued a move toward "hereditary rule" would betray the very anti-monarchist roots of the Islamic Revolution in 1979.
Seriously wounded in the same Israeli air strike that killed his father, Khamenei has also been absent from public view since his appointment on March 8. He suffered injuries to his head, lower back, and foot but was now "in complete health," Mazahar Hosseini, head of protocol in the supreme leader's office, said on May 8.
US intelligence has said it believes Khamenei plays a prominent role in war strategy and managing peace talks with the United States. But in a system where the supreme leader is omnipresent -- issuing audio messages, making video addresses, and appearing in public to display his authority -- his absence is striking.
"Iran has entered a period of transition after the death of Ali Khamenei and the end of his 36-year leadership," Ali Afshari, an Iranian political analyst based in Washington, told RFE/RL's Radio Farda. [It's] a challenging period in which the postwar alignment of forces will be decisive."
Hossein Taeb: Behind-The-Scenes Operator
A hard-line cleric, Taeb led the IRGC's intelligence branch for 13 years until 2022, when he was dismissed as part of a major security shakeup.
Taeb, who is blacklisted by the United States and European Union for his alleged role in state repression, worked in the supreme leader's office before he was appointed as the IRGC's intelligence chief in 2009.
A longtime confidant of the younger Khamenei, Taeb is considered a key figure behind the scenes. Experts say he could play an important role in managing Khamenei's relationships with key players inside the system.
Ahmad Vahidi: IRGC Chief
The IRGC, the elite branch of Iran's armed forces, has always played a key role in politics. But it is now the dominant political force in the Islamic republic after the killing of Ali Khamenei.
That's despite Israel and the United decimating the leadership of the IRGC, including killing its commander in chief, Mohammad Pakpour.
Pakpour's deputy, Ahmad Vahidi, a former interior and defense minister, took over the IRGC in early March. But experts say it is unclear if Vahidi has the clout and credibility to unite the competing factions within the IRGC.
Experts say the war and the securitization of Iran following Ali Khamenei's death has allowed the IRGC to play a central role in the domestic and foreign affairs of the country.
"The era after Ali Khamenei remains ambiguous. However, one key fact is visible: the increasing role and power of the IRGC in the administration of the Islamic republic," Mojtaba Najafi, a France-based Iranian political commentator, told RFE/RL's Radio Farda.
"Today, a significant part of the country's administration is in the hands of the IRGC," he added. "Militarization in the economy, politics, culture, and society has also now reached a stage of maturity."
Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf: The Intermediator
Qalibaf is a conservative politician and former military commander who spent decades cultivating ties to Iran's supreme leadership and the IRGC.
After a career overshadowed by corruption scandals and failed presidential bids, he arguably finds himself as the most powerful figure left standing in the Islamic republic.
Experts describe the role of Qalibaf, the parliament speaker who is also Iran's top negotiator with the United States, as a mediator between the different centers of power in Iran. He is considered close to the new supreme leader.
This was the role played by Iran's powerful security chief Ali Larijani before his assassination in March. Larijani was a unifying figure who brought together competing political factions and maintained strong ties with the IRGC, intelligence apparatus, and clerical establishment.
"Qalibaf has always been a pawn" used by the leadership, Hossein Razzaq, a political analyst based in Germany, told Radio Farda.
"Today, with the elimination of other key pawns, the role he plays for the system has become more prominent."
Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr: Security Chief
A former commander in the IRGC, Zolqadr succeeded Larijani as the head of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, the country's key policymaking body.
While Larijani was known as a shrewd and pragmatic politician, Zolqadr is a hard-line security and military official.
Razzaq considers the general's appointment as an attempt by Khamenei to divide power among his loyalists. His selection, he said, also underscored the dominance of the IRGC in the different centers of power in Iran.
Masud Pezeshkian: The Powerless President
The reformist president is not a major political player and not considered a threat by the hard-liners who dominate the system.
Pezeshkian's role is administrative, running the day-to-day affairs of the government. But the final decision on major issues, including war and diplomacy, is made elsewhere.
He and Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi are the only members of the reformist and moderate political camps to play a visible role in the new power structure. Like Pezeshkian, Araqchi does not have decision-making power but follows orders from above.
Still, differences have emerged that pit figures like Pezeshkian and Araqchi who are pushing for diplomacy against generals who oppose making concessions to the United States in negotiations to end the war.
As Iran Talks Stall, Markets Bet On Diplomacy, Experts Say
WASHINGTON -- The latest exchange between Washington and Tehran over a proposed path toward de-escalation has raised new questions about what comes next in the growing crisis around the Strait of Hormuz.
US President Donald Trump described Iran's latest response to a US-backed proposal as "totally unacceptable," even as both sides continue to signal interest in negotiations over sanctions relief, nuclear restrictions, and the future of shipping through the strategic waterway.
Analysts in Washington say the standoff is increasingly testing assumptions that diplomacy can move quickly enough to prevent wider economic fallout from the conflict.
So far, financial markets have remained relatively calm despite some choppy moments.
But experts say the relative market stability reflects expectations that negotiations will eventually produce some form of agreement.
"There's pressure on both sides to make some sort of deal," Mark Cancian said during a discussion hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on May 11.
Cancian, a retired US Marine Corps colonel and senior adviser at CSIS who served more than three decades in the military, including during Operation Desert Storm, and Iraq, said the military situation has settled into "a stalemate."
Tehran has attempted to restrict movement through the strait, the waterway for one-fifth of the world's oil and gas, while the United States has maintained pressure from outside the waterway.
Although clashes have remained largely confined to the strait, neither side appears positioned for a decisive breakthrough.
According to Cancian, both Washington and Tehran appear to be exploring possible compromises involving Iran's enriched uranium stockpile, future enrichment activity, and phased sanctions relief.
He noted that the United States seems willing to forgo inspectors on the ground in exchange for physical constraints on enriched uranium.
In the meantime, Cancian said the longer the confrontation continues, the greater the military and economic pressure will become for both sides.
Asia Watching Closely
Although global markets have remained relatively stable, analysts said the economic impact could become more pronounced if disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz continue.
While some cargo traffic does get through, the crisis has already contributed to higher fuel prices -- up roughly 40 percent -- and growing supply concerns in parts of Asia and Europe.
The crisis is being followed particularly closely in East Asia, where several economies remain heavily dependent on Middle Eastern energy imports -- 70 percent for South Korea and 95 percent for Japan.
Victor Cha, who serves as president of the geopolitics and foreign policy department at CSIS and a professor at Georgetown University, said Japan and South Korea are already looking for ways to diversify energy supplies and reduce long-term dependence on Gulf shipping routes, eyeing investments in Central Asia and Africa.
"Both of them, as a result of this, no matter what happens, are going to want to lower their dependence on crude coming out of the strait," Cha said.
He further noted that this shift creates a "geostrategic imperative" for Korea and Japan to improve relationships with Russia, as alternative routes from Central Asia would likely transit the Russian Black Sea coast.
Additionally, both the Japanese yen and South Korean won have hit multi-year lows against the dollar, further straining their economies.
The Iran issue is also expected to loom over Trump's upcoming summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping on May 14-15.
Beijing has remained Iran's primary oil customer, taking roughly 90 percent of its exports last year. US officials may press Beijing to use this leverage to encourage Iranian concessions.
Still, analysts say the immediate issue remains whether diplomacy can move faster than the economic pressures and munitions depletions now building across global markets and military theaters.
- By Kian Sharifi
Could Iran Start Charging Global Tech Firms For Undersea Cables In The Strait Of Hormuz?
Iran has insisted for weeks that it has the right to charge international ships to transit the Strait of Hormuz, a key global shipping route off the coast of the Islamic republic.
Now, two news agencies affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) have issued proposals urging Tehran to go further by imposing fees on the global tech firms that operate undersea fiberoptic cables running through the narrow waterway connecting the Persian Gulf to the open sea.
The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, which Tehran has effectively closed since the United States and Israel launched a bombing campaign on February 28, remains a key sticking point in ending the war. Tehran has claimed sovereignty over the strategic waterway, which is rejected by the international community.
Experts say the proposals calling for Iran to demand payment for undersea cables under the strait are more of a threat than a viable plan.
"The risk of adversarial subsea cable cuts has always been there, but an open threat from a nation-state like Iran adds urgency," Isik Mater, director of research at the London-based Internet monitoring group NetBlocks, told RFE/RL.
Undersea cables are mostly owned and operated by international tech companies like Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Amazon. The cables carry SWIFT transactions, cloud traffic, and general Internet data between Asia, Europe, and the Persian Gulf.
If the submarine cables running through Hormuz were severed, the impact on ordinary people across Asia, the Middle East, and Europe would be immediate and wide-ranging
.
Streaming services would buffer or fail entirely. Messaging apps would slow or go dark. Video calls would drop. Online banking and card payments could be disrupted. Cloud-dependent services -- from e-mail to workplace tools -- would degrade.
Internet providers could reroute traffic through surviving cables or satellites, but capacity is limited, meaning slower speeds for everyone even where connectivity survives. Repairs typically take weeks, sometimes months.
What's The Pitch?
The Tasnim and Fars news agencies argued that Iran should both monetize and assert sovereignty over the web of undersea cables that crisscross the strait.
The legal foundation for the proposals draws on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which Iran has signed but never ratified.
Citing Article 34, Tasnim argued that transit passage rights granted to shipping do not eclipse Iran's sovereign rights over the seabed. At the strait's narrowest point, the territorial sea claims of Iran and Oman overlap entirely, meaning the cables physically sit in Iranian-claimed territory.
Building cables there without authorization, Tasnim claimed, amounts to "occupying Iranian soil underwater" and requires both licensing and fees.
The revenue model is borrowed loosely from Egypt, which Tasnim claims earns hundreds of millions of dollars annually from undersea cables that run through the Suez Canal.
Tasnim and Fars also argued that Iran should compel tech giants to formally operate under Iranian law and partner with Iranian technology companies. Fars described the goal explicitly as turning Iran's control over the Strait of Hormuz into a "digital power lever," with Iranian firms controlling the maintenance and repairs of the cables.
Does It Hold Up?
Experts say the legal arguments provided by the Iranian news agencies have significant weaknesses.
While coastal states do retain sovereignty over their territorial seabed, Tasnim ignores UNCLOS Article 79, which explicitly protects the right for global Internet providers to build and maintain undersea cables.
Mater of NetBlocks said the Egypt comparison has "limited weight" because Cairo "licenses transit and landing points on its own territory, and these agreements have been entered willingly."
"By contrast Iran's position is more tenuous, and though it has control of its territorial waters it doesn't own a significant stretch of the routes," she added.
Mater said the proposals' "biggest red flag" is the call for international tech firms to be forced to formally operate under Iranian law and partner with Iranian technology companies.
Under Iranian law, "communications are typically controlled and monitored, before even considering sanctions and geopolitical barriers," she said.
"This makes Iran's demand come off as more of a 'protection' fee, similar to what they've been doing with tankers, distant from any kind of conventional transit licensing agreement we usually see in the industry," Mater said.
Before a US sea blockade of the Strait of Hormuz was imposed in mid-April, Iran was charging commercial ships up to $2 million to transit the strait, although few vessels were making the passage. Maritime traffic in the strait has come to a standstill since the American barricade.
Iran has a history of imposing severe restrictions on Internet usage. The authorities have enforced an Internet blackout since February 28 and refused to restore access since a cease-fire came into effect on April 8.
"Iranian authorities haven't hesitated to cut off their own citizens' connectivity and may well seek to sever external links if demands are unmet," said Mater. "Although international cables aren't under Iran's direct control, sabotage via ships' anchors or diving teams would be within their capabilities in the strait."
Former Senior US Diplomat Gordon Gray: Iran Talks Likely To Continue Despite Trump's Latest Rejection
WASHINGTON -- Former senior US diplomat Gordon Gray, who served as deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs under President George W. Bush, says indirect negotiations between Washington and Tehran are likely to continue despite what he described as significant pain and pressure on both sides.
The latest exchange comes after Tehran reportedly sent a proposal via Pakistan seeking an end to military operations across the region, sanctions relief, and guarantees for maritime security, including the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.
President Donald Trump responded on May 10 by rejecting the Iranian position, while signaling continued frustration with the slow pace of diplomacy.
RFE/RL spoke with Gray, who also served as US ambassador to Tunisia and deputy chief of mission in Egypt and now is a professor of Gulf and Arabian Peninsula affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, about the latest state of Iran peace talks.
RFE/RL: Iran has now responded to the US proposal. Does this feel like a breakthrough moment?
Gordon Gray: I don't believe it is as much a breakthrough as it is a continuation of the process that began in Islamabad when [US] Vice President [JD] Vance met with the speaker of the Iranian parliament. Even though those talks did not result in a breakthrough, as many had hoped they would, what is important was that the two sides kept speaking indirectly through Pakistani mediators, but also, perhaps more recently, through the Qataris as well.
I note that the Qatari prime minister was in Miami two days ago, where he reportedly met with Mr. [Steve] Witkoff and Mr. [Jared] Kushner.
RFE/RL: Trump said earlier that a deal was very possible. What is the real obstacle today -- Washington’s demands or Tehran’s red lines?
Gray: They're both. It's like any negotiation: Both sides have demands, both sides have red lines. In this case, both sides are suffering from the actions of the others, and that gives them motivation to seek some sort of agreement.
RFE/RL: Based on reports from Tehran and mediators that Iran is seeking sanctions relief as a precondition for deeper nuclear negotiations, does this leave the White House facing a choice between compromise or further escalation?
Gray: I don't know that I would put it that way. I think Washington's decision will be based on what the Iranian response is to the US proposal and whether it meets at least minimal US demands.
I don't expect that the Iranian response will completely address all of the issues. The reports I've seen -- and they're very initial since the Iranians just handed over their response -- suggest there may be a short-term cease-fire and reopening of the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for time to allow the other issues to be successfully negotiated.
If those reports are accurate, I wouldn't call that a compromise if Washington decides to accept it. I'd call it part of the negotiation process.
RFE/RL: Do you think Tehran is negotiating because it wants relief, or because the pressure campaign is working?
Gray: I wouldn't say the pressure campaign is working so much as it is creating an incentive for Iran to seek a diplomatic solution. Of course, it wants relief, but it wanted relief from sanctions before February 28, as well.
RFE/RL: Iran's economy has been hit hard by sanctions and isolation. How much strain is the regime really under right now?
Gray: It's under tremendous strain. Infrastructure has been destroyed. Inflation is high. The Iranian currency is virtually worthless. There's tremendous economic mismanagement and tremendous corruption.
Because of the Internet blackout, for example, a lot of unemployment is going up because many businesses are laying off workers. So the regime is under tremendous strain.
But that being said, it's also responded with tremendous brutality when people rose up to protest in January. It's not a democracy, and it has shown that it's willing to use brutal repression to stay in power.
RFE/RL: Some analysts suggest that even if an agreement is reached, the Strait of Hormuz could remain a potential flashpoint for renewed tensions. Do you agree with that assessment?
Gray: It certainly has the potential to be because Iran has shown it has the ability to act in an asymmetric way to close off the Strait of Hormuz.
The issue is not simply the free flow of energy through the strait. It's also the confidence of insurers, shipping companies, and those making medium- and long-term contracts to buy oil. Iran does not have to do much to shake that confidence.
RFE/RL: The proposed framework would reportedly halt uranium enrichment for at least 12 years. Would that fundamentally change the nuclear threat?
Gray: It depends how you assess the nuclear threat to begin with.
Trump has given conflicting statements on whether he wants Iran to turn over the uranium enriched to 60 percent. Sometimes he says it has to be turned over; other times he says it's buried, so it doesn't matter. The US position on that is unclear.
RFE/RL: How significant are the reported concessions involving underground enrichment and long-term restrictions?
Gray: I'd have to see the details. There are too many reports right now, and the devil is in the details. I'd also want to see what impartial nuclear experts conclude after reviewing any agreement carefully.
RFE/RL: Despite the military pressure, have Iran’s core nuclear red lines changed?
Gray: I don't think so. I think they are going to insist on what they perceive to be their right as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to enrich uranium.
This is not simply the position of the Islamic republic. It was also the position of the shah of Iran, who began the Iranian nuclear program.
RFE/RL: If Trump rejects Iran's conditions, are we looking at diplomacy breaking down or a much wider war?
Gray: No, I don't see diplomacy breaking down. I think there will be a continuation of discussions.
That doesn't mean there won't be military strikes by one side or the other, but at the end of the day both sides have an incentive to get out of the situation they're in because the other side has created sufficient pain and therefore sufficient incentive for some kind of resolution.
RFE/RL: Gulf nations initially appeared united against Iran. What is your assessment of the current state of the regional alliance?
Gray: The regional alignment against Iran is probably stronger than it has been before because Iran made a strategic miscalculation in striking Gulf Arab economic and civilian infrastructure.
That being said, there are reports of a Saudi-Emirati rift, but that rift predated February 28.
RFE/RL: And in terms of the endgame with Iran, do regional allies remain united?
Gray: They all have similar objectives. They want a cessation of Iranian attacks against their countries, and they want the Strait of Hormuz open again so they can export energy and import goods they need, including foodstuffs.
RFE/RL: From the perspective of ordinary Iranians, what would be the best possible outcome right now?
Gray: There would be two best outcomes.
One would be a cessation of military strikes against their country because civilians have lost their lives and infrastructure has been severely damaged. We can all hope for that outcome.
The second would be a transition to democratic governance. But unfortunately, I don't expect that for a very long time.
RFE/RL: Given the current circumstances, how long could it realistically take to bridge the remaining differences and sign an agreement?
Gray: Diplomacy takes time. You can look at other arms-control negotiations outside the Middle East as well.
The United States and the Soviet Union did not reach the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty in 30 or 60 days. These negotiations are complicated. So, it's going to take a long time because there are a lot of complicated issues.
In the short term, I could see an agreement leading to a cessation of hostilities, a reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, and possibly sanctions relief or assets being unfrozen.
But if you're talking about resolving the nuclear issue, that is sufficiently complicated that reaching an agreement there is going to take quite a long time.
This interview has been edited for clarity and length.
- By RFE/RL
US, Iran Clash Over Peace Proposal As Gulf Stalemate Continues
US President Donald Trump described the cease-fire with Iran as being on "life support," adding he is considering restarting naval escorts -- dubbed Operation Enduring Freedom -- through the Strait of Hormuz amid a continuing a deadlock over how to bring the conflict to an end.
Speaking to reporters at the White House on May 11, Trump said the cease-fire, agreed to on April 8, is now "unbelievably weak" and that he's looking to achieve "complete victory" in the war.
"I would say it's one of the weakest right now, it's on life support," he said. "I would say the cease-fire is on massive life support."
Trump's latest comments came after he angrily rejected Tehran's response to a US peace proposal in a social media post, calling it "totally unacceptable." He did not say what part of counterproposal he was opposed to.
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baqaei said in his weekly press conference on May 11 that Tehran's response included stopping the war, lifting the US blockade on the Strait of Hormuz, freeing Iran's assets, and "establishing security in the region and Lebanon."
Iranian state media said that accepting the US conditions would amount to the country's "surrender" to what it called "excessive demands."
Baqaei said "the only thing we demanded was Iran's legitimate rights."
Many reports have suggested the US plan was set out in a one-page memorandum that called for an end to fighting and the unblocking of the Strait of Hormuz but left other key issues -- including Iran's right to enrich uranium -- until later.
Trump said in a Fox News interview on May 11 that he was considering renewing Operation Enduring Freedom, though a final decision had yet to be made. The operation was launched on May 6 but stopped less than two days later.
"We're going to have a complete victory," he said, adding that Tehran thinks "I'll get tired of this. I'll get bored, or I'll have some pressure. But there's no pressure."
Trump has taken a dual line in public statements, stressing the possibility of a diplomatic solution to the war while alternatively threatening massive new air strikes on Iran's energy and power infrastructure.
In an interview with journalist Sharyl Attkisson broadcast on May 10, Trump said American military operations against Iran may not be over, suggesting the United States could still target additional sites if necessary.
Asked whether combat operations involving Iran had concluded, Trump responded: "No, I didn't say that. I said they were defeated, but that doesn't mean they're done. We could go in for another two weeks and hit every single target."
Trump added that US and Israeli strikes had already hit "probably 70 percent" of the intended targets since launching air strikes on Iran on February 28.
The campaign was halted on April 8 when a two-week cease-fire was agreed via mediation by Pakistan. The strikes have not resumed even though the deadline has passed.
"We have other targets that we could conceivably hit," Trump said. "But even if we don't, it will take years for them to rebuild."
He also addressed Iran's enriched uranium stockpiles, saying the United States was monitoring the sites closely.
"We have it under surveillance," he said, adding that US space-based monitoring capabilities were tracking activity around the facilities.
Iran has repeatedly rejected proposals that would require it to transfer its stockpile of enriched uranium to the United States.
Former senior US diplomat Gordon Gray, who served as deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs under President George W. Bush, told RFE/RL in an interview that indirect negotiations between Washington and Tehran are likely to continue despite what he described as significant pain and pressure on both sides.
"I don't see diplomacy breaking down. I think there will be a continuation of discussions," said Gray, who also served as US ambassador to Tunisia and deputy chief of mission in Egypt and now is a professor of Gulf and Arabian Peninsula affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University.
"That doesn't mean there won't be military strikes by one side or the other, but at the end of the day both sides have an incentive to get out of the situation they're in because the other side has created sufficient pain and therefore sufficient incentive for some kind of resolution."
With reporting by RFE/RL's Radio Farda and Reuters
- By RFE/RL
Iran's Currency Falls To Record Low As War, US Blockade Rattle Economy
Iran's currency has fallen to a record low against the US dollar as the two-month-long conflict rattles the country's sanctions-hit economy.
Air strikes by the United States and Israel, launched at Iran on February 28, along with the American naval blockade on Iranian ports and vessels, have disrupted Tehran's vital oil exports, hampered domestic production, and fueled inflation.
Iran's national currency, the rial, dropped to a new low of 1.81 million to the US dollar on April 29 before rebounding the next day. The rial has seen its value fall by nearly 15 percent in recent days, according to Iranian media.
Iran and the United States agreed to a cease-fire on April 8, although Washington increased economic pressure by imposing a blockade on April 13, a move that has made it harder for Tehran to obtain hard currency through exports.
According to Iran's Central Bank, annual inflation, which was above 40 percent before the war, increased to 50 percent as of April 4.
Iranians say the prices of basic goods such as rice, eggs, and chicken have increased significantly since the conflict began.
Rising inflation was the catalyst for nationwide protests that broke out in January and posed one of the biggest threats to the Iran's clerical rulers since the Islamic Revolution in 1979.
The authorities responded to the demonstrations with unprecedented force, killing thousands of people, according to human rights groups.
Iran, too, has sought to impose significant economic pain on the United States and its allies. It responded to US-Israel air strikes by effectively closing the Strait of Hormuz, a key artery for global oil and gas supplies, to international shipping.
The move has rattled international energy markets and upended the global economy.
On April 29, the price of Brent crude rose by almost 7 percent to over $126 a barrel, the highest since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
- By Ray Furlong and
- RFE/RL's Radio Farda
'Endgame' For Iran's Oil Sector? How US Blockade May Impact Tehran's Calculus
Weeks of US and Israeli air strikes, sanctions, and restrictions have hit Iran hard, but it could be geology that eventually pushes it into making concessions in its ongoing standoff with the United States.
As the US naval blockade of Iran approaches the end of its third week, data from shipping and industry monitors suggests that tankers have been unable to move Iranian crude through the Strait of Hormuz toward markets in Asia.
This means that Iranian oil storage capacity is rapidly filling, and the clock is ticking before Iran will need to cease production. That's the problem for Tehran, analysts say, as it tries to withstand US pressure to negotiate a peace agreement.
'Geological Impact'
"That creates more of a geological impact rather than anything else, to do with how oil is extracted," Stephen Innes, managing partner at SPI Asset Management, a foreign exchange and commodity advisory, told RFE/RL.
Once the valves get turned off, "oil tends to settle down at the bottom of the reservoir. And it's quite viscous and it's quite thick and it takes a lot of propulsion to bring that up," he said.
The result, he added, could even be "an endgame" for the sector.
"The whole process to build up pressure again and successfully get [oil] coming up the well again, could possibly take a year…. A lot of people think it's just the end of the production because it's just going to be too costly [to restart]," Innes said.
A research note issued by Goldman Sachs on April 23 stated that "the share of country production with relatively low reservoir pressure is estimated to be higher in Iran and Iraq than elsewhere in the Gulf."
The note, which was considering oil sectors in all Persian Gulf countries, said that recovery of oil production levels "may be only partial after a prolonged closure."
Mehdi Moslehi, a UK-based Iranian risk consultant who worked in the oil sector for a decade, agreed that the timescale of any extraction shutdown would be important.
"If production at a well is stopped for a short period, say between one week up to two or maximum three weeks, then it can be brought back into operation again," he told RFE/RL's Radio Farda.
"But if a well remains shut for a long period -- especially because the oil wells in southern Iran mostly have high sulfur content, and depending on how old the well is -- there will be serious problems. Reservoir pressure may drop."
A Race Against Time?
Of course, Iran may not need to shut down production. But data released this week suggested that it's now a race against time.
A recent report by Kpler, a commodities and shipping analytics company, said "no confirmed tanker has exited the US blockade zone" since Washington began enforcing the blockade on April 13.
"Several tankers passed through the Strait of Hormuz but failed to clear the US blockade, which sits further south between the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea," it said.
This is why Iran's oil stores are filling up. Kpler estimated Iran had about 12 days spare capacity. Some analysts have suggested a time window of 2-3 weeks.
"Before, we could say time was on the side of the Islamic republic. But now we can't really say that anymore," Kpler analyst Homayoun Falakshahi told Radio Farda. "The rules of the game have become somewhat balanced."
Iran's blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, preventing oil exports by other Gulf nations, is also exerting pressure. It has led to a spike in oil prices and sent supply shocks through the world economy, hitting not only oil but also gas and other vital commodities.
As this goes on, the global pain increases.
"Right now this is a game of endurance, of seeing which side gives in more in the short term…. Prices around $100–110, even up to $120 per barrel are still levels the global economy can tolerate. However, if the Strait of Hormuz is closed in the coming days or weeks, prices will probably rise further," Falakshahi said.
On April 29, Brent crude rose sharply to $115 per barrel following a report in The Wall Street Journal that US President Donald Trump had told aides to prepare for an "extended" blockade.
In the meantime, Iran is seeking other ways to ease storage pressures. There's talk of delivering oil by train to China, which is Iran's biggest customer by far. But this would be more expensive and in smaller volumes than by tanker and so have limited impact.
Iran's next step may be further escalation.
Many other Persian Gulf producers have been able to alleviate the storage pressures Iran is facing by using other routes, such as Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline to the Red Sea. Amid curtailed output this has helped keep the pumpjacks jerking and the trunk lines pressurized.
Iran could mobilize its Houthi proxy forces in Yemen to attack this route, by targeting shipping in the Bab al-Mandab Strait, through which roughly 10 percent of the world's seaborne oil passes.
But this would also entail risk for Tehran. In recent weeks, the United States has added to its massive military presence in the region and indicated the possibility of a return to hostilities.
"The feeling around the market is that something's going to get done on the deal front between now and the next three weeks," Innes said.
- By Kian Sharifi
Iran's Conservative Camp Split Over US Talks To End War
In the face of a devastating US-Israeli bombing campaign, Iran's rival political factions cast aside their differences to unite behind the country's decision-makers.
But since a cease-fire with the United States came into force on April 8, deep-rooted political differences in the Islamic republic have spilled out into the open.
The public rupture over Tehran's attempts to negotiate an end to the two-month-long war has pitted Iran's small but vocal faction of ultraconservatives against more moderate conservatives, a confrontation that has been laid bare in the halls of parliament and on the front pages of state-affiliated media.
But analysts warn the fracture is not ideological. The main differences, they say, are not even over whether to cut a deal with the United States, but when to pursue peace and what concessions to make.
The dispute crystalized in the days following the first round of talks between delegations led by Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf and US Vice President JD Vance in Pakistan on April 11-12.
What had largely been friction behind closed doors erupted into an open media war when the Tasnim news agency -- linked to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) -- published an editorial on April 25 mocking ultraconservatives, comparing their expectations for the talks to a "magic beanstalk."
Ultraconservatives have said Iran should not make any concessions to the United States, including over its nuclear program, a nonstarter for Washington. They also insist any peace deal should extend to Iran's regional proxies and must ensure the lifting of all sanctions against Tehran.
In a separate piece, Tasnim accused Raja News, a website close to the ultraconservatives, of causing "discord" and playing into US President Donald Trump's hand by criticizing the Iranian negotiating team. Days earlier, Trump had said there was "tremendous infighting and confusion" within Iran's leadership.
Ali Afshari, an Iranian political analyst based in Washington who spoke to RFE/RL's Radio Farda, cautioned against reading too much into the public confrontation.
"I don't think we yet have evidence that this dispute represents a large structural fracture," he said.
The US-Israeli bombing campaign launched on February 28 has decapitated much of Iran's political and military leadership. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the longtime supreme leader, was assassinated and succeeded by his son, Mojtaba, who has yet to appear in public since his ascent to power.
The primary target of the ultraconservatives is Qalibaf, the country's top negotiator with the United States. Politicians linked to the Paydari Front, an influential ultraconservative faction aligned with former presidential candidate Saeed Jalili, accused the negotiating team of violating the red lines set by the new supreme leader.
Mahmoud Nabavian, a lawmaker affiliated with Paydari who accompanied the delegation to Pakistan, said talks were "pure damage" and discussing limits to Iran's nuclear program was a "strategic mistake."
Iran's parliament on April 27 voted on a statement expressing support for the negotiating team. Only seven of the 261 lawmakers, all prominent Paydari figures, refused to sign.
"Iran's oil is selling for double the pre-war price," Nabavian wrote on X the next day, calling on "cowards" to join the public whom he suggested did not back the talks. The war has rattled international energy markets and upended the global economy, and hard-liners appear hopeful this will ultimately force Washington to make concessions.
Afshari said the divide among ultraconservatives and more moderate conservatives is over the timing of peace talks.
The ultraconservatives want to continue the war and negotiate from a position of strength, he said. By contrast, Qalibaf and other more moderate conservatives want to end the war now and secure a deal while they still can.
"The disagreement exists at this level, but it doesn't go so far that anyone in the [ultraconservative] bloc is advocating for no deal at all," Afshari argued.
Political differences in Iran have been exacerbated by the absence of Mojtaba Khamenei, who is living in hiding and is reportedly gravely wounded. He has minimal contact with Iranian officials, according to reports.
"The lack of a decisive central authority due to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei's absence has likely allowed these disputes to escalate into the public domain rather than remain contained within regime channels," the Institute for the Study of War, a US-based think tank, wrote in a report on April 28.