Europe
What We Know -- And Don't Know -- About Trump's Massive Tariff Plan
US President Donald Trump is set to announce a number of massive tariffs on April 2 as part of his ambitious economic agenda to rewire the United States’ trading relationships with its allies and adversaries alike, while shaking up the global economy in the process.
Trump and his administration have promoted the tariff announcement as “Liberation Day” for the United States as they look to reduce the country’s dependence on foreign goods as part of a broader policy push intended to resuscitate US manufacturing, cut the US trade deficit, and help reduce the national debt.
“The president will be announcing a tariff plan that will roll back the unfair trade practices that have been ripping off our country for decades,” White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt told reporters. “He’s doing this in the best interest of the American worker.”
Trump will deliver remarks on April 2 at what is being billed as a Make America Wealthy Again Event in the White House Rose Garden, the White House said on April 1.
But it’s unclear ahead of the announcement what exactly will go into effect and if there will be exceptions, delays, or rollbacks on tariffs.
Leavitt said that it’s ultimately up to Trump to decide what tariffs to impose, and various scenarios have been floated by the US president and his advisers in the weeks and days ahead of the announcement.
Those scenarios range from across-the-board tariffs of up to 20 percent that would affect virtually every country doing business with the United States to the so-called reciprocal tariff approach, where Washington matches dollar for dollar other countries’ levies placed on US products.
The enactment of postponed 25 percent tariffs on Mexico and Canada, as well as tariffs on lumber, copper, pharmaceuticals, and microchips could also be on the table.
Trump has already announced 25 percent tariffs on auto imports that are set to go into effect on April 3.
What's The Latest Trump Administration Thinking On Tariffs?
Which approach Trump adopts for tariffs may reveal more about how he and his administration intend to use the financial measures.
The Trump administration wants to both raise revenue with tariffs -- which are import duties on goods coming into the United States -- and use them as leverage to get other nations to lower their own duties, or make other policy changes, such as combating migration and drug trafficking.
But some economists and market analysts have noted that if the tariffs are subject to negotiation and could be lowered over time, this would limit how much revenue they could ultimately generate.
Other concerns have also been raised about the effects that the tariffs could have on rising prices in the United States and the broader economic fallout.
Trump’s tariffs and his threats to impose more have already sent US stocks tumbling and sparked fears that the country’s economy could go into a recession. The S&P 500 -- the market index tracking the performance of 500 leading companies listed on stock exchanges in the United States -- is on track for its biggest quarterly loss since the fall of 2022.
What Will Be The Global Impact Of US Auto Tariffs?
The shock from the auto tariffs could be large and leave lasting fallout across Europe and Asia.
In Asia, the measures could have major impacts on the South Korean and Japanese economies, which rely heavily on their auto sectors. In Europe, the fallout could hit Germany and neighboring countries also heavily integrated into the European Union’s auto manufacturing supply chain.
Slovakia, which relies on the auto industry as a driving force for its economy, would be “among the top three” most affected in the EU, Slovak Economy Minister Denisa Sakova said on March 28.
According to estimates compiled by Goldman Sachs, almost half of the 16 million cars sold in the United States last year were imported with a total value exceeding $330 billion.
Some studies show that the measures may help generate the policy outcomes touted by the Trump administration.
Car manufacturers, including South Korea’s Hyundai and Kia, have already announced plans to boost production in the United States.
The Yale Budget Lab, a nonpartisan research center associated with Yale University, also estimated that Trump’s new auto tariffs could raise $600 billion to $650 billion in revenue from 2026 to 2035.
But that same study showed that the levies would see US vehicle prices rise by 13.5 percent on average, the equivalent of an additional $6,400 for the price of an average new 2024 car.
Trump’s 25 percent tariffs on steel and aluminum, which kicked in on March 12, are also forecast to increase the prices of conventional engine vehicles by $250 to $800 and those of electric vehicles (EVs) by $2,500 or more, according to the Anderson Economic Group (AEG), a financial consultancy.
Will New Tariffs Ramp Up A Global Trade War?
Trump’s tariffs have already been met with retaliatory measures, and the April 2 announcement could bring a new round to further ignite a global trade war.
Both Canada and China have imposed retaliatory tariffs on a range of US products, while the EU has said it will impose 50 percent on American whiskey, motorcycles, and motorboats, as well as additional tariffs beginning in mid-April on chewing gum, poultry, soybeans, and other goods.
The 27-country bloc has also threatened, but not enacted, a 25 percent tariff on all US imports.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said on April 1 that Brussels has a “strong plan” to counter incoming US tariffs, which could reportedly go after US banks and major tech companies.
Trade tensions between Beijing and Washington, who have exchanged tariffs since February, are also poised to grow further following Trump’s “Liberation Day” announcement.
However, the US president has also floated the idea of cutting tariffs on Chinese goods to secure a deal with TikTok’s Chinese parent company, ByteDance, as the April 5 deadline to sell the app approaches.
Under US law, ByteDance was required to divest its ownership of TikTok by January 19 or risk a ban. However, Trump granted a 75-day grace period.
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Hungary's Veto Casts Shadow Over EU Enlargement Talks
A day after the NATO summit in The Hague ends, EU leaders will take the short journey south to Brussels for their regular summer European Council.
Kicking off on the morning of June 26, this summit may continue into the next day as there are plenty of items on the agenda -- most notably Iran, where the EU is struggling to stay relevant.
According to the Brussels diplomats I have spoken with, however, the bloc still aims to act as a conduit for potential direct talks between the United States and Tehran.
That said, there are also several key political decisions on the table -- especially concerning Ukraine.
When Poland took over the six-month rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union with much pomp and circumstance at the start of the year, the stated goal was that formal EU accession talks would start with Ukraine and Moldova during the first six months of 2025.
Polish diplomats had even confidently voiced hopes that more than one of the six negotiating clusters would be opened during their chairmanship.
It's fair to say that things have not panned out as expected.
'Last Chance Saloon'
Unanimity is needed for every cluster to be opened, and Hungary has persistently blocked any move to this effect, even conducting a widely criticized consultative referendum on Ukrainian EU membership.
This summit is something of a "last chance saloon" to unblock the situation but few diplomats believe that Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban will give it much thought.
Some think that maybe things will get moving on this issue after the summit in July when Denmark takes over the presidency.
However, since this has increasingly become a domestic political issue in Hungary, most believe Budapest will continue vetoing progress until the country's parliamentary elections in April 2026.
As regards Ukraine and Moldova, the draft summit declaration seen by RFE/RL states that "the European Council looks forward to the next steps in the accession process in line with the merit-based approach, with clusters being opened when the conditions are met."
The key question now is whether Ukraine and Moldova should be separated in the accession process, as none of the 27 EU member states appear opposed to allowing Chisinau to proceed.
Several member states, however, are reluctant to green-light this "decoupling" as they don't want to "succumb to Hungarian blackmail" as they put it, and believe that the pair should continue together on the road to membership.
A Carrot For Moldova
On the other hand, the EU also wants to give Moldova a carrot, with the first-ever EU-Moldova summit in early July and what are expected to be tightly fought parliamentary elections in September.
The most likely scenario, however, is that all preparatory work on the accession talks will continue in the hope that every cluster can be opened once there is approval from everyone.
For now, the most likely candidate to show concrete progress at the end of June is Montenegro, which is expected to close a cluster of chapters on June 27.
So much for the "EU enlargement momentum" eurocrats have so often keenly propagated in previous years.
If there is one area where Hungary -- and increasingly Slovakia -- may be more willing to move forward, it is on sanctions against Russia.
And there are two decisions to be taken on sanctions: the newly proposed 18th round of restrictive measures and the six-month rollover of all sanctions imposed on the Kremlin since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine nearly three years ago.
Quid Pro Quo?
Several European diplomats have indicated that there might be something of a quid pro quo during the summit, whereby both sanctions decisions will be adopted, but it will be generally accepted that Ukraine cannot move forward on the accession path for now.
For most officials, the most important thing is to get an extension of all the previous sanctions.
This includes all frozen Russian assets in the bloc, totaling over 200 billion euros ($230 billion).
Hungary was toying with the idea of not a giving thumbs-up to the prolongation last time around in January, but officials think that it won't be too dramatic this time, with Russia's increased attacks on Ukrainian civilian targets making any calls for potential peace talks moot.
The fact that the actual deadline for the extension isn't till the end of July means most people RFE/RL has spoken are confident that something can be worked out.
For the 18th sanctions package, most things have been agreed on a diplomatic level already.
This is not too surprising, as most of the blacklistings and proposals -- such as de-SWIFTing Russian banks and sanctioning Nord Stream 1 and 2 -- have been relatively uncontroversial.
Quick approval is also more likely now that the headline proposal to lower the Russian oil price cap from $60 to $45 per barrel appears unlikely to gain traction.
The United States didn't get onboard with this idea at the recent Group of Seven summit, and few believe that the EU -- even with potential political support from allies such as Britain and Canada -- is willing or able to lower the cap without Washington.
EU Targeting Deal To Lower Oil Price Cap For Russia By G7 Summit Next Week
The European Commission has presented new sanctions against Russia to the 27 EU member states, highlighted by a lowering of the cap on the price of Russian oil, as the bloc looks to find a unanimous agreement on the measures before the end of the month.
The key proposal in this round, the 18th since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine three years ago, is to lower the price cap on Russian oil to $45 per barrel from the current $60. The hope in Brussels is that the Group of Seven (G7) countries will agree on this move when the heads of state and government meet for a summit in Alberta, Canada, next week.
Other measures include a transaction ban on both Nordstream 1 & 2. While no Russian gas currently flows through the two Baltic Sea underwater pipelines that connect Russia with Germany, such a move aims to prevent the potential resumption of such supplies.
"Oil exports still represent one-third of Russia's government revenues. We need to cut this source of revenues," European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen told a news conference in Brussels on June 10.
She added that the cap change is necessary since the price of oil has dropped so much "that the effectiveness of the cap is to be questioned, and therefore we all want to lower the oil price from $60 per barrel down to $45 per barrel."
Other sanctions include a proposal to lock out 22 Russian banks from the international financial messaging service, SWIFT, and the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and its subsidiaries will also be targeted by sanctions.
Russia's Shadow Fleet Banned From Ports
Like previous rounds of restrictive measures, there are more ships belonging to Russia's so-called shadow fleet being added to an EU servicing ban.
So far over 300 vessels believed to be circumventing EU sanctions by carrying mainly Russian oil have been listed, meaning they are not allowed to call at EU ports or be serviced by companies in the bloc.
In addition, nine individuals and 33 companies would be slapped with asset freezes, meaning the EU blacklist would surpass 2,500 entries.
Rosneft is still not targeted, but a company from the United Arab Emirates and an Iranian businessman alleged by the bloc to be trading with the Russian oil giant are included.
Belarus, which in various ways has supported the Kremlin's war effort, is hit in this round, too. Four arms companies from the country are sanctioned, and EU countries will no longer be able to import arms from Belarus.
Previously there was only an EU arms export ban in place against Minsk. The club is also trying to close various sanctions loopholes by banning products to Belarus that can be used for military purposes such as various chemicals, metals, and plastics.
Ukraine, Moldova Move A Step Closer To EU By Joining Mobile Roaming Zone
Ukraine and Moldova are set to take a major symbolic step toward European Union membership by joining the bloc's "roam like at home" (RLAH) mobile phone regime on January 1, 2026.
One of the EU's more popular policies since it began in 2017, RLAH allows people who have a mobile contract in one EU member state to be charged domestic rates for calls, text messages, and data when visiting another country in the club.
The RLAH is also applicable in the other non-EU countries of the European Economic Area -- Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway -- as well as other states in which some telecom operators have decided to align with EU legislation, like the United Kingdom. But this move is the first time Brussels has invited EU candidate countries to join this part of its single market.
What Does It Mean For Ukraine?
For Ukraine, this move is not entirely unexpected, nor is it something completely new.
When the full-scale invasion of Ukraine occurred in 2022, the bloc's operators, in cooperation with several Ukrainian counterparts, struck a deal allowing Ukrainian refugees in the EU to benefit from either roaming free or very low costs while using their Ukrainian mobile phones.
This benefit has been prolonged on numerous occasions by the EU, most recently in July last year through a vote backed by a qualified majority (55 percent of the member states comprising 65 percent of the total EU population).
In fact, EU diplomats have described this measure as one of the easiest to agree on among themselves, unlike other Ukraine-related policies such as the removal of trade barriers for Ukrainian goods coming into the bloc.
Ukraine will become a permanent member of the RLAH regime in January following a final decision by the other members of the scheme expected in July. A transition period lasting through the end of the year is expected to be agreed to make sure everything goes smoothly. During that transition period a final extension of the temporary RLAH provision will also be agreed on in July.
Moldova, which also is expected to join Ukraine in the RLAH area by early next year, doesn't enjoy the same temporary roaming measures in the EU as Ukraine, but since last year Moldovan and EU operators have gradually and voluntarily lowered telecom costs.
How Are Ukraine And Moldova Joining RLAH?
Ukraine and Moldova are able to join RLAH because of an opening in the association agreement that both countries struck with the EU in the past decade.
These agreements provided for what is called "mutual internal market treatment" for a product or a service such as roaming. This means that if Kyiv and/or Chisinau complies with all EU legislation for that product or service and the EU is happy with the implementation of the laws, they would be part of the EU's internal market in that specific area.
EU hopefuls in the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia) don't have this in their respective association agreements with Brussels because they were inked much earlier than those for the EU's eastern neighbors.
Instead, the six Balkan nations created a specific "roam like home" policy among themselves with the aim of gradually reducing tariffs vis-a-vis the EU.
Since last year both Ukraine and Moldova have introduced various EU roaming and telecom legislation. Some relates to technical standards, networks, and pricing, while other legislation addresses practical things like the number of masts and transmitters.
Ukraine's parliament adopted the final necessary bill in this respect in April, and the European Commission received the final notification that all the laws had been published on June 6. It will soon recommend that EU member states vote in favor of Kyiv joining full time.
Moldova, on the other hand, is a few weeks behind Ukraine, but the commission hopes to be notified of all the necessary legislative changes by the end of this month.
While these measures in general are positive for consumers, there is no doubt that both Moldovan and Ukrainian mobile operators will lose out financially, just like EU operators did when RLAH was first introduced. And while the changes have been gradual, operators will likely compensate for their losses by raising charges for consumers in other areas.
There will also be questions around what territory the RLAH policy actually covers when it comes to Moldova and Ukraine. Moldova's Transdniester should be covered, and there could be parts of the Russian-occupied Donbas where it works, but Kyiv has lost many transmitters due to the fighting, and Crimea -- annexed by Russia in 2014 -- is now completely covered by the Russian telecom network.
EU Sanctions Score A Legal Win Over Russian Oligarchs
The European Union scored an important legal victory over Russia with its sanctions policy on June 5 as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Luxembourg issued an opinion stating that visa bans and asset freezes of five prominent Russian businessmen deemed closed to the Kremlin are not only lawful but also Brussels doesn't need to prove their ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin's regime.
Following the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the EU blacklisted the five Russians -- Dmitry Pumpyanskiy, Dmitry Mazepin, Tigran Khudaverdyan, Viktor Rashnikov, and German Khan -- and accused them of undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the war-torn country.
The quintet, together with up to 80 other sanctioned Russians and Belarusians, petitioned the ECJ to be removed from the black list on various grounds. The cases were dismissed in 2023, and the judges at the time noted they that all five held high positions in the Russian economy, and that those sectors provided a substantial source of revenue for the Kremlin.
They all appealed the court's initial ruling, and before the final verdict, one of the court's Advocate Generals was requested to deliver an opinion on their appeals. This opinion isn't binding on the court, but in most cases the court rules in line with the opinion.
In this case, given the clear view the Advocate General delivered, a ruling could come as early as July or after the EU court's summer recess in August.
The impending ruling is also likely the end of the road for the quintet's legal quest in the EU's court system to get their sanctions removed. Given that other Russian businessmen have made similar appeals to be delisted, it's fair to assume not many will be successful going forward.
Setting A Precedent For Sanctions
The opinion sets a sort of precedent and spells out one thing: The legal framework for the bloc's Russia sanctions policy appears solid.
The opinion states clearly that there is "a rational relationship" between sanctioning leading businesspeople who provide a substantial revenue to the Russian government and the objective of the restrictive measures. The objective is stated clearly: to "exert pressure on the Government of the Russian Federation to put an end to aggression of Russia in Ukraine by reducing the financial resources available." By sanctioning businessmen in the country, the economy is harmed, and thus it increases the cost of waging war against Kyiv.
The key thing in the opinion, however, is that when imposing these sanctions the EU doesn't have to prove "any specific conduct of the listed person, in particular in terms of influence over the Russian Government." This is what the sanctioned people in essence wanted to appeal: that while they are economically active in Russia, they have no direct sway on government policy when it comes to the war in Ukraine.
It now appears sufficient to produce general links with Putin to clear the legal hurdle. When the EU decided to sanction leading Russian businessmen, they referred to a meeting organized by Putin a few days after the Ukrainian full-scale invasion with almost 40 of the most economically influential Russians to discuss the impact of the course of action in the wake of Western sanctions.
There are other reasons, too, that Brussels lists these five. In Pumpyanskiy's case, the EU noted he participated in the congress of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs in March 2023, in which Putin urged participants to put "patriotism before profit."
German Khan is one of the owners of Alfa Bank, and the bloc notes that Putin's eldest daughter, Maria, ran a charity project called Alfa-Endo that was funded by the bank.
Both Mazepin and Rashnikov are listed because their businesses provide "substantial resources of revenue to the state budget," whereas Tigran Khudaverdyan, executive director of one of Russia's leading technology companies Yandex, is blacklisted because the company "has been warning Russian users looking for news about Ukraine on its search engine of unreliable information on the Internet."
The ECJ ruling comes as a sigh of relief for the EU, which has faced some hurdles. It was battered in the same court for sanctions imposed on former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and his entourage in 2014 for the "misappropriation of Ukrainian state funds." The sanctions were based on rather flimsy evidence and have since largely collapsed.
Brussels was also slapped on the wrist for the current Russia sanctions, notably restrictive measures on relatives of listed businessmen. Both Nikita Mazepin, the racing driving son of Dmitry Mazepin, and Violeta Prigozhina, the mother of the late Russian oligarch and Wagner mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, have won in the Luxembourg court and have since been delisted.
- By RFE/RL
European Commission Gives Bulgaria Green Light To Adopt Euro From January 1
The European Commission has given Bulgaria the go-ahead to join the eurozone single currency region as of January 1, 2026, the country's second major step in just one year on its path to full integration into the European Union.
The commission, which met on June 4 to convey its decision on the issue, said Bulgaria fulfils the four nominal convergence criteria that are used to evaluate whether a country is ready for euro adoption.
"The euro is a tangible symbol of European strength and unity," said European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.
The European Central Bank (ECB) also gave a positive assessment of Bulgaria's application, saying it met the criteria of currency stability, inflation, public finances, and interest rates.
“This positive assessment of convergence paves the way for Bulgaria to introduce the euro as of 1 January 2026 and become the 21st EU Member State to join the euro area,” Philip Lane, a member of the ECB Executive Board, said.
“I wish to congratulate Bulgaria on its tremendous dedication to making the adjustments needed.”
The Council of the EU will take the final decisions on euro adoption for Bulgaria, basing its decision on the opinions of the EC and the ECB, as well as from talks with the Eurogroup and European Council.
While adoption of the euro was a condition for joining the European Union, legislative failures, including reforms to combat money laundering, concerns over inflation, and political gridlock -- Bulgaria has had seven elections in the past four years -- have made the path difficult for the country.
Mass protests took place in Sofia and other cities across the country last week, and politicians said after the decision that the task now is to make sure adoption provides benefits, not disruption.
Prime Minister Rosen Zhelyazkov said the government would work to make "the process of introducing the euro smooth, predictable, predictable" and to dispel "the fears that are instilled in people and that are used for political abuse."
Added Boyko Borisov, leader of the GERB party and a former prime minister: "A huge amount of work lies ahead, especially next year, because Bulgarians should feel the benefits of the eurozone."
The decision in favor of adoption is Bulgaria's second big step in just one year on its path to full integration into the European Union.
In January, Sofia became a full member of Schengen agreement -- and Bulgaria’s borders with neighboring Greece and Romania are now fully open.
NATO Set To Agree On New Defense Budget Targets
NATO defense ministers meet on June 5 in a last ministerial meeting before the big annual NATO summit on June 24-25, when the military alliance's 32 heads of state and government, including US President Donald Trump, gather at The Hague.
The meeting is about one thing only: cash. This is when officials are set to agree on the next NATO spending target.
As most alliance members now spend 2 percent of GDP on defense, the next goal is 3.5 percent in so-called hard spending, meaning military capabilities such as tanks, rockets, and ammunition.
According to NATO officials who spoke to RFE/RL, only Spain seems to have problems with the 3.5 percent target, but it's expected to relent at the ministerial.
Spain is one of only a few countries still not clearing the 2 percent baseline, having only reached 1.28 percent last year; the budgeted military spending increase it was hoping for appears to be stuck for now.
The issue in Madrid is related to the center-left government's long-held promise to coalition partners to get Catalan, Basque, and Galician to become official EU languages -- something that requires unanimity among EU member states, which Spain failed to secure when it came up on the agenda in Brussels on May 27.
While the language issue hasn't been entirely dismissed yet, no date has been set for a potential decision on the question.
NATO 'Soft' Target Spending
The 3.5 percent target is not the only thing awaiting a decision. There should also be a 1.5 percent of GDP spending goal on what could be called soft targets, bringing total defense spending up to 5 percent of GDP.
One of the big issues now, with negotiations likely to continue right up till the summit, is what kind of expenditure can be included in that 1.5 percent. It would certainly include boosting civil preparedness and cyberdefense, but allies are lobbying to put pretty much anything in there -- rumor has it Germany wants to include financing for its Deutsche Welle media broadcasting.
There are two more questions that may not be resolved anytime soon: the timeline for reaching the target and how exactly to do so. The year 2032 has been mentioned, but that may well be pushed back to 2035, with officials saying it's unrealistic for every country to boost defense spending before then as there are low growth and considerable budget deficits to contend with.
There is a real discussion on the method of how to reach the target with NATO officials pushing for a 0.2 percent spending increase every year. Most countries, however, don't want such a detailed plan and prefer spending in spurts when money is available. This would mean their defense spending could jump considerably during a year when they place a major order of tanks or airplanes, for example -- and ideally this would come nearer the 3.5 percent target.
Where Does The US Stand On NATO Defense Spending?
It's been Trump, after all, who's hammered home to European NATO allies that they need to spend more. European diplomats I have spoken to say Washington simply wants the 3.5 percent in writing at The Hague meeting and doesn't really care what the other 1.5 percent involves.
But there's also a grand transatlantic bargain to be had. The United States would like a potential European defense splurge to benefit American weapon manufacturers. But with supply chains stretched in North America, it could make sense to set up more American production in Europe. In other words: buy American in Europe. Think of the Patriot systems that will be made in Germany or F-35 aircraft production in Italy.
So what about Ukraine? There will at least be a session of the NATO-Ukraine Council at the defense ministerial on June 5. But that is something that seems unlikely at the summit in The Hague with the presence of the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy still unconfirmed.
The day before the ministerial meeting, the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (also known as the Ramstein group), an alliance of 57 countries, will meet to coordinate military aid for Kyiv. For the first time since the group was created three years ago, the US defense secretary will not be in attendance.
Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth will not arrive in Brussels until after the Ukraine Defense Contact Group's meeting is over. With the United States no longer in the lead, Germany and the United Kingdom are now co-chairing the group with more announcements of military aid expected.
NATO allies provided 50 billion euros to Ukraine in 2024, and the goal is to provide another 40 billion this year. More than 20 billion euros have been pledged so far, but there is still a fear that target won't be reached as countries will be prioritizing their own defenses and the United States signaled it might not send more arms to Kyiv as it seeks a negotiated end to the fighting.
EU Members Playing The Waiting Game On New Russia Sanctions
When the European Commission started briefing EU states last month on the next sanctions package expected to be imposed on Russia, the 27 member nations expected concrete written proposals to follow. They're still waiting.
Normally these sorts of documents -- in this case the potential 18th round of restrictive measures since the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine was launched more three years ago -- are provided only a few days after the briefings, or “confessionals” as they are known in Brussels.
The documents outline details of what the commission is considering about targeting. In turn, EU members provide red lines as to what they are willing to agree on since all sanctions require unanimity.
So what's the holdup? Two things.
The first is that some EU member states -- including larger ones such as Germany and France -- wanted to wait and see how June 2 peace talks in Istanbul between Russia and Ukraine proceeded.
Several EU officials told RFE/RL on the condition of anonymity that they don't believe Moscow is serious about making progress in negotiations with Kyiv and wanted to wait and see the results.
Aside from agreeing to swap thousands of their dead and seriously wounded troops, the two sides made no progress toward ending Europe's longest and deadliest conflict since World War II.
Then there is the United States.
So far, President Donald Trump has refrained from targeting Moscow with sanctions even though he has threatened to do so on numerous occasions.
The reason given is the same as the Europeans: he wants to give the Russia-Ukraine negotiations every chance possible to succeed. And Brussels is desperate to have Washington onboard on for any new sanctions.
European diplomats say they are relieved that the US hasn’t, at least so far, accepted “a rushed, bad peace deal,” or that the Americans simply haven't walked away from the issue despite threatening to.
And while they admit that sanctions are no longer synchronized like they were during the Biden administration, they are still keen to coordinate any coming round of measures to maximize their impact and message.
Sanctions from Washington may also help coax some EU countries such as Hungary -- run by Trump ally Viktor Orban -- to go along with another wave of measures despite voicing concerns over their effectiveness.
So, what would the 18th package contain?
EU diplomats familiar with the file note that one particular item would require American consent: lowering the G7 Russian oil price cap to $45.
The cap has held at $60 for years even though oil prices have traded below that level.
The idea is that the leaders formally will agree to decrease the price cap to at least $50 when they meet at the G7 Summit in Canada on June 15-17.
The group’s finance ministers couldn’t reach an agreement in May as Washington resisted the move. Some EU officials told RFE/RL that they believe there could be movement on the issue soon.
Much like the EU’s 17th package that was adopted on May 20, the new measures include blacklisting more individuals and targeting the Russian shadow fleet.
On the latter, the EU has targeted more than 300 vessels that the bloc believes Moscow uses to circumvent sanctions, notably the export of oil.
With an additional 600 boats believed to be part of the fleet, the goal of the upcoming measures is to add as many as those as possible even if European diplomats admit it is a challenge to find evidence that stands up in court proving that the Kremlin is financing the ships.
More visa bans and asset freezes are also expected, with the EU looking to add another 100 individuals and companies to a sprawling list of those sanctioned that exceeds 2,400 entries.
The European Commission also could propose reintroducing those previously removed from the blacklist.
Another move could be to hit Russian diplomats who have been posted in various European countries and are suspected of spying on behalf of Moscow.
The proposal also includes sanctions on the Nordstream pipelines connecting Russia with Germany.
No gas is flowing through them at the moment, but Berlin has indicated that it wants formal measures to apply as some talks have resurfaced in the country about using them again in case relations with Moscow improve.
There is also an idea to cut more than 20 Russian banks from the SWIFT international payments system, even though most of the country’s big banks already have been targeted.
The Russian foreign direct investment fund could also be hit, and the bloc is planning to introduce trade restrictions that would prevent European companies from exporting various industrial components that Russia may use to fuel its war machine.
In the meantime, EU members will have to wait for the commission to write down its proposals.
- By Ivan Bedrov
Arson, Lies, And Russian Flags Fail To Halt Bulgaria On Euro Adoption
Bulgarian authorities expect to get the green light this week from the European Commission and the European Central Bank to introduce the euro from January 1, 2026.
Such an indication comes in the face of anti-euro protests with angry young Bulgarians carrying national and Russian flags, and even an arson attack on the European Commission building in Sofia.
While adoption of the euro was a condition for joining the European Union, legislative failures, including reforms to combat money laundering, concerns over inflation, and political gridlock -- Bulgaria has had seven elections in the past four years -- have made the path difficult.
Still, on June 4, Bulgaria expects a positive assessment from the European Commission and the European Central Bank on whether it is ready to introduce the euro beginning next year.
A decision in favor of adoption will be Bulgaria's second big step in just one year on its path to full integration into the European Union. In January, Sofia became a full member of Schengen agreement -- and Bulgaria's borders with neighboring Greece and Romania are now fully open.
How Is Euro Adoption Possible?
Bulgaria entered the EU in 2007 and, with the signing of the accession treaty, committed to introducing the euro. This goal has been supported by all governments in Sofia since then.
The financial crisis in Greece in 2010 postponed the topic once.
Then a major Bulgarian bank went bankrupt in 2014 and local institutions have not yet fully investigated the causes. It was not until 2020 that Bulgaria became a member of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, ERM II, the so-called waiting room for the euro.
Adding more bumps on the euro path, Bulgaria has been mired in a period of political turbulence, holding seven parliamentary elections since 2021, and a number of short-lived governments followed.
However, if there was a silver lining to the instability, the turbulence has made anti-corruption reforms a part of the government agenda with reform-minded pro-Western politicians now in parliament.
Why Are Bulgarians Unhappy With The Euro?
Support for the euro has been waning and now more Bulgarians are against its introduction than those who support the single European currency.
The disdain for the euro could be seen in the streets of Sofia and other cities over the weekend, with thousands protesting joining the single currency zone fearing it will harm the economy and push consumer prices higher.
A recent Eurobarometer survey showed 50 percent of Bulgarians are against adopting the euro, while 43 percent are in favor. The explanation can be found in the same survey -- the biggest problem for Bulgarians in recent years has been a rise in the cost of living.
Those fears have fueled even more by the aggressive campaign of anti-European and pro-Russian parties that many accuse of waging a misinformation campaign to scare ordinary Bulgarians.
Leading the campaign has been the Revival party, which recently signed a cooperation agreement with Russia's ruling party, United Russia.
They say that people's savings will be taken away if they don't use them within a certain period of time. Or that the digital euro will be introduced so that the authorities can monitor everyone.
Neither is true, but a general lack of trust in Bulgaria -- in politicians, institutions, and the media -- has helped keep tensions and concerns high.
What Awaits Bulgarians Now?
The introduction of the euro seems irreversible.
Even the surprising action of President Rumen Radev, who requested a referendum at the last minute on the date of the introduction of the single currency, failed to stop its progress.
The Constitutional Court has said it's legally impossible to hold such a vote, while 171 out of 240 deputies in parliament support the government taking the final steps to the introduction of the euro.
How Will Euro Adoption Work?
If all goes to plan, Bulgaria will become the 21st country in the eurozone from January 1.
All prices and salaries will then be denominated in euros.
The exchange rate has long been determined -- 1 euro will equal 1.95583 leva. It has been fixed like this since the very beginning of the euro in 2002, because the Bulgarian lev was previously tied to the German mark.
Prices in some supermarkets are already in both currencies.
People will have six months to exchange their cash savings for euros without commission. Labels on prices will remain in both currencies for at least that period, if not longer.
Experts say the introduction of the euro will boost Bulgaria's economy.
For most Bulgarians, the change will not be that big.
Property prices have long been talked about in euros. Some services are also calculated in euros. Many people's savings are already in euros.
EU Mulls Black Sea Security Hub To Counter Russian Threats
The European Union hopes to set up a "Black sea maritime security hub" to counter Russia's action in the region and to protect critical maritime infrastructure.
The plan is part of a wider EU strategy that was presented on May 28 by EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas to forge closer cooperation with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Turkey, and Ukraine.
The document, titled The European Union's Strategic Approach To The Black Sea Region, was seen by RFE/RL.
It notes that Brussels should help by "building up maritime capacities and enablers regarding sea monitoring, including for observation of a possible maritime ceasefire, mine cleaning efforts, protection of critical infrastructure, patrolling of commercial sea lines, countering hybrid threats, with the aim of deterring future aggressions in the region and, when conditions allow, to consolidate peace."
There is no indication as to where the hub would be situated or which countries would be included.
But the text notes it should deal with issues such as "maritime situational awareness, real-time monitoring from space to seabed, and early warning of potential threats and malicious activities."
The hub would focus on things such as submarine cables, offshore installations, and gas and wind energy operations off the Romanian and Bulgarian shores.
The paper comes amid planning by European nations of some sort of reassurance force in Ukraine in case of a permanent cease-fire in the Russian war.
While the United Kingdom and France are leading the way in terms of placing boots on the ground, Turkey has already, according to RFE/RL sources, suggested it would lead the maritime component of such a force, notably by assuring safe passage in the Black Sea and potentially clear up mines.
While the document doesn't refer directly to any reassurance force for Ukraine, it does highlight increased cooperation with Ankara to secure peace in and around the Black Sea.
"Turkey can play a constructive role on countering Russia's shadow fleet, and contributing to efforts to enhance maritime safety, energy security and connectivity in line with international law and relevant conventions," it says.
A specific Black Sea strategy was promised by European Commission head Ursula von der Leyen after being re-elected as European Commission President in late 2024.
The idea is that Kallas now should organize "a dedicated EU ministerial meeting with partner countries in the Black Sea region to develop and advance different aspects of cooperation under the new EU approach to the Black Sea region based on a jointly agreed way forward."
The EU already has such dedicated meetings with foreign ministers from EU hopefuls in the Western Balkans and did previously with the Eastern Partnership countries -- Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.
While the text doesn't contain any new financial pledges or concrete legislative proposals, it offers some indication of the European Commission thinking on some countries in the region.
In thinly veiled criticism of the increasingly anti-EU government in Tbilisi, the text notes that "the EU's role and responsibility in the Black Sea region is increasing, particularly with the opening of accession negotiations with Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova; and with Georgia, should the country revert to the EU path."
Human rights are not mentioned, with the document focusing on three areas: "enhancing security, fostering growth and prosperity and promoting environmental protection, climate change resilience and preparedness."
While Brussels previously would have mentioned some criticism of Azerbaijan, notably the lack of free and fair elections and a shrinking space of civil society in the country, the current strategy only mentions Baku in terms of energy cooperation and fighting climate change.
"Cooperation with regional partners, particularly Azerbaijan, is one among the essential actions to support the EU's efforts to phase out remaining Russian energy imports and accelerate energy diversification, as outlined in the RePowerEU Roadmap, thereby strengthening EU's energy security.
As host of COP29 Azerbaijan furthermore committed itself to decarbonization and the multilateral process, which is a core priority for the EU."
Merz Comments Put Spotlight On Taurus Cruise Missiles For Ukraine
Remarks by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz on allowing Ukraine to fire Western-supplied missiles at military targets deep inside Russia have rekindled debate about supplying Taurus cruise missiles to Kyiv amid a visit to Berlin by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on May 28.
Ukraine has long requested the German-Swedish weapons system, which can deliver a heavy payload with high precision on targets some 500 kilometers away.
Germany is the second-largest supplier of military aid to Ukraine after the United States. Yet Merz's predecessor, Olaf Scholz, declined to supply Taurus missiles amid Kremlin threats that it would make Berlin a party to the war.
"German dithering under Scholz handed Russia an operational advantage and allowed them to adapt their defenses and tactics," John Foreman, a former British military attache in Moscow and Kyiv, told RFE/RL.
"Adding belatedly another string to Ukraine's bow would be good. But I'm unconvinced it will change the trajectory of the war," he added.
What Long-Range Missiles Does Ukraine Have?
Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Western countries have provided Kyiv with a variety of weapons capable of hitting targets far behind Russian lines.
The United Kingdom and France have supplied Storm Shadow/Scalp cruise missiles, which have a range of about 250 kilometers, while Washington has sent its Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) with a range of some 300 kilometers.
These weapons were originally supplied with the proviso that they would only be used on targets in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory.
But in November last year then-President Joe Biden's administration said Ukraine could use ATACMS in Russia's Kursk region, where its forces were fighting to hold a small chunk of Russian territory.
Shortly afterward there were reported uses of Storm Shadow/Scalp within Russia. Merz now appears to have commented on these developments.
"The countries that imposed range restrictions have long since abandoned these conditions," he said on May 27.
"Ukraine has the right to use the weapons it receives -- including to use them beyond its own national borders against military targets on Russian territory."
The remarks clarified a statement during a TV interview the previous day, which implied that this was a new policy as well as sparking renewed speculation about Germany supplying Ukraine with Taurus missiles.
"The main issue is that our partners provide us with the means to strike, both Scalps and the German Taurus. If they do it will help us quite a bit," Ukrainian lawmaker Roman Kostenko told RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service.
Roman Svitan, a Ukrainian military analyst, took a similar line in comments to RFE/RL's Russian Service.
"First, one should provide those missiles and then grant permission to use them wherever. Ukraine has no such Western missiles left. We have nothing to fire," he said.
Not A Game-Changer
Foreman, the UK military attache, warned that the Taurus system would not be a game-changer.
"Russia has adapted considerably over the last three years, in particular by dispersing its forces, changing its tactics, and improving its kinetic and nonkinetic defenses," he said.
"These steps have reduced (but not removed) vulnerability to Ukrainian missile strikes in the Russian rear areas…. A few missile strikes by Taurus won't affect this dramatically."
Still, getting an announcement could boost Ukrainian morale and would give Zelenskyy a political victory. Merz's comments drew a negative response from Moscow.
"These potential decisions, if they have been made, are completely at odds with our aspirations for a political settlement," Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said.
These are "quite dangerous decisions," he added.
There was no immediate official response from London, Paris, or Washington, a silence that aligns with a strategy Berlin has dubbed "strategic ambiguity." Broadly speaking, it means not telegraphing military strategy to Moscow. And it's something of a departure for Merz.
Merz's Changing Views On Taurus
Merz views on Taurus have changed over time. While in opposition, he fiercely criticized what he saw as the German government's timidity over support for Ukraine -– and demanded openness on military supplies.
In November 2023, he submitted a motion in parliament calling for "finally, without delay, satisfying the Ukrainian request for Taurus cruise missiles." The motion was defeated.
By October last year, Merz's position had morphed. In a parliamentary debate, he said the government should give Moscow an ultimatum: either stop attacking civilian targets in Ukraine, or Germany will supply the Taurus.
In his comments on May 26, he did not mention Taurus but may have hinted at it.
"We will do everything we can to support Ukraine. This means no more range restrictions for weapons we supply," he wrote on social media.
Yet he may not be speaking about Taurus missiles. Germany has also provided Ukraine with Mars II rocket launchers, which have a range of some 85 kilometers.
There are obvious military reasons for "strategic ambiguity" but also political ones. Merz's coalition partners, the Social Democrats, have opposed supplying Taurus, and opinion polls show it is deeply unpopular with the German public.
It has been suggested that, for this reason, Merz is no longer so keen on the idea and may now be inclined to instead help Ukraine develop its own long-range capabilities.
In any case, it could be that the first the world hears about Taurus missiles being supplied to Ukraine will be if and when they are fired.
- By Mike Eckel
In Italian Court, Another Verdict Looms In Saga Of Artyom Uss's Great Escape
After Artyom Uss, a Russian businessman and son of a powerful Kremlin-connected governor, escaped from Italian house arrest two years ago, investigators spent months honing in on a motley Balkan crime gang that smuggled him home to Russia.
The trail of evidence led from the suburbs of Milan to Zagreb, to Belgrade, and to the sprawling Siberian region of Krasnoyarsk, where Uss hailed from. US prosecutors, who had indicted Uss on charges of smuggling Western military technology and issued an arrest warrant, were involved.
Uss has since dropped out of public view. So has the group that allegedly abetted his escape. A Bosnian man was released from Croatian custody after cooperating with Italian prosecutors. A Serbian man who mysteriously joined a Russian expedition to the North Pole also gave testimony.
Now comes the latest development in the saga: A Geneva-based Russian lawyer named Dmitry Chirakadze is set to be sentenced by a Milan court for his alleged role in organizing Uss's March 2023 escape. A verdict could come as early as May 22.
In closing arguments earlier this month, Milan prosecutors requested a 5 ½ year prison sentence for Chirakadze, who has been in custody since being arrested in Rome in June 2024 as he arrived from Sardinia. He is reportedly an owner of a luxury hotel on the Italian island.
The lead prosecutor, Giovanni Tarzia, did not respond immediately to an e-mail from RFE/RL seeking comment.
The son of Aleksandr Uss, then the governor of the massive Russian region of Krasnoyarsk, Artyom Uss, was arrested at the Milan airport in October 2022, a month after a US grand jury secretly indicted him on smuggling charges.
Along with a Russian business partner and four others, Uss was accused of using a German company to smuggle military and dual-use technologies to Russia in violation of Western sanctions -- including the kinds of electronics that later showed up on the battlefield in Ukraine.
From Milan To Moscow: Inside The Twisting Plot Behind Artyom Uss's Escape
Previous RFE/RL investigations on this topic:
Uss was held, pending an Italian court ruling on the US extradition request. He was held not in police custody but under house arrest, living in a townhouse in a housing development south of Milan.
In March 2023, days before he was set to be extradited, Uss escaped from house arrest, breaking an electronic monitoring bracelet. He was driven across Italy, Slovenia, Croatia, and into Belgrade, where he later flew to Moscow and later to Krasnoyarsk.
The escape embarrassed Italian authorities. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni said the circumstances behind his flight deserved further scrutiny. It also infuriated US prosecutors, who had warned Italian counterparts that Uss was a flight risk.
In the months that followed, Italian investigators and US authorities identified a group of seven men and women from Bosnia, Serbia, and Slovenia who were alleged to have organized Uss's escape.
A Bosnian man was indicted by US prosecutors in December 2023 in connection with the escape and arrested in Zagreb. He later cooperated with the Italian investigation and was released. A Slovenian man was arrested by Slovenian police on an Italian warrant in January 2024 and was later released.
Also implicated was a Serbian businessman named Srdjan Lolic who joined a Russian expedition to the North Pole in April 2023, less than a month after he allegedly helped Uss escape. He traveled via Krasnoyarsk.
While at the North Pole, Lolic was seen dancing along with the region's vice governor, and he also bragged about dining with Aleksandr Uss, the governor, and attending an Orthodox mass with him.
Lolic could not be reached for comment.
After resigning as Krasnoyarsk's governor, Aleksandr Uss became a lawmaker in Russia's upper house of parliament.
In June 2024, meanwhile, Chirakadze was flying from Sardinia to Switzerland, when he was detained at Rome's airport by Italian police.
In addition to owning a luxury resort in Sardinia, Chirakadze owned a hunting estate in Krasnoyarsk. In Russia, he is also known for his part in establishing Pravo.ru, an online legal publication and resource popular with the Russian legal community.
In closing arguments earlier this month, Tarzia, the lead Milan prosecutor, told the court that Lolic had testified via video conference from Serbia and implicated a now-deceased Russian lawmaker from Krasnoyarsk.
According to the Milan newspaper Correiere Della Serra, Lolic testified that the dead lawmaker contacted Lolic and asked him to meet with Chirakadze, who prosecutors said was the lead mastermind behind Uss's escape.
Chirakadze's defense lawyer, Tatiana Della Marra, did not respond to e-mail inquiries.
Uss could not be located for comment. However, his Russian lawyer told the business newspaper Vedomosti that Chirakadze was not involved in the escape, and he accused Italian authorities of "hostage taking."
"Chirakadze was organizing Artyom's legal defense, and obviously could not have had anything to do with his escape from house arrest," Aleksei Tikhomirov was quoted as saying.
- By Ray Furlong and
- Rikard Jozwiak
Does The EU Still Have The Sanctions Cards Needed To Hurt Russia?
With the ink still drying on the European Union's freshly printed 17th sanctions package on Russia, work is already under way on a next step that European leaders say will be "massive."
But some analysts warn that, in many ways, the EU has already played its best cards and doesn't have many left, especially at a time when Washington seems reluctant to join in as it pushes peace talks between Kyiv and Moscow.
"The cards that we still have to play largely include measures for which we would need the United States," Benjamin Hilgenstock, senior economist at the Kyiv-based KSE Institute, a think tank, told RFE/RL.
"Specifically, this would be about removing Russian oil and gas from global markets in volume," he said, adding that counties such as India, China, and Turkey would not stop buying Russian fossil fuels without the weight of secondary US sanctions.
European leaders threatened Russia with "massive" sanctions on May 10 if Moscow did not agree to a 30-day cease-fire proposed by Washington. They said they were making their demand after coordinating it with US President Donald Trump.
It was meant to appear as a game-changing moment, but the apparent transatlantic concord quickly went awry.
Russian President Vladimir Putin did not commit to a cease-fire during a phone call with Trump on May 19, yet Trump praised the call and did not appear ready to announce new US sanctions saying imposing them now could imperil talks and make the situation "much worse."
To be clear: The "massive" sanction threat had nothing to do with the 17th package of EU measures announced on May 20, as this had already been some time in the works.
An Empty Threat?
European leaders may need to deliver something big by themselves, without US involvement -- or appear to have made an empty threat.
Can they deliver?
Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kestutis Budrys thinks so. He told RFE/RL that the EU could redouble its efforts on Russia's energy exports.
"We should stop the major income to Russia's budget and major income to their war machine. This is the exports of gas, oil, LNG. We have to stop those," he said.
But in practice, countries such as Spain, the Netherlands, and Belgium are actually importing more LNG, or liquified natural gas, now than they were a year ago. Budrys argued there were plenty of alternatives on the global market.
"There are voices that say, 'Oh, they're too expensive and it will cost us too much, we can't afford this.' Look, we (Lithuania) already did this," he added.
But the arguments about price illustrate that the self-harming impacts of sanctions have held the EU back in the past, and may do in the future, too.
Sanctions will be "massive, only when we are willing to go further than we would like to go," Tom Keatinge of the London-based Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) told RFE/RL.
"By that I mean only when we're willing to inflict sanctions that have a degree of blowback on our own economies," he added.
Hitting Energy Exports
Hilgenstock makes a distinction between countries using Russian LNG for economic reasons and countries such as Hungary and Slovakia that would oppose an import ban due to their close political relationship with Moscow.
Even if economic objections can be overcome, political considerations can also delay or complicate a significant tightening of sanctions in this area.
European leaders have suggested that the next sanctions package will include the energy sector, but that's a broad term. Some have also suggested financial measures.
"It's relatively unclear what they are actually talking about," said Hilgenstock, who is also an Associate Fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations.
"Are they overselling what they can deliver? I think they are."
European Commission chief Ursula von der Leyen did provide some indication of what might come next in remarks on May 16.
"It will include working on listing more vessels of the Russian shadow fleet," she said, referring to ships without clear ownership used to evade restrictions on Russian oil and oil products.
The 17th sanctions package, along with British measures announced the same day, already added dozens of ships, following the pattern of previous packages. As such, adding new ships would appear like further cumulative action rather than something bold and new.
'All Talk And No Trousers'
Von der Leyen also mentioned reducing the oil price cap for Russian oil, another punitive measure imposed after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. But this too would require US agreement for global enforcement.
Three years of sanctions have had a big impact on the Russian economy but have not stopped Moscow's aggression.
Still, announcing the latest measures, European politicians were resolute.
UK Foreign Minister David Lammy called Putin a "warmonger" while urging him to agree to the 30-day cease-fire, adding that "delaying peace efforts will only redouble our resolve to help Ukraine to defend itself and use our sanctions to restrict Putin's war machine."
EU Foreign Affairs chief Kaja Kallas wrote on social media that "more sanctions on Russia are in the works."
Keatinge warns that not following through with genuinely impactful sanctions risks undermining credibility.
"It gives plenty of ammunition to [Russian Foreign Minister Sergei] Lavrov and others to basically say…the Europeans are all talk and no trousers."
Hilgenstock shares the concern.
"We're seeing Vladimir Putin's response, or rather non-response to this ultimatum," he says, referring to the May 10 statement on "massive" sanctions.
"That makes clear what the Russian side thinks."
- By Ray Furlong
Former NATO Chief Rasmussen Says Plan For European Force In Ukraine 'Moving Too Slowly'
Former NATO chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen has told RFE/RL that preparations for a European force to deploy to Ukraine after a cease-fire or peace deal are "moving too slowly" and that the whole European security model was "at a turning point."
"I don't want to see a coalition of the willing becoming a coalition of the waiting," Rasmussen said, referring to a plan announced with fanfare by British Prime Minister Keir Starmer in London on March 2.
Since then, there has been a series of meetings at various levels. Yet key questions about the mission's mandate, its rules of engagement, and who would be sending troops, have yet to be publicly answered.
"Typically, in Europe, we spend a lot of time discussing and talking, and too little efforts are spent on taking action," Rasmussen said.
"However, I do hope that Putin's attack on Ukraine and the election of Trump would be wake-up calls that tell us in Europe that we have to move fast."
Rasmussen was speaking in a wide-ranging interview on military issues, economic security, and US President Donald Trump's repeated talk of seizing Greenland from Denmark.
He was Danish Prime Minister before serving as NATO Secretary General from 2009-2014.
"It's shameless to threaten Denmark, a close ally, with military means to conquer Greenland," Rasmussen said.
"I don't think it will happen. But obviously, there is a potential for creating a split within NATO when you are threatening an ally."
Since leaving his NATO role, Rasmussen has created the Alliance for Democracies, a nonprofit organization that seeks to counter what it describes as the global rise of "autocrats and dictators."
Double Defense Spending
Last week the group announced a five-point plan for European defense that included a call to boost defense budgets to 4 percent of GDP by 2028.
This follows moves by the European Union and Europe's military big guns (Britain, France, and Germany) to increase defense spending in the coming years, but it goes well beyond the plans announced so far.
"Russian defense investment is now bigger than the combined defense investment in the rest of Europe. So, we have to step up. We have to at least double the European investment in defense," Rasmussen told RFE/RL.
"For too long, we have relied on a model that doesn't work any longer, a combination of cheap energy from Russia, cheap goods from China, and cheap security from the US."
The convergence of security and economic issues was a major theme at a conference Rasmussen hosted in Copenhagen last week, where the five-point plan was discussed.
An Economic NATO
The 72-year-old political and diplomatic veteran singles out the Trump administration's global tariffs as a new danger that has created the need for a kind of economic NATO.
"The Trump administration declared a trade war against the whole world except Russia and North Korea," he said.
"I would suggest to create what we call D7, seven democracies in the world, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, South Korea, Japan, New Zealand. And I think the backbone of that should be what we would call an economic Article 5. We would consider an attack or coercion against one of those seven countries an attack on all, and we should respond collectively."
It's striking indeed to hear a former NATO chief excluding the United States from a list of global democracies.
"Yes, but the United States have chosen isolationism.... I don't see an American willingness to exercise the global leadership of the free world. So that's why the US is excluded from this D7," Rasmussen said.
Governments around the world are wrestling with the best response to Trump's tariffs. Closer cooperation and trade with other partners are certainly a part of their calculations.
But, as with defense spending, Rasmussen's proposals go well beyond what's being considered in most capitals.
For example, the European Union's much-touted free trade agreement with four South American nations in the Mercosur group has been cited as part of the EU's collective response to a new environment, but France is still hugely wary of ratifying it.
Meanwhile, the EU and individual countries have all responded separately to US tariffs, seeking to negotiate with Washington rather than form a common front.
Rasmussen offers no easy answers to untangling the complex web of interests that make it difficult for multiple nations to forge new global structures. But, he says, it's the challenge that must be overcome.
"For the 19th consecutive year, we have seen a decline in global freedom and democracy. So now it's time to create a stronger cooperation," he said.
"I know from experience with Putin and other autocrats that they only respect power, unity, and a firm stance…. If we act together, if we act in unity, then we can counter the advancing autocracies."
Turnout High As Romanians Choose New President After Months Of Chaos, Controversy
BUCHAREST -- Romanians turned out in droves to vote in the second round of a controversial presidential election, a vote that followed months of unprecedented political chaos.
Turnout by late afternoon on May 18 exceeded 53 percent of eligible voters -- sharply higher than during the first round, with voters outside Romania casting a higher number of ballots than anticipated over two days of voting.
Turnout was also higher than last November's initial vote, which was annulled amid accusations of Russian meddling in the campaign.
The run-off pits ultranationalist candidate George Simion against centrist Bucharest Mayor Nicusor Dan.
Simion was drafted in as a replacement for Calin Georgescu, who was not allowed to run after he won a first round of voting in November.
Simion built on Georgescu's success, as he scored some 41 percent support in the first round of voting on May 4. Dan was a distant second on nearly 21 percent.
In most polls conducted since then, Simion has been ahead though the most recent surveys put the candidates neck-and-neck.
In terms of powers, the president appoints the prime minister, subject to parliamentary approval, and represents Romania at NATO and EU summits. He can also wield the country's EU veto.
"We came out because we hope for a change, we need many things to change for the better in Romania, especially us young people," said Elena Lupu, a 30-year-old voter casting her ballot in a Bucharest polling precinct.
"We want a better future. We want [people] to stop leaving the country. We want to stay here, to have united families, to have jobs for young people," she told RFE/RL's Romanian Service.
Who Is George Simion?
Simion is pledging to completely overturn Romania's politics, taking a Euroskeptic attitude within the European Union and ending support for Ukraine.
"Our position is…neutrality, not escalation, not supplying weapons, and perfect alignment with the policy of the Trump administration," he said on May 8.
Simion has also stressed ideological affiliation with "the MAGA movement" and posted a photo of himself online in a red baseball cap with the logo "Trump Save America."
The political affinity may be mutual, as Washington sharply criticized the decision to annul the first round of elections.
Simion has also riled Romania's neighbors. He has hinted at territorial claims on Ukraine and calls for union with Moldova, which has led to him being banned from entering both countries.
On May 19 a Moldovan court is set to reconsider his ban, which followed his arrest at a protest in the capital, Chisinau, in 2015.
A few years earlier, in 2011, he had a brush with the law in his own country, receiving a fine and six-month ban from entering soccer stadiums for racist chanting at a Romania-Bosnia match.
In December 2019, he co-founded the Alliance for the Unity of Romanians (AUR) party, which is now the second-largest group in parliament. The party's website says it stands for Christian faith, low taxes, family values, and national sovereignty.
In 2023, former Moldovan Defense Minister Anatol Salaru alleged that Simion had secretly met with an agent of Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) in Ukraine.
Simion has denied both this incident and the wider claim that he is pro-Russian. He recently lost a court case in which he sought to sue Salaru over the allegation.
His election manifesto includes items that many critics say do not fall within the presidential powers, such cheap housing.
He has also said he would appoint Georgescu as prime minister. Georgescu, 63, has called 38-year-old Simeon "my young protege."
Who Is The Other Candidate?
Nicusor Dan is not a member of any party, winning the race to be mayor of Bucharest as an independent -- and is now seeking to do the same for the presidency. The 55-year-old entered politics in 2015, pledging to fight corruption in the capital.
A mathematician, he gained his doctorate from the Sorbonne University in Paris in 1998 before returning to work at Romania's Mathematics Institute.
It was at this time he began campaigning as an activist on issues related to illegal construction, urban planning, and heritage protection.
After two failed runs to be mayor of Bucharest, Dan was elected in 2020 and then re-elected in 2024 – despite criticism for being a poor communicator while in office.
His decision to run for president raised eyebrows, given that he had only just been given a second term in charge of the capital. Dan explained the decision by referring to the political crisis that was engulfing Romania.
"We are in a moment of balance, the most difficult since 1989," he said, adding that "too many lies" had been told in the country's political life.
Dan said fighting corruption and interest groups would be a major issue for his presidency.
On foreign policy, Dan has spoken of keeping close relations with the United States while maintaining a consistently pro-EU stance.
Speaking after the first round of voting on May 4, Dan said the next round would be "a debate between a pro-Western direction for Romania and an anti-Western one."
It's a message that has so far resonated with educated voters in big cities, which leaves him facing an uphill battle in the second round.
He has had a chance to address voters during three televised debates this week, all of which Simion pulled out of.
Senior international correspondent Ray Furlong contributed to this report.
Estonia Accuses Russia Of 'Serious Threat' To NATO After Fighter Jet Disrupts Tanker Inspection
Estonia has accused Russia of creating a "serious threat" to NATO in the Baltic Sea after a Russian fighter jet disrupted operations by the Estonian Navy to inspect an unflagged tanker that is on the United Kingdom's sanctions list.
The ship, the Jaguar, is believed to be part of Russia's "shadow fleet" that Moscow is using to avoid international sanctions imposed over its war in Ukraine.
Estonia's Navy said the vessel refused to cooperate when asked to stop.
Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna told reporters Russia sent a fighter jet on May 15 "to check the situation, and this fighter jet violated NATO territory for close to one minute."
He added in a post on social media: "This incident is yet another example showing that Russia poses a serious threat not only through its war in Ukraine but also to the NATO alliance as a whole."
Russia has not commented on the incident, but officials have repeatedly said Russian ships have free passage in the Baltic Sea and that any attempt to stop them is dangerous.
Over the past 18 months, there have been numerous incidents in the Baltic Sea in which telecom and electricity cables, as well as gas pipelines, have been damaged.
While attribution has often proved tricky and some of the incidents could have been accidents, some European officials have pointed fingers at Russia's so-called shadow fleet.
This refers to approximately 350 vessels of opaque ownership that are believed to evade Western sanctions on Russian oil by transporting around 80 percent of the supply, with nearly 50 percent departing from Russian Baltic Sea ports.
The European Union has imposed measures on half of these vessels by barring them from calling at EU ports or getting serviced in any way by EU companies.
The recent incidents highlight rising tensions in the Baltic Sea since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine more than three years ago.
In January, NATO and EU leaders agreed to launch a monitoring mission of the Baltic Sea saying Russia's use of the so-called shadow fleet poses a particular threat to the maritime and environmental security in the Baltic Sea region and globally.
"This reprehensible practice also threatens the integrity of undersea infrastructure, increases risks connected to sea-dumped chemical munitions, and significantly supports funding of Russia's illegal war of aggression against Ukraine," NATO allies said.