Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s energy sector have caused at least 60 billion rubles ($714 million) in damage, a joint investigation by RFE/RL, Frontelligence Insight, and a group of volunteers reveals.
Our analysis of over 100 satellite images of sites hit by Ukraine between September 2024 and February 12, 2025 also shows that dozens of Russian military facilities have been damaged or completely destroyed by Ukrainian strikes over the past six months.
Where Has Ukraine Struck Russian Infrastructure?
While strikes are most often carried out against targets relatively close to the Russian-Ukrainian border or the front line, Kyiv’s missiles and drones have also reached much further -– to Moscow, some 450 kilometers from the border, Engels air force base in the Saratov region, over 600 kilometers from the front line, and even as far as Izhevsk, about 1,300 kilometers from the front.
How Badly Have Ukraine's Deep Strikes Hurt Russia's Military?
In the period analyzed, September 2024 was the most successful for Ukraine in terms of strikes on Russian military infrastructure.
Two large ammunition depots -– in the towns of Toropets and Tikhoretsk – were destroyed. According to Frontelligence Insight, these two facilities played a key role in supplying Russian troops with artillery shells, missiles, and small arms ammunition, with Tikhoretsk serving as a key hub for ammunition supplied by North Korea.
Various estimates have put the amount of ammunition destroyed in the strike on Toropets at between 30,000 and 160,000 tons, dealing a tangible blow to Russian logistics and frontline supply chains.
Other strikes were less successful, with the Frontelligence team assessing that more than half of those recorded between September 2024 and February 12, 2025, had no significant impact on the targeted facilities.
According to US-based military analyst Michael Kofman, the “battlefield impact was most visible in cases where Ukraine went after ammunition and [command and control]."
"Unfortunately, strike campaigns using ATACMS (tactical missile systems) and air-launched cruise missiles were often out of sequence with combat operations…. Long-range strikes were an important piece of the puzzle, affecting how Russian forces operate, but by themselves were not decisive," Kofman told Frontelligence.
He said "these weapons had shaping effects on enemy forces, but Ukraine was often not in a position to capitalize on them, and expectations that these would be game-changing weapons tended to exceed the impact observed.”
Strikes On Russia's Energy Infrastructure
Over time, during the period analyzed, Ukraine shifted its focus from striking military facilities -- mainly ammunition depots -- to attacking oil and gas refineries and storage facilities.
Oil storage facilities were the most common target. Oil and gas storage facilities, refineries, and pumping stations were successfully hit 27 times between September and mid-February.
Based on an analysis of satellite imagery, we counted 97 oil storage tanks as either destroyed or damaged over the period monitored. Depending on how full of oil they were, and taking into account their volume and the price of Urals crude on February 12 of this year, the damage could range from around $38 million to almost $100 million.
The largest strike in terms of total damage to a single storage facility took place on October 7, when 11 tanks with a total volume of 69,000 cubic meters were destroyed at an oil depot in Feodosia, in Russian-occupied Crimea. The maximum monetary damage could exceed 3.3 billion rubles ($39 million).
The majority of these damaged tanks are not replaced or repaired, with just one out of 16 tanks hit between September 1 and January 15 restored, according to our analysis of satellite imagery.
Oil industry experts told RFE/RL that Russian oil companies are likely in no hurry to restore these facilities due to the fear of repeat strikes, and may be hampered by sanctions and a shortage of workers.
There also may simply be no economic need to restore the tanks, experts say: Ukrainian strikes are forcing refineries to reduce output, and much of the refined oil is immediately sent to tankers or otherwise distributed.
“In general, if they really wanted to repair, they could do it. But it would be a waste of materials, production facilities, and skilled labor. Especially considering that the lack of storage facilities does not seem to be a vulnerability of the Russian oil industry,” a European export control organization employee who worked for several years as an assistant captain on offshore oil vessels said on condition of anonymity.
Do Strikes On Refineries Have A Bigger Impact?
Over the past six months, damage to Russian refineries and storage sites may amount to as much as 59.4 billion rubles ($707 million).
Factoring in a potential stoppage at Gazprom’s Astrakhan gas refinery, which was attacked in February and would take three to six months to repair, the total damage could amount to 77.9 billion rubles ($927 million).
However, Russia’s total income from oil exports in 2024 was estimated by the International Energy Agency at $189 billion.
Last year, according to NATO sources cited by Reuters, Ukrainian attacks reduced the capacity of Russian refineries by 15 percent, forcing the government to impose a ban on gasoline exports in March 2024 to “protect the domestic market.”
According to experts interviewed by RFE/RL, this meant that the amount of gasoline produced was only sufficient for domestic consumption –- in 2023, 13 percent of Russian gasoline was exported and the rest was used inside the country. A 14 percent reduction in production capacity made it impossible to sell fuel abroad, and the United States asked Ukraine to stop hitting Russian refineries to avoid a rise in global oil prices.
Due to the latest attacks, experts say, Russian authorities have extended the fuel export ban until at least the end of summer 2025.
Could An Energy Infrastructure Cease-Fire Allow Russia To Restore Its Production Capacity?
On March 18, Russia agreed to abandon strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure for 30 days, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy agreeing to a halt on similar strikes the next day.
Both countries’ militaries, however, carried out strikes against infrastructure following these announcements, with Russia hitting energy infrastructure near the Donetsk region city of Slavyansk and a Ukrainian drone causing a fire at an oil depot in Engels on March 20.
Experts interviewed by RFE/RL say that, even if the limited cease-fire is observed for a month, it would not be enough for Russian companies to repair the damage caused by Ukrainian strikes. However, some believe the cease-fire plays more into Russia’s hands than Ukraine’s.
“Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy infrastructure are, in my opinion, much more effective than Russian attacks on Ukraine’s energy supply infrastructure. Oil cash flow is king for Russia, and we can see that attacks on refineries…and export hubs have worked from a financial standpoint,” said chemical engineer Will Thiel.
Now, Russia is seeking to tie another limited cease-fire –- in the Black Sea –- to Western countries lifting sanctions hampering one of its other sources of cash: agricultural exports.
Zelenskyy accused Russia of trying to “manipulate” the deals, and US President Donald Trump said “Russia wants to see an end to it, but it could be they’re dragging their feet.”
If the energy infrastructure cease-fire is ultimately unsuccessful, Frontelligence Insight analysts believe the number of Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s military and energy facilities, and the effectiveness of those strikes, could increase as Ukrainian production of long-range drones that commanders have hailed as better than their Western counterparts picks up.
