When Ukraine declared its independence from the U.S.S.R in August 1991., Kyiv came into possession of the third largest nuclear weapons stockpile in the world, after the Soviet Union and the United States.
Besides large and complex strategic missiles, Kyiv had also taken over thousands of the Soviet Union's “tactical” nuclear devices, designed to be small enough to use on an active battlefield.
General-Lieutenant Oleksandr Skipalskiy was the head of Ukraine’s military intelligence through the 1990s. The retired military chief spoke to RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service about how an estimated 2,800-4,200 tactical nuclear weapons were relinquished to Russia in a move that may have changed the course of history.
“We were told that Russia was determined to strip Ukraine of its tactical nuclear weapons at any cost,” Skipalskiy recalls of the period following the collapse of the U.S.S.R. “This was deliberately aimed at depriving Ukraine of the simplest nuclear devices, which did not require complex storage and maintenance systems.”
Unlike long-range strategic missiles which require costly upkeep, tactical nuclear munitions can be stored for decades with minimal effort. Some tactical nukes can be as small as an artillery shell.
After Skipalskiy ordered a review into the transfer of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia, a report was compiled calling for the proposed transfer to be canceled.
In early 1992, as Russian teams were already removing the nuclear munitions, the retired intelligence head says, “I saw with my own eyes how [Ukrainian Security Service Head] Yevhen Marchuk placed our report arguing against the removal of tactical nuclear weapons into a folder and said, ‘I’m going to take this to the president.’”
For two weeks following the delivery of that report, the extraction of the weapons was paused.
“Then it got back under way without any explanation; at least I wasn’t told anything,” Skipalsky says.
“I believe [then-Ukrainian President Leonid] Kravchuk made the final decision himself. But who advised him and what arguments were put forward? That I don’t know.”
Russian crews tasked with removing the weapons, he says, worked “fast and around the clock” to load and transport the tactical nuclear warheads out of Ukraine.
When the last weapon was taken away, Skipalskiy claims, “the Russians and their supporters in Ukraine were openly celebrating, saying: ‘We totally hoodwinked the [Ukrainians], we left them the bones and took the meat!'”
Kyiv had requested to monitor each step of the transfer, which would ostensibly end with Russia destroying the tactical nuclear weapons. But, Skipalskiy claims, “they didn’t allow our observers to oversee this, we were just shown some building and told, ‘this is our processing facility,’ but no one was let inside so no one witnessed the claimed disposal of these warheads.”
Skipalskiy says Moscow was able to spook Washington into piling pressure on Kyiv. The Kremlin, he says, “argued that there was a lack of control and that there was the threat of nuclear terrorism. Even if there were no Ukrainian terrorists per se, they claimed that the technological situation was dangerous. As a result, the Americans helped to twist Ukraine’s arm, demanding the transfer of nuclear weapons.”
Tactical nukes were stored in facilities throughout Ukraine, especially in Crimea. In some cases, localized attempts were made to stop their transfer to Russia. “In the Ivano-Frankivsk region there was a major storage base and the civilian administration started saying that the removal was a mistake,” Skipalskiy recalls. A similar confrontation was also reported in Sambir, in western Ukraine.
“Anyone with any sense could see that nuclear weapons are primarily a deterrent, a tool of security,” Skipalskiy told RFE/RL. “Many people spoke out informally, and military personnel even sent letters of concern.” But in Ukraine’s early months of independence, some military hierarchies were still directly linked to Moscow.
“Military personnel are disciplined people subordinate to their commanders. So when their officer tells them, ‘this has been coordinated with your leadership, send it all for disposal immediately,’ they simply follow orders.”
Another factor muddying the issue of tactical nuclear weapons at the time, Skipalskiy says, was the idea that had been floated suggesting that formerly Soviet militaries might be joined to form some kind of union. With the emergence of multiple new, formerly Soviet states with links to Moscow, Spikalskiy recalls, “some argued that the nuclear component needed to be centralized.”
Later, when Ukraine’s more powerful strategic nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles were targeted for destruction or removal, Skipalskiy says, “there were more organized attempts to hold onto them but the pressure and threats [to destroy or relinquish the weapons] were intense.” Former U.S. President Bill Clinton, who played a leading role in the denuclearization of Ukraine, suggested in 2023 that the move was a strategic blunder in light of the war that has been waged on Ukraine since 2014.
Skipalskiy says questions today about whether Ukraine should build its own nuclear weapons capacity is pointless to talk about publicly. “No state has created nuclear weapons while broadcasting that fact,’ he says, adding, “those who grandstand and beat their chests saying, ‘we should do X and Y,’ that is not how a responsible state operates. Just look after your country’s security and be discreet about it.”
