China In Eurasia

ALMATY, Kazakhstan -- In the days leading up to Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s arrival in the Kazakh capital, Nur-Sultan, activists have been arrested and intimidated for protesting their relatives’ imprisonment in China's Xinjiang Province and its vast internment camp system.

Bakhyt Zharykbasova’s husband, Baibolat Kunbolat, was one of those arrested and sentenced to 15 days in jail. For more than a year and half, Kunbolat has been organizing demonstrations outside the Chinese Consulate in Almaty, the country's biggest city, demanding the release of his brother along with other Kazakhs whose relatives are missing, jailed, or trapped in the neighboring region.

But in the lead-up to Xi’s high-profile September 14 visit -- his first trip abroad in more than two years -- protesters say they have been met with a wave of arrests, police summonses, and warnings not to travel to Nur-Sultan in an attempt to prevent dissent during the Chinese leader’s state visit.

“The authorities warned him and I warned him, [too], but he decided that this is what he is going to do and [that] he will keep doing it,” Zharykbasova, whose husband was arrested on September 10, told RFE/RL. “Baibolat says he is fine [in detention], but I know they will not let him out as long as the Chinese president is here.”

China’s crackdown in Xinjiang has seen more than 1 million Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Muslim minorities put into mass detention camps. Since Beijing’s dragnet accelerated in 2017, the plight of ethnic Kazakhs interned in China has been an unexpected source of dissent, with the testimonies of former detainees and family members fueling a guerrilla advocacy campaign that brought outsized international attention to the issue.

This left the Kazakh government walking a tightrope between appeasing Beijing -- which denies the long list of abuses that have been documented in its camp system -- and dealing with an exasperated segment of its population lobbying for family members in China.

“There is only one goal here [with these arrests and threats] -- to please the Chinese leader,” Yerbol Dauletbek, the leader of the officially registered chapter of Atazhurt Eriktileri, a group lobbying for ethnic Kazakhs detained in Xinjiang and their relatives, told RFE/RL. “This is how [the government] helps to hide the crimes of China.”

Silencing Xinjiang Protests

Demonstrators were facing growing pressure from the authorities even before Xi’s meeting with Kazakh President Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev was announced.

In recent years, the government has led a swift crackdown against activists working on Xinjiang issues in the country: shutting down organizations, arresting activists, and intimidating leading figures into exile, leaving only a small but devoted segment -- such as Kunbolat and his peers -- for public protests.

On September 12, Gulfiya Kazybek, Gaukhar Kurmanaliyeva, and Qalida Akytkhan -- who were all part of ongoing protests outside the Chinese Consulate in Almaty and embassy in Nur-Sultan since February 2020 -- said police officers removed them from a bus that they were on while traveling to a wedding in the southwestern city of Shymkent.

“The police demanded that we get off the bus and then they took us to the police station,” Kazybek told RFE/RL.

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Once at the police station, the three women were told that an administrative case had been opened over the violation of “the procedure for holding peaceful assemblies” and they were handed summonses.

Kurmanaliyeva and Kazybek went to their local police station in Almaty on September 13 but were told by officers that no materials on their case had been received yet and they were asked to wait for a phone call for more information which had not been provided by the time this article was published.

Kurmanaliyeva told RFE/RL that she believes security operatives had been tailing her and other protesters since September 10, saying that she and others had documented instances of being followed at the market and outside their homes.

“We'll keep protesting until our relatives are out,” she said. “I am against Xi Jinping's visit. He is making genocide against Kazakhs and Muslims in Xinjiang and he comes here like nothing has happened. He should answer for what he is doing.”

Following the release of a damning UN report earlier this month that said China has committed “serious human rights violations” in mass detention camps in Xinjiang that may be crimes against humanity, activists urged Toqaev to raise the issue of the treatment of ethnic Kazakhs during his talks with Xi.

Kurmanaliyeva says an official from Almaty's city administration had told her Toqaev would raise the plight of their relatives when he meets with Xi, although she doubts it will happen.

“They just didn't want us to go to [the capital],” Kurmanaliyeva said. “They told us: ‘You'll create a bother.’”

Other protesters who had been part of the regular pickets outside the Chinese Consulate and embassy also faced detention and harassment in the lead-up to Xi’s visit.

Akikat Kaliolla, a musician whose relatives are believed to be in Xinjiang’s camp system, was also sentenced to 15 days in jail for allegedly violating laws on public protests and was taken directly by police from his recording studio.

Nurzat Yermekbay, who has also regularly participated in demonstrations against the camps, said he was detained for four hours on September 10 in Almaty and warned by police “not to go to the capital.”

Bekzat Maksutkhan, the head of Naghyz Atazhurt, an unregistered advocacy group that works with families who have relatives missing in Xinjiang, told RFE/RL that the Kazakh authorities have been effective in silencing dissent around the issue and that the treatment of ethnic Kazakhs in Xinjiang is not receiving mainstream attention in the country.

The Chinese Embassy in Nur-Sultan has not responded publicly to the appeals of protesters and neither the embassy nor the consulate in Almaty responded to RFE/RL’s request for comment about the fate of ethnic Kazakhs in Xinjiang and the protesters’ complaints.

Xi Arrives

The fact that Xi chose Kazakhstan and Central Asia as the location to first step outside of China since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic brings prestige and geopolitical significance to the government in Nur-Sultan.

Expanding its already deep economic and political ties with China has been a priority for the Kazakh government and local authorities have treaded cautiously with Beijing over the issue of interned Kazakhs.

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The issue is further complicated by the complex family connections across the lengthy 1,782-kilometer border between China and Kazakhstan.

Cross-border ties have been a mainstay for centuries but accelerated when the Kazakh government sought to attract ethnic Kazakhs living in Xinjiang to move following the collapse of the Soviet Union. This led to many Chinese-born Kazakhs uprooting and resettling in neighboring Kazakhstan. They have become permanent residents and even Kazakh citizens while still maintaining close connections to family in China.

In instances where Kazakh citizens, many of whom were originally born in China, were detained in Xinjiang, the Kazakh government has negotiated behind-the-scenes with Beijing to secure their release. But it says it has no jurisdiction in other cases.

“Since the Kazakh diaspora living in Xinjiang are citizens of the People's Republic of China, all issues related to them relate to China's internal affairs,” a spokesperson for the Kazakh foreign ministry told RFE/RL. “Therefore, it’s necessary to consider ways to resolve this issue without prejudice to the comprehensive and eternal strategic partnership between Kazakhstan and China.”

Temur Umarov, an expert on China’s relations with Central Asia at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told RFE/RL that the internment camps are a sensitive political topic for Beijing and, given Nur-Sultan’s track record, Toqaev is unlikely to raise the issue publicly and even less likely to criticize China’s detention system during meetings with Xi.

“There is an unspoken rule in relations between Kazakhstan and China: only successes are publicly raised and problems are never spoken about,” he said. “The countries of Central Asia cannot afford to criticize Beijing simply because they depend on [China]. Criticism can come back to haunt them with economic consequences.”

Written and reported by Reid Standish in Prague based on reporting by Nurtai Lahanuly and Elnur Alimova in Almaty, and Chris Rickleton in Nur-Sultan.

Chinese President Xi Jinping will leave China for the first time in more than two years in a trip to Central Asia that aims to boost Chinese leadership in the region and reaffirm Beijing's partnership with Moscow in a meeting with Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin.

The trip marks Xi's return to the world stage and kicks off with a visit to Kazakhstan on September 14 followed by a trip to the ancient Silk Road city of Samarkand, in Uzbekistan, for the annual Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit. At the SCO meeting, Xi will meet with various leaders from the region as well as Putin, who he has not seen since they declared a "no limits" Russian-Chinese partnership in February just days before the Kremlin's invasion of Ukraine.

The Xi-Putin meeting is likely to attract the most attention, but the fact the Chinese leader has chosen Kazakhstan and the SCO summit as the venues for his first international trip since January 2020 sends a powerful message about Beijing's vision for Central Asia and the importance of the SCO -- a political and security bloc that includes India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan as members -- for China.

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The timing of the trip -- which comes a month before Xi is poised to receive a third five-year term as leader of the Chinese Communist Party -- is also significant and showcases the confidence he has even before his expected October 16 confirmation that will cement his position as the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao Zedong.

Here are the storylines to follow and what to expect as Xi embarks on a week of high-profile diplomacy that is set to shape China's vision for Central and South Asia, the Middle East, and beyond.

Face Time With Putin

Against a backdrop of Moscow's confrontation with the West, its war in Ukraine, and escalating tensions between Beijing and the West over Taiwan -- all eyes will be on Xi and Putin in Uzbekistan.

Few details are available about what kind of meeting will take place between the pair. Beijing has confirmed Xi's travel plans, but no other information. Kremlin aide Yury Ushakov told reporters last week that the Xi-Putin meeting will be "very important," but did not elaborate.

On September 7, Li Zhanshu, a member of the Chinese Communist Party's Politburo Standing Committee and the country's No. 3 leader, visited Vladivostok in Russia's Far East to attend the Eastern Economic Forum and meet with Putin.

Li called for increased cooperation with Moscow and, according to an official Russian readout of a meeting with lawmakers from the State Duma on September 9, said that China "understands and supports Russia," especially "on the situation in Ukraine."

The comments received added attention as they appeared to be a more full-throated endorsement of Russia's war than past public statements from Chinese officials and the mentions of Ukraine were notably absent from Li's comments from the meeting published in Chinese state media.

The extent of China's support for Russia has been in the spotlight since the Kremlin invaded Ukraine, but Beijing and Moscow's relationship is slated to receive added scrutiny as Russia faces new setbacks from a Ukrainian counteroffensive that has seen Kyiv retake large amounts of territory.

Beijing has refused to condemn Russia's actions, has criticized Western sanctions, and boosted the Kremlin's narrative about fighting in Ukraine in its state media -- though it has also been cautious about explicitly endorsing Moscow's invasion.

Chinese companies have bought Russian energy supplies at record levels, with Russian energy giant Gazprom saying recently that it signed an agreement to start switching the currency of payments by China for gas supplies to yuan and rubles instead of U.S. dollars.

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But China has been careful to avoid violating Western sanctions on Russia and many analysts say its support has largely been out of self-interest. Beijing has bought up Russian energy at steep discounts and amplified anti-American rhetoric throughout the war. But it has held back from providing military aid or technological support that could improve Moscow's standing on the battlefield.

With the stakes high, the SCO summit in Uzbekistan will be an important litmus test for where the Chinese-Russian partnership stands after nearly seven months of war.

Symbolic Trip Abroad

While a meeting with Putin comes with its own unique symbolism, the fact Xi will begin his first tour abroad in Kazakhstan sends an important message about China's vision for Central Asia and how it is adapting to the geopolitical fallout from the war in Ukraine.

Kazakhstan was where Xi launched the overland portion of what would morph into the globe-spanning Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the country has become a strategic partner for Beijing as a top energy and resource provider that borders China's western Xinjiang Province, where Chinese authorities have launched a mass-internment program targeting more than 1 million Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Muslim minorities.

The stop in Kazakhstan provides a chance for Beijing to deepen its relationship with Nur-Sultan and also burnish its foreign policy credentials.

The Ukraine war has created a new and tumultuous era for Russia's historic ties to Central Asia, with governments in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan providing aid to Ukraine in the early months of the conflict and distancing themselves from Moscow. Kazakhstan has also been the target of threats from hard-line Russian commentators and officials about possibly annexing its territory in the north.

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This sets the stage for Beijing to be an even more appealing partner to countries in the region -- a tough balancing act for China to maintain as it looks to preserve its strategic relationship with Moscow and simultaneously expand its influence in a part of the world that the Kremlin has traditionally seen as its "backyard."

Breathing Life Into The SCO

The exact agenda of the SCO summit is still being set, but the bloc's 22nd leaders' summit is slated to be an important one.

The meeting in Samarkand will be the first in-person summit since 2019 and is expected to focus on security and economic issues related to Afghanistan, the admission of Iran -- whose membership was approved last year -- and potential member status for Belarus, which is currently an observer.

Founded in 2001, the SCO has been criticized for being an empty vessel unable to tackle the big issues on its security mandate and often divided by the rivalries of its members.

Despite its flaws, Beijing -- and Xi -- still see value in the SCO as an umbrella organization for pushing China's interests across Eurasia and as a geopolitical vehicle for Chinese leadership.

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In Samarkand, Xi will likely look to use the SCO as an opportunity to highlight a gathering of countries under Chinese guidance that exists as an alternative to Western-led alliances. The summit will also provide a chance for important face-to-face diplomacy for a host of countries: Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi confirmed his attendance on September 12 and leaders from other members and observer states -- such as Turkmenistan -- will also attend.

This provides useful optics for Xi and will perhaps give the SCO a boost in credibility as a regional leader.

But doing so will certainly keep Beijing's hands full in a year that is already full of upheaval across Eurasia -- from the war in Ukraine to unrest in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, as well as a deepening global economic crisis.