Welcome back to the China In Eurasia briefing, an RFE/RL newsletter tracking China's resurgent influence from Eastern Europe to Central Asia.
I'm RFE/RL correspondent Reid Standish and here's what I'm following right now.
Listen to the Talking China In Eurasia podcast. Apple Podcasts | Spotify | Google | YouTube
What Does China Want From The Israel-Hamas War?
As the conflict between Israel and Hamas -- designated a terrorist organization by the U.S. and EU -- enters a dangerous new phase, China has pivoted to taking up a peacemaker role amid the war, but what can Beijing realistically achieve?
Finding Perspective: China has increasingly aligned its response with the Global South, offering a mix of calls for a cease-fire, neutrally-worded statements on the hostilities, and expressing solidarity with the Palestinians, Arab states, and Russia in diplomatic exchanges and meetings.
Wang Yi, China’s top diplomat, discussed the war in Washington during a recent three-day visit where he met with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and other officials. The United States pledged to work with China on trying to find a resolution amid fears of a wider regional war breaking out and called on Beijing to use its relationship with Iran and other countries in the region to prevent the conflict from spreading.
Earlier this year, Beijing brokered a peace deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia and it is Tehran’s largest trading partner.
Washington and others are hoping that China can use its relationship with Iran -- who backs Hamas in Gaza and Hizballah in Lebanon -- to put pressure on its leadership to de-escalate.
Why It Matters: China is looking to assume the mantle of leader of the Global South -- with the Middle East being an important strategic area where the Chinese have invested in recent years -- but doing so comes with its limits.
As Beijing looks to claim its position on the world stage, the stakes are higher than ever before and the Chinese are moving cautiously, looking to not take a side too strongly so as not to jeopardize their long-term interests.
That may help preserve China’s image as it tries to maneuver as a new superpower, but it’s also unclear how much sway Beijing actually has over Iran or others in the Middle East at the end of day.
China's first statement on the war angered Israel, which then expressed “deep disappointment” that Beijing did not condemn Hamas or mention Israel's right to self-defense following an attack on its territory.
Chinese diplomats have since elected for a more delicate balancing act and have used the war to push some cynical, self-serving messages in the meantime.
As with the war in Ukraine, it's another opportunity for China to burnish its reputation, and like with that war, Beijing’s target audience is not the one in the West.
Podcast Corner: Can China Learn To Live With The Taliban?
Listen to the latest episode of the China In Eurasia podcast. You can find the show on Spotify, Apple, Google, and YouTube.
What China wants from Afghanistan has been one of the most burning questions since the Taliban retook power in 2021. For some, Beijing is chasing the country’s mineral wealth, for others, it’s all about China’s own security. Working with the Taliban is an awkward fit and many in Beijing are still unsure if the group can be a reliable partner.
On the latest episode of Talking China In Eurasia, we’re unpacking all of that and more.
I’m joined by Ali Latifi, the Kabul-based Asia editor for the New Humanitarian, for an on-the-ground look at where Chinese business stands after two years of Taliban rule. Later in the program, the German Marshall Fund’s Andrew Small breaks down Beijing’s complicated history with the group and what it might tell us about China and the Taliban’s future together.
Be sure to listen and leave a review on your listening platform of choice. I’d also love to hear what you think. Reach out at Standishr@rferl.org
Three More Stories From Eurasia
1. Looking Inside Global Gateway
A week after Beijing hosted representatives of more than 130 countries at a summit for its $1 trillion Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the European Union gathered world leaders for its first-ever Global Gateway Forum, its own global infrastructure project. Read more here.
What It Means: It was the first big step into the spotlight for Global Gateway since it was unveiled by European Commission chief Ursula von der Leyen in late 2021 and the reviews are mixed.
On the positive side, the event managed to wrangle 90 top government representatives from more than 20 countries and unveiled 3 billion euros ($3.2 billion) in new deals. That’s on top of the 66 billion euros ($69.6 billion) that von der Leyen announced during the speech that had already been inked under the Global Gateway umbrella.
But criticism for the project also abounds in Brussels.
While EU diplomats who spoke to RFE/RL voiced tacit support for the project, they also expressed concerns that it faced headwinds from conflicting attitudes among European governments and various EU agencies over how to support the program, as well as doubts about whether Brussels can make more appealing offers to partner countries than China does.
As one EU diplomat said: “Global Gateway is like so many other EU initiatives -- a good idea, but it’s ultimately about ‘repackaging’ old money and, as always, making it complicated by having 10 or so different portfolios instead of just one big pot of cash.”
Another EU diplomat expressed concern over the seemingly low-level political representation at the Global Gateway summit, especially from within the bloc itself.
“[Global Gateway] is a strange beast,” the diplomat said. “Its intentions are serious and laudable, but look at the attendance list and you'll know enough. Quite a few non-EU leaders but hardly anyone from our side.”
Romana Vlahutin, the former EU special envoy for connectivity, told me that one of the biggest obstacles facing the venture is how to incentivize private markets across the bloc -- and the West at large -- to invest in the types of projects that could have a transformative impact on the ground.
2. A Curious Saga With A Chinese Ship In The Baltic
Finnish police have said that the rupture of a gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea was probably caused by an anchor dragging along the seabed, with a probe by investigators pointing to the Chinese NewNew Polar Bear container vessel, which had passed over the pipeline around the time of the damage.
What You Need To Know: The Baltic-connector is an underwater natural gas pipeline between Finland and Estonia.
It shut down in early October after a sudden drop in pressure, and authorities said at the time that the pipeline and a telecoms cable had been damaged in two places by an external mechanical force.
Authorities initially suspected the damage was deliberately caused by Russia, which had a ship in the area, possibly as a reprisal for Finland joining NATO.
But a probe by Finland's National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) has since taken an unexpected turn, pointing toward the Hong Kong-flagged cargo vessel.
Investigators said the Finnish Navy has retrieved an anchor from the location where the pipeline ruptured on October 8 and are yet to say if they believe it was intentional or an accident.
Finnish investigators said they have tried contacting the ship’s captain to no avail and according to the Barents Observer, a Norwegian newspaper covering the Arctic, the NewNew Polar Bear is currently making its way back to China via Russian waters, where it obtained special permission to return via the Northern Sea Route that allows access to China through the Arctic Ocean.
The damaged pipeline has been the only channel for Finland to import natural gas since Russian supplies were halted in May 2022 following Moscow's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Attention is focused on the incident following the clandestine bombings that sabotaged the Nord Stream 1 and 2 gas pipelines that brought Russian natural gas across the Baltic to northern Germany.
3. Li Qiang’s Visit to Kyrgyzstan
Chinese Premier Li Qiang recently wrapped up a visit to Kyrgyzstan where he attended a leaders meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and discussed Chinese investment in the cash-strapped Central Asian country, RFE/RL’s Kyrgyz Service reported.
The Details: Central to the talks were plans for the international railway linking China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan that has been moving forward, but recently hit a snag as Beijing signaled it was unwilling to foot the entire bill for the project.
China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan reached a basic agreement in September 2022 and carried out a feasibility study. Construction was expected to begin as soon as this year, but Beijing reportedly decided to postpone the project due to differences over construction cost-sharing.
The planned railway has an estimated cost of $3 billion to $6 billion. Li raised the railway with his Central Asian counterparts during the trip and it's unclear if any progress was made in resolving the price tag.
Beyond the visit, the Kyrgyz government announced that several new agreements were signed with Chinese companies for the construction of new wind and solar plants in the country.
Across The Supercontinent
BRI Deals: During the BRI summit in mid-October, Kazakhstan signed 30 commercial documents worth an estimated $16.54 billion with China, according to the Kazakh president’s office.
Tashkent’s Takeaways: Details were less available for what Uzbekistan signed with China, apart from an announcement that several deals – from energy to telecoms – were signed.
Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoev also said that Chinese investment in his country has increased fivefold and said he hopes that annual trade turnover can approach $20 billion.
Officially Removed: Li Shangfu, China’s defense minister, has not been seen in public since August 29 and little explanation has been given for his absence.
On October 24, Beijing officially removed Li from his post without any explanation given or replacement announced. Reuters reported in September that he was under investigation for suspected corruption related to equipment procurement and development.
Kazakhstan’s Smart City Experiment: Reporting from small town in Kazakhstan for Coda Story, Bradley Jardine looks at the Central Asian country’s experiment with a smart city project fueled by Chinese tech that may signal a new era of surveillance in the region.
One Thing To Watch
The popular outpouring for Li Keqiang, who died suddenly last week aged 68, has sparked rare public outbursts of grief across China and online, remembering him as a reformer that could have brought China down a different path than it has gone under the rule of Xi Jinping.
Although Li in many ways represents what could have been for China, he was far from a democrat or human rights champion. This is perhaps best exemplified when leaked documents about Beijing’s crackdown in Xinjiang were made public several years ago. They showed that both Li and Xi advocated for similarly repressive policies, including mass detentions.
That’s all from me for now. Don’t forget to send me any questions, comments, or tips that you might have.
Until next time,
Reid Standish
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