China In Eurasia

As Western attention focused on the deepening ties between China and Russia and the potential transfer of Chinese military aid to Moscow, Belarusian ruler Alyaksandr Lukashenka embarked on a three-day state visit to Beijing.

In going to China, Lukashenka -- a Kremlin ally and regular interlocutor of Russian President Vladimir Putin -- is hoping to offset Belarus’s political and economic reliance on Moscow, which has grown even more dependent on Russian energy, security, and financial assistance following large-scale anti-government protests in 2020 and Minsk’s increased international isolation since the war in Ukraine started.

Arriving on February 28, the trip represents an opportunity for Lukashenka to court Chinese investment and comes as the authoritarian leader has moved carefully during the yearlong war as Belarus has hosted Russian troops and was a launching pad for Moscow’s invasion -- though it has refrained from committing its forces to the grinding conflict.

“This visit has symbolic meaning for Lukashenka and it can help lend some credibility to the idea that he isn’t as isolated as he was in the past,” Katsiaryna Shmatsina, an expert on Belarusian politics at Virginia Tech university, told RFE/RL.

But while Belarus’s important relationship with China is set to be the focus of the trip, the visit to Beijing will draw further scrutiny on China’s role in the war following allegations from U.S. officials that Beijing is considering supplying Moscow with arms and ammunition at a time when supplies are running low.

Chinese officials have denied Washington’s claim, but Kyiv and its Western allies will be watching Lukashenka’s trip closely to see if it leads to further deals on military cooperation between Beijing and Minsk given Lukashenka’s proximity to both Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

“The only way that Xi would bother to meet with Lukashenka right now would be because something larger is at stake for Beijing and it likely has to do with the war in Ukraine,” Shmatsina said.

Between Moscow And Beijing

Belarus and China have a history of military ties, especially around technology transfers.

In 2015, Minsk announced the completion of its Polonez multiple-rocket-launcher system, which military experts say uses modified Chinese designs and was developed with Chinese help.

The development of the Polonez came about after Moscow refused to sell its Iskander missile system at a discount to Belarus, leading Lukashenka to turn to Beijing in a bid to gain strategic distance from Russia.

Belarus is looking to keep those lines open. In a joint statement at September’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, Lukashenka and Xi vowed to “further expand practical cooperation in every sphere between the two militaries.”

But sweeping Western sanctions placed on Belarus following its crackdown on protesters in 2020 after a presidential election that the opposition and international observers deemed fraudulent has seen Lukashenka become more obedient to the Kremlin after it came to his aid -- a trend that has increased following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

Minsk’s past strategy of limiting its dependence on Moscow by balancing between China and Russia has been further offset by the deepening relationship between Xi and Putin.

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Both leaders declared a “no-limits” partnership a few weeks before the Russian invasion and China has since increased its trade with Russia, scooping up cheap energy supplies and supplying its neighbor with dual-use deliveries of more advanced technology like microchips, which could potentially be used in weapons.

Some private Chinese companies are already grappling with sanctions and added scrutiny amid U.S. accusations of military transfers to Russia.

Chinese satellite-maker Spacety was sanctioned by Washington in February for supplying satellite imagery of Ukraine to the Wagner Group, a Russian mercenary organization with close connections to the Kremlin that has played a prominent role in the war.

Both Russian and Ukrainian troops are also using Chinese civilian drones -- mostly from DJI Technology, the world’s largest manufacturer -- for military surveillance and strikes. The company has said that its drones are not sold for military use and that it is trying to limit their sale to war zones.

Zhu Feng, an international affairs professor at Nanjing University, told the South China Morning Post that Beijing could not prevent the possibility of sales of Chinese-made weapons and equipment to Moscow by third parties.

“Beijing and DJI couldn’t rule out the possibility [of third-party acquisitions]. However, once any cases occur, Beijing and the company should make their position clear and help in further investigations to prevent similar situations from happening,” Zhu said.

Minsk And The War In Ukraine

This makes escaping the shadow of the Ukraine war difficult for Lukashenka during his trip.

On February 24, China released a 12-point proposal for ending the conflict. The Chinese position paper was not warmly received in the West but has been supported by countries with China-friendly governments like Kazakhstan, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, and Lukashenka himself.

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In an interview with Chinese state news agency Xinhua released prior to his trip, Lukashenka is quoted as saying that Beijing’s proposal is a testimony to China’s peaceful foreign policy and an original step that would have a far-reaching impact.

Lukashenka will also look to translate any goodwill with China into expanded investment and trade, which has become strained in recent years.

Chinese money once poured into Belarus, financing new roads, factories, and rail links with Europe, as well as a sprawling industrial park on the outskirts of Minsk that drew more than $1 billion in investment from 56 foreign companies, including Chinese technology giants Huawei and ZTE.

But Western sanctions on Minsk made Belarus a less attractive partner to China, with Beijing not offering a new project or loan to Minsk since 2019.

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Despite the stalled economic ties, China has sought to offer rhetorical support for Lukashenka as he clashed with Europe and the United States.

Xi was the first foreign leader to congratulate Lukashenka after the 2020 presidential election despite international condemnation and, ahead of his arrival in Beijing, Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang told his Belarusian counterpart Syarhey Aleynik that Beijing supports Belarus maintaining national stability and that it opposes attempts by “external forces” to interfere in its internal affairs or impose “illegal” unilateral sanctions.

Amid a shared standoff with the West by Belarus, China, and Russia, attention will also be focused on just how much autonomy Lukashenka has, given his dependence on the Kremlin and how that fits in with China and Russia’s evolving ties.

Lukashenka had a long conversation with Putin a few days before flying to Beijing and hints of the expanded imbalance in their dynamic are increasingly on display.

Both countries are signatories to a Union State treaty that has been the source of friction between Minsk and Moscow for decades. Yahoo News recently reported that it had obtained leaked documents showing a Kremlin plan to absorb Belarus by 2030 under the guise of the treaty. Lukashenka has since dismissed the report as “nonsense and chatter.”

But even Lukashenka has seemingly acknowledged Moscow’s dominance.

After Putin thanked him for “agreeing to come” to a meeting earlier in February between the two leaders, Lukashenka hinted at his growing subservience.

“As If I could not agree,” he replied.

A position paper unveiled by Beijing pushing for a cease-fire in Ukraine has been met skeptically by many experts and Western officials who question China’s ability to broker a truce given its growing ties with Russia.

Released by China on February 24 to coincide with the one-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion, the 12-point proposal calls for an end to Western sanctions against Moscow, setting up humanitarian corridors for the evacuation of civilians, ensuring the regular export of Ukrainian grain, security guarantees for Russia, and calls against the use of nuclear weapons.

The paper pitches a gradual de-escalation of hostilities that would pave the way for peace talks, but China’s call for a truce between Russia and Ukraine quickly faced scrutiny as it appeared to reaffirm Beijing’s position that the West is fueling the conflict while seemingly offering Moscow a reprieve.

“Beijing is speaking to a global audience with this paper,” Raffaello Pantucci, a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, told RFE/RL. “But for China to seriously push for peace, they would have to tell Moscow things they don’t want to hear, and there is no evidence that [Beijing] has ever told Russia to step back -- either behind the scenes or in front of the cameras.”

Peace-Broker Status

Those stepped-up ties were most recently on display during a February 23 visit to Moscow by Wang Yi, China’s top diplomat, and saw Russian President Vladimir Putin hail “new frontiers” in the relationship as he signaled that Chinese leader Xi Jinping would visit Russia in the spring.

The paper itself mainly revisits long-held Chinese foreign policy positions and views on the war, such as asking for all countries to ensure that “sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity be effectively guaranteed.”

But it also included language that appeared to be directed at the West, including calls to end the “Cold War mentality” toward the conflict and warning against “expanding military blocs,” which are terms the Chinese Foreign Ministry has used in the past to refer to what it views as Washington’s interference in other countries’ affairs and the growth of the NATO military alliance.

“[It’s] interesting in any case, since China has so far not done many things in terms of mediation,” a senior European Union official who requested anonymity because they were not cleared to speak to the media, told RFE/RL. “I think the main goal is to improve their own reputation.”

A separate senior EU official told RFE/RL that the proposal should be seen in the context of China looking to appear as “a leader of the ‘Global South’ and as a peace promoter,” adding that “Europe is not wooed” by the Chinese initiative.

The Chinese call for a truce comes after a year of Beijing looking to present itself as a neutral party to the war -- rejecting Western attempts to get China to condemn Russia’s war in Ukraine.

A few weeks before the Russian invasion, Xi and Putin heralded a new era of relations by announcing a “no-limits” partnership between their two countries that many analysts say is driven by a shared desire to push back against the United States.

Throughout the war, Beijing has carefully avoided any bold moves to help Russia that would lead to Western backlash while simultaneously deepening cooperation with Moscow. This has included providing crucial economic and diplomatic support for Russia, such as buying up Russian energy and parroting Moscow’s narrative of the war in its media and at international forums like the United Nations.

On February 23, Beijing also abstained -- for the fourth time -- from a UN vote demanding that Russian forces withdraw from Ukraine.

Some Western officials had hoped Xi could use China’s growing economic support for Russia as leverage to nudge Putin toward the negotiating table, but Temur Umarov, a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, says Beijing’s position paper and its new, more visible role is about cementing its status as “a global superpower” that seeks to counterbalance the West on the world stage.

“This is a very vague text that doesn’t really bring anything new,” Umarov told RFE/RL. “It’s hard to imagine how this could affect the future of the war in Ukraine.”

Eyeing Beijing And Moscow

Public reactions to the proposal have ranged from critical to muted.

Speaking to CNN shortly after the paper was released, U.S. national-security adviser Jake Sullivan dismissed much of the proposal’s contents, saying it could have stopped “at point one, which is to respect the sovereignty of all nations.”

“Ukraine wasn’t attacking Russia. NATO wasn’t attacking Russia. The United States wasn’t attacking Russia,” he added. “Russia’s aims in the war were to wipe Ukraine off the map, to absorb it into Russia.”

In Beijing, Jorge Toledo, the EU’s ambassador to China, told reporters at a February 24 briefing that what China released was a position paper not a peace plan, and that the bloc would study it.

Ukrainian officials were not consulted on the paper, but Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba said that Wang had shared “key elements of the Chinese peace plan” with him during a meeting at the Munich Security Conference.

Speaking at the same press briefing as Toledo in Beijing, Zhanna Leshchynska, Ukraine’s charge d’affaires at its embassy in China, said that the Chinese paper was “a good sign.”

“We hope they also urge Russia to stop the war and withdraw its troops,” Leshchynska added.

During a February 23 press conference in Kyiv with Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez prior to the paper’s release, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy called the Chinese move an important first step.

“I think that, in general, the fact that China started talking about peace in Ukraine, I think that it is not bad,” he said.

The Chinese paper also comes amid rising tensions between Beijing and Washington and accusations that China is considering supplying military equipment to Russia.

That claim has been raised by U.S. officials multiple times recently, and The Wall Street Journal reported that Washington is considering releasing intelligence on the alleged arms transfer.

The German magazine Der Spiegel also claimed in a report published on February 23, citing unnamed sources, that Moscow was in negotiations with a Chinese company about supplying large quantities of strike drones.

Chinese officials haven’t commented on the Der Spiegel report but have strongly rejected the U.S. claims, with Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin saying, “The U.S. side isn’t qualified to point fingers at China or order China around, and we never accept the [United States] criticizing Sino-Russian relations.”

Those accusations, coupled with the fact that Xi has yet to speak with Zelenskiy since Russia’s invasion one year ago, hurt China’s credibility as a mediator and only add to the skepticism over the new position paper, Umarov says.

“Kyiv knows that China is on Moscow's side,” he says. “China's proposals might not be pro-Russian per se, but they are certainly anti-West, and that makes it difficult for Ukraine to meaningfully engage with any of this.”