China In Eurasia

French President Emmanuel Macron will go to Beijing for a three-day trip as the European Union grapples with its desire to pursue economic interests with China while dissuading Chinese leader Xi Jinping from deepening ties with Russia.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is traveling with Macron to Beijing on April 5, where they will seek to strike a balance between EU geopolitical goals and its China-linked economic ambitions. They are expected to call on China to urge Russia to work toward a cease-fire in Ukraine and get Moscow to refrain from escalating its nuclear weapons rhetoric.

But the tightrope Europe is walking is becoming increasingly difficult, especially as Moscow's invasion of Ukraine and Beijing's position toward the war -- including China's moves to appear as a peace broker in the conflict -- reshape Brussels' ties with Beijing.

This shift was reflected in a March 30 speech by von der Leyen in which she called for a reassessment of the bloc's relations with China and warned that "we cannot close our eyes to the fact that China is not only an economic partner but also a systemic rival."

Macron, meanwhile, is looking to add a more personal touch to his discussions with Xi as part of an ambitious diplomatic push to create distance between Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin -- who recently hosted the Chinese leader for a lavish state visit.

Speaking ahead of the visit to Beijing, Macron said his goal was to "try and involve China as much as possible to put pressure on Russia" on topics such as nuclear weapons, with aides saying Macron will try to gauge Xi's reaction to Russia's threat to host nuclear missiles in Belarus.

Macron's efforts will be closely watched by the international community, but EU officials told RFE/RL that expectations remain low for the visit, especially given that the French president has minimal leverage in talks and has not succeeded in previous diplomatic gambits, including to stop Putin from using military force in the run-up to the invasion of Ukraine or in a stalled bid to revive the Iran nuclear deal.

"[The EU] wants to underline the message [to China] to not support Russia any more than is already being done, otherwise the bilateral relationship is doomed," an EU official who was not cleared to speak to the media told RFE/RL. "History will show if all this traveling [to China] is a good thing or not."

A New Tightrope

Brussels' difficulty in striking a balance in its relationship with China is not new.

As a recent report by the Asia Society Policy Institute notes, the bloc remains "caught between the United States, which is pushing for a tough approach, and China, which is pushing for closer economic ties."

Those economic ties took a hit in 2021, when Beijing blacklisted a group of European lawmakers, experts, and diplomats over the bloc's placing of sanctions on four Chinese officials for rights violations in Xinjiang. The fallout from the incident led to an EU-China investment treaty being frozen and China's growing ties with Russia amid the war in Ukraine -- with Beijing emerging as one of Moscow's closest partners -- has worsened internal divisions within the EU on how to shape its China policy.

SEE ALSO:

As China Juggles Russia Ties, EU Skeptical Of Beijing's Charm Offensive

While Beijing has stopped short of providing Moscow with lethal military support for the war in Ukraine, China has extended a crucial economic lifeline to Russian and Chinese customs data, as well as documented reports, show the growing trade in dual-use commercial goods that are repurposed for military means.

EU officials say this leaves them with few good options moving forward. "The most important thing is what China doesn't do as opposed to what they do," an EU official told RFE/RL about Beijing's support for Moscow.

The 27-country bloc will continue to pursue cooperation with China on issues such as climate change, and the EU can't afford to alienate Beijing, which is a key trade partner and a major player in global affairs. But there is also a greater push within the EU for a stronger stand for its values and interests such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

This had led to the European Commission taking a harder stance toward China as part of a "bad cop" approach, the European Council on Foreign Relations, a Brussels-based think tank, said in a recent report.

In March, the French president said that he had "suggested to von der Leyen that she accompany him to China" so they could speak "with a unified voice."

But the tougher approach risks backlash from Beijing that could throw off the bloc's delicate balancing act, as evidenced by the Chinese reaction to remarks by von der Leyen in a March 30 speech in Brussels.

Fu Cong, China's ambassador to the EU, told reporters afterwards that he was "a little bit disappointed" and said in an interview with the Chinese state-owned broadcaster CGTN that von der Leyen's speech "contained a lot of misrepresentation and misinterpretation of Chinese policies and the Chinese positions" and was written by someone who "does not really understand China."

China's Peace Power

The visit by Macron and von der Leyen comes on the heels of a similar trip to China by Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez, who also discussed the situation in Ukraine with Xi and urged the Chinese leader to discuss peace plans with Kyiv directly.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has repeatedly said that he is ready to speak directly with Xi, but the two leaders have not spoken since before Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. In the lead-up to Xi's March visit to Moscow, reports circulated that Beijing was ready to break its top-level silence, but a call with Zelenskiy did not materialize.

China has gone on a global public-relations push in the last month to paint itself as a country advocating for peace in Ukraine, with Beijing marketing a 12-point proposal that could open the door to peace talks. Western capitals have mostly shrugged off the document and criticized it as freezing the conflict along lines favorable to Moscow, but China's diplomatic push has received support from some countries in the Global South, such as Brazil, Kazakhstan, and South Africa.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba told the Financial Times during a March 29 interview that he believes that "China is testing the ground, in terms of the peace process" but that it hasn't yet made a decision on what role to play. He added that Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang assured him earlier in March that China would not provide weapons to Russia.

In going to Beijing, Macron is hoping to capitalize on China's desire to paint itself as a peace broker on the global stage, even if the path forward for him is increasingly narrow amid tensions with China and widespread protests in France after the increase of the retirement age -- issues that analysts say may diminish his standing with Xi.

In addition to visiting Beijing, Macron will also travel with Xi to Guangzhou, where the Chinese leader's father served as provincial governor. French officials have said they hope the side trip will allow for private, candid discussions between the leaders.

Shortly after wrapping up a high-profile meeting in Moscow with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese leader Xi Jinping turned his sights toward Central Asia and announced plans to host a summit in May as the ripple effects from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continue to shake up the region.

The announcement came on the heels of a visit to Russia where Xi and Putin heralded a new era in their ties despite fallout from Moscow's invasion of Ukraine, a development that has wide-ranging ramifications for Central Asia.

The Kremlin traditionally viewed the area as its strategic backyard, but has been displaced by China as the premier economic force for the region’s five countries. Moscow’s war in Ukraine has released geopolitical and economic shock waves and seen China’s role in the region grow through diplomatic summits and new initiatives that have disrupted the tightrope that Central Asian governments have walked for balancing their ties between China, Russia, and the West.

As Xi and Putin strengthen their partnership and work closer together, Central Asia is now left walking an even wobblier tightrope than before, analysts argue.

“I don’t think Central Asia is caught by surprise by this growing Russia and China cooperation,” Temur Umarov, a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told RFE/RL. “But the big question is how they will adapt their foreign policies to these big changes.”

Finding A New Line To Walk

Beijing once positioned itself cautiously in Central Asia to ensure it didn’t upset Russia as the Kremlin guarded its influence in the region.

But that dynamic has shifted in recent years.

Beijing has expanded the scope and scale of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and moved to grow its leadership role in the region with stepped up diplomatic engagement and a heightened security presence.

In September, Xi made his first trip abroad since the COVID-19 pandemic to Kazakhstan and then to Uzbekistan for the annual SCO summit. Beijing has stepped up its bilateral diplomatic ties with Central Asia and sought to create more formats with regional governments that don’t include Moscow.

Chinese officials have also been hosting virtual summits with Central Asia’s top brass -- the upcoming meeting in May will be the first in-person summit between the region’s leaders and Xi.

But while the slated summit highlights how China’s influence is rising and Russia’s has diminished since the war started, Umarov says Beijing and Moscow are not competing in the region.

“I don’t see this as an attempt to [snub] Moscow. China doesn’t want to push out or even replace Russia in the region,” he said. “Actually, [China] is working to better coordinate things with Russia and this [fits] with Beijing’s foreign policy priorities.”

In a statement issued on March 21 following the Moscow talks, Xi and Putin spoke about their shared interests in Central Asia, saying that they would work together “to support the countries of Central Asia in ensuring their sovereignty and national development” and safeguard them against so-called “color revolutions and external interference in the affairs of the region.”

Warnings of a “color revolution” have been a standard talking point from Beijing and Moscow when discussing Western involvement in Eurasia.

Xi also used the term to describe unrest in Kazakhstan in January 2022 when violent clashes sparked by simmering popular grievances and a behind-the-scenes power struggle culminated in a Russian-led military intervention under the guise of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

In a potential blueprint for navigating future crises in Central Asia, Beijing deferred to Russia to act as the key political and security actor.

But Haiyun Ma, a professor at Frostburg State University who studies Beijing's relations with Russia and Central and South Asian countries, told RFE/RL that Moscow’s influence has declined since then and regional governments have looked to gain some political distance from Moscow.

“It seems clear that Central Asian states would prefer China’s economic and peaceful development as a model to Russia’s political and military coercion,” he said.

A Complicated Reality

This shift has created new opportunities for Beijing as it looks to shore up its influence along its western border at a time of intensifying competition with the United States.

Xi will chair the third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation later this year -- a gathering of global leaders centered around the Chinese investment initiative -- where Central and South Asia could feature prominently. Beijing and Moscow continue to find ways to harmonize the Belt and Road Initiative with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union and China has also agreed to tentatively fund the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway.

“Central Asian countries are closely watching Chinese-Russian ties with complex feelings,” Ma said. “On the one hand, a closer China-Russia partnership in noneconomic areas is not good news. On the other, China's economic blueprint for Central Asia [and including Russia], is attractive.”

Despite Russia’s weakened state and unease in the region over Moscow’s unprovoked attack on a neighbor, Central Asian states have managed to capitalize on the fallout from its sanctions-riddled economy.

Russia remains a top destination for work for millions of Central Asians, with remittances sent home by migrants holding steady to preinvasion levels or in some cases rising, according to the World Bank.

Trade turnover between Russia and Central Asia -- particularly with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan -- has also grown since February 2022 as Moscow has needed to replace European imports and sell its own products.

“China and Russia are high on Central Asia’s list of priorities and they won’t risk their relationships with Eurasia’s two big powers,” Umarov said. “The disadvantage from this is that the West’s presence will inevitably decrease in the region.”