China In Eurasia

Welcome back to the China In Eurasia briefing, an RFE/RL newsletter tracking China's resurgent influence from Eastern Europe to Central Asia.

I'm RFE/RL correspondent Reid Standish and here's what I'm following right now.

The Wider Strategy Behind China's Ukraine Diplomacy

China joined international diplomatic talks in Saudi Arabia on August 6 for a two-day summit with officials from 40 countries designed to find a framework for peace in Ukraine. But does it signal a new tack for Beijing?

Finding Perspective: China sent its special envoy for Eurasian affairs, Li Hui, who offered support for the summit and called for another round of talks through the format that includes countries from the West and across the Global South.

The summit -- which also included representatives from the European Union, India, and the United States -- excluded Russia and centered upon putting momentum behind a 10-point peace formula developed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy.

Several observers saw China's presence as a sign that it was willing to play a more constructive role in pushing for peace talks, but there's plenty of signals that show Beijing is playing its own game here.

China unveiled its own 12-point peace document in February and Alexander Gabuev, the director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, was skeptical that Beijing was changing its stance on the war, arguing that while the economic and reputational costs for standing by Russia are rising, the longer term strategic calculations of keeping Russia by its side remain the same for China.

This was reaffirmed when Foreign Minister Wang Yi spoke with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, on August 8 and assured him that China hadn't wavered on its partnership with Moscow.

Why It Matters: China is hoping that it can use its diplomatic track record and openness to dialogue on Ukraine to cement its status as the Global South's superpower and showcase its leadership credentials in the process.

Mark Leonard, the director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, wrote in a recent article for Politico that think tankers and policymakers in China are focused on appearing constructive around ending the war while at the same time ensuring that Moscow will continue to stand by Beijing in rewriting the Western-led world order.

The focal point for establishing this new non-Western order are the so-called "nonaligned" countries across Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere in the Global South -- many of the same ones that were in Saudi Arabia over the weekend.

Beijing has invested tens of billions of dollars over the last decade in boosting its global image and it has so far yielded mixed results, according to a series of new polls.

A recent Pew Research poll found that two-thirds of respondents from the 24 countries surveyed viewed China unfavorably, while only 28 percent held a favorable opinion. Anti-China sentiment has also reached new highs in Argentina, India, and Brazil, according to the poll.

But there are important divisions here. The majority of the countries surveyed were Western, with African countries like Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa showing much more favorable views of China in comparison.

While souring public opinion in the West and countries like India marks its own type of foreign policy failure for China, the story is different in Africa and the Middle East.

Public opinion polls by Afrobaromter and Arab Barometer, show that majorities in Africa and the Middle East tend to view China favorably -- although, the Afrobarometer data found that both China and the United States were slipping in recent years as competition between them accelerates.

These global divisions and the larger battle for hearts and minds have now carried over to the diplomatic stage around Ukraine.

Expert Corner: Georgia Gets Closer To China

Readers asked: "Georgia signed a strategic partnership agreement with China on July 27. How major of a step towards China is this for the Georgian government?"

To find out more, I asked Emil Avdaliani, a China expert and professor at Tbilisi's European University:

"This is yet another sign that Georgia is pursuing a multivector foreign policy. Focus on the West will remain in place, but ties with other powers will be developed further. Whether this would bring meaningful results will depend on the war in Ukraine and especially the elections in Georgia slated for 2024.

"The agreement between Tbilisi and Beijing could also be regarded as a bargaining chip for Tbilisi's rather complicated relations with the West. The calculus could be that amid Brussels' upcoming decision on whether to grant Georgia an EU candidate status, Tbilisi might be raising the stakes by advancing its ties with big Eurasian actors like China.

"I think the Georgian public slightly overreacted to the agreement between China and Georgia when it was announced. It's unclear what the document would bring in practical terms. For China, Georgia is a rather small market and the only real value the country holds for Beijing is its geographic location and the growing realization to advance the Middle Corridor trade route. Moreover, China could also be eyeing greater engagement with the Black Sea region, where major geopolitical competition is unfolding between Russia and the West."

Do you have a question about China's growing footprint in Eurasia? Send it to me at StandishR@rferl.org or reply directly to this e-mail and I'll get it answered by leading experts and policymakers.

Three More Stories From Eurasia

1. A Belt And Road Summit This October

After a three-year hiatus due to strict COVID restrictions, Chinese leader Xi Jinping is planning to host a high-profile summit for his signature Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) -- although there are early signs that it won't receive the top billing Beijing is hoping for.

What It Means: The most prominent guest to RSVP for this October's Belt and Road Forum -- the first such gathering since 2019 -- is Russian President Vladimir Putin, something The Wall Street Journal reports is causing European leaders to want to keep their distance.

The BRI -- China's mammoth overseas infrastructure push that gained steam in the mid-2010s -- has been the subject of some belt tightening in recent years and seen its reputation fall amid stalling projects, governments struggling to repay loans, and allegations of corruption and overspending.

High-level European leaders like French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz currently have no plans to attend the forum in Beijing -- which will be the third BRI summit since the inaugural one in 2017 -- and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has said she plans to pull her country out of the BRI altogether.

Other countries like the Czech Republic and Greece, both of which signed up for the initiative and were among some of Europe's more enthusiastic participants, currently do not plan to send senior officials for the BRI forum.

The BRI has been at the center of Beijing's efforts to boost international development and expand its global influence and the guest list for this year's upcoming gathering will be an important litmus test for the strength of China's economic diplomacy under Xi.

No confirmed date has been set for the summit, but Chinese officials are reportedly eying mid-October.

2. Kyrgyzstan Turns To China For Hydropower Help

Kyrgyzstan, which is in the midst of a yearslong energy crisis, announced that it signed a memorandum of understanding and an investment agreement with a consortium of Chinese companies on July 27 to build a new hydropower plant that could help with the growing energy shortages, my colleague Toktosun Shambetov from RFE/RL's Kyrgyz Service reported.

What You Need To Know: Few details were revealed about the newly inked project, which will consist of a cascade of multiple hydropower plants (HPPs) in succession near Kazarman in the country's Jalalabad Province.

But according to an announcement by the Kyrgyz cabinet of ministers, it's tentatively estimated to cost between $2.4 billion-$3 billion, making it one of the country's most ambitious hydropower ventures.

Akylbek Japarov, the chairman of the Kyrgyz cabinet of ministers, said the project was a game changer that wouldn't only help erase the Central Asian country's energy deficit, but also turn it into an energy exporter.

That would be a welcome achievement for the government, which announced a three-year energy emergency on August 1 due to widespread electricity shortages.

There are still concerns over whether the project will come to fruition, with multiple experts telling Toktosun that the government's poor record in actually delivering large-scale infrastructure is spotty at best, with many projects grappling with corruption, delays, or being abandoned altogether.

3. How Serbia Become Blanketed In Chinese-Made Surveillance Cameras

A quiet expansion of Chinese-made surveillance cameras has spread across Serbia in the last five years, with some towns and villages having one camera for every 100 inhabitants.

My colleague Natalija Jovanovic from RFE/RL's Balkan Service traveled across the country and investigated the shadowy company behind the spread of the technology. Read her report here.

The Details: Belgrade's expansion of Huawei surveillance cameras -- many of which have facial-recognition capabilities -- was the center of an RFE/RL investigation last year, but the countrywide growth has received little attention inside and outside the country.

Natalija's monthslong investigation found that the spread has taken place with little public consultation or disclosed information from the authorities.

The report also found that 42 local governments surveyed have awarded their contracts exclusively to Macchina Security, a shadowy Serbian company increasingly active on the security goods and services market that has been winning tenders and importing Chinese-made surveillance technology into the country in recent years.

Check out Natalija's investigation here.

Across The Supercontinent

Homebody: According to a Bloomberg News analysis, Xi, who made an average of 14 overseas trips per year from 2013 to 2019, has only spent two days outside China this year and has not supplemented the foreign trips with video calls. Instead, Xi is making foreign dignitaries come to him and has met with representatives from 36 countries so far in 2023.

Willkommen: TSMC, the world's largest contract chipmaker based in Taiwan, has agreed to build a 10 billion-euro ($10.9 billion) plant in Dresden, Germany, in partnership with Infineon Technologies AG, NXP Semiconductors NV, and Robert Bosch GmbH. 5 billion euros ($5.49 billion) will come from the German government as subsidies to support construction of the factory.

Seaside Power Politics: The Chinese Communist Party has begun its annual summer retreat in Beidaihe. The gathering is usually a chance for party members to gather and speak candidly about issues concerning its leadership and comes amid growing tensions over the economy and the unexplained disappearance of Qin Gang, who was China's foreign minister.

Steel Partners: A delegation of lawmakers from the ruling Serbian Progressive Party traveled to China in late July, where they reaffirmed their support for the Chinese Communist Party's political model and held talks over the status of Kosovo, my colleague Nevena Bogdanovic from RFE/RL's Balkan Service reports.

CPEC Turns 10: Late July marked the 10th anniversary of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Beijing's flagship project within the BRI. CPEC has had no shortage of controversy and setbacks in those years, while still forging ahead with investment and deeper ties.

The Lowy Institute published a scorecard for CPEC that concludes that it may have been unrealistic from its inception. Take a look here.

One Thing To Watch

With China's economy performing below expectations, Chinese authorities are putting pressure on prominent local economists to avoid discussing negative trends, such as deflation.

Multiple local brokerage analysts and researchers at leading universities as well as state-run think tanks have told Western media that they have been instructed by regulators, their employers and even domestic media to avoid speaking negatively about topics ranging from fears of capital flight to softening prices.

Market analysts say the growing self-censorship among economic-research professionals will have deepening knock-on effects and attach further questions to how reliable local Chinese data is for investors.

That's all from me for now. Don't forget to send me any questions, comments, or tips that you might have.

Until next time,

Reid Standish

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your inbox every other Wednesday.

Welcome back to the China In Eurasia briefing, an RFE/RL newsletter tracking China’s resurgent influence from Eastern Europe to Central Asia.

I’ve returned from a short summer hiatus in my native Canada and here’s what I’m following now that I’ve returned to RFE/RL’s newsroom in Prague.

China's Missing Foreign Minister Gets Replaced

Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang was suddenly replaced on July 25 by his predecessor Wang Yi in a surprise shake-up to China’s foreign policy leadership.

Finding Perspective: Qin has not been seen in public since late June and the announcement of his removal at a special session of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee came after weeks of speculation about his fate.

Qin has only been on the job for seven months and assumed the role as Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s handpicked successor after serving as China’s ambassador to Washington.

No reason was provided for Qin’s removal, but his mysterious absence has fueled a wide array of rumors about what happened to him.

China’s Foreign Ministry cited unspecified health reasons for Qin’s absence from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meeting in Indonesia earlier this month, but has not commented since.

Other rumors have linked his disappearance to an alleged affair with a Chinese state-run TV anchor, a severe case of COVID-19, or that he is under government investigation.

Why It Matters: Like most high-level moves in Beijing, this one exists within China’s black-box political system and his removal raises more questions than answers.

What did Qin do? Is Wang’s appointment long-term? Did Qin lose an internal Party battle? Did his time spent in the United States leave him vulnerable to accusations of being politically compromised by foreign intelligence?

It may be some time -- if ever -- before we get some answers to those questions. But here’s what we do know.

Wang became China’s top diplomat when he joined the Politburo in October and state media reports didn’t mention any change to Wang’s party roles, suggesting he would occupy his Politburo and Foreign Ministry positions at the same time. Some analysts have speculated that this signals that he will be a placeholder until a younger replacement can be found.

Qin appears to maintain his role as state councilor, a senior government rank in the State Council, China’s cabinet, with the State Council’s website continuing to list him as a state councilor. Mentions and images of him on the Foreign Ministry's website, meanwhile, have been removed.

Some have speculated this indicates that Qin is under investigation and that he has been sucked into China’s extrajudicial interrogation system for Communist Party members who are viewed as politically suspect.

Qin has been regarded as a fast-rising protege to Xi, and is said to have been pulled up through the ranks by the Chinese leader. His appointment last year as foreign minister over more experienced candidates caused some surprise among observers of elite Chinese politics.

That close association with Xi makes the episode particularly intriguing, but with few details known about Qin’s disappearance, it’s difficult to figure out how exactly his removal will change things behind the scenes.

Expert Corner: The Ripple Effects From Qin’s Disappearance

Readers asked: “What message does Qin Gang’s absence and removal as foreign minister send to the world and does it hurt Chinese foreign policy?”

To find out more, I asked Sari Arho Havren, an associate fellow at London’s Royal United Services Institute:

“Qin Gang is not the first, and not the last, high-ranking official to go missing in China. The ‘loud’ silence follows the Chinese Communist Party’s pattern of secretive behavior. While he has been removed and now replaced, the longer the absence takes without a sensible explanation, the higher the chances that Qin’s career is finished. From Beijing’s perspective, however, the way Qin’s disappearance radiates to the outside world is a minor, if any, concern at all.

“Qin’s absence is, however, not entirely without consequences abroad. While China is facing a myriad of challenges and is trying to woo foreign investors back, a missing foreign minister does not increase confidence in China’s conditions and stability. Instead, it further underlines the dissonance between the country’s political and business environments.

“Additionally, foreign ministerial level meetings have been postponed or downgraded to the vice-minister level. While Qin’s disappearance caused delays in diplomacy and fueled speculation, the long-term consequences are likely minimal. Once Beijing closes the case, the whole episode will quickly be forgotten as the majority of other countries have gotten used to dealing with the Communist Party’s abnormal behavior.”

Do you have a question about China’s growing footprint in Eurasia? Send it to me at StandishR@rferl.org or reply directly to this e-mail and I’ll get it answered by leading experts and policymakers.

Three More Stories From Eurasia

1. A Chinese 'Super' Observation Station

A new Chinese “super” observation station for climate and environmental monitoring opened in Tajikistan in June, but what’s behind the appearance of the station in Central Asia? I looked into it here.

What You Need To Know: The station -- located in Shahritus, a town in southwestern Tajikistan near the meeting point of the country's borders with Afghanistan and Uzbekistan -- is part of a growing constellation of stations in countries along Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that are run by or partnered with Lanzhou University.

Scientists from Lanzhou University say the station provides comprehensive data for dust, pollutants, and weather in key areas of Central Asia and that it can help warn about extreme weather conditions, as well as provide data about climate change.

The station uses LiDAR (light, detection, and ranging) systems, which help scientists to accurately map and examine natural and manmade environments.

But as Bradley Jardine, managing director of the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, told me, LiDAR systems are also a key component of smart, autonomous, and electric vehicles -- a sector where China is an emerging global leader -- and the broader network that the new station is part of is designed to allow China to refine its domestic technology.

“As China positions itself to become dominant in the future global automotive industry, there are a large number of state grants available for refining the technology, and research institutes like Lanzhou are on the cutting edge,” Jardine said.

The station’s location and the Tajik government’s close cooperation with Beijing have also raised questions about whether it could be used for surveillance and security purposes, especially given that China has financed, built, and in some cases helped operate surveillance and security outposts and facilities in Tajikistan.

While the station’s full scope is unclear, Jardine noted that stations like those in Shahritus “rely on weather satellites -- possibly similar in nature to the object that had recently run errant across the United States,” in reference to the high-altitude Chinese balloon that traversed Canada and the United States in February and was said by U.S. and Canadian officials to be used for espionage and surveillance.

2. What We Learned From A Virtual SCO

This year’s annual Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit was held virtually and wrapped up on July 4 in comparatively muted fashion to last year’s meeting in Uzbekistan.

But what are the key takeaways from one of Eurasia’s main political gatherings?

The Details: Last year’s summit in Uzbekistan was a multiday event that garnered outsized attention around the world because it was the first time that Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin met in person since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Xi’s trip to Kazakhstan en route to the summit also marked his first foreign trip since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The 2022 summit’s high-profile billing led to increased momentum about the SCO becoming the premier bloc for the region and something that could eventually rival Western-led organizations, given that it is spearheaded by China and Russia and its members comprise around 40 percent of the global population.

In comparison, the 2023 gathering hosted by India was virtual, a format believed to be adopted due to concerns in New Delhi over hosting Putin in person and strained relations between India and China.

This tale of the two summits illustrates the contradictions inherent within the SCO.

The grouping continues to extend its reach -- something seen this year with Iran becoming a new member and Belarus slated to join next year -- but the SCO is still hamstrung by a tangled web of interests and allegiances among its members, which includes includes China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

Kazakhstan has assumed chairmanship of the bloc and the 2024 summit will be held in Astana, where it is likely to receive higher billing from its host government.

Kazakh President Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev has already called for closer cooperation within the SCO on energy and Astana is likely to use its chairmanship to focus on the issue.

3. The Transit Ground

Trade data shows Central Asia’s imports from China are up sharply, with heavy truck shipments from China to Central Asia tripling this year, in another sign of how the region is becoming a growing hub for Chinese dual-use goods reaching the Russian military.

What It Means: A new report by Joseph Webster for the Lowy Research Institute said that most imported goods are then re-exported to Russia.

As Webster notes, such flows have helped Russia stave supply shortages, but also to avoid making tough calls on which manufactured products to prioritize in production. “Importing certain industrial products could allow the Kremlin to repurpose production lines for military goods, such as tanks or armored vehicles,” he wrote.

According to Chinese customs data, Beijing has exported $16.6 billion worth of goods to Central Asia, up 140 percent from the same period in 2021.

The report feeds into a growing body of evidence that Beijing is delivering enough militarily useful -- although non-lethal -- equipment to Russia to have a material impact on the Kremlin’s war on Ukraine.

A new investigation from Politico found that Russian buyers have declared orders for hundreds of thousands of bulletproof vests and helmets made by Shanghai H Win, a private Chinese manufacturer. The shipments, along with those of Chinese-made drones and other products, show the loopholes being used to keep Russia’s war machine afloat amid sanctions.

Across The Supercontinent

Bye-Bye BRICS: South Africa has announced that Putin, who has an outstanding arrest warrant issued in his name by the UN’s International Criminal Court (ICC), will not travel to the BRICS summit in Johannesburg next month.

Partners At Sea: China and Russia wrapped up air and naval exercises in the Sea of Japan on July 23 that the Chinese Defense Ministry said were aimed at “safeguarding” the security of waterways.

Gassed Up: According to Chinese Customs data, Uzbekistan sold nearly $204 million worth of gas to China in this year’s second quarter. This ranks the country as China’s fifth largest source of gas.

Content Control: Sohu, the prolific Chinese website, sparked backlash in Tajikistan after it published an article saying that the Central Asian country of nearly 9.7 million has over 800,000 widows. A claim that was not tied to any source of information or survey.

After Tajik media -- including RFE/RL’s Tajik Service -- reported on the claims and some user comments on Sohu, the article was then removed. No explanation has been provided, but articles regularly vanish from China’s heavily censored Internet and there is precedent for controversial articles about Central Asia being removed after they sparked backlash in the region.

One Thing To Watch

Chinese stocks soared on July 25 as Beijing pledged to ramp up measures to bolster China’s sputtering economy.

The stock rebound comes after China’s top leaders pledged to ramp up policy support to boost domestic consumption as the post-COVID rebound has been slower than expected for the Chinese economy.

Xi’s hold on power rests on the belief that he drives prosperity for his people. Yet economic growth has been -- in relative terms for China -- muted, and local government debt remains problematic.

Last week, official data showed that economic recovery in China continued to lose momentum in the April to June months, prompting urgent calls for more help from the central government.

That’s all from me for now. Don’t forget to send me any questions, comments, or tips that you might have.

Until next time,

Reid Standish

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your inbox every other Wednesday.