China In Eurasia

WASHINGTON, D.C. -- Incoming U.S. President Donald Trump has once again kicked up a storm with his pursuit of Greenland, this time refusing to rule out the use of force to gain control of the Arctic island from ally Denmark for national-security reasons.

But Washington was interested in acquiring Greenland to mitigate threats emanating from the Arctic long before Trump came along, even offering Denmark $100 million in gold for the icy island shortly after the conclusion of World War II.

That interest has only expanded in recent years as Russia and China step up their military and commercial activities in the Arctic, conduct joint military exercises, and invest in new weapon systems like hypersonic missiles.

"Greenland is growing in importance as we find ourselves in a global competition with China and in a new technological revolution with regards to warfare," Rebecca Pincus, director of the Wilson Center's Polar Institute and a former adviser to the U.S. Defense Department on Arctic strategy, told RFE/RL.

"So, Greenland is important from a missile-defense perspective, from a space perspective, and from a global competition perspective, in which shipping and maritime sea lanes are increasingly important," she said.

Weakest Link In Homeland Defense

An autonomous territory of the Kingdom of Denmark, Greenland is physically closer to the United States with just 1,900 kilometers separating the state of Maine from the arctic island's shores.

As a territory of Denmark, it is part of NATO, but Greenland is pursuing independence from Copenhagen and some experts fear that could open a door for Russia and China to gain a foothold in the country.

While the United States already has a space base on Greenland for missile defense and space surveillance, control of the entire island would enable Washington to better defend against naval and air threats emanating from the region as well as dangers from space.

Russia has a much greater military presence in the Arctic than the United States and has continued to invest heavily in its defense capabilities in the region despite the war in Ukraine.

Retired U.S. General Terrence J. O'Shaughnessy, who served as commander of the U.S. Northern Command, told a Senate hearing in February 2020 that if Russia were to attack the United States, it would likely do so via the Arctic.

"The Arctic is no longer a fortress wall, and our oceans are no longer protective moats; they are now avenues of approach," he told the hearing.

Jahara Matisek, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College who spoke to RFE/RL as an independent expert and not on behalf of the government, said U.S. military infrastructure in the Arctic has languished, calling it the weakest link in homeland defense.

"If you want to be a powerful space-faring nation and be able to project space power in terms of offensive and defensive space weapon systems and other sorts of ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), you have to have infrastructure in the Arctic Circle -- not to mention the Antarctic Circle -- to seamlessly communicate and control all of your satellites," he said.

Chinese Ambitions

While China is not an Arctic nation, it is seeking to be a major player in the region. In recent years, Beijing has sought to buy ports, other infrastructure, and mining rights on Greenland though it has not been successful.

Matisek said the United States suspected China's real interest in those projects was to place dual-use sensors and radars in the Arctic Circle to help control their military satellites and gather intelligence on U.S. space-based operations in the region.

"If China can disrupt our 'Kill Chain' -- our space-based assets, our satellites -- then we will struggle to shoot things down. We will struggle to target, identify, attack, so that's why Greenland ends up actually mattering a lot," he said.

Pincus said the United States needs more ISR in the Arctic.

"That's our biggest gap that we need to close. So, we need more sensors from space to the seabed. And we need a data fusion capability to integrate all of that sensor data and observations into something that's a usable product for decision makers," she said.

Pincus said it makes sense that Russia and China would carry out joint military exercises in the Arctic.

"It's not surprising that they're focused on the Arctic, because the U.S. is weak in surface presence in the Arctic," she said, pointing out that the United States has no more than two functioning icebreakers compared to about four and a few dozen, respectively, for China and Russia.

Northern Passage

As ice continues to recede in the Arctic due to rising temperatures, it is opening a path for ships -- including military vessels -- to transit from Europe to Asia via the waters above Greenland and Canada.

"Chinese merchant shipping will increase passage along the northern route as it's shorter for them, but presumably Chinese warships will also use that route," Ben Hodges, a retired U.S. lieutenant general and former commander of U.S. Army forces in Europe, told RFE/RL.

Military vessels coming into the Atlantic Ocean from the Arctic would have to pass through the GIUK gap -- the stretch of water between Greenland, Iceland, and Scotland. During the Cold War, NATO forces tracked Soviet submarines coming into the North Atlantic through that gap, Hodges said.

Receding ice will also make it easier to mine Greenland's massive reserves of natural resources. They include metals critical for the production of high-technology goods, electric vehicles, and wind turbines.

China dominates many of those metals markets, including their mining, refining, and processing -- and Beijing has expressed interest in developing Greenland's natural resources.
The monetization of those natural resources is crucial for Greenland's dream of independence. The island still depends on subsidies from Denmark.

"When you have a nation like Greenland, they need money for investment. China and Russia will throw money at this problem," Philip M. Breedlove, a retired four-star U.S. Air Force general who led U.S. forces in Europe and served as NATO's supreme allied commander from 2013 to 2016, said in an interview with The Cipher Brief.

"Guaranteeing a Western-leaning Greenland is extremely important," he said, adding it "doesn't have to be through sovereign ownership."

Matisek said Trump may simply be trying to get the United States to "really take Greenland seriously" because of the integral role it plays in North American defense.

It is also "obviously an attempt to make sure the Chinese and Russians don't get a footprint there," he said.

Welcome back to the China In Eurasia briefing, an RFE/RL newsletter tracking China's resurgent influence from Eastern Europe to Central Asia.

I'm RFE/RL correspondent Reid Standish and here's what I'm following right now.

Beijing's Headwinds And Tailwinds

It’s another new year and that means it’s time to look ahead into the coming year for the big stories that will shape China’s growing role across Eurasia.

Here’s what’s at stake for 2025.

Finding Perspective: While each new year brings its own set of questions, 2025 will inject an added layer with the return of Donald Trump as U.S. president in January.

Trump has promised to pick up where he left office and raise tariffs on Chinese imports up to 60 percent and keep adding export controls on advanced technology.

A tougher relationship with the United States could have wider ripple effects for Beijing. Unlike back in 2018, when Trump first unleashed tariffs on China, the country’s economy is in a two year slump as it grapples with high debt, deflation, and a real estate crisis.

Further economic pain brought by Washington could potentially push many of Beijing’s global ambitions off course, leading to setbacks in tech, lending, and broader influence.

But Chinese leader Xi Jinping isn’t only facing headwinds as he prepares for Trump 2.0.

Xi now has a strengthened partnership with Russian President Vladimir Putin as both leaders chase revisions to international borders and the global and regional security order.

And while Trump could ramp up pressure on Beijing in areas like the South China Sea, Xi is also sensing opportunity from the incoming U.S. president.

Trump has promised to bring changes of his own to the international trading system and Washington’s relationship with its allies and partners.

Xi is banking that Trump’s policies will alienate other countries from the United States, leading typically U.S.-friendly nations to hedge more toward China and a greater acceptance from others of Beijing’s vision for the world order.

Geopolitical Twins: The biggest test could come early as the incoming Trump administration looks to the ongoing war in Ukraine.

On the campaign trail, Trump promised to end the war, and while doing so will be no simple feat, a push to end the conflict is expected and the future of Ukraine will have wider effects across Eurasia and beyond.

A perceived Russian victory in Ukraine would resonate particularly in China. One clear possibility is that it would embolden Xi to pursue his own ambitions in Asia.

China under Xi has become more nationalistic and more menacing in its behavior toward Taiwan, and Taiwanese officials have warned that a Russian victory would be a signal for Beijing to ramp up pressure on the self-governing island.

Why It Matters: Xi has vowed to unify with Taiwan, and to do so by force, if necessary.

Some prominent U.S. officials have speculated that Xi has told the military to be ready to conquer the island by 2027. Xi himself has mentioned 2050 in public as a potential date, but many analysts also believe that the Chinese leader would aim to take the island and secure his legacy during his tenure. Already 71 years old, that leaves a short window.

President Joe Biden has said several times that Washington is prepared to go to war to defend Taiwan from a Chinese invasion, though Trump has made no such commitment.

What to expect from Trump was the topic of most of my conversations during a recent reporting trip to Taiwan in December.

Many Taiwanese officials have taken some solace in the China hawks that the incoming president appears to be surrounding himself with, but Trump has also inserted a new level of uncertainty and his campaign rhetoric calling for Taiwan to pay for the United States to come to its aid in a crisis appears to have rattled some in Taipei.

Current and former senior Taiwanese officials said that both Taipei and Beijing are already drawing important lessons from the war in Ukraine, but the biggest one could come in 2025 as both countries watch how Kyiv’s own experience with Western support plays out over time.

Three More Stories From Eurasia To Watch In 2025

1. Chinese Firms Take Hold In Central Asia

Chinese companies have been ascendant in Central Asia for many years and that trend looks set to continue in 2025 amid a push from Chinese electric vehicle (EV) makers and tech giants.

The Details: While mega-projects and investments often get the spotlight when looking at China’s economic profile in the region, its companies are becoming mainstays of everyday life for many Central Asians.

EVs are a large part of this push, especially as Chinese companies eye emerging markets and look to export their overcapacity at home.

A factory from BYD, China’s industry leader, opened this year in Uzbekistan and is looking to ramp up production and expand with a local workforce of employees trained in China.

EVs sales continue to climb globally and within Central Asia, with Chinese brands taking up a growing percentage of the market thanks to their combination of affordability and increasing quality.

On the tech front, Huawei is also rising in the region despite the company coming under pressure from Washington and other Western nations.

Despite some global setbacks, the company remains formidable and has turned its focus outside the West with increasing returns and a renewed focus on emerging tech like AI and semiconductors.

2. The EU's Tightrope 2.0

Brussels is preparing to once again navigate potential tariffs and trade disputes with a Trump-led United States while balancing pressure and opportunities from China.

What You Need To Know: In many ways, it’s deja vu all over again for the EU.

During Trump’s last term, trade tensions with Washington led the bloc to more strongly balance its ties with the United States with China. By the time that Trump left office, Brussels was preparing to push through a historic EU-China investment deal and had lingering questions about its reliance on America.

That trade deal was eventually put on ice and a series of scandals and incidents, starting with the COVID-19 pandemic and culminating with Beijing’s support for Russia following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, have severely damaged China’s relationship with Brussels.

But while there is a new line toward Beijing from the EU, it’s a familiar balancing act that could leave Brussels in an even worse spot than before as it looks to balance security concerns with economic necessity.

3. Is This The Year For China In Afghanistan?

It's been a year of major announcements for China’s footprint in Afghanistan, but will 2025 be the year when Beijing’s projects in the country move forward?

What It Means: 2024 saw a series of notable developments. In July, Chinese engineers and the Taliban government officially started work at Mes Aynak, a massive project in Afghanistan to mine the world's second-largest deposit of copper.

The first train carrying goods from China to Afghanistan arrived in November after crossing through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and Beijing granted tariff free access to Afghan companies in October.

That momentum looks set to carry over into the new year. But beyond headlines and flashy groundbreaking ceremonies, will newfound Chinese investment be coming into Afghanistan?

That seems uncertain given that Beijing still has lingering security questions about Afghanistan, something that is set to only grow as tensions rise between Kabul and Beijing’s main regional partner in Islamabad.

Across The Supercontinent

Russia’s Car Market: Since Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, Chinese carmakers have come to dominate the Russian auto market.

According to a new study by the Rhodium Group, Russia has also emerged as China’s most significant automotive export market. Between January and October 2023, China shipped 735,000 vehicles to Russia, accounting for 19 percent of its total passenger vehicle exports.

New Lines In Central Asia: At a December 27 ceremony, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov broke ground on a long-planned railway link between China and Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

BRICS Balancing: Kazakhstan officially joins BRICS as a partner state, starting on January 1, 2025.

But Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s office said that the country does not plan to seek full membership in the organization that comprises economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.

One Thing To Watch

Xi made his annual New Year’s speech where he said that no one can stop Beijing’s desire to take control of Taiwan.

"The people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are one family. No one can sever our family bonds, and no one can stop the historical trend of national reunification," Xi said in a televised speech.

The Chinese leader also said that the country’s economy is his “top priority” and was on course to expand, as he looked to rebut concerns that Trump’s incoming administration will harm Beijing’s prospects in the new year.

That’s all from me for now. Don’t forget to send me any questions, comments, or tips that you might have.

Until next time,

Reid Standish

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your inbox every other Wednesday.