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China In Eurasia

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping review a military honor guard during an official welcoming ceremony in Beijing in May.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping review a military honor guard during an official welcoming ceremony in Beijing in May.

TAIPEI, Taiwan -- Attacks on strategic undersea telecom cables off the coast of Taiwan are not new, but when one was suspected of being severed off its northern coast by a Chinese-owned ship in early January, it fit a growing pattern.

Just a few weeks earlier, a Russian-flagged ship had cut an electricity cable running between Finland and Estonia in the Baltic Sea.

That followed several similar developments in the Baltic involving Chinese-flagged ships harming undersea infrastructure, including severing fiber-optic cables in November and damaging a gas pipeline in October 2023.

For Gabrielius Landsbergis, who served as Lithuania’s foreign minister until December, the string of incidents highlights how the dividing lines between simmering tensions with the West and Russia over the war in Ukraine are blurring with China’s aggression in the South China Sea as it claims the self-ruled island of Taiwan as its own.

“There shouldn’t be any doubt that Russia is behind these incidents in the Baltic,” Landsbergis told RFE/RL in an interview as he visited Taiwan. “For China, there is no clear attribution, but if it wanted to build up pressure on Taiwan through a shadow war by cutting cables, there are lessons to learn about that from Moscow.”

While China has supported Russia diplomatically since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, helped its economy, and bolstered its war effort by supplying dual-use technology for the battlefield, the prospect of growing coordination between Beijing and Moscow represents a new challenge for the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump.

With An Eye On Ukraine, Taiwan Prepares For Trump 2.0
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"China is trying to create a new normal around Taiwan,” Chiu Chui-cheng, the minister of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, the body that spearheads relations with Beijing, told RFE/RL. “Beijing’s goal is to shrink the buffer zone between us and make it that much easier for it to escalate, if it decides to.”

The recent cable incident is the latest of what Chiu says has been a steady uptick in such events -- ranging from new military exercises intended to simulate a blockade of the island to a threefold increase in suspected Chinese espionage cases -- meant to lay the groundwork for future moves against Taiwan.

“We don’t see these as accidents, we see them as strategy,” he said, referring to an increase in incidents targeting undersea infrastructure around Taiwan in recent years.

Living In The 'Gray Zone'

Fears over a potential Chinese invasion are far from the surface of everyday life in Taiwan’s lush, urban capital.

But the realities of these shifting dynamics are also setting in. During his campaign, Trump said that Taiwan doesn’t pay enough for its own defense and raised doubts over the level of U.S. support in the event of a Chinese invasion.

For the island’s policymakers, that’s raised concerns that severing underseas cables as part of so-called “gray zone” operations -- the term often used by Taiwanese officials to refer to the hybrid tactics used to intimidate the island but which remain below the threshold for war -- will make it harder to defend against Chinese aggression should it escalate to an outright attack.

China has denied involvement in the January cable damage in Taiwan and investigations into the incidents in the Baltic Sea are still under way.

While these cable episodes highlight the vulnerability of crucial offshore infrastructure and the difficulties in prosecuting sabotage, analysts say that they are part of a worrying new security climate in frontline areas near Ukraine and Taiwan that could easily escalate in the coming years as Trump takes office.

“These hybrid tactics that we’re seeing from China and Russia are meant to create favorable conditions for them if an opening presents itself to carry out a larger move,” Sari Arho Havren, an associate fellow at London's Royal United Services Institute, told RFE/RL. “It seems there is also a desire to signal some red lines to Washington as Trump comes into office.”

A New Normal

While Trump has vowed to quickly end the war in Ukraine, the risk of tensions between Beijing and Taipei escalating into a conflict appears to be rising.

U.S. officials have warned in recent years that China is preparing for a potential invasion of Taiwan, a call echoed by Senator Marco Rubio, Trump’s pick for secretary of state, during his January 15 U.S. Senate confirmation hearing.

“We need to wrap our head around the fact that unless something dramatic changes, like an equilibrium [between China and Taiwan], where they conclude that the costs of intervening in Taiwan are too high, we're going to have to deal with this before the end of this decade," Rubio said.

Added to the rise in hybrid encounters and growing tensions is stepped-up military cooperation between Beijing and Moscow.

Recently, Chinese and Russian bombers have flown exercises near Alaska, conducted naval drills together off the coast of South Africa, and carried out live fire exercises in the South China Sea.

The joint war games are part of a pattern of more than a decade of enhanced military coordination and one of the more visible expressions of Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s alignment, which is held together by a shared desire to counterbalance the United States.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington-based think tank, has recorded 102 joint war games, multilateral military drills, or patrols from 2003 to the end of July 2024. Since then, an additional four exercises involving China and Russia have occurred. According to CSIS data, their militaries held at least four and as many as 10 joint drills each year between 2014 and 2023. The two countries carried out 11 exercises together in 2024.

U.S. policymakers have repeatedly warned in recent years about the risks posed by China and Russia’s growing partnership -- from economic support to growing military cooperation -- with one congressionally mandated report describing China and Russia’s deepening alignment as “the most significant strategic development in recent years.”

“As a military planner, you need to prepare for the worst-case scenario, which is Russia and China teaming up in a major way,” said Elizabeth Wishnick, a senior researcher at the Center for Naval Analyses who studies Chinese foreign policy.

Taken together, the trend raises difficult questions for the Trump administration and other U.S. policymakers who have long factored how to deal with each nuclear-armed power separately, but now must plan for the risk of dealing with both, especially how China and Russia could act together in any potential future conflict in Europe or the Asia-Pacific.

“It’s still unclear how this would all play out and this isn’t a true military alliance,” said Wishnick. “But within the contours of where Beijing and Moscow like their cooperation to be, it’s growing.”

An attendant walks past EU and China flags ahead of the EU-China High-level Economic Dialogue in Beijing in 2020.
An attendant walks past EU and China flags ahead of the EU-China High-level Economic Dialogue in Beijing in 2020.

Welcome back to the China In Eurasia briefing, an RFE/RL newsletter tracking China's resurgent influence from Eastern Europe to Central Asia.

I'm RFE/RL correspondent Reid Standish and here's what I'm following right now.

A Warning From The Baltics

Former Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis offered a clear warning for those who say that China is able to mediate an end to the war in Ukraine.

Finding Perspective: Speaking to the French international affairs outlet Geopolitique.eu, Landsbergis stamped down the idea.

“China is waiting for a moment of weakness to step in and offer ‘solutions’ and I fear that some in Europe would accept this offer because it’s a cheap alternative to us stepping up, in the same way that you buy a Chinese car because it’s cheaper. The same goes for their peace proposals.”

Landsbergis was commenting on a recent interview with outgoing U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and The New York Times, where Blinken said that one of the reasons that Moscow had not escalated into a nuclear war in Ukraine was because of China.

“If you follow that line of reasoning, it means that China has become a protector of Europe. That would be the beginning of a new paradigm,” Landsbergis said.

“If we accept that China, which in my view supports Russia and is therefore an adversary of the countries supporting Ukraine, is now the guarantor of nuclear deterrence on our continent, it would be a dangerous mistake and a failure.”

Why It Matters: Landsbergis’s warning comes as U.S. President-elect Donald Trump takes office and Europe anxiously looks at a very different geopolitical reality.

Trump’s tariff threats and less traditional approach to Washington’s relationship with Europe is a source of consternation in European capitals and there is talk in some corners about having a more amenable position toward Beijing to balance the Trump administration.

On January 14, Chinese leader Xi Jinping spoke with European Council President Antonio Costa to begin what many analysts believe will be a charm offensive from Beijing toward the continent.

But while Trump may have a rockier relationship with Brussels and various capitals than his predecessor, Beijing is also facing a different playing field than when U.S. President Joe Biden took office.

China’s support for Russia amid the war in Ukraine has strained ties with Europe, and Brussels is taking aim at Chinese companies in some sectors, a trend that looks set to continue.

EU High Representative Kaja Kallas has also voiced strong criticism of China, especially for its stance around the war in Ukraine and its long-term repercussions.

Landsbergis shared similar sentiments, saying that “Ukraine is central to what will happen in the future” between China and Taiwan.

“I mentioned earlier that [Russian President Vladimir] Putin has managed to change the nuclear doctrine by getting us to accept, at least for now, that resisting an attack is a form of escalation and therefore a nuclear strike is justified.”

“One can imagine a situation where China imposes a blockade, even a partial one, on Taiwan and they resist and we try to lift it, then China could use the Russian playbook,” he said. “I don’t think we collectively understand how reckless it is.”

Three more stories from Eurasia

1. The Taliban Courts Chinese Capital

My Afghan colleagues at RFE/RL's Radio Azadi and I reported about a new road built by the Taliban in northeast Afghanistan that the hardline group is hoping can better connect the country to neighboring China.

The Details: The first section of the road in the Wakhan Corridor was completed a year ago in early 2024, and the Taliban is looking to build out the connections further to one day open up more trade with China.

The road link is part of a series of announcements and groundbreaking ceremonies in 2024 -- from oil deals to mining rights -- that the Taliban are hoping will keep moving ahead in the coming year.

But the main questions remain over whether the militants can finally calm China's long-standing security concerns.

Haiyun Ma, an associate professor at Frostburg University, told me that, despite the lofty deals, Chinese investment is still not flowing in Afghanistan and that there are growing frustrations under the surface between Beijing and the Taliban.

Ma says that the announcement in 2024 helps bring prestige and legitimacy to the Taliban as it adapts to governing and that it offers a low-risk, low-commitment way for Beijing to signal long-term intent toward the country.

But he adds that China is in no hurry to have a footprint in Afghanistan.

China is yet to set up a border crossing in the area where the Wakhan road leads and despite all the resource deals, Beijing has plenty of already developed alternatives elsewhere in the world to help meet its domestic needs.

2. Trump, Greenland, China, And The Arctic

Incoming U.S. President Donald Trump has once again kicked up a storm by refusing to rule out the use of force to gain control of Greenland.

As my colleague Todd Prince writes, Trump’s pursuit shines a light on the complicated national-security picture in the Arctic between the United States, China, Russia, and other players.

What You Need To Know: While China is not an Arctic nation, it is seeking to be a major player in the region. In recent years, Beijing has sought to buy ports, other infrastructure, and mining rights on Greenland though it has not been successful.

Todd writes that the United States suspected China's real interest in those projects was to place dual-use sensors and radars in the Arctic Circle to help control their military satellites and gather intelligence on U.S. space-based operations in the region.

3. U.S. Energy Sanctions Hurt Chinese, Indian Purchases Of Russian Oil

Chinese and Indian refiners are looking for new fuel supplies as they adapt to hard-hitting new U.S. sanctions on Russian oil producers and tankers.

What It Means: Many of the newly sanctioned tankers brought oil to China and India, and both Bloomberg and Reuters reported that the sanctions have led to a jump in prices and driven Chinese refiners back to sellers of oil that is not restricted.

The sanctions were announced on January 10 and they target Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas, two of Russia's five largest largest oil producers, as well as 183 vessels transporting Russian oil and oil products to foreign markets.

The Biden administration also sanctioned “opaque” traders of Russian oil, more than 30 Russia-based oil-field service providers, and more than a dozen leading Russian energy officials and executives.

The Chinese refiner Yulong Petrochemical has previously bought Russian crude, but, according to industry data, it purchased 4 million barrels of crude from the United Arab Emirates following the sanctions.

After the sanctions announcement, Unipec, a subsidiary of China’s state-owned energy giant Sinopec, booked four large carriers of crude from the Middle East which the data intelligence firm Kpler said could carry a total of up to 2 million barrels.

Across The Supercontinent

Kyiv’s China Consultations: Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry told RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service that 2024 was a year of “developing” political dialogue in Beijing, pointing to the extensive high-level talks with their counterparts in the Chinese Foreign Ministry.

Ukrainian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Heorhiy Tykhyi added that Kyiv considers China one of the countries that can and does have influence on the Russian Federation. And we will continue to maintain this contact with the Chinese side.”

Parting Shots: In a speech at the State Department on January 13 summing up his administration’s record, Biden said the United States has widened its lead over competitors like Russia and China.

"Our adversaries are weaker than they were when we came into this job four years ago. Let's consider Russia. Putin invaded Ukraine. He thought he'd conquer Kyiv in a matter of days. But the truth is, since that war began, I'm the only one that stood in the center of Kyiv, not him," Biden said, referring to his visit to the embattled nation last year.

The China Connection: As Russian forces have intensified their advances in eastern Ukraine in recent weeks, they're being helped by a new tool on the battlefield: drones that fly with the use of fiber-optic cables, RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service and I reported.

Some Ukrainian experts have said that the drone models used by Russia are very similar to China’s commercially available Skywalker drone. There are also growing reports in Ukrainian media of high-quantity orders being placed at Chinese factories by Russian companies for large spools of fiber-optic cables.

One Thing To Watch

Trade between China and Russia reached a record high in 2024, according to official data released on January 13 by China’s General Administration of Customs.

The figures show how Beijing and Moscow’s efforts to strengthen their relationship are paying off in the face of tough Western economic sanctions on Russia.

While the 2024 trade data reached an all-time high, the year-on-year growth rate slowed significantly compared to the 26.3 percent surge seen in 2023.

That’s all from me for now. Don’t forget to send me any questions, comments, or tips that you might have.

Until next time,

Reid Standish

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your inbox every other Wednesday.

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About The Newsletter

In recent years, it has become impossible to tell the biggest stories shaping Eurasia without considering China’s resurgent influence in local business, politics, security, and culture.

Subscribe to this weekly dispatch in which correspondent Reid Standish builds on the local reporting from RFE/RL’s journalists across Eurasia to give you unique insights into Beijing’s ambitions and challenges.

To subscribe, click here.

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